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This is the fourth volume of the book series ”Logic and the Philosophy
of Time”. As in earlier volumes, the main focus is on the beginnings
as well as the further development of modern tense logic. However, in
the present volumemost of the papers also consider basic metaphysical
questions related to time, logic, and modality.
In most cases, earlier versions of the papers in the volume have been
presented at the conference “TheMetaphysics of Time”, at Aalborg Uni-
versity, Denmark, 19st-21st March 2019. Following that event, the au-
thors have been given the chance to improve their papers based on the
discussions at the conference and the suggestions in the peer reviews.
As Peter Øhrstrøm argues in his paper “From A-time to B-time:
Prior’s journey there and back again”, A.N. Prior’s life from his child-
hood to his death in 1969 can be conceived as a metaphysical journey.
From the belief in free choice as a Methodist in his childhood, he as
a teenager moved on to Calvinistic determinism and rejection of free-
will, and at the age of 40 he introduced a brand new paradigm based
7
on free choice, indeterminism and a tensed view of time. As argued by
Øhrstrøm, all the papers in the present volume can somehow be related
to important topics and questions which Prior had to deal with on his
life-long, metaphysical journey.
Prior was not only a highly qualified philosopher and an outstand-
ing logician, but he also involved himself in a series of public debates
as a public philosopher. In his essay “The Public Prior: A.N. Prior
as (relocated 17th & 18th century) Public Intellectual 1945-1952”, Mike
Grimshaw argues that this activity can be viewed as a continuation of
his public voice as religious journalist.
There can be no doubt that Prior’s views on time, logic andmodality
over the years were closely related to his religious and existential views.
In his paper “Dispelling the Freudian Specter: A.N. Prior’sDiscussion of
Religion in 1943”, David Jakobsen considers Prior’s metaphysical world
view and his correspondencewithKarl Popper about relevant aspects of
faith and unbelief. In their joint paper ‘On Prior’s “Logic of theWord of
God”, David Jakobsen and Hans Götzsche consider Prior’s early paper
‘The Analogy of Faith’, seeking out productive insights which it offers
into Prior’s view on logic.
One of the things that made Prior so influential was his ability to co-
operate with others. He maintained an extensive correspondence and
was quick to realize the potential of ideas suggested by his fellow lo-
gicians and philosophers. In many cases he would develop such ideas
much further, whilst carefully acknowledging their original authors. As
argued in the paper “Early Prior on the Nature of Modality: Debates
with Łukasiewicz” by Aneta Markoska-Cubrinovska and Zuzana Ry-
baříková, Prior adopted the formalism and proof theory of Jan Łukasie-
wicz, although Prior disagreed with Łukasiewicz’ view on modality. In
his development of so-called hybrid Priorwas able to benefit fromhis co-
operation with Carew Meredith, who introduced the notion of ‘world
propositions’ in 1953. As pointed out in Per Hasle’s paper “The Begin-
nings of Hybrid Logic: Meredith, Prior and the Contingent Constant n”,
Meredith’s 1953 note laid the earliest (albeit rudimentary) foundation
of hybrid logic, and Prior later decisively improved this early notion of
world propositions.
Prior vigorously argued for a tensed view of time. However, he was
not the first modern philosopher to do so. Other thinkers much earlier
made similar points. As pointed out in Florian Fischer’s paper “Prior
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to Prior”, Moritz Schlick made the case for indispensable A-sentences
25 years prior to Prior. Prior himself also referred to much earlier work
(1908) by McTaggart, which in spite of imperfections contains impor-
tant and fundamental observations in this respect. Such forerunners
notwithstanding, Prior was the first philosopher to develop full-fledged
logical systems based on the tensed view of time, and thus stands as
the founder not only of modern tense-logic but also of so-called hybrid
logic.
Prior found his tense-logical view of time challenged by relativistic
physics. In her paper “Arthur Prior and Special Theory of Relativity:
Two Standpoints from the Nachlass “, Julie Lundbak Kofod explores
the evolution of Prior’s views on the special theory of relativity. She
compares and contrasts the views expressed in Prior’s early reactions
with his mature views, which were most fully expressed in Past, Present
and Future (1967).
In their joint paper “Letters betweenMary and Arthur Prior in 1954:
Topics onMetaphysics and Time”, David Jakobsen, Peter Øhrstrøm and
Martin Prior discuss correspondence between Mary and Arthur Prior
and betweenArthur Prior and J.J.C. Smart from 1954 on five topics: free-
dom, abstract entities, modal logic, religion and theology and finally the
logic of time. The paper argues that the logic of time was formulated in
the context of reflections on the first four of these.
Clearly, Prior’s tensed view of time can still be analysed in a meta-
physical and also religious manner. In his paper “Time, tense, and eter-
nity”, W.L. Craig argues that if we are to understand divine eternity,
we must first settle the question of the tenseless vs. tensed theory of
time. In his other paper in the volume “Legal pardon, tensed time, and
the expiation of guilt”, Craig deals with topics at the intersection of the-
ology, philosophy of law, and philosophy of time. In particular, he ex-
plores the relation between legal pardon, tensed time, and the expiation
of guilt.
The following three papers all deal with conceptions of presentism.
In his paper “Future Bias and Presentism”, Sayid R. Bnefsi has sug-
gested an account of what some call “future bias”, according to which
there is a preference for certain tensed truths properly relativized to the
present. Furthermore, Bnefsi has demonstrated the compatibility of this
notion with presentism.
In his “Fatalism for Presentists”, David P. Hunt considers Prior’s
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view that presentism offers some obvious grounds for denying divine
foreknowledge of future contingents. Hunt argues that this view is not
tenable, or in the very least not cogent. On the other hand, he finds
that the recent foreknowledge debate has shown that Prior was right in
insisting that the idea of future contingent truth can well be challenged.
In his paper “A defence of presentism against the Rietdijk-Putnam-
Penrose argument”, Atle Søvik considers the problems arising from the
theories of relativity with regard to presentism and touches upon the
block universe perspective. Søvik offers a defence of presentism against
such a line of argumentation.
Elton Marques in his paper “Eternalism, hybrid models and strong
change” argues that eternalism in the block universe conception is com-
patible with change. In fact, Marques shows that what he calls ‘strong
change’ can in principle be introduced in an eternalistic model.
The following three papers in the volumedealwith problems related
to the open future and branching time. In her paper “Living in a World
of Possibilities: Real Possibility, Possible Worlds, and Branching Time”,
Antje Rumberg introduces a notion of so-called real possibility. She ar-
gues that real possibilities—as temporal alternatives for actuality—are
most adequately represented in Prior’s theory of branching time.
In their paper “Perspectival Semantics and the Open Future”, Ciro
De Florio and Aldo Frigerio offer a perspectival temporal semantics, in
which propositions are evaluated with respect to two indexes: the time
of evaluation and the time of the perspective. It turns out that this sug-
gestion is very promising in relation to the foreknowledge problem.
In his paper “History relativism as extreme assessment relativism: A
note on Prior’s Ockhamism”, Jacek Wawer introduces a doomsday ex-
tension of a branching model, and he proves that history-relative truth
in any given model is equivalent to doomsday-relative truth in the ex-
tended model. It turns out that this equivalence holds in general only if
the end of time is also, in a sense, beyond time.
In their paper, “Some Remarks on Hybrid Modal Logic with Propo-
sitional Quantifiers”, Patrick Blackburn, Torben Braüner and Julie Lund-
bak Kofod have offered an conceptual and formal analysis of Prior’s
instant-propositions as well as other nominals in modern hybrid logic.
They have shown that the two intuitions of instants suggested by Prior,
the index view and the content view, correspond to two different inter-
pretations of propositional quantifiers.
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In his paper “Modeling Decision in a Temporal Context: Analysis
of a Famous Example Suggested by Blaise Pascal”, Ola Hössjer offers
a study of the temporal aspects of the decision between two mutually
exclusive alternatives available for an unknown period of time. The pri-
mary example is taken from Pascal, but Hössjer’s model is in fact a gen-
eral approach to decision making in a temporal context.
In his paper “Counterfactuals and Irrelevant Semifactuals”, Lars
Gundersen offers an analysis of some basic problems regarding the se-
mantics of counterfactuals in terms of a notion of relevance. However,
Gundersen shows that when we try to handle the notion of relevance
formally, we can easily get into trouble because of some very counterin-
tuitive consequences. This calls for further research in order to come up
with a satisfactory notion of relevance.
Acknowledgements
Wewant to thank the personswho have contributed to the various parts
of this book. We want to thank Dr. Martin Prior for the permission to
use a drawing by his mother, Dr. Mary Prior, for the book cover. Fur-
thermore, we also thank the Danish Council for Independent Research,
for making this book possible.
11
12
From A-time to B-time: Prior’s
journey there and back again
Peter Øhrstrøm
Aalborg University, Denmark
poe@hum.aau.dk
Abstract
A.N. Prior developed his famous tense-logical paradigm during a period
of 15 years (1954-1969). However, it turns out that this work was done
under the influence of a long struggle with scientific, philosophical and
theological problems regarding time and reality. During his childhood,
it was generally taken for granted that we can to some extent make free
choices. However, when Prior was16 years old he wrote three booklets in
which he rejected free-will and defended a kind of determinism related
to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. He held on to this view for
almost two decades, although he went through periods of doubt during
which he felt that his world-view was challenged. In 1954 he finally left
determinism and embraced a tense-logical account of indeterminism, pre-
sentism and change. In terms of McTaggart’s A- and B-series this means
that Prior as a teenager left the A-theoretical approach to time and reality
which had dominated his childhood, and furthermore that after several
years as a B-theorist he returned to a logically elaboratedA-theory of time
and reality. Prior’s long metaphysical journey made it possible for him to
suggest a tense-logical paradigm that reaches far beyond his ownmodels
and theories.
Keywords: A-time; B-time; determinism; free choice; Prior; Einstein; Berg-
son.
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1 Introduction
A.N. Prior (1914-69) contributed significantly to the development of the
modern philosophy of time. In fact, his focus on the importance of the
tenses has given rise to a new and powerful paradigm for the study
of time. Prior insisted on the reality of the distinction between past,
present, and future, and he demonstrated how the temporal aspects
of reality can be treated formally in terms of tense-logic. He showed
how ideas of presentism, branching time and instant propositions can
be treated in terms of formal logic. Prior developed this famous tense-
logical paradigm during a period of about 15 years (1954-69). However,
recent research into the unpublished works of A.N. Prior makes it clear
that his remarkable tense-logical approach should be understood in the
light of a much longer struggle with scientific, metaphysical and the-
ological questions concerning time and reality. Actually, this struggle
began when he was a teenager!
Prior was brought up in a Methodist home in which the importance
of free choicewas emphasized. It was believed that the individual has to
make significant decisions for himself. The most crucial decision in life,
of course, would have to do with conversion and becoming a Christian
believer. In the Methodist Church, young people were strongly encour-
aged to make this crucial decision as a personal step into the Christian
belief. Prior presented his father as an Arminian, i.e., a defender of the
viewgoing back to theDutch theologian JacobusArminius (1560–1609),
according to whom man’s free-will is compatible with the doctrine of
God’s sovereignty. According to this view a person can actually decide
freely to become a Christian. In this way, a conversion should be seen
as a result of a free choice.
Much later Mary Prior noted, looking back, that Arthur never had
any experience of a conversion of that kind and probably did not find
that he needed one (in personal communication). Anthony Kenny has
made a similar point in his account of Prior’s rejection of his earlier de-
nomination:
He became dissatisfied with Methodism, finding its theol-
ogy too unsystematic, and disliking its stress on the felt ex-
perience of conversion. (Kenny, p. 322)
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2 Rejection of the reality of free-will and
becoming
As a teenager Prior became a Calvinist and rejected that there could
ever be any free decisions at all. It has recently been discovered that
Prior wrote three booklets during September and October in 1931 when
he was just 16 years old. In these booklets he rejected his earlier beliefs
in free-will and in becoming as a fundamental aspect of reality. Instead,
he defended the view that the world is fixed and determined — a view
Prior related to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination.
With his booklets Prior apparently wanted to formulate an account
of his newworld-view. At that time, he was preparing for his final exam
from Wairarapa High School in Masterton. He based his presentation
on the knowledge he had obtained from literature, religion and science.
This led him to writing the three booklets: Essays Literary, Essays Re-
ligious, and Essays Scientific. The first is in private possession in New
Zealand, whereas the latter two have been donated to the Bodleian Li-
brary in Oxford as part of the Ann Prior Collection. Prior’s Essays have
recently been edited and published in (Jakobsen et al. 2020).
In his essays Prior clearly tried to integrate religious and theologi-
cal thought with current scientific and philosophical ideas. As noted by
Jack Copeland (2020) Prior, in his Essays Literary, even wanted to name
“the greatest thinkers the world has known”. A project of this kind is
obviously difficult, but Prior stated: “I have no hesitation in placing JE-
SUS OF NAZARETH at the top of this list” (Jakobsen et al. 2020, p. 49).
This clearly indicates that in the integration he was inclined to give the-
ological and religious thinking a key role.
Prior found that in integrating religious, philosophical and scientific
he thought the questions regarding the concept of time should be seen
as very important. There are various notes and addenda attached to the
Essays, and one of them is in fact entitled “Father Time”. In this note,
dated 1.8.31, Prior wrote:
Who shall contend with Time?” wrote Henry Kirke White
in 1805, and to anyone with a pretence of education it must
be obvious that the answer he intendedwas “Mach, Einstein,
Jeans, Whitehead and Bergson.
(“Father Time”, Prior’s Nachlass)
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Later in the same note Prior wrote:
In my young days, when I was green in judgement, I used
to style myself a Bergsonian, but now, philosophically speak-
ing, I prefer Einstein’s view, and try to paint on the tableau of
my mind his picture of Space-Time as a vast void wreathed
into the strange and shadowy shapes of stars and atoms and
life and humankind.
(“Father Time”, Prior’s Nachlass)
According to the young Prior there are two important views of the
temporal reality: one based on change and tense (Bergson) and one re-
ferring to a fixed structure of Space-Time (Einstein). It should be men-
tioned that the two positions correspond toMcTaggart’s A- and B-series,
although Prior did not use this reference before P.T. Geach convinced
him that he should do so; see (Prior 1967, p. vi).
It is obvious that Prior when writing in 1931 still found Bergson’s
views interesting:
Even more importance is attached to Time by the great
French philosopher, Henri Louis Bergson, who holds that to
argue about the nature of Time is futile, for Time is the only
thing which exists, andMatter, Mind and Spirit are alike but
aspects of it. Time, according to Bergson, is not just a sort of
abstract background against which events take place, but is
rather the one livingReality ofwhichwe are all but parts and
aspects. For Bergsonwe are all like ripples and eddies on the
streamof Time, a streamof “unceasing becoming, which pre-
serves the past and creates the future.”
(“Father Time”, Prior’s Nachlass)
Here Prior quotes fromH.Wildon Carr’s book on Bergson’s philoso-
phy of time (Carr 1911, p. 15). According to this view, the proper under-
standing of time depends on change and becoming. It is not just “a sort
of abstract background against which events take place”, but time is es-
sential for life and reality as such. This alsomeans that the tenses should
be taken into account. Prior presented his discussion of Bergson’s con-
ception of time in Essays Religious, in which he made the criticism that
Bergson fails to understand the importance of the permanent basis of
everything:
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Reason teaches us that, though changes occur, they occur ac-
cording to principles which do not change — that for all the
ever-changing appearances there must be some basis that is
permanent. But Bergson maintains that nothing is perma-
nent, and indeed that Change is one name for the funda-
mental Reality. Another name for this Reality is Duration,
or Time […] (Jakobsen et al. 2020, p. 216)
However, it seems that Prior’s main criticism of Bergson’s philoso-
phy of time has to do with the notion of free will. Whereas Bergson in-
sisted on somedegree of human freedomas crucial feature ofman, Prior
simply rejected this idea as being against the fundamental assumptions
of causality and determinism:
This belief […] has been revived in recent years by Henri
Louis Bergson, who applies the enticing term ‘creative’ to
actions performed independent of any guiding motive or
reason. What a lot of irresponsible maniacs we must be, to
be sure, if these people are right!
(Jakobsen et al. 2020, p. 216)
Prior’s earlier belief in human freedom probably has to do with his
religious upbringing in Methodism and Arminianism. In Essays Reli-
gious he strongly argued against Arminianism. In fact, he wrote the fol-
lowing dedication in the beginning of this booklet: “Dedicated to my
Father and other Arminians who will not agree with it.”
According to Prior modern Arminians may be divided into two
schools (Øhrstrøm et al. 2000, p. 210):
1. Those who hold that God’s control of the Universe is imperfect,
and that Change plays a considerable part in Nature’s workings.
2. Those who hold either that God does not exist or He is perpetu-
ally changing, or even that He is Himself Perpetual Change, and
believe in what they call “creative freedom”.
Prior mentioned Bergson as a representative of School 2, and in the
booklet Prior consequently rejected the Bergsonian beliefs in free-will
and in change as a fundamental aspect of reality. However, it seems
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that his main reason for this was religious. He pointed out that “if Berg-
son and his followers are right in saying that the fundamental Reality is
Change, the unchangeableness of God is also challenged” (Øhrstrøm et
al. 2000, p. 218). Prior certainly had to oppose that view.
Having rejected the Bergsonian and Arminian view of time, Prior
argued in favour of scientific determinism quoting the following claim
from Einstein:
Everything is determined, the beginning as well as the end,
by forces over which we have no control. It is determined
for the insect as well as the star. Human beings, vegetables
and cosmic dust, we all dance to a mysterious tune intoned
in the distance by an Invisible Piper.
(Øhrstrøm et al. 2000, p. 200)
Furthermore, Prior pointed out that according to Einstein events “do
not happen — we simply come across them” (Øhrstrøm et al. 2000,
p. 240). In his note dated 1.8.1931 and entitled “Father Time” Priormain-
tained that Einstein was a follower of Ernst Mach, who had “reduced
the concept of Time to a kind of meaningless figment of the imagina-
tion based on the observed succession of events”.
Prior found a similar account of determinism (andmaybe even some
kind of Predestination) in the works of Shelley. Prior quoted Shelley:
We live and move and think; but we are not the arbiters of
every motion of our own complicated nature; we are not the
masters of our own imagination andmoods of mental being.
There is a Power by which we are surrounded, like the atmo-
sphere in which some motionless lyre is suspended, which
visits with its breath our silent chords at will.
(Øhrstrøm et al. 2000, p. 137)
In this way Prior pointed out that both Shelley and Einstein – as
well as many others – have spoken convincingly in favour of a deter-
minism fully consistent with Calvinistic predestination. Such accounts
leave no room for human freedom. Furthermore, this view means that
time should be conceived as something fixed. It means that time is in
fact an “abstract background against which events take place” (to use
the expression Bergson strongly opposed). On this Einsteinian view
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the “passage of time” is not something real, but “just one of our many
delusive sense-impressions” and the distinction between past and fu-
ture is a mere “convention based on light-signals.” (Øhrstrøm et al.
2000, p. 241).
In his essays from 1931 Prior argued in favour of such an Einsteinian
view of time and reality. In his opinion Einsteinian determinism and
Calvinistic predestination should be understood as two approaches to
the same world-view according which time is an eternal structure that
leaves no room neither for free choice nor for becoming and change. It
is evident from his letters to Ursula Bethell (Grimshaw 2018), that he
remained dedicated to Calvinistic predestination and determinism dur-
ing the 1930s. Apparently, he even kept supporting this view most of
the time during the 1940s. However, his world-view was challenged
several times during the 1940’s. As Mary Prior remembered there was
something about his view that did not please him:
[…] it is true that Arthur was preoccupied by the problem
of free will. At first he saw it in a semi-theological context. I
have never felt quite sure how seriously Arthur really took
the Calvinism which intellectually attracted him. It was rig-
orous and logical, unlike the Methodism of his childhood.
But its God lacked humanity. I think sometimes he enter-
tained Calvinism in its various forms rather than quite be-
lieving it. He was very aware of the dilemmas it posed. Per-
haps his failure to resolve themwas a reason why despite so
muchpreparation the book on Scottish Theology never came
to anything. In his later work I think he was prepared to go
where logic led him, but the idea of the future as open to
choice, where the past and present were not, may also have
had deeper emotional attractions. But here I speculate.
(Mary Prior, 1997; quoted form (Prior 2003, pp. 301-302))
3 Return to a belief in the reality of tenses and
free choice
Prior’s metaphysical journey eventually resulted in the precise formu-
lation of his tense-logical views presented for the very first time at the
Second Philosophical Congress, held at Victoria University Wellington,
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New Zealand, on the 27th August, 1954. It is not clear what made him
change hismind. However, his interest in ethics and deontic logicmight
have made him rethink his view on free choice and reality, see (Jakob-
sen et al.; in this volume).
Prior was not the first to formulate a logic of time. As mentioned
in (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2019) an account of a logic of time had ear-
lier suggested by Jerzy Łoś, which was in fact recognized by Prior him-
self. Even the emphasis on the importance of tenses had been defended
by Moritz Schlick two decades before Prior’s findings; see (Fischer; in
this volume). However, as pointed out by Fischer Prior’s and Schlick’s
contexts differed a lot. Prior saw his tense-logic as a re-discovery of
medieval logic, and his approach was very systematical and general.
Furthermore, his ideas were presented in terms of a very powerful for-
malism. This still makes it reasonable to present Prior as the father of
modern tense-logic.
There can be no doubt that Prior in first presentation found a lot of
inspiration from modal logic and his studies of Polish Logic; see
(Markoska-Cubrinovska; Rybaříková; this volume). In his further de-
velopment of tense-logic he was clearly able to benefit from the close
co-operation with a number of fellow logicians, such as Carew Mered-
ith; see (Hasle; this volume).
Prior formulated his new tense-logical position in an undated paper,
“Some Free Thinking about Time”, which he never published:
So far, then, as I have anything that you could call a philo-
sophical creed, its first article is this: I believe in the reality
of the distinction between past, present, and future. I be-
lieve that what we see as a progress of events is a progress
of events, a coming to pass of one thing after another, and
not just a timeless tapestry with everything stuck there for
good and all […]
This belief, or prejudice of mine, is bound up with a belief
in real freedom. One of the big differences between the past
and the future is that once something has become past, it is,
as it were, out of our reach — once a thing has happened,
nothing we can do can make it not to have happened. But
the future is to some extent, even though it is only to a very
small extent, somethingwe canmake for ourselves. And this
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is a distinction which a tensless logic is unable to express.
(“Some Free Thinking about Time”, Prior’s Nachlass)
Prior’s long metaphysical journey took him from seeing time and
reality in the light of Bergsonian Arminianism to understanding it in
terms of a world-view based on Einsteinian determinism and Space-
Time Theory. Finally, his journey took him back again to the A-camp.
Like Bilbo in Tolkien’s Hobbit (1937), Prior returns from his journey
there and back again as a changed person. Like Bilbo, Prior comes back
with amuchwider outlook. He returned to the A-theoretical campwith
a revisedworld-viewmainly established through formal logic, which he
learned to use on his way as a great tool for anyone whowants to under-
stand reality better. Clearly, his approach to time and reality obtained
on the long journey is consistent with essential parts of Bergson’s philos-
ophy of time. However, Prior did not return to his earlier Bergsonian
position, but to a rather different view. The difference is mainly that
whereas Bergson’s own philosophy remained rather informal and ten-
tative, Prior formulated his philosophy of time in terms of formal logic.
With his tense-logic Prior was able to offer a formal account the basic
flux and flow of things which Bergson referred to in his philosophy of
time. In his printed papers and books Prior did not refer to Bergson,
since wanted to support an A-theoretical approach very different from
Bergson’s. In an unpublished note Prior wrote:
Perhaps you could call my logic a mixture of Frege and Koła-
kowski. — I want to join the formal rigorism of the one with
the vitalism of the other. Perhaps you regard this as a bas-
tard mixture — a mésalliance. — I think it is a higher syn-
thesis. And I think it important that people who care for
rigorism and formalism should not leave the basic flux and
flow of things in the hands of existentialists and Bergsoni-
ans and others who love darkness rather than light, but we
should enter this realm of life and time, not to destroy it, but
to master it with our techniques.
(“A wants me to relativize my tenses to dates”, Unpub-
lished note, Prior’s Nachlass)
Prior ended up rejecting Calvinism as his personal view. In partic-
ular, he rejected Calvinistic Predestination and determinism. On the
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other hand, it is obvious that he was able to benefit from religious stud-
ies even after he had left active Church life; see (Jakobsen; Jakobsen and
Götzsche; in this volume).
Theway Prior handledwhat he conceived as Einstein’s determinism
was rather complicated. His paper, “Some Free Thinking about Time”,
contains some critical remarks on the view of time that follows from
Einstein’s theory of relativity. This criticism is apparently rather early
and unfinished. This may have been Prior’s reason for choosing not to
publish the paper. On the other hand, he knew that he had to discuss the
relations between tense-logic and relativity, and in his most important
book, Past, Present and Future (1967, p. 203-205), there is a much more
mature account of the relativity in terms of tense-logic. It should be
added that the topic of relativistic physics seen in the light of time and
tense is still being discussed; see (Søvik; Kofod; in this volume).
Prior’smetaphysical journey shows that the tense-logic he suggested
is not just a nice and practical formalism. Prior showed that tense-logic
provides a rather strong argument demonstrating that it is possible to
defend a view of time and reality based on indeterminism in a formal
and precise manner. In fact, it is even possible to model free-choice and
decision-making within a general temporal framework; see e.g. (Höss-
jer; in this volume). Obviously, according to such a model our present
beliefs and expectation regarding the future are seen as very different
from our present relations to past experiences. When he became an in-
determinist, Prior insisted that this asymmetry between the past and
the future is essential for a proper understanding of reality. Clearly,
this means seeing tenses as something real. This approach turns out to
be extremely relevant within the modern philosophy of time in general.
Even inmodern analytic theology it is possible to benefit from the tense-
logical approach to time and reality; see e.g. (Craig; in this volume).
The tense-logical approach also makes it evident that there are sev-
eral ways to carry out a project of this kind. The very precise tense-
logical formalism suggested by Prior makes it possible to specify a vari-
ety of different models of the temporal world. For this reason, it would
be fair to say that the tense-logical approach is a paradigm of investi-
gation rather than just a single theory; see for instance (Hunt; Marques;
Bnefsi; Florio & Frigerio; Wawer, Rumberg, Gundersen; in this volume).
Actually, Prior himself presented four “grades of tense-logical involve-
ment” (Prior 2003, p. 117 ff). Personally, he preferred the fourth grade.
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However, hewas verymuch aware of the fact that fellow logiciansmight
see some of the other possibilities within branching time semantics as
more attractive. In Prior’s opinion, the choice between the various pos-
sibilities has to be made on the basis of what he called ‘the choice of the
soul’. In his own words:
In doingmetaphysics there is still no substitute for ‘the choice
of the soul’; or, if you like, prejudice. (Prior 2003, p. 284)
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Abstract
This essay considers an eight-year periodwhen Prior was involved in a se-
ries of public debates as a public philosopher. I argue this can be viewed
as a continuation of his public voice as religious journalist. What is in-
teresting is Prior’s choice of the medium of public periodicals to express
and develop the transition in his thought to the wider, educated general
public of New Zealand. This was carried out in three main journals, all
published in New Zealand: the Student Christian Movement’s Student;
Landfall, a quarterly of literature, the arts and culture; and theNewZealand
Listener, the weekly magazine modelled on the British title of the same
name. As Mary Prior notes, in post-war New Zealand not only was ‘ev-
eryone catching up on lost years’, but also the limited resources of tertiary
education at the timemeant Prior ‘lived isolated from other philosophers,
save by letter’(Hasle et al. 1997/2003, p. 294, 295).
Keywords: Public intellectual, religious education, ethics, Karl Popper,
C.S. Lewis, moral philosophy.
1 Introduction
Arthur Prior was a man of varied interests, and, it could be said, varied
careers. As is well documented, Prior originally attended the University
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of Otago in Dunedin as a medical student but soon changed his stud-
ies to Philosophy and Psychology (gaining a BA). In 1935 he enrolled
as a Theological student, training for the ministry of the Presbyterian
Church. The common tale is that Professor J.N. Findlay’s influence lured
Prior from theology and training for the ministry to the world of Philos-
ophy. Yet the reality is not so clear. As has been noted (Grimshaw 2002;
Grimshaw 2018), Prior’s transition was not so smooth — nor as influ-
enced by Findlay as he and others would later claim. The influence of
J.M. Bates, the Presbyterian clergyman, theologian and in the 1930’s, co-
founder of The New Zealand Journal of Theology (1931-35) for whomPrior
wrote was, it can be argued, just as formative. Bates not only provided
(with the Calvin scholar and clergyman) J.M. Steele an outlet for local
theological thinking, hewas also the acting head of Philosophy at Otago
University in 1933 and so provided amodel for Prior that straddled both
theology and philosophy. Likewise, Prior did not just abandon theolog-
ical study and immerse himself into philosophy; nor does it seem that it
was a matter of disbelieving in theology and now believing in philoso-
phy (Hasle 1997b). Until the early years of World War II, Prior strongly
considered a career as a religious journalist writing widely on theology
and contemporary Christianity, especially when travelling and living
on the Continent and in England with his first wife Clare (Grimshaw
2018).
When in 1946 Prior did take up a position teaching philosophy at
Canterbury University College, Christchurch, he continued to write on
religious issues. In fact, it could be argued that the decisive turns were
the loss of books and notes in two house fires— the second in 1949 dam-
aging a manuscript (or rather notes) on a history of Scottish theology1
and destroying further material – and the publication in that same year
of his first text Logic and the Basis of Ethics (1949a) (Hasle et al. 1997/2003,
p. 295).
The circumstances of Prior’s move from theological study into firstly
religious journalism and then philosophy, has tended to be read as if
embodying a modernist sense of inevitability and scientific enlighten-
ment. Yet there exists a document that challenges this history of either
a smooth transition or a sudden turn to philosophy via what is set out
1The first section of the ‘ms’ comprised notes that were used in Prior’s ”Adam Gib
and the Philosophers”, Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, vol. 26 (1948b),
pp. 73-93.
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the 1942 ‘crisis of faith’ diary entry (Jakobsen 2016). In August 1936
Prior wrote to the Convenor of the Theological Hall committee asking
for his name to be ‘definitely’ crossed off the list of Theological Hall stu-
dents. What makes this letter important for revising common histories
of Prior is the statement: ‘The course of my personal life has broughtme
to a crisis in the past fewmonths.’ This is his meeting and falling in love
with the journalist Clare Hunter (around June 1936); by the end of the
second term of 1936 he had moved out of Knox College, where he had
lived since 1932, and married Clare on 27 August 1936 (two weeks after
sending his letter to the Hall Convenor) (Grimshaw 2018, pp. 19-20, 23,
93). As a result Prior has:
[…] come to doubt very seriously my vocation to the min-
istry. Neither my desire to serve the Church nor my interest
in theology has dimmed this year, but I have become more
and more convinced that I am not cut out for the work and
the life of the regular ministry. (Prior 1936 [italics added])
Theology students had to gain the approval of the Theological Hall
Committee to marry, and there was little chance that the politically and
socially radical Clare Hunter would have been considered a suitable
minister’s wife — nor that she would wish to take on such a role.
However, we also need to understand this letter to the Hall Con-
venor in the light of the letter Prior wrote to the poet Ursula Bethell
concerning his marriage and future plans. In late July 1936, Prior not
only informs Bethell that he and Clare “are going to get quietly mar-
ried” by the end of the year but that they aim to “depart for England to
earn our living as best we may by free-lance writing of various kinds.”
While the outcomes of this are increasingly well-known to Prior schol-
ars, it is the following statement that helps us understand his transition:
“[…] instead of my theologizing from pulpit or lecture-hall, I shall do
it, like Coleridge, on paper and in conversation”; and he adds a foot-
note comment “I have hopes of ending up eventually as the editor of a
religious periodical” (Grimshaw 2018, p. 93).
The reply from the Convenor is sympathetic, noting the Commit-
tee’s acceptance ‘with regret.’ While this is a stock phrase and can be
excused as niceties, the Rev. David Herron’s further comments also sig-
nal awider understanding that Prior’smove from study for theministry
was not a move from the wider work of the church and theology:
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However, if you feel that this is not the lifework towhich you
have been called you are wise to withdraw at this stage. No
man could be more unhappy than one in the ministry who
felt it was not his vocation. I trust that you will find your
right niche and that you will be able, without actually being in
the ministry, to make a valuable contribution to the work of
Christ and His Church. (Herron 1936 [italics added])
These two letters2 are important not only for revising the current
view of Prior’s transition from Religion to Philosophy, but they also
help us understandwhyhe seemed to undergowhat, in JackCopeland’s
phrase, is his ‘bohemian wanderings’ in Europe (Copeland 1996, 2020).
Both Prior and Herron (and by implication the Theological Hall Com-
mittee) seem aware of the fact that Prior, whilst removing himself from
clerical activity, will continue to act within a type of Christian world
and activity. Prior continued to be an active member of the Student
Christian Movement, writing regularly for its publication the Student;
he also attended St Andrew’s Presbyterian Church in Dunedin after
his withdrawal from the Theological Hall. Therefore, the change from
Theology to Philosophy is not one of doubts of faith and intellectual
questioning (the most common reasons to withdraw) but rather one oc-
casioned by personal circumstances. It could be argued that a statement
in 1936 has little relevance for what Prior began to undertake in public
life almost a decade later; furthermore, during these years he divorced,
remarried, gave up his pacifism, joined the air force and served overseas,
went through a period of atheism and returned to Christianity, and then
transitioned into the university. Yet throughout this time, the one con-
stant in Prior’s life was his writing, for publication, on theological and
religious matters. Prior may have read a great deal of philosophy, but
until he began teaching at Canterbury he wrote a great deal on theol-
ogy. We also need to remember that the Minister in the Presbyterian
church is also ‘a teaching elder’; the sermon, not a mass or eucharist is
the centre of the Sundayworship. Prior’s “right niche […]without actu-
ally being in the ministry” would appear to have been as type of public
intellectual teaching elder “theologizing […] on paper and in conversa-
2My thanks to Jane Bloore of PCANZ archives, Knox College, Dunedin for finding
these letters when I contacted the archives for information on Prior’s writings in church
journals.
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tion.” As a further example of what is being claimed here, it has also
just recently come to light that for some time from the late 1940s to the
early 1950s Prior was also writing a column in the New Zealand Presby-
terian weekly the Outlook under the pseudonym ‘Napthali’ (one of the
Tribes of Israel). This is described as “a column of answers to questions
on theological or ecclesiastical matters which were purported to have
been sent in by readers” (McEldowney 1966, p. 38).3 So here is Prior,
undertaking another type of public intellectual sermonizing, using the
Outlook as one of his pulpits.
This preamble is important for contextualizing Prior’s later burst
as a public intellectual, not only because much of the content revolves
around religious issues, but also because his involvement, in this period,
arises from a timewhen he is teaching philosophy at CanterburyUniver-
sity College. Prior’s public face is exercised in what, it can be argued, is
a last attempt at a form of public, non-ordained ministry, that both pre-
dates and follows his period of atheism as expressed in his diary entry
of 1942 (Jakobsen 2016).
This attitude of being a public intellectualwho is also a public theolo-
gian can be discerned in an article Prior wrote for the Outlook, in 1941,
having returned to New Zealand in November 1940. Entitled ”Some
Mail Gone Missing” (Prior 1941) Prior addresses the issue of how the
Church could implement a social voice by ensuring the “ecclesiastical
machinery” of theChurch could get the effects of decisionsmade “down
to our congregations and parishes, to the people it really concerns, and
getting it pressed on this man and that?” (Prior 1941, p. 10). Taking
as his example a letter written to the London Times by various church
leaders in England, “solemnly renouncing, in the name of the Christian
Church, the evil of racial discrimination and the colour bar”4, Prior asks
if such a process is really the most successful or appropriate? (Prior
1941, p. 10). Does it, he asks, change the attitudes of those in London
“refusing to have Negro air wardens” or Christchurch (New Zealand)
landladies knitting for missions “but refusing to let Chinese visit their
tenants” or those soldiers on the streets in Wellington “shouting insults
3For a discussion of this column; seeGrimshaw, “Prior as ‘Napthali’” (forthcoming).
4In February 1939, in a letter to Bethell, Prior had expressed his distaste (“it’s hard
to stomach to say the least”) of expressions of “this abominable race prejudice” he and
Clare noted while in Britain (Grimshaw 2018, pp. 202-203).
29
at a white woman for being seen there with her Chinese husband,5
and to legislators responsible for immigration regulations?” (Prior 1941,
p. 10). The problem is what could be termed a lapse in logic, in that the
letter’s signatories intended the public letter to be also a personal one
to each of these individuals “just as if it had his name and address on
it” but “the letter hasn’t been delivered to him (at all events, its deliv-
ery is improbable)” (Prior 1941, p. 10). Prior’s solution, arising out of
his interest in the Scottish reformers, is to firstly consider how things
might have proceeded in 17th century Scotland. Here Church ratifica-
tion would have been swift; letters would have been sent to all presby-
terieswith calls for a public fast “for the sin of racial discrimination” and,
importantly “the unchristian character of such discrimination being ex-
plained, and difficulties answered, in a paper giving the ‘Reasons for
a Fast’” (Prior 1941, p. 10). This would have been followed by Church
disciplinary action (warnings, and if necessary, excommunication) and
Parliament being “pestered” by the Church to take appropriate action,
this all only taking “atmost amonth or two to swing into action through-
out Scotland” (Prior 1941, p. 10).
Prior notes that the basis of such a public move and system “was dis-
cipline, ultimately excommunication” but this is neither possible nor the
best way to proceed today. To implement a modern version Prior sug-
gests clerical action, pastorally, in preaching “about it with the utmost
concreteness” and partaking in “public agitation” (Prior 1941, p. 10).
Prior’s letter can be understood as an act of both of these forms of ac-
tion; not only giving concrete examples of the issue but also, by writing
to the Outlook, seeking to arouse ‘public agitation’.
It is the second part of Prior’s article that is important for what fol-
lows, because Prior also calls for prophetic action not just to commu-
nicant members of the church but to those outside the church “just as
discipline formerly was not only applied to convinced Christians but to
everyone in Scotland by the law of the land” (Prior 1941, p. 11). The
problem Prior discerns is that the Church has not only lost its prophetic
approach but that it now only preaches to and otherwise approaches
“only the ‘converted’” (Prior 1941, p. 11). This means that “One of the
main reasons why the Church fails to influence the world today is that it
has given up the attempt before it has even begun, and assumes to start
5Arthur and Clare were living in Wellington at this time, and the specific nature of
the incident would seem to be one that they had witnessed.
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off with that the world consists of people who ‘won’t understand.’ Our
forebears knew better” (Prior 1941, p. 11).
This, I argue, is the reasoning behind Prior’s venturing into being a
Public Philosopher/Public Intellectual. He wishes (driven by his study
of Scottish theology that begin in the late 1930s and continued until
1949) to attain some sort of a prophetic voice and talk to those whom,
it may have been decided “won’t understand”. In Prior’s understand-
ing, the Public Intellectual does adopt, in the tradition of the Scottish
Reformers, “their bold prophetic approach to all sorts and conditions
of men, and to all of these men individually” (Prior 1941, p. 11); and
this involves their discussion in the public realm of matters that, on the
face of it, may have only a sectarian interest, as an attempt to influence
“the world today”. This is why Prior, in the debates that follow, writes
for non-church/non-sectarian journals. His aim is to address and en-
gage in debate those whom it could be assumed (wrongly, Prior would
say) ‘won’t understand.’ So, for the public intellectual to ‘convince the
world today’ they must undertake their ‘sermonizing from the pulpit’
in the pages of the journals that the society — both churched and non-
churched — might read.
2 Public Debate One: Religious Education 1945
While Prior had previously undertaken involvement in public debate in
church and religious journals under his own name here inNewZealand
and in Britain, and also written under nom de plumes,6 Prior’s first ven-
ture into public debate in a wider public journal under his own name
occurred in 1945 in the pages of the New Zealand Listener over the issue
of teaching religion in schools. Writing a letter fromMilitary Camp and
harking back to his 1941 call for the prophetic, communal call of Chris-
tianity (and back to 17th century Scotland) Prior states the teaching of
religion [that is, “what Christianity is and has done”, taught in an objec-
tive fashion7] in schools “is part of the State’s duty”; this duty balanced
6Prior wrote letters to the editor while a student under various nom de plumes in-
cluding ‘Independent Labour’ and ‘John Everdean’ [with Clare Prior]; he also wrote
some articles and letters under ‘Richard Bramley’. For discussion of his writings un-
der ‘John Everdean’ and ‘Richard Bramley’; see Grimshaw (forthcoming).
7Here Prior is quoting “A.M.R.” who wrote the original letter. “A.M.R” is most
likely the pacifist and theologian Rev. Alun Morgan Richards (1907-2000). Prior knew
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by the Church’s “duty to teach people to be less ‘touchy’ about what
teachers say” (Prior 1945a). His concern is to separate religious prac-
tice/observance from the duty to teach an understanding of Christianity
and its history.
Prior continues to discuss this issue in greater depth in an article for
the Presbyterian Church journal theOutlook published the same month
(Prior 1945b). This in itself is interesting because here Prior is clearly
arguing the matter to both the church and the unchurched at the same
time. That is, to the unchurched to understand why the matter is im-
portant, while to the churched the argument is that religion in schools
is not and cannot be what many within the church would wish.
Prior locates the debate and agitation for religious instruction in
schools as part of an awareness by the Churches that sectarianism is
an “evil” indicative of not only a “wrong relationship between different
churches” but also “a wrong relationship between the church and the
community. It has turned the Church into a clique for the religiously
inclined, instead of an institution serving the whole People.” Sectarian-
ism is named as “a national evil” whereby the Church needs the help of
the world and the State “to make her the kind of Church she ought to
be” (Prior 1945b, p. 9). Prior denounces the sectarianism of Religious
Education which is “thought of by both its advocates and its enemies as
essentially an instrument for turning a godless nation into a godly one”
(Prior 1945b, p. 9), and he also singles out for criticism The Campaign
for Christian Order with its “smug slogans and slick antitheses as ‘Man
is beaten – God is waiting’”.8 Instead, the church needs to be more posi-
tive regarding the Education Act’s guaranteeing of “free, compulsory
and secular” education, this being, paradoxically “the nearest equiv-
alent in our national constitution to a religious establishment” (Prior
1945b, p. 9) because there is no national church in New Zealand. This
guarantee within the Education Act is, he argues, New Zealand’s “Na-
tional Covenant” and bothChurches and teachers have a duty to honour
it even if the religion established tends to be “our false national religion
of Sectarianism.” (Prior 1945b, p. 9) The Church needs to remember
that the Act was formulated because of the “evil” in the Churches —
Richards from the 1930s and had engaged in debate and correspondence with him in
both the Student and Tomorrow in the 1930s,
8The Campaign for Christian Order was a project of the National Council of
Churches, established in 1941, as a response to the context of the war.
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and which is still in them. Rather the Churches need to remember “fear
and touchiness” (Prior 1945b, p. 9) are signs of sectarianism and apply
asmuch to the Church’s attitudes to atheism and agnosticism as to other
churches and their activities. That the Education Act serves to prevent
sectarianism is something the Church should be thankful for, as the re-
sult is the possible growth “of a genuineChurch ofNewZealand” (Prior
1945b, p. 10). As such the Act should serve to help reform religion in
NewZealand in themanner of “the old Confessions of the Reformation”
(Prior 1945b, p. 10), away from sectarianism, by importantly ensuring
that Government servants are not subjected to any religious test.
Prior’s second point expands his central argument of his Listener let-
ter:
It is no part of the State’s function to turn a non-Christian
population, or a non-Christian part of the population, into a
Christian one; but it is part of the State’s function, and a part
in which teachers have a special interest, to turn ignorant
Christians and non-Christians into well-informed ones.
(Prior 1945b, p. 10)
Prior’s proposal is not that the Churches offer to finance, select and
train teachers to teach religious studies, (for that will only continue sec-
tarianism) but rather that they need to support:
[…] the incorporation of religious studies into the ordinary
school syllabus on exactly the same footing as all other sub-
jects […] a syllabus so framed that a teacher of any religious
opinions can use it without being insincere.
(Prior 1945b, p. 10)
Neither Church nor State would have any need or cause to worry,
for such an approach, in creating well-informed citizens, should be wel-
comed by both sides. This would mean that the underlying sectarian
emphasis of education could and should be attacked by the Church.
That it has not, Prior claims, is because the Church seems to prefer its
internal sectarianism. As he concludes:
To sum up: to ask the State to evangelise, is to violate the
faith of both the Church and our nation; but wemay ask it to
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remedy our weakness more than it has yet done, by adding
to the gift of freedom the gift of knowledge; but we cannot
even ask for this let alone obtain it, unless we really want it.
(Prior 1945b, p. 30)
Having addedwhat could be termed a ‘sectarian dissent’ in the Pres-
byterian journal, Prior returns to the more public debate within the
letters page of the Listener, again emphasizing a central logical point
that “[…] teaching about religion is not open to the same objection as
teaching of religion […]” (Prior 1945c, p. 5) and offering the solution
of students learning “different possible interpretations, including anti-
supernatural ones” so when they are able they can make up their own
minds. The concern is to ensure the State does not impose a particular
decision on either teachers or pupils. Prior’s stated model is London
University’s Certificate of Religious Knowledge.
Prior’s first debate echoes his ‘Church and State’ article (Prior 1941).
The prophetic nature of the Church must be addressed to all the com-
munity, but not in a sectarian manner. The State too must not act in a
sectarianmanner by promoting sectarian division. Yet as all the debates
on religious education in schools have done in New Zealand, it failed to
initiate a change. There is to this day no teaching about religion in New
Zealand state schools. This failuremeans sectarian views regarding reli-
gion and different forms/expressions of it are rife — as is a widespread
lack of religious understanding or knowledge. In this case the prophet
of religious education was (as always) without honour in his own land.
3 Public Debate Two: Writing in Landfall 1947-48
The launch of the quarterly Landfall inMarch 1947 provided another out-
let for Prior to act as public intellectual. Created, financed and edited
by the poet and patron Charles Brasch (1909-1973), Landfall was mod-
elled on British arts and cultural journals. While in England, Prior had
written reviews for T.S. Eliot’s The Criterion. Knowing this,9 Brasch asks
Prior to review C.S. Lewis’ The Abolition of Man (1943) in the inaugural
9Brasch met Prior though Ursula Bethell and the painters Toss Wollaston and Rod-
ney Kennedy, while Prior’s brother Ian, an eminent epidemiologist, married Brasch’s
cousin Elespie, in 1946.
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issue of Landfall. Prior’s review is, in retrospect, understandably and im-
plicitly underscored by the work he was doing that became his first text,
Logic and The Basis of Ethics (Prior1949a). His review is not so much con-
cerned with Lewis’ book as with discussing the nature of ethics itself.
Lewis’ book arose out of the Riddell Memorial lectures delivered at
the University of Durham in 1943 (Lewis 1943). Lewis takes as his cen-
tral focus two texts for students: King and Ketley’s The Control of Lan-
guage (1940) [referred to as ‘the green book’ by ‘Gaius and Titus’] and
Biaggini’s The Reading and Writing of English (1936) [the book by ‘Or-
bilius’]10 and their discussions as to what constitutes the reality of and
behind ‘emotive’ speech. Prior notes the importance of Lewis’ lectures
in that:
They constitute the most vigorous attack yet made on the
widely prevalent notion that moral judgements are a form
of ‘emotive’ speech, which conveys no information about
the real world but merely gives vent to the feelings of the
speaker. (Prior 1947a, p. 63)
What is fascinating about Prior’s review is not what he says in it
about Lewis, but rather what he says in it about other philosophers.
Prior dismisses those who Lewis attacks as the “follies” of “the philo-
sophical underworld’”;11 but while inclining to “regard Mr Lewis’s ‘ob-
jectivist’ account of ethical statements as the true one”, he also believes
Lewis scores somewhat of a “hollow victory” and is “curiously close to
his victims in his readiness to assume that a reaction is somehow dis-
credited by being labelled ‘emotional’” (Prior 1947a, p. 65). For Prior,
it is not whether a reaction is or could be labelled ‘emotional’ or other-
wise that is important for the ethicist; that is, the degree of reaction is
not, logically, suggestive of an ethical position or value. Prior suggests
the focus should not be on the reaction, but rather on the basis for mak-
ing the decision. That is, Prior argues that disinterestedness should “be
made the defining characteristic of ethical sentiments” (Prior 1947a, p. 66)
and states “themost important contemporary elaboration of this sugges-
10SeeWalter Hooper, C.S. Lewis. A Companion & Guide (Harper San Francisco, 1996).
11Those so dismissed are I.A. Richards (Principles of Literary Criticism, 1924); C.H.
Waddington (Science and Ethics, (ed.), 1942). For Lewis’ dismissal of them see Lewis,
The Abolition of Man pp. 50-51.
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tion” is that recentlymade by his mentor J.N. Findlay, writing inMind.12
This, he claims is supported in a more populist sense by Bertrand Rus-
sell in Religion and Science translating “[…] the ‘pseudo-statement’ ‘This
is good in itself’ as ‘Would that everybody desired this!’’’ (Prior 1947a,
p. 67).
Prior’s review is a guarded support for Lewis, who he feels is too
keen to quickly offer the solution of “a rational recognition of and sub-
mission to an objective moral standard”. Rather, one should always
heed Hume’s claim that reason “is and ought only to be, the slave of
the passions” (Prior 1947a, p. 67).13 This review’s importance is that
here Prior foreshadows the arguments later developed in Logic and The
Basis of Ethics.14 This is supported in Prior’s review for the next edi-
tion of Landfall, where he critiques Popper’s The Open Society and its En-
emies (Prior 1947c), noting the similarities of Popper’s critique of facts
and norms in ethical statements to those made by Lewis (Prior 1947c,
pp. 137, 138).15
It is interesting and important to note that Prior wrote two quite dif-
ferent reviews of Popper’s text.16 The first was for the New Zealand
SCM journal The Student in March 1947, with the longer Landfall piece
published three months later. The review for The Student is far more
positive in that Prior discusses the importance of Popper’s argument as
a corrective to and for the Church. The ‘Christian’ reading of Popper is
one that uses Popper’s critique of historicism to support Prior’s claim
of the Christian’s need to discern a difference between “a true and false
historicism” just as Popper, Prior claims, “is more concerned to distin-
guish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of Christianity than to decide for
or against Christianity as such […]” (Prior 1947b, p. 12). Prior then asks
12Prior refers to J.N. Findlay, “Morality by Convention”, Mind, April 1944. As Prior
states of Findlay in the forward to Logic and The Basis of Ethics: “I owe to his teaching,
directly or indirectly, almost all that I know of either Logic or Ethics.” (p. xi.) Prior
discusses Findlay’s article in more depth in chapter viii of this text.
13In Logic, Prior notes the central importance of Hume to such a discussion (p. x) and
in detail (chapter viii).
14While this is conjecture it seems to fit the timing noted by Mary Prior in her inter-
view. See (Hasle1997/2003, p. 295).
15Prior makes no mention of this in his earlier review for the Student.
16It is clear that Prior’s reviews of Popper were written alongside Prior’s “Eighteenth
centurywriters on twentieth century subjects”, The Australasian Journal of Psychology and
Philosophy, vol. 24: 3 (1946), pp. 168-182. A number of the points raised in his reviews
of Popper also occur in this article.
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if Popper, the anti-historicist is himself a historicist, with a history of “at
least two acts, one before the “fall’ and one after it […]” and “at least one
law of historical development, namely that the tribal ‘paradise’- which,
however, was in any case only a fool’s one — can never be regained”
(Prior 1947b, p. 12). All of which results, Prior claims, in “room for a
Christian critique” of Popper’s historicism (Prior 1947b, p. 12).
Having suggested Popper is not as scientific as he may seem, Prior
then suggests that Popper’s critique of ‘utopian’ social engineering
should be applied to the current debates on Church Union. Prior’s con-
cern is that too much of the discussion is concerned with ‘blueprints for
an ideal united church’ and too little on the practicalities of common the-
ological training, inter-denominational participation in ordination and
common parish magazines. Echoing his earlier calls on the role of the
church in contemporary society, Prior, locating himself still within the
church, claims “in the church as in society at large, our task is not to
build theNew Jerusalem, but tomakewhatwe can of the Jerusalem that
know is” (Prior 1947b, pp. 12, 14). To enable this, the church should
also learn from Popper’s picture of science’s “fellowship in criticism”
(Prior 1947b, p. 14). For Prior identifies in Popper “not only the confes-
sion of a creed, but many suggestions for a scientific approach to social
institutions which may be as usefully applied to religious institutions
as to any others” (Prior 1947b, p. 12). Here Prior believes that debates
about Church Union tend to be ‘Utopian’ when they should be ‘piece-
meal’; that is, not seeking to replace “our present society as a whole by
one after an ideal pattern”, rather aiming at “remedying particular evils
one by one.” (Prior 1947b, p. 12) For Prior agrees with Popper in stat-
ing “Only the piecemeal approach can be regarded as scientific” (Prior
1947b, p. 12).
Prior then applies a form of this noted Popperian “fellowship in
criticism” in his far more stringent critique of Popper in Landfall (Prior
1947c). In an echo of Prior’s own engagement as a public intellectual and
indeed his ‘pulpit’ of ‘theologizing on paper and in conversation’, Pop-
per is described as indulging in “weighty and timely […] sermons on
the duties of social scientists, politicians and citizens” for dealing with
what is reduced by Prior to be “Perhaps the history of historicism”(Prior
1947c, p. 137); yet these which are unfortunately “buried in other mate-
rial of more questionable worth, and so often disguised as digressions,
some of the best of them even being relegated to footnotes”(Prior 1947c,
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p. 137). Prior proceeds to discuss how two central points of Popper are,
in one case “identical with that made by Mr C.S. Lewis in the second of
his lectures on The Abolition of Man” (Prior 1947c, p. 137), and that both
points develop positions first put forward in British ethical thought by
the 18th century philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746). The first
is a “dualism of facts and norms”, in “that we cannot justify any deci-
sion by an appeal to the facts to which it ‘pertains’” (Prior 1947c, p138).
That is, the adoption of a norm is a fact, but the norm adopted is not.
As stated, Prior notes that Lewis makes a similar claim in The Abolition
of Man, but Prior observes that Popper adds the analysis that those at-
tempting to do otherwise are “attempting to recover a ‘tribal’ mentality
in which there is only ever one conceivable response to a given set of cir-
cumstances is even conceivable” (Prior 1947c, p. 138). Prior then notes
a further dualism by Popper when he states that although arguments
cannot determine a fundamental moral decision, it is most helpful to
carefully analyse the consequences of the alternatives from which we
have to choose. These decisions may be characterised as rational or ir-
rational. Here Prior notes the similarity to Hutcheson’s distinction be-
tween the irrationality of passionate states and the reason of calm de-
sire, but both, Prior notes, recognise that in the end the decision must
be made by something other than final appeal to reason — in Popper’s
case, our conscience (Prior 1947c, p. 138). Prior states that Popper’s
following of Hutcheson extends to them both being “unclear and am-
biguous” (Prior 1947c, p. 138) as to the independent reality of norms
and standards. Popper’s “incoherence” is positioned as “an indiscreet
zeal to repudiate any ethical position which could possibly be traced to
a Platonic origin’” (Prior 1947c, p. 140).17
Hutcheson’s second anticipation of Popper occurs, Prior claims, in
Popper’s discussion as to “what actions are morally obligatory” (Prior
1947, p. 141). Popper’s location of pain and suffering as the basis of
moral urgency is a position Hutcheson promoted and was taken up by
Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. Prior states this is im-
portant to remember as Smith’s “more eager economic disciples” have
overlooked this and it is their legacy, “‘the man of the system’”, that
Popper ‘directs his polemic’ against (Prior 1947c, p. 142).
Prior is critical of Popper, being wary of any whole scale appropria-
17Prior does allow him the possibility of holding “a position not unlike Kant”
(Ibid. p. 140).
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tion of Popper as a form of secular revelation or ethical critique. There is
the implicit warning that potential Popper-ites could, themselves, limit
the open society.
Having reviewed his immediate predecessor at Canterbury Univer-
sity College, Prior next reviews The Moral Sense by D. Daiches Raphael,
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Otago. Noting that im-
portant work by Findlay and Popper had been written while in New
Zealand, Prior however cautions against claiming this as aNewZealand
text in that its research was carried out before Raphael arrived in Dune-
din. (Such an argument of academic environmental determinism —
the location of research provides its authenticity — perhaps reflects the
isolation and limitations felt by Prior in these post-war years). Yet he
also states that “the general climate of opinion” is in part determined
by “what philosophers think and teach” (Prior 1947d, p. 314) — even
whenwithin the technicalities of their subject matter— so note needs to
be made of what they have written. This said, The Moral Sense is, Prior
notes, an important book in its own subject, helping to mark a turning
point. After giving a brief overview of the past century of British moral
philosophy, noting the importance ofMoore’s Principa Ethica (1903) and
Pritchard’s “Is Moral Philosophy Based on a Mistake?” (1912), Prior
refers to ‘Intuitionism’ (“the logical gap between statements in which
terms like ‘good’ or ‘ought’ do not appear and the ones in which they
do”) (Prior 1947d, p. 315). For Prior, Raphael’s book is important be-
cause it is a conscious re-evaluation of the 18th centurymoralists (in this
case Hutcheson, Hume, Price and Reid)18 noting not only their anticipa-
tion of present-day problems, but also the solutions and the arguments
made to support them. Here the echo of Prior’s own position is clear:
to understand the present in moral philosophy and ethical terms, we
must, in the twentieth century, draw upon the moralists and the ethi-
cists of the past, in particular those of the 17th and 18th centuries. For
our modern problems are, in their own ways, the same, or at least sim-
ilar to those confronted by philosophers and theologians at the turn of
the Enlightenment. Furthermore, just as such thinkers operated as pub-
lic intellectuals, so too shouldmodern daymoral philosophers, ethicists
— and theologians. Prior, in this period, can be seen as trying to model
18Here again is the link back to Prior’s “Eighteenth century writers on twentieth cen-
tury subjects”, The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, vol. 24: 3 (1946),
pp. 168-182.
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such thinkers, not only in his engagement in public debate but also by
looking to past models to do so — and, perhaps just as importantly, re-
minding his readers of such thinkers.
The centre of Prior’s review is Raphael’s chapter on Hume. Even
after he terms its foray into Logic as “unfortunate” — demonstrating
the problem with Raphael’s analogy comparing a refusal to discharge
an acknowledged obligation to the refusal “to draw the logical conclu-
sion from admitted premises” — he praises it as the “most original in
the book, and is probably the most important contribution that has yet
been made to the interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy” (Prior
1947d, p. 317). Prior does critique a methodological “defect” in that the
exposition on the 18th century thinkers is too often interrupted by “the
voice of appraisal’ (and what he terms Raphael’s “anxious reminder”).
This results in a “continual mingling of exposition, criticism and com-
parison (some of it too, a little laboured)” (Prior 1947d, p. 318) — a
criticism he also made of Popper’s work.
This is where Prior makes explicit his role as public intellectual. For
while the text is “of the utmost value for students of philosophy”, the
“educated general reader (towhom the 18th centurymoralists originally
addressed themselves)” will find it to have less appeal than it could and
should have. (Prior 1947d, p.318) In fact Prior’s religious journalism,
his role as a public intellectual (and moralist in the philosophical sense
of the term) can be read as an attempt to reinstitute the 18th century
practice of such scholars. This claim helps to explain why Prior first
turned to religious journalism and continued to write for publications
designed for ‘the educated general reader’ for many years.
These criticisms of Raphael and Popper and the commendation of
Findlay and the 18th century moralists are to find later, detailed expres-
sion in Prior’s first text Logic And The Basis of Ethics (Prior 1949a).19 In
this Prior, while locating himself as an anti-naturalist, wishes to demon-
strate to both naturalists and anti-naturalists20 “how their position may
19In Logic, Popper is critiqued in chapter vii (pp. 69-76), especially his distinction be-
tween norms and facts and between ‘validity and truth’. Raphael is critiqued for failing,
in The Moral Sense of noticing in Hume’s Treatise ‘that there are two views’ of ‘possible
subjectivist accounts of moral judgments’. Throughout modern moral philosophers
are held up to measure against, primarily Hutcheson and Adam Smith and found, to
greater or lesser degree, wanting. Findlay, Prior’s mentor, is naturally accorded the
most sympathy.
20Prior states that an ‘anti-naturalist’ holds that ethical predicates such as ‘good’,
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be freed from logical faults” (Prior 1949a, p. viii) by reconsidering the
18th century moralists. An extended discussion of G.E. Moore’s refuta-
tion of the naturalistic fallacy in Principa Ethica, Prior’s text is one that
needs to be re-read with reference to these earlier public discussions for
in them he can be seen to be giving a public airing to the critiques and
themes he is to later express in a scholastic tone. In a sense the ‘public
Prior’ of these writings acts as the ‘prior Prior’ of the emergent logician.
Another example of giving a public airing of what is academic work
occurs in the article written to commemorate the century of the found-
ing of the Otago province, and especially, its Presbyterian, Free Church
basis. Entitled simply, “Disruption” (Prior 1948a) this recounts the ori-
gin of the Free Church of Scotland and can be presumed to been drawn
from the manuscript and research for his proposed ‘A History of Scot-
tish Theology’ (Hasle1997/2003, p. 295). Prior states that to retell the
story of the Disruption is important:
[…] not only because it forms part of what might be called
the pre-history of Otago and of the Presbyterian Church of
New Zealand, but also because a proper understanding of
it involves and illuminates principles of ecclesiastical orga-
nization, activity and development which concern many be-
sides Presbyterians.
(Prior 1948a, p. 8)
For Prior, the importance of the Disruption is in illustrating how
denominationalism in New Zealand, as in most countries of “the New
World”, serves only to cut off “religious bodies not merely from one an-
other, but from the community as a whole” (Prior 1948, p. 8). The prob-
lem is amove to sectarianism away from a “view of the Church as bearer
‘of the means of grace’ to all within its reach” (Prior 1948a, p. 9). The
article, a detailed discussion of the move towards Disruption, is really
another of Prior’s calls for ChurchUnion— and, implicitly, a warning of
how not to proceed. Prior’s conclusion is of the need to echo the call of
the present Archbishop of Canterbury21 that reunion in England would
not be thatwith but rather that of the Church of England. As Prior notes,
‘evil’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ‘represent qualities which are sui generis, in a category on
their own, different from all ‘natural’ qualities’. p. vii.
21Archbishop Geoffrey Francis Fisher (1945-1961).
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“in our own country we have still to discover the proper equivalent of
this language” (Prior 1948a, p. 18). Fourteen years later, another ‘pub-
lic intellectual’, the historian and poet W.H. Oliver, commenting on the
paucity of ‘religious sociology’ in New Zealand notes Prior’s essay as
suggesting “lines on which a study of Scottish Presbyterian transplanta-
tion might proceed” (Oliver 1962, p. 3).
4 Public Debate Three: The Listener December
1949-March 1950
Prior’s next entry into the realm of Public Philosopher occurred in the
weekly New Zealand Listener, the official journal of the New Zealand
broadcasting service that also occupied a central position in New
Zealand literary and cultural life at this time. If one sought to be a pub-
lic intellectual then participation in theNew Zealand Listener guaranteed
a national audience. Prior’s short review (one and one-half columns)
(Prior 1949) sparked an ongoing battle and four month-long philosoph-
ical and theological debate in the letters pages until closed down by the
editor on March 3 1950. The book reviewed was Evolution and Philoso-
phy by a local priest, Father G.H. Duggan S.M. (Duggan 1949a).22 Ded-
icated to St Thomas Aquinas and with a preface endorsement by the
ornithologist Dr. R.A Falla of the Dominion Museum, Wellington,23
it is an attempt, by a Catholic scholastic philosopher, to question the
ideas and arguments of evolution, written for “the average educated
and half-educated person”. His basic argument is threefold. The uni-
verse is intelligible only if we admit it is dependent on and caused by
an unchanging reality distinct from it, that is called ‘God’. Secondly, a
demonstration “that the Scholastic theory of moderate vitalism is true”
and “the absolute impossibility of spontaneous generation”. Appeal-
22Duggan was a noted contributor to the correspondence columns of the Listener. A
Catholic priest from Greenmeadows in Auckland, he was recalled by the editor, M.H.
Holcroft as “formidable in debate, using a strong intellect to defend conservative posi-
tions, both in theology and politics […]when Imet him [he] turned out to be a smallish
man with large and rather appealing eyes.”
M.H. Holcroft, Reluctant Editor (1969), Wellington, A.H. & A.W. Reed, pp. 57-58
23Falla concludes his preface: “[…] I have found his comments in fields in which
I have done some study refreshingly stimulating, and should for this reason like to
commend his book to students of biology.”
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ing to reason, the origin of life arises out a threefold (plant, animal and
human) divine intervention and causality. Thirdly a discussion as to
whether the variety of life occurred by evolution from a divinely caused
single living thing in each kingdom, or a divinely caused “considerable
number of distinct forms”. The central basis of his argument is “the
rational certitude that the universe depends for its existence on an un-
changing First cause, distinct from itself, whom we call God” (Duggan
1949a, pp. 13-14). AsDuggan concludes: “It ismore probable, therefore,
that the human body was directly formed by God. The matter from
which it was formed could have been living or non-living, and from
the philosophical point of view, the alternatives seem equally probable”
(Duggan 1949a, p. 218).
Given the central argument, Prior’s review is remarkably temperate.
Duggan, he suggests, over-argues and makes rash accusations against
atheistic philosophers, and in his use of the term ‘self-contradictory’
Prior compares him to “the free way in which ‘Logical Positivists’ fling
around the charge of ‘meaninglessness’” (Prior 1949b). This, Prior avers,
is a case of “crying Wolf” (Prior 1949b). As for Duggan’s reliance upon
gaps in fossil records, Prior states that the gaps occur not because of
the lack of fossil material, but rather because biologists “cannot decide
which of the characteristics is most suitable for use as a dividing line”.
Indecision actually indicates the presence of transitional forms, not the
absence as Duggan claims (Prior 1949b).
Duggan’s letter of reply accused Prior of reading carelessly and al-
lied himself with “St Thomas and common sense” against Prior and
Hume’s position “that a change that has no cause implies no contra-
diction.” Prior’s charge of overusing “self-contradictory” invokes the
request for substantive referencing to support the claim, while his state-
ment that biologists are undecided as to the placement of fossils is really,
Duggan claims, due to their desire to “to have the transitional forms so
necessary for the Darwinian theory of evolution from one stock” (Dug-
gan 1949b).24 Prior responds detailing examples of Duggan’s “indis-
24Alongside Duggan’s response, is an attack on Duggan in support of Prior by J. Mal-
tonMurray, who states given that man is “is totally ignorant of the plans and purposes”
of a Creator (if there is one) then no organised religion is justified “in adopting an au-
thoritarian attitude and pretending to know what nobody knows concerning the ulti-
mate power behind the universe and man’s relation to that power.”
J. Malton Murray, “Letter” New Zealand Listener, December 23 1949, p. 5.
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criminate” use of “self-contradictory”, focusing on the Duggan’s illogi-
cal use of the term, stating that a particular view as to the constitution
of the material universe may mean a contradiction in our convictions is
not to mean that it contradicts itself (Prior 1950a). Prior then discusses
the distinction between “being caused”, “being a change” and “being
an effect”. His concern is for logical clarity, in that there is a difference
between “a self-evidently false” assertion “that a change may have no
cause” and a self-contradictory one “that an effect (i.e. that which is
caused) has no cause”. He then takes issue with Duggan’s use of the
term ‘nonsense’ for a claim that may contradict itself, abruptly stating
”It is something of a philosophical fashion nowadays to describe any
position with which one does not agree as ‘nonsense’; I must confess I
regard the fashion as a bad one.” He concludes rather impatiently by
noting his willingness to answer “the rest of Father Duggan’s letter if
nobody else does, but this is enough in the meantime” (Prior 1950a).
What is important to note in these exchanges is that Prior is essen-
tially conducting a public tutorial in philosophical logic in the letters
pages25 of a journal that, because it had the monology on radio listings
for the country, had a weekly circulation of 80,000-100,000 copies26 in a
country with a population of just under 2million. This is not to suggest
that every reader would have read this exchange in the letters column,
but rather to note that in conducting this public tutorial Prior was cer-
tainly fulfilling the role of public intellectual.
Prior’s review is attacked by another reader for its “outmoded argu-
ments for evolution” and for his reliance on unnamed philosophers. In
what is a direct challenge Prior is accused of being both illogical (A.A.N.
1950a)27 and a careless philosopher in his review,28 who should either
Holcroft notes of Murray: ‘He was a determined atheist of a school that had been
influenced by those slim brown volumes of the Thinkers’ Library […]”. M.H. Holcroft,
Reluctant Editor (1969) Wellington, A.H. & A.W. Reed, pp.57.
25Holcroft (1969) notes that in a survey of readers in the early 1950’s he discovered
that more saw the Listener as a literary journal than those who bought it for the radio
listings. The most popular feature for the ‘literary journal’ readers was actually the
letters page (p.37)
26Holcroft (1969), p. 26.
27A.A.N. (Wellington), “Letter”, New Zealand Listener January 6 1950, p. 5: “[…] per-
hapsMr Prior has forgotten the rule of logic that it is invalid to argue from the particular
to the general’.
28Ibid: ”Surely Mr Prior is aware that a philosophical system can only be built upon
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have “remained silent” or “given us those scientific and factual proofs
which we could reasonably expect from him” (A.A. N. 1950a).
Duggan’s next letter continues the attack that Prior’s review (and
letter) contains ‘bad philosophy’ (my term). His first point is that, in
arguing as to whether Monism is “incompatible with the principle of
contradiction”, Prior should ‘know enough logic’ to understand that
the self-contradiction would only occur if Duggan had written “imme-
diately incompatible” — but he did not and “in fact, the distinction un-
derlies the theory of the syllogism” (Duggan 1950a). He then tackles
Prior on the self-evident falsity of a proposition, suspecting Prior “has
not grasped the difference’ between ‘evident” and ‘self-evident’”, stat-
ing that “to say that a proposition is self-contradictory is merely a short
way of saying that it contradicts some self-evident truth, e.g. the prin-
ciple of identity”(Duggan 1950a). Prior’s distinction of ‘cause, ‘change’
and ‘effect’ is dismissed as being “irrelevant” in this context, repeating
the claim that change is possible without the intervention of a cause is
nonsense — whatever the present day philosophical fashions.
Prior then responds to the criticisms of “A.A. N.”, appealing first to
the same “rule of Logic” A.A. N. invoked whereby “it is invalid to ar-
gue from the particular to the general” (Prior 1950b). Prior grants that
under this the theory of evolution is not proved in the sameway as a the-
orem of geometry—but this is true for all generalisationsmade by natu-
ral scientists, all ofwhich stand open to correction from future discovery.
However, this is no reason to abandon natural science. In a following
letter, Prior next dismisses Duggan’s claims that any self-contradictory
statement is only “mediately” so (that is, not in themselves but only
when combined with other statements), saying this “novel extension of
the notion of self-contradiction” could be applied to any proposition be-
lieved to be false on any grounds (Prior 1950c). Prior comments that
this means even though one may not believe that God turns stones into
statues it would be “mediately” self-contradictory to say that he does
since it would be “‘immediately’ self-contradictory” to say God does
and does not. But, Prior states, someone who believes God does such
an action would not be “much moved” by that argument “nor can I see
that he logically should be” (Prior1950c). He then undertakes a detailed
discussion of the uses of ‘change’ and ‘cause’, claiming that Duggan’s
facts.”
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discussion of these in his letter implies a different usage to the one em-
ployed in both his text and his first letter (December 23, 1949). Dug-
gan, he states, is guilty of the truism “that any changes that have causes
have causes”, and while this might be what he meant by stating “ev-
ery change has a cause” it “simply has no bearing on the point” (Prior
1950c).
Duggan, replying to Prior’s earlier letter (January 27, 1950) attacks
him over his (it is implied) acceptance of “some theory of gradual evo-
lution” (Duggan 1950b). This, states Duggan “requires a vast number
of transitional forms”- which Prior cannot, it is claimed, provide. Dug-
gan’s claim is that gradual evolution is not actually a scientific theory
(if it were, lack of evidence would have had it “scrapped”) but it is
“an integral part of a philosophical creed”. So, if the theory needs to
be “scrapped”, then the creed ‘will have to be re-examined” (Duggan
1950b). Duggan thus turns the issue into one of competing beliefs, with
truth located on his side of the argument, having already ‘scrapped’ the
theory of gradual evolution.29
Duggan, in a further letter then replies to Prior’s letter of Febru-
ary 3, asserting he did not describe a self-contradictory position as ‘me-
diately so’— this being enough for him to satisfactorily refute Prior’s
claim (Duggan 1950c). He again charges Prior with a careless read-
ing of his comments, this time regarding the use of ‘mediately’ and
‘self-contradictory’, claiming that there is nothing novel in the way he
used it but ‘[c]omment on Mr. Prior’s dialectical methods I leave to the
discerning reader.’ Further, he charges that “Mr Prior dragged in the
term ‘effect’” when discussing uncaused change, again accusing him
of ‘bad logic’ [my term] in that “change is a process while an effect
may be a permanently existing thing. A motor-car is an effect, but not
a change” (Duggan 1950c).30 He then dismisses Prior’s statement that
29Two further letters on this debate appear in the Listener February 10, 1950, p. 5. In
the first, Robert Mouat charges Duggan with an incorrect usage of ‘a is A’ as a type
of proposition. He then agues against Duggan, invoking Bertrand Russell, Einstein,
Chesterton, Samuel Butler, Cyril Joad, Willi Hollitscher, Freud and McDougall. But he
does thank Duggan “for the stimulus which he has given to thought in New Zealand.”
J. Malton Murray also re-joins the debate, attacking A.A.N, claiming a possibility of a
far nobler life than mankind has yet attained, if he (A.A.N) throws off “the shackles of
dogma and superstition.” (J. Malton Murray).
30Duggan’s tone is one of aggrieved petulance, determined to discredit Prior’s claims
to the philosophical high-ground.
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“some changes have no cause” on the grounds of self-evident truth, “con-
firmed by an appeal to experience” using the example of the absurdity
of dismissing any cause for the change of a “flat tyre” (Duggan 1950c).
The editor closed the debate on March 3 1950. While others do get
involved (A.A.N.writes a defence against Prior claiming natural science
and philosophy argue from different premises therefore if evolutionists
“wish to enter the world of philosophical certitudes” they need to “first
establish the validity of evolution as a philosophical science capable of
explaining ultimate causes” (A.A.N. 1950b)) it is left to Prior and Dug-
gan to sum up.
Prior gets the lead letter, quoting from a French text on the classi-
fication of fossils,31 noting that the same view has been put forward
in earlier writings by Lucien Cuenot who Duggan quoted from “with
approval […] when it suits him” (Prior 1950d). Prior concludes by dis-
missing Duggan’s response as at “first a suspicious silence, and then a
dogmatic assertion about the state of biological opinion which will not
bear inspection” (Prior 1950d).
Duggan’s letter deliberately ignores Prior, being a response to the
letter of Robert Mouat (see fn 29), stating that while Mouat “does not
look to logic for his metaphysics […] But I want my metaphysics to be
logical” (Duggan 1950d). This can be read as another indirect attack
upon Prior, stating “whatever is true is logically valid but the converse
does not hold.” He then sums up his entire approach by stating: “Per-
haps I should add that there are realms of the spirit beyond the reach of
philosophy. But one must start with philosophy” (Duggan 1950d).
It is not surprising that the editor closed this correspondence. For
four months Duggan and Prior had been attacking each other in the
pages of the major mainstream public record of New Zealand life and
letters. Neitherwas prepared to concede, both dismissed the other’s cre-
dentials — and intellectual standing. In the process quite dense philo-
sophical argument had appeared in a public journal in a manner that,
from over seventy years’ distance, seems scarcely possible today. Read-
ing the correspondence one gets the feeling that Duggan and Prior were
indulging in a game of intellectual points scoring, concentrating on the
minutiae of each other’s rebuttal, rather than on the thematic content it-
self. As such there is the sense that the editorial decision was made out
31The text quoted is Traite de Zoologie ed. Grasse (vol. VI 1949) p. 145.
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of a fear that Duggan and Prior could/would continue ad infinitum!32
Prior’s willingness to involve himself in a protracted discussion on evo-
lution needs to be read three ways. Firstly, this is part of his call for a
well-informed citizenry, not held in thrall to sectarian religious beliefs.
Secondly, paradoxically, this is Prior as Calvinist combating the ‘errors’
of Catholic scholasticism. Thirdly, this is the modernist Logician attack-
ing superstition anddogmatic religious belief. The influence of Popper’s
Open Society can also be detected; for while his critiques of Popper may
be read as in-house philosophical discussion, his challenge of Duggan
is the challenge to what he views as symbolic of ‘a closed society’.
5 Public Debate Four: Landfall 1950
Having taken on Father Duggan in the pages of the Listener, Prior next
returns to Landfall to challenge a (younger) contemporary, the historian
Peter Munz33 of Victoria University College, Wellington. In December
1949 Munz had published a long essay in Landfall entitled “Proust and
Philosophy” (Munz 1949). In this essay he argues that:
[…] the great works of metaphysics in the nineteenth and
twentieth century are the novels, and not the fanciful trea-
tises on that part of physical nature which is supposed to
exist beyond the senses […] the real metaphysics of our age
is represented by the novels of Thomas Mann, Joyce and
Proust. (Munz 1949, p. 337)
Just as Prior’s public statements can be argued as an attempt to de-
velop and then discuss the Logic that will come to be fully expressed
32As the editor states: ‘We are sorry to leave some correspondents in full argument
and to exclude others who wish to enter the discussion; but we have given this corre-
spondence all the space that can be spared, and it must now be closed.’New Zealand
Listener, March 3 1950, p. 14.
33Peter Munz (1921-2006) was born in Germany and emigrated with his family to
Christchurch as Jewish German refugees in 1940. Accepted into Christchurch Teacher’s
College, Munz studied for his BA and MA at Canterbury University College, majoring
in History- but he was also taught by Karl Popper. He travelled to Cambridge to study
for his PhD (there being taught byWittgenstein- andwas present at the ‘poker incident’
debate between Popper and Wittgenstein). Munz returned to New Zealand in 1948 to
take up a position as Senior Lecturer in History at Victoria University ofWellington and
later held the chair in History 1968-1986.
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in Logic and The Basis of Ethics, so it can be argued that Munz was here
attempting something similar. In Problems of Religious Knowledge (1959)
Munz undertakes a detailed discussion of “a kind of meta-theology” of
symbols (Munz 1959, p. 12). Here, a decade earlier, he appears to be
first attempting a public discussion of what will later eventuate.34
Having stated his thesis, in his articleMunz proceeds to discuss “the
knowledge and truths conveyed by Proust”, which consist of proposi-
tions of Proustian consciousness, arising “from his recognition that they
constitute what one ought to call Reality” (Munz 1949 p. 338). This,
Munz claims is the overcoming of nominalism by the process of symbol-
ization, whereby, in the attempt to make our own “feeling states mean-
ingful’ to ourselves, we are forced to enter the universe of the feeling
states of others — and draw on their symbols to use as formulas for our
own. This allows the subjective and particular feeling state to become
trans-subjective” (Munz 1949, p. 342). Reality therefore does not exist
in time and space, but is rather what we are aware of — and so “(t)he
only problems connected with Reality are the problems of symboliza-
tion and of congruity.” (Munz 1949, p. 343) Munz discusses Proust in
reference to Whitehead, Bergson and Husserl, concluding that:
Proust radically eliminated the notion that the externalworld
is as such a given reality which we must confront and study.
Here perhaps is an end to the ‘bifurcation of nature’ that was
the burden of Whitehead’s complaint, and an avenue along
which might lie new eras of philosophical thought.
(Munz 1949, p. 352)
Prior’s involvement occurs because of a letter highly critical of
Munz’s essay, published in Landfall in June 1950. Written by two expatri-
34The role of Brasch’s Landfall as testing ground for later academic texts could provide
a fruitful avenue for an intellectual history of NewZealand. In the current audit culture
of academic outputs and ‘impact’ factors, the academic focus on (primarily) overseas
academic journals could be said to be unwittingly contributing to the much lamented
‘dumbing down’ of New Zealand society. Without public intellectuals can the public
be blamed for being ‘unintellectual’?
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ate scholars, Ernst Badian35 and Thomas McPherson36 studying at Uni-
versity College Oxford, it is a systematic defence of philosophy against
Munz’s claims. Munz, they claim, makes “the familiar confusion be-
tween the formal and the material mode of speech” (Badian & McPher-
son, p. 178); Munz undertakes “distortions of ordinary words”, “does
not use language properly”, and misuses the term nominalism (Badian
& McPherson, p. 179). They then deliberately seek to wound Munz by
comparing him to his past teacher Wittgenstein, stating:
Itwill not to say thatDrMunz is struggling to express thoughts
too deep to be expressed simply. If a thought is communica-
ble at all, it is communicable simply. If it is not communica-
ble, the thinker had better keep it to himself.
(cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 7.) (Badian
& McPherson, p. 180)
Munz therefore should have kept quiet andnot saddled “poor Proust
[…] with a theory which is based on misuse of words” (Badian &
McPherson, p. 180).
Munz’s brief reply is that in the discussion of such subject among
adults “there are implied standards of courtesy and dignity”. Given
that Badian and McPherson have not observed these standards (and so
dismissing them as ‘not adult’), “it would serve no good purpose to
argue on the level they have set” (Munz 1950a, p. 180).
Given the tone of this interchange — and Prior’s recent exchanges
with Duggan — it is perhaps surprising that he decides to enter this de-
bate. However, in his role as public intellectual he again conducts his
by now familiar public tutorial on philosophical logic. Prior begins by
identifying the exchange as one between “some points in the theory of
35Ernst Badian (1925-2011) like Munz was a Jewish refugee to New Zealand, mov-
ing with his family in 1938. He took his NZ BA (1945) and MA (1946) at Canterbury
University College. An eminent classicist and historian, after teaching in Britain and
then SUNY, Buffalo, he was appointed to the history department at Harvard Univer-
sity in 1971. In 1998 he was appointed Emeritus JohnMoors Cabot Professor of History
Emeritus, Harvard University.
36Thomas McPherson (1925-) born in Dunedin and took his NZ BA (1946) and MA
(1947) at OtagoUniversity. Primarily a philosopher of religion, he taught at Bangor and
then Cardiff, retiring (1983) as Professor of Philosophy at University of Wales, College
of Cardiff.
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knowledge” towhichMunz had replied by discussing “the ethics of con-
troversy”, stating that in suchmatters of “vital importance” Prior “is not
so sure” thatMunz “is a very reliable guide” (Prior 1950e). He then sets
out to confront Munz, accusing him of “stumping out of the room in a
huff” — something Prior states “may be the custom amongst historians
when they disagree”, but he wants to make clear, is not “characteristic
of philosophers”. The substance of Badian and McPherson’s argument
is, Prior states, “perfectly right” regarding (what he terms) “the very
curious theory of knowledge propounded in Dr Munz’s article”. Munz
has not articulated “a grand newdiscoverywhichwill revolutionize phi-
losophy” because “there are states of mind to which the subject-object
antithesis is irrelevant.”37 Rather, Munz’s proposal is “just an invitation
to confusion” (Prior 1950e).
Charles Brasch, the editor of Landfall (and friend of Prior), having
obviously previously alerted Munz to Badian and McPherson’s letter
and sought a response to publish, nowdid the same in the case of Prior’s
letter. For immediately following Prior’s letter, Munz replies in a direct
response to Prior, stating that he has written a paper and expressed a
point of viewwith which others do not agree (Munz 1950b). But rather
than saying so clearly, they choose to abuse him. Therefore, he abuses
them back stating:
There is an ire and irritation in their letters which is unbe-
coming to philosophers andwhichmakesme feel thatMessrs
Prior, Badian and McPherson may be good philosophical
technicians but have so far not benefited from the serenity
and equanimity which philosophical pursuits have always
bestowed on men. (Munz 1950b, p. 226)
Munz’s central point is that many philosophers have either denied
or overlooked “the fact that the cases which we describe as knowledge
and the cases which we describe simply by the statement ‘I am miser-
able’ have something in common.” The problem with Prior is that he
reacts to Munz’s “theory like an automaton” arising, Munz suspects,
because “Mr Prior’s theological interests have rendered him incapable
of philosophical discussion” (Munz 1950b, p. 267). This in effect chal-
lenges the ‘dual pulpit’ public intellectual role of Prior. He is dismissed
37Prior’s example is A says ‘I’m miserable’, to which B asks ‘What about?’ to which
A replies ‘Oh nothing-I’m just miserable’. A is not necessarily talking nonsense.
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as not only too theological to be philosophical but also, by implication,
too philosophical to be theological. Munz then undertakes a calculated
insult by stating Prior reminds Munz “of a Catholic theologian who
maintained that Barth’s Dogmatics were all nonsense because they con-
tradicted the Acts of the Council of Trent” (Munz 1950b, p. 267). Com-
paring the Barthian-influenced Prior with an anti-Barthian Catholic the-
ologianwas a direct attack on Prior’s position as both a Philosopher and
aPresbyterian and especially onPrior’swell-knownessay “CanReligion
Be Discussed?”(Prior 1942).38 Munz concludes by stating he knew his
critics do not see “a similarity between two cases of awareness” (Munz
1950b, p. 257) as he does, but he expected their critique to show this and
not just maintain that in their view there is no similarity.
Replying to Munz (Prior 1950f), Prior states he will seek to respond
in the spirit of “‘serenity and equanimity’” that Munz demands of a
philosopher and so will not compare Munz to either a Catholic theolo-
gian nor an automaton (Munz not being like either) nor will he suggest
Munz’s interests have unfitted him for philosophical discussion (Prior
1950f, p. 369). What he does state is that it appears Munz gained opin-
ion as to Prior’s philosophical opinions from some source other than
Prior; there may be others (“ill-humored fun-poking un-philosophical
fellows”) Prior notes who will accuse Munz of imagining the opinions
attributed to Prior- but Prior will do no such thing, having “forsworn all
such reflections on DrMunz’s intelligence” (Prior 1950f, p. 369).39 Prior
then, in what is yet another public tutorial on logic, lists four points that
Munz attributes to him but which “I do not hold, and have never as-
serted, even in casual conversation.” Prior first refutes that knowledge
and the theory of mind expressed by ‘I am miserable’ do not have a
point of similarity and so we can’t refer to them by a single term, for
“they are both states ofmind andmay be called such.” Neitherwould he
claim “that there is only one ‘proper’ way of using the verb ‘to know’”;
nor (and perhaps most crucially) does he believe “that everything that
contradicts my own theories is nonsense”. Instead, he would claim that
38Arthur Prior, “Can Religion Be Discussed?”, The Australasian Journal of Psychology
and Philosophy, vol. xx, no.2, September 1942, pp 141-151. In this the debate is ‘a play’
between ‘Barthian Protestant’, ‘Catholic’, ‘Psychoanalyst’, ‘Logician’ and ‘Modernist
Protestant’. This is a crucial text for tracking Prior’s move from ‘Barthian Protestant’
to ‘Logician’ and concludes, tellingly with ‘Barthian Protestant’ stating ‘Lord, I believe;
help Thou mine unbelief!’ (p. 151).
39Ibid.
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“‘knowledge’ is one state ofmind andwhat is customarily called ‘feeling
miserable’ is another” and so in seeking a term to cover both it would be
confused and confusing to use a term “now used for one” and not the
other (Prior 1950f, p. 369). Thirdly, “that in all its customary usages the
verb ‘to know’ is transitive; and that [fourthly] a transitive verb without
an object is a logical monstrosity” (Prior 1950f, p. 369). Prior’s parting
shot is that while one is entitled to talk and write in a private language,
if these are translated by another into plain English andmade to appear
commonplace or absurd then one should tell us where and why the
translation is incorrect. This is the challenge thrown to Munz, for Prior
states he, like Badian andMcPherson, is unsure of what Munz means—
unless it is what the latter take it to be. Prior concludes “For this reason
it seems to me considerably more regrettable that he has refused to an-
swer them than that he has refused to answer me” (Prior 1950f, p. 370).
Munz replies in the same volume as it is “necessary” for him “to
make quite clear the issue on which I must differ from him”, stating his
[Munz’s] claim is that “‘feeling miserable’ and ‘seeing a chair’ are both
states of consciousness” that are “states of knowledge” (Munz 1950c,
p. 370). The object of knowledge is a state of consciousness that in the
first case “the outside world” enters “into the situation as a symbol of
misery” and in the second enters as a chair (Munz 1950c, p. 370). Be-
cause, for Munz, the “state of consciousness is not different from the
knower […] in such acts of knowledge the knower and the known are
really identical” (Munz 1950c, p. 370). Thus, in this case the use of the
verb “to know” as transitive must be rejected. Munz also conjectures
that he is “very much more of an idealist than Mr Prior”, attempting a
theory of knowledge in which “the world emerges in our consciousness
only as a symbol” (Munz 1950c, p. 370). Badian andMcPherson’s asser-
tion on the necessity of the simplicity of communication is dismissed as
“a gratuitous dogma, towhich nobody but a fewpositivistswould like to
subscribe” (Munz 1950c, p. 371). While this concludes the debate, this
is the decision of the Landfall editor, not of the participants. For it is clear,
like Prior and Duggan in the Listener, that Munz and Prior could have
continued such a debate for many more exchanges. The issue for Prior
as public intellectual is not only the limited number of available outlets
in a small country but also that his participation is primarily reduced to
reviews and exchanges in the letters/correspondence options. That is,
his pulpit is at the discretion and control of others. To understand this
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issue, we need to remember his hopes from 1936 of “of ending up even-
tually as the editor of a religious periodical” (Grimshaw 2018, p. 93); for
only as editorwould Prior not only have a regular editorial whichwould
act as his pulpit, he could also create and curate the debate and discus-
sion. The only real possibility for Prior to do so would have been to take
over the editorship of the Presbyterian weekly, the Outlook, yet he most
probably lacked the journalism background to do so, nor would it have
enabled him to follow his philosophical interests.40 For as is evidenced
in his final foray as public intellectual, having been able to expand his
philosophical contacts in person, Prior was able to discover a way past
the very real limitations of New Zealand academic and intellectual life
at this time.
6 Public Debate Five: Landfall 1952
In 1951, in the words of Mary Prior, Arthur and Mary “scraped” to at-
tend that year’sMeeting of theAustralasian Philosophy and Psychology
Society (Hasle 1997/2003, p. 295)41 where he gave his paper “The Eth-
ical Copula” (Prior 1951). What is of interest here is that Prior chose
to write a detailed report for the layman in Landfall, for no other rea-
son than “I found it interesting” (Prior 1952a, p. 49). He begins with
a discussion of John Anderson’s reputation as “a dangerous propaga-
tor of atheism, immorality and Red Revolution” (Prior 1952a, p. 50)
noting that Anderson is most probably an anarchist, whose “immoral-
ism” is expressed in being an absolutist on “goodness and badness”. In
Prior’s description, while Anderson admits the science of Ethics which
discriminates between goodness and badness and investigates causes
and effects, it is not the role of Ethics “to coax or dragoon or bamboozle
people into doing or being good rather than bad.” For obligation is a
bad thing because it is a social constraint, masquerading as something
else. So, there is no such thing as “Morality with a capital M; in truth
there are onlymoralities […]” (Prior 1952a, p. 50). Andwhile Anderson
40Prior’s student, the philosopher Jonathan Bennett was acting editor of the Outlook
from January-June 1953. Bennett took this on without any input from Prior and also
notes that “After my two years as a student at Oxford, and one year as an instructor in
the US, I was approached with an offer of the Outlook editorship on a permanent basis;
and ANP strenuously urged me not to accept.” (email to Grimshaw 4 July 2020).
41Mary Prior noted: ‘There were no grants towards such things in those days.’
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may be an atheist, Prior notes it seems to be strongly aligned to a type
of Presbyterianism, “of a type now dying out”, that is, of “some fairly
small dissenting Scottish sect” influenced form with “definite echoes of
Calvinism in his creed” (Prior 1952a, p. 51).
Prior then notes the battle between Melbourne and Sydney, com-
mending W.D. Falk’s paper on “Prescriptive Speech”42 and noting the
Andersonian line is that such linguistic focus are a “waste of philosophic
time” and “have abandoned ethics for etiquette”(Prior 1952a, p. 52).
What makes this conference report important is that Prior next turns
to Professor J.J.C. Smart’s paper on “Logical Paradoxes”43 because he is
not satisfiedwith either Smart’s solution or any other he has come across
“and would be interested to see some philosophical amateur who reads
Landfall chip into the discussion. (He couldn’t do worse than the profes-
sionals have done with this subject.)” (Prior 1952a, p. 52). The subject
discussed is that of “redness” whereby if it is granted that the abstract
character of redness is not red itself, is there a character possessed by
the character of redness? But given that is self-contradictory, it must be
abandoned, and so alsowemust abandon not only that redness does not
characterize itself, but also that redness is not red. Does this mean that
redness is red? The paradox being it “does not make sense” to either
affirm or deny.
Smart’s answer “had a quite shattering simplicity”; the question of
‘redness’ in itself is one we just “do not want to say”, rather we affix ‘red-
ness’ to things such as pillar boxes and say other things i.e. ‘soap boxes’
are not red. The logician’s prohibition against “redness is red” is not a
real one for it prohibits something no one wants to do. Here Prior states
his disagreement (as a logician) because the paradox remains (“[…]
though I can see that there are powerful reasons against saying so, I do
want to say that redness is not red, and a little enquiry has disclosed the
same ill-bred impulse in other persons also […] (Prior 1952a, p. 53)) —
and notes that doing so caused Smart (“who is of the Ryle-Melbourne
42A version of this was published as W.D. Falk, “Goading and Guiding”, Mind, Vol.
62, No. 246 (Apr., 1953), pp. 145-171.
43Smart publishes a very thoughtful critical reading of Prior’s Formal Logic (1955)
in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 34: 2 (156) pp. 118-126. Smart begins by
stating “This book ismarked by awholly admirable eclecticism. In no other comparable
treatise on logic, so far as I know, are so many alternative systems discussed.”(p.118).
Smart concludes “I hope this book will be rapidly sold out, as it deserves to be […] the
book is outstanding in its field.” (p.126)
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factor”) (Prior 1952a, p. 53) to call him “an Andersonian” (Prior 1952a,
pp. 52-53).44 Having in the past turned to the public sphere to articu-
late his discussions prior to academic expression, here Prior inverts his
model, attempting to see if his academic articulation can be discussed
in the public sphere. This is Prior the public intellectual testing whether
intellectual discussion of philosophical logic can really be made public.
Prior’s increasing isolation from the issues of public discussion in
New Zealand can be seen in that his challenge was only, briefly picked
up by another ‘public intellectual’, the poet and critic A.R.D. Fairburn.45
Fairburn, as “an ‘amateur of philosophy” (Fairburn 1952a, p. 161) ap-
peals to I.A. Richard’s discussion in The Philosophy of Rhetoric as to how
we arrive at a general abstractness from a particular concrete thing. Fair-
burn’s contention is that it is impossible to detach the abstract character
of redness from the experience of red objects in a manner that we could
treat it as a detached entity – or define it negatively as “is itself not red.”
Fairburn states he couldmake similar statements i.e. “themoon ismade
of green cheese” but he could not expect others to be interested “un-
less they are psychiatrists.”(Fairburn 1952a, p. 161) Fairburn suggests
that there is linguistic confusion occurring arising from abstraction “in
which the word ‘is’ bears a heavy load of guilt. Nouns and adjectives
that belong to the same situation cannot be brought face to face at the
altar without some rude person pointing out that they have been living
together for years.” (Fairburn 1952a, p. 161) His conclusion is that the
philosophers present were seeking to play the game improperly (ping-
pong played by hitting the bat with the ball whilst standing on their
head is the example given) and so recourse should have been given
“that Occam be asked to apply the guillotine” (Fairburn 1952a, p. 161).
Prior replies that, if he understands Fairburn correctly, his view “is
44Prior notes of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy: “it is still the main stamping-
ground of the Andersonians who constitute (whatever one thinks of them) a genuine
Antipodean philosophical school” (p. 53).
45For an informative biography of Fairburn; see http://www.bookcouncil.org.nz/
writers/fairburn.html. Fairburnwrote for Landfall and had noted Prior’s earlier reviews,
stating his Lewis review “is a shade over specialist for a first number” (p.158) while
his calling his Popper review “excellent.” (p.164) See Lauris Edmond, ed. The Letters
of ARD Fairburn. Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1981. Prior (under the nom de
plume ‘Richard Bramley’) and Fairburn, bothwrote for theNewZealand journal Tomor-
row in the 1930s and were part of the wider (though small) New Zealand intellectual,
cultural and artistic milieu of the 1930s-1950s.
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a most respectable one” and that “he can be written down as an Aris-
totelian.” (Prior 1952b) He however points out the Platonist counter-
argument that such a reduction does not get rid of all statements with
abstract subjects. To this (in the same issue, immediately after Prior’s
letter) Fairburn replies that he is probably both “a confused thinker”
and a Nominalist. He is aware of the Platonist argument, but would
argue that redness has no a priori existence “but is merely a mental pro-
cess”: “My interest in the controversy arises mainly from a belief that
much unnecessarymischief has been caused throughout history by peo-
ple who allow verbal abstractions to break their moorings” (Fairburn
1952b). And with that the debate ends.
7 Conclusion
Following this, Prior no longer involves himself in public discussions,
for asMary Prior notes he had discovered the Polish logicians and “1952
was the beginning” (Hasle 1997/2003, p. 298). Yet for five years Prior
had involved himself very publicly with an attempt to bring the dis-
cussion of philosophical issues to the wider public of New Zealand.
His ventures as public intellectual can be read as a part of that general
post war desire to, as Mary Prior notes, “catch up on lost years” (Hasle
1997/2003, p. 294). What makes these public utterances important is
that as well as being a part of the yet unwritten (and unconsidered)
‘intellectual history of New Zealand’ they are public evidence of the
shifts and developments of Prior’s thought in a very public and accessi-
ble manner. What runs throughout his public utterances is the way in
which Prior used the public forum in New Zealand to attempt to facili-
tate the issues he was developingwithin his academic work and his first
academic text. Here hismodels are those 17th and 18th centurymoralists
who sought to create and inform an educated citizenry. That the pub-
lic forums were willing to participate provides another insight into the
intellectual history of New Zealand. On the one hand Prior was acting
as a public intellectual in an environment that was prepared to include
such figures in its presentation and discussion of life and letters in New
Zealand. On the other hand, this was also indicative of an audience that
itself acted as a type of communal public intellectual in that editorswere
prepared to accept such discussions within the pages of their publica-
tions. Yet tellingly, where the discussion moved into explicit discussion
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of logic such as the concluding ‘redness’ debate, only the intellectual
gadfly Fairburn would respond.
The public Prior perhaps presents the limit of Logic in the public
arena.
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Abstract
Newly released letters between Arthur Norman Prior and Mary Wilkin-
son (later Prior) in 1943, reveal that Prior, after having struggled with
Freudian explanations of religious belief in 1942, returned to
Christianity in July 1943. With Freud’s specter dispelled, Prior wanted
to provide an answer to three articles, he had written from an atheist per-
spective, and therefore wrote Faith, Unbelief and Evil: Fragments of a dia-
logue. Furthermore, it turns out that Prior discussed and corresponded
with Karl Popper, about faith and unbelief. This study situate Prior’s dis-
cussion on religion in 1943 and discusses its relevance for his authorship.
Keywords: A.N. Prior, Religion, Atheism, Freud, Karl Barth, Karl Pop-
per.
1 Introduction
Arthur Norman Prior is known by most as the founder of tense logic.
His logic for tenses was formulated from a realist perspective, and his
defense of this view made him one of the twentieth century’s most im-
portant analytical philosophers of time. Even a casual reader of his
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work will notice the many references to theologians such as Augustine,
Aquinas, Jonathan Edwards, William of Ockham, and many more. One
can of course expect that contemporary philosophers are acquainted
with the works of these theologians. For Prior, however, his reasons
for studying theology were not only professional, but also existential,
though this was not evident in his later work in the sixties. Theology re-
ceded into the background of an agnosticism that was already present
in his correspondence with his wife Mary from 1954. In 1968, he wrote
that he used to be an expert in seventeenth and eighteenth century Scot-
tish reformed theology, but that he no longer held any religious beliefs.
His early works were mainly theological and include many articles on
various theological topics. Two of his contributions to philosophical
theology stand out: “Can Religion Be Discussed?” (Prior 1942 [11])
and “The Formalities of Omniscience” (Prior 1962 [24]). The impact
of these two articles has been great. The latter, according to William
Hasker, started the modern discussion of divine foreknowledge and hu-
man freedom (Hasker 1998 [3]), and it is arguably among the finest
applications of modern logic to theology in the twentieth century. The
impact of the former has also been great for philosophical theology. As
Anthony Kenny notes, this was the first article in philosophy that Prior
was remembered for (Kenny 1971 [6]). “Can Religion Be Discussed?”
was later republished in Flew and MacIntyre’s New Essays in Philosophi-
cal Theology (1955 [23]). According to Alvin Plantinga, this book was a
wakeup call for Christian philosophers:
In 1955 New Essays in Philosophical Theology appeared, a
volume of essays that was to set the tone and topics for phi-
losophy of religion for the next decade or more; and most
of this volume was given over to a discussion of the impact
of Verificationism on theism. Many philosophically inclined
Christians were disturbed and perplexed and felt deeply
threatened; could it really be true that linguistic philosophers
had somehowdiscovered that theChristian’smost cherished
convictions were, in fact, just meaningless?
(Plantinga 1984 [7])
Prior’s paper was the lead essay of the book, and if one were only
to associate his name with the author of “Can Religion Be Discussed?”,
then one would be excused for thinking him an atheist who considered
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theology a meaningless illusion. In fact, it turns out that Prior’s author-
ship of that article was the product of a crisis of faith. This has been
known since Kenny’s obituary of Prior, as well as from the discovery
of a diary note from May 25, 1942 (Jakobsen 2016 [5]). Furthermore,
it has been known, also since Anthony Kenny’s obituary, that Prior’s
crisis didn’t last long, and that he not only rather quickly resumed his
study of theology (Kenny 1971 [6]), but he also became an elder in
the Presbyterian Church in Christchurch. However, we did not know
how long this crisis lasted or what to think of some of the unpublished
articles apparently written during it. These articles display the same
atheistic application of Freudian psychoanalysis as “Can Religion Be
Discussed?” However, to add to the confusion, the archive also con-
tained an article similar in style to “Can Religion Be Discussed?” but
much more positive in its conclusion on the discussion between faith
and unbelief. This article is titled “Faith, Unbelief and Evil: Fragments
of a Dialogue” and, as Kenny notes, it “looks forward to Logic and the
Basis of Ethics.” From Kenny’s obituary of Prior, along with the rough
indications of what went on from 1942 to 1944 when Freud’s influence
waned, we have reason to think that Prior’s crisis of faith was impor-
tant for his development as a philosopher. The diary entry from March
25, 1942, confirmed this and increased our knowledge of the depth and
importance of Prior’s crisis of faith. Now, however, the letters between
Arthur Norman Prior andMaryWilkinson (later Prior) from 1943 have
been released and can be studied at the Bodleian Library in Oxford as
the Ann Prior Collection. From these we learn that Prior returned to
the Christian faith in July 1943; that the unpublished articles “Children
of the Damned” [28] and “Law and Order” [26] were written from an
atheistic perspective; and that, finally, Prior wrote “Faith, Unbelief and
Evil” in August 1943 as an answer to himself. These letters provide us
with a unique key to unlock these three articles and suggest that Prior’s
return to the Christianity made the question of the foundation of ethics
important. Finally, it turns out, from Prior’s letters to Mary, as well as
from a letter written by Karl Popper to Prior, that Prior felt compelled
to tell Popper, who in 1943 was a professor in Christchurch, about his
return to Christianity.
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2 From Barth to Freud and Atheism
In 1971, Kenny, Prior’s close friend, wrote about his friend’s 1942 crisis
of faith, saying that it “gave rise to his first philosophical article which
is still remembered: ‘Can religion be discussed’” (Kenny 1971, 326 [6])
Kenny knew that the crisis did not last very long, a fact supported by
Prior’s continued cherishing of his theological library and his dismissal
of Freudian explanations of belief in 1944. The discovery of the diary
note from themiddle of his crisis revealed that Priorwasn’tmerely going
through a crisis of faith in 1942. He considered Christianity a thing of
the past. On March 25, Prior wrote:
I recollected that I had already in my Christian days com-
pared theological systems with works of art—in the intro-
ductory paragraph of an article on Barth’s Dogmatics which
Alexander Miller tells me will be appearing in “Theology.”
On that occasion I was stressing the importance of form and
structure in theology, of seeing how the bits of a theologi-
cal system fit together and contribute to the “shape” of the
whole thing. And indeed I have always been conscious
that this has been my main interest in theology—that my
main interest has been in that respect “aesthetic,” though
as a Christian I wasn’t quite at ease about this.
(Prior 2014 [27])
Indeed, as the lettersmake evident, in 1942, Prior considered himself
an atheist. With Christianity behind him, Prior looked on theologywith
different eyes. In one diary entry, he called theology an illusion some-
what close to life (Jakobsen 2016 [5]). Why the change fromChristianity
to atheism? The immediate cause appears to have been his divorce from
Clare, whom he had married in 1937. However, “Can Religion Be Dis-
cussed?” suggests that psychoanalysis and logic also played a role, and
the letters confirm that psychoanalysis was an especially crucial factor.
“Can Religion Be Discussed?” is written as a discussion between five
stereotyped voices on religion. The title plays on the irony that what ap-
pears to be a discussion of religion cannot be so if the Barthian Protestant
is right. According to Barthian, there is no common ground between the
believer and the unbeliever on which a meaningful discussion can take
place. The two other theological voices in the discussion — Catholic
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and Modern Protestant — each model two different ways in which re-
ligion can be said to be absurd and meaningless. Modern Protestant’s
“milk and water” religion is mere emotion and lacks genuine theologi-
cal content, and Catholic’s adherence to divine simplicity, presented as
the idea of God being identical with his own goodness, is rejected by
Logician as meaningless. Barthian, on the other hand, “presents you
with the ‘nonsense’ right from the jump.” (Prior 1942 [11])
Of course we can only talk nonsense when we try to talk
about God — our language is the language of sinful men,
and is utterly unfitted for such use. Of course the laws of
thought, and the laws of grammar, forbid us to confess our
faith — we try to speak of God, and it is impossible even to
begin. But God, with whom all things are possible, comes
to our rescue, and takes up our words and our thoughts and
makes them carry His meaning and His message to men.
(Prior 1942, [11, p. 149])
In a footnote to this comment by Barthian, Prior wrote:
This is not a wild guess at what Barth might reply to a crit-
icism such as Logician’s. The idea that nonsense may be
given sense by an act of sheer omnipotence is repeated again
and again in his “Prolegomena to Church Dogmatics.” On
this miracle, for him, the very possibility of a science of the-
ology depends. And on this miracle alone. Barth refuses ex-
plicitly and absolutely to try and justify his “nonsense” by
criticizing or qualifying or revising the laws of thought (like
Hegel; and Modernist; and perhaps even Kant, to whom
Barth is obviously close). Nor, however, does he consider
it any part of his business to affirm or accept their validity.
The Miracle is his one standing-ground.
(Prior 1942, [11, p. 149])
We have good reasons to think that Prior fundamentally disagreed
with Barth’sHegelian influences, even thoughhewas attracted to Barth’s
theology. Prior’s reservations about philosophical idealismwere due to
the influence of J.N. Findlay, under whom Prior, in 1937, hadwritten his
master’s thesis “The Nature of Logic.” We only know the title because
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Prior mentions it in an undated letter to Mary most likely written in
1947. In that letter, Prior also revealed the extent of Findlay’s influence
on his thinking:
I am realizing how little I really knewwhen I wrote myM.A.
thesis on “The Nature of Logic”; & what a cheek I had to
submit it with so thin a background, and what a lot of work
in it was really Findlay’s.
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, B30 [8])
We can be quite sure that Prior’s aversion to what he called “the
philosophical disease of idealism” (Prior 1937, [10, p. 11]) was in large
part due to Findlay. Another undated letter to Mary, also quite likely
written sometime in 1947, confirms this. Prior was that year preparing
for a logic course and had reread the idealist Bosanquet’s The Essentials
of Logic. It turns out that Findlay had used The Essentials of Logic in his
teaching in 1936–7. Prior recollected the following to Mary:
I have been re-readingBosanquet’s “Essentials of Logic.” We
used it for advanced Logic in my day, Findlay pulling it to
pieces bit by bit. It is rather poisonous stuff & not Logic at
all. I’m going to read a few Hegelian & Pragmatist Logics,
through, I think; to keep track of the Enemy. I’ll need it if I
do land in Auckland next year!
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, B46 [9])
The obvious influence of Findlay’s pulling The Essentials of Logic
to pieces was noticeable in the problems Prior perceived in the logi-
cal implications of Barth’s theology. In the years after he graduated,
Prior wrote two critical articles on Barth: “Revaluations” [21] and, in
the following year, a review of Etienne Gilson’s “The Philosophy of St.
Bonaventura” (1938). In “Revaluations,” Prior wrote about “a certain
philosophical disease called ‘idealism’ of which Barth’s theology has
not properly freed itself.” It is evident that “CanReligion BeDiscussed?”
was influenced by this criticism. Prior’s quotation in the article of Mark
9:23–25 — “Lord I believe, help Thou my unbelief!” — is an echo of his
criticism of Barth five years earlier in “Revaluations”:
It has to be recognised that the question as to the falsehoodof
our belief is different from the question of our unbelief. We
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can pray, “Lord, I believe, help Thoumine unbelief,” but it is
meaningless to pray, “Lord, I believe, and my belief is false,
but pleasemake it true,” andwicked to pray, “Lord, I believe,
and my belief is false; but make me go on believing all the
same.” The Reality of God is deeper than all our doubts, and
unaltered by them, if He is real—there is our comfort. But if
He is unreal, His unreality is deeper than all our certitude—
there is our peril. And there is no way of evading this. Barth
tries to evade it, often; all his critics, without exception, far
more often. (Prior 1937, [10, p. 11])
In “The Philosophy of St. Bonaventura” (1938), Prior suggested that
a way forward for Barth could be to look into the Anselmian–Augustin-
ian tradition, where “the light of faith and reason comes in together,
each lending strength to one another.” However, he does not appear to
have explored this line of inquiry further. In the earliest letter we have
between Mary and Prior—on 24 February, 1943—Prior spelled out how
the atheistic conclusionwas reached in “Can Religion Be Discussed?”; it
is evident that the logical criticism was a crucial premise. Referring to a
conversation he had had with Karl Popper, who had read Prior’s article,
he wrote:
[P]sychoanalysts tend to claim that standards of “normality”
can be arrived at from psychoanalysis itself. I don’t hold
with this at all; and was quite appalled when Dr. Popper
told me that he had gathered from my dialogue on “Can re-
ligion be discussed?” that I did. He said that the remarks by
“Psychoanalyst” in that dialogue suggested that he consid-
ered he pad proven religion false by tracing it back to our
attitude to our father, etc. What I really meant to suggest, by
the order in which the participants said their piece in the di-
alogue, was that religion is first proved false (or rather non-
sensical) by someone else (not by the psychoanalyst but by
Logician).
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, February 24th 1943,
[12, p. 4-5])
This quote helps us understand “Can Religion Be Discussed?” with
regard to gaining a deeper understanding of howPrior lost his Christian
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beliefs. The only standpoint that was acceptable from the perspective of
Barthian orthodoxy embraced philosophical idealism, which to Prior’s
mind was the mere acceptance of nonsense as meaningful. This in itself
didn’t push him into atheism because, up until 1942, Prior simply found
within himself the miracle of faith. His crisis woke him up to the cruel,
cold, and bitter reality of the psychological roots of his urge to believe.
In “Can Religion Be Discussed?”, Prior put the followingwords into the
mouth of Psychoanalyst:
But a time may come […] when circumstances will push
them into an emotional crisis in which they will go mad un-
less they do something about it, and then in the painful pro-
cess of their own analysis they will see for themselves the
roots of their urge to believe. Only in that way are genuine
atheists made. (Prior 1942, [11, p. 150])
The diary entry fromMarch 1942 confirms this. Prior had notmerely
accepted Freud’s story as an alternative adequate explanation of religion
that is ultimately decided by a leap of faith. For Prior, in 1942, faith was
a thing of the past. This fact is not possible to gather from merely read-
ing “Can Religion Be Discussed?” In that article, Barthian appears to
consider psychoanalysis an adequate explanation that one must accept
or reject by faith—and that faith is a miracle:
[F]aith is not the product of superior intellectual discern-
ment; it is not a thing on which we are in any way entitled
to compliment ourselves; it is an inward miracle of God’s
mercy, and that is all we can say about it.
(Prior 1942, [11, p. 147])
On the other hand, in the diary entry Prior wrote that, even though
theology is close to life, it is nonetheless an illusion: while we can learn
much good from theology because it is close to life, it is nonetheless
“real history distorted.” Theology’s story of God’s covenant with man
is “a distorted version of the same story that Freud tells in ‘Moses and
Monotheism,’ the story of the ‘growing-up’ of the human race through
various psychological crises.” (Prior 2014 [27]) Prior’s letter to Mary—
on 24 February, 1943—confirms that he, in his own eyes, had turned
from a childish (theological) belief in determinism to a mature belief in
a more scientific determinism.
70
When I first embarked on this psychoanalyzing of religion,
it was only my own religion I had to go on, a religion essen-
tially expressing the emotions of a son.
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, February 24th 1943 [12])
Prior had lost his Christian belief during 1942 as his marriage to
Clare dissolved and as he realized that the more scientific version of
reality, given by Freudian psychoanalysis, constituted a defeater of his
religious beliefs. Prior’s belief in God had been that of what he in “Re-
actions to Determinism” described as a “darling child.” The psycholog-
ical crisis of his divorce woke him up, and, with no superior intellectual
discernment to defend his Christian beliefs, he grew up, and left his
childish beliefs behind.
3 Dispelling the Freudian Specter
In Prior’s letters to Mary from February to July 1943, it is evident that
Prior was gradually questioning his doubts about Christianity. Finally,
in his letter to Mary on July 4, he wrote about having been troubled
about “an ever deepening feeling of unreality in all my mental oscilla-
tion between belief and unbelief.” [13, p. 1] The atheism that had lasted
throughout 1942, so clearly expressed in his diary note from March 25,
1942, was losing its grip on him:
Lately I have thought much of my eighteen months or so
of atheism as a kind of voluntary excommunication of my-
self. But I realized this morning that there was something
sophistical in this conception of it. To abstain from Com-
munion when one doesn’t really want it anyway, is a very
phony sort of “penance.” Such abstinence can only have the
significance of Christian repentance when one does want to
be there. And I therefore resolved not to communicate this
morning, but to do so at the next available opportunity. And
this was a real self-excommunication, the thing demanded
of me, by God. […] And this was a genuinely Christian act,
and my mind was very much at peace about it.
([13], p. 2-3)
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Prior’s atheism was over. It had lasted eighteen months, from the
end of 1941, when Clare ran off with Prior’s cousin to July 1943. He
immediately began to read the bible again devotionally. He wrote to
Mary that he returned to his tent (he was in the military serving in the
air force) and read the story of Jacob, who struggled with God in Gene-
sis 33:24–28. Two aspects of that story were emphasized in his letter to
Mary: that Jacob struggled with the man “who turned out to be God,”
and that God changes Jacob’s name to mean “peace of God.” For Prior,
both of these emphasized his own experience with making peace with
God: “I had done what I had to do; and it was over; and I was at peace.”
[13, p. 3] The “next available moment” for taking communion came on
July 18. Prior wrote about it on the same day in a long sixteen page letter
to Mary:
Its afternoon now, and a lot has happened since I wrote the
above. I received communion at the service this morning–
there were only four of us remained behind to communicate;
[…] Mac said afterwards how glad he was about it; and he
wished you had been able to be there, but I won’t try and
describe the service, except to say that the reading was the
story of the Prodigal son. ([13], p. 4)
On the same day, Prior also wrote about a conversation he had had
with Ursula Bethel (1874–1945), a New Zealand poet with a keen in-
terest in theology with whom Prior corresponded during his studies.
Prior’s letters to Bethel provide valuable documentation of his relation-
ship with his first wife Clare (Grimshaw 2018 [2]). By 1943, there-
fore, Prior had known Bethel for quite some time. While discussing C.S.
Lewis’ new book The Allegory of Love, Prior conveyed to Mary an earlier
conversation he had had with Bethel:
I put forward the idea that Freudianism had performed a
secretly Christian function for me at a time when I had so
abused Christianity that it was impossible for Christianity
to do me any good directly, or something like that.
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, July 18th 1943 [14,
p. 2-3])
During his talk with Bethel about the impact Freudian psychoanal-
ysis had had on him, Bethel was reminded of a poem from William
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Blake’s Jerusalem. She thought it was relevant to Prior’s experience, and
gave it to him. He thought it excellent and passed it on to Mary.
Each man is in his Spectre’s power
Until the arrival of that hour
When his humanity awake,
And cast his Spectre into the Lake.
([14, p. 2-3])
There can be little doubt that Prior found Blake’s poem fitting. By
1944, it is evident that the Freudian ghost had been dispelled. As Prior
wrote:
God “dwelleth not in temples made with hands,” even in
the strange shrines erected by psychoanalysts in the mental
depth they have discovered; hemay certainly appear in such
places if it pleases Him and furthers His purposes of love
with men; but where He has told us to seek Him is in His
Word and in the ordinances of His appointment.
(Prior 1944 [21])
In 1943, however, this was all still future; and while his return to
Christianity seems to have caused much joy, it also led him into deep
reflection. First, he had to consider his relationship with Popper, who
was one of those he had disclosed his atheism to. Second, he had to do
something about the articles that he had written during those eighteen
months of atheism.
4 Prior’s Answer to Himself
During the first eight months of 1943, Prior and Mary discussed three
articles by Prior written under the influence of atheism: “Reactions to
Determinism,” “Children of the Damned,” and “Law and Order.” The
latter two caused Prior the most consternation. On July 25, while writ-
ing about Miller’s use of his articles in general, he wrote that he didn’t
quite know “what to do now with The children of the damned.” [28, p.
4-5] In 1943, Miller was editor of the journal The Presbyter, and Prior
had thought of sending “Children of the Damned” [28] to Miller “as an
73
expression of the view that ‘the Reformation of the Reformation’ that
his paper stands for, can only lead in the end to unbelief.” [22, p. 3-4]
Aware that he “love[s] to see [his] stuff in print,” Prior contemplated
not sending “Children of the Damned” to Miller before he was able to
send an answer to it. The envisioned answer was explicitly directed at
what Prior considered an atheistic part of “Children of the Damned”:
The most explicitly atheistic part of the article is the “inser-
tion” in the section on Duncan which I have pinned on to
the end; where I trace a sort of historical development from
the old Calvinistic willingness to be damned just for God’s
glory, to a willingness like Duncan’s to be damned for the
salvation of God’s people, and so for His glory indirectly;
and this, I say, is a sort of “partial psychoanalysis” of the
older attitude—“partial” because “God” still comes into it;
the “love” involved is not yet fully revealed as purely hu-
man.
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, July 25th 1943 [5, p. 4-5])
Few were aware of the existence of “Children of the Damned” be-
fore Hasle’s comprehensive categorization and description of the vari-
ous items in the Prior archive at the Bodleian Library. “Children of the
Damned” is a predominantly psychological examination of how four
authors considered their parents more or less damned. The authors
considered by Prior are the English theologian Frederick Denison Mau-
rice, the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, the Presbyterian mis-
sionary to the Jews “Rabbi” John Duncan, and James Joyce. Freudian
psychoanalysis, especially the Oedipus complex, was the pivotal center
of Prior’s examination of these authors’ fears of damnation. Maurice,
guilt-stricken and fearful of his mother’s damnation, was on a mission
to save her; he was “fed by a love between them of a kind which they
felt to be wrong, which they never permitted to come into their con-
sciousness, but which endlessly tormented the one with inexplicable
fears, and goaded on the other to his endless theoretical and practical
Christian labours [ sic].” (Prior 2014 [16, p. 3]) Prior’s letter of July 25
to Mary revealed that he was especially troubled by his application of
psychoanalysis to Romans 9:1–5, where Paul bemoans Israel’s rejection
of Christ to the degree that he wouldwish himself “accursed and cut off
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from Christ for the sake of my brothers, my kinsmen according to the
flesh.” Prior’s comment on Paul is found in his analysis of Duncan:
Earlier Calvinists sometimes held that complete submission
to God’s will demanded that one should be willing to be
damned “for His glory.” Duncan held this too; but his own
willingness to be damned was for God’s “glory” in a new,
dynamic sense. He thought of God’s plan for advancing
HisKingdomas one involving “strategic retreats” from some
fields (e.g., Israel), followed by new attacks from better
points of vantage; and he could wish for his own damnation
as part of such a “strategic retreat.” In this there was less of
pure submission to God’s sovereignty than of love to those
whose salvation wasmade possible by his loss. This is some-
thing like a partial psychoanalysis of the earlier Calvinism—
the inhuman and irrational submission to God’s arbitrary
will has been revealed as a product of essentially human feel-
ing.
(Prior 2014 [16, p. 7])
From this letter, it is evident that Mary appears to have challenged
Prior’s dismissal of the traditional Calvinist interpretation as “inhuman
and irrational submission to God’s arbitrary will,” which essentially is
just a product of human feeling. According to Mary, Paul’s words can
also be interpreted, not psychologically as merely a human feeling, but
as a temptation. This much seems apparent from Prior’s words toMary:
The answer that I have in mind now is all in little bits, but
I think the central part is this (you gave it to me long ago,
when first writing to me about my unbelief & your belief
when you treated Paul’s wish to be accursed from Christ as
a temptation).
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, July 25th 1943 [15,
p. 4])
The goal of his answer is to supplement the psychoanalytical read-
ing of Romans 9:1–5 with a theological reply. Freudian psychoanalysis
is not in itself atheistic; however, the notion that psychoanalysis pro-
vides the final analysis does exclude God. In August 1943, Prior sent a
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draft to Mary of what eventually became his answer to himself: “Faith,
Unbelief and Evil: Fragments of a Dialogue.” (Prior 2012 [25]) On July
29, Prior had decided that the form of his answer should be similar to
that of “Can Religion Be Discussed?” The dialogue form that he chose
reflected the fact that it was a reply to himself; this fact also influenced
the subtitle. On August 9, Prior wrote that he will “subtitle it ‘A frag-
ment of a dialogue conversation,’ because it really never ends.” [16, p.
2] Furthermore, Prior did not want his answer to be considered as a pu-
rification of himself but rather as “a transposing to another key.” [17,
p. 2] It is evident that, without the letters, it would be very difficult
to read back from “Can Religion Be Discussed?” and “Faith, Unbelief
and Evil” to his personal religious beliefs. The letters show that deep
existential questions and personal matters between him and various un-
named persons were being treated in those articles. Without the letters,
we would be very much in the dark regarding them. His philosophi-
cal criticism of Barthianism in “Revaluations” and “The Philosophy of
St. Bonaventura” can easily be used to interpret “Can Religion Be Dis-
cussed?” as thework of a Barthian Protestant whomerely argues that, if
Barth does not embrace philosophical realism, then one has a rationality
defeater in psychoanalytical reductionist accounts of religious beliefs.
The letters from 1943 and Prior’s diary note fromMarch 1942 show that
he had indeed embraced such psychoanalytical accounts as the proper
analysis of religious beliefs and was in “Reactions to Determinism” and
“Children of the Damned” applying them to Calvinist theology. For
eighteen months, Prior had, through Freud, transcended into atheism.
Marywas the beginning of a “transposing to another key.” At the center
was Mary’s suggestion that a theological reading of Romans 9:1–5 was
also possible. Prior’s consideration of Mary’s suggestion constitutes the
climax of the dialogue between Theologian, Historian, andHumanist in
“Faith, Unbelief and Evil.” Historian suggests that the Calvinistic way of
understanding Romans 9:1–5 as a question of “being damned for God’s
glory” is more proper to Islam than to Christianity. The Humanist ob-
jects to this, pointing to the defense some German theologians made of
Nazism:
One of these gangster theologians, Stapel, dismisses Chris-
tian objections to what Nazis do and order one to do, as
“moral hairsplitting”, humanist rather than Christian, and
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says “If God orders His man to go to hell then his sworn ad-
herent will accordingly go to hell.” (Prior 2012 [13, p. 394])
With this reply, the scene is set for Prior to provide, through Theolo-
gian, the theological reply he had been working on. It deserves to be
quoted at length because it is packed with meaning. It is the heart of
Prior’s reply to himself —which originated withMary— and it demon-
strates that Prior’s subsequent focus on the foundations of ethics origi-
nated in his reply to his own atheism:
[T]here’s somethingmore serious to be said against thiswill-
ingness to be damned for God’s glory. Even to contemplate
such a thing is an implicit pushing aside of the salvation of-
fered to us in Christ, who has taken our damnation upon
Himself, and glorified His father even from hell. “Rabbi”
Duncan, 19th century Scottish missionary to the Jews and
then Old Testament Professor, once burst into tears before
his students at the thought that Christ’s dereliction on the
cross, when He cried, “My God, why hast Thou forsaken
me?”, “was damnation—and He took it lovingly.” I have
a feeling that this—“taking damnation lovingly”—was one
thing that Rutherfurd’s God, for all His omnipotence un-
limited by goodness, could not do. But it’s one thing that
the God of the Bible has done; and in this act lies the one
thing that Rutherfurd’s theology, like Humanist’s philoso-
phy, does not give us—a foundation for ethics. We are not
called upon to do the really crucial acting here—we are not
called upon to “take damnation lovingly,” and we couldn’t
do it if we were; but we are called upon to live as those for
whom God Himself has done this. And that is the whole of
the negative side of predestination—the whole meaning of
“predestination to damnation.” And the positive side too. It
is the gospel. (Prior 2012 [13, p. 395])
The importance of Prior’s discussion of the foundations of ethics in
“Faith, Unbelief and Evil” is highlighted by another letter from Prior
to Mary from August 6, 1943. It turns out, that Prior was reminded
of another article, “Law and Order,” also written during his atheistic
period. In his letter to Mary on August 6, Prior wrote:
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I have realized tonight that I still have at present an atheisti-
cal article in the hands of John Anderson, to wit, “Law and
Order” for publication in the Australasian Journal of Psy-
chology and Philosophy, if he feels so disposed and must
communicate with him as swiftly as may be to get it with-
held.
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, August 6th 1943 [18,
p. 6])
At first, Prior considered rewriting the article “without the atheism”
in order to offer it to the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philos-
ophy again, together with a rewritten “Children of the Damned.” He
was, however, unsure, and the next day he wrote again to Mary about
“Law and Order,” saying that, while “Children of the Damned” would
be somewhat easy to rewrite without the atheism, the same would not
be true of “Law and Order.” This article was “a much tougher proposi-
tion to de-anti-Christianize.” [26, p. 10] Prior decided to immediately
mail Jon Anderson, the editor of the Australasian Journal of Psychology
and Philosophy, by air-mail the same day to get the article withdrawn
from publication. He was somewhat perplexed about what to do with
the article and askedMarywhat she thought. On the one hand, Prior felt
that he needed to consider the atheism of the article; on the other hand,
he considered the article to be theologically important. “Law and Or-
der” is a brief two-page discussion of the ethical foundations of law. As
Prior wrote to Mary, without the atheism it is “a simple account of the
logical character of legal propositions.” [19, p. 10] The argument opens
with the two “atheistic” paragraphs. In these, Prior dismisses claims
of the kind that “the universe is constructed on moral principles” and
“there is a moral order in the universe” as “wishful thinking.” On the
contrary, Prior argues, there is no “way of proving that such-and-such
is our ‘duty’ fromdescriptions of how things happen.” (Prior 2014 [26])
In his letter to Mary on August 7, Prior, in a crossed out section, wrote
that “it is Wittgenstein rather than Freud.” Prior does not give a reason
for crossing out this phrase. Perhaps he simply realized that it would
be wrong to attribute the views in Law and Order to Wittgenstein. It is
however evident, from the letter’s postscript and his letters to Ursula
Bethel, that Prior did attribute the view, that ethical prescriptions are
disguised imperatives, to Wittgenstein:
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I’m replacing the opening two paragraphs of “Law and Or-
der” with the following: “I propose here to give an account
of the logical nature of legal propositions in the fairly straight-
forward sense of propositions which express ‘the laws of the
land.’ The characteristic of these propositions that needs
most to be explained is that they appear to transcend the
sharp distinction made by modern students of ‘logical syn-
tax’ between indicative and imperative sentences, or between
‘descriptions’ on the one hand and ‘demands’ or ‘decisions’
or ‘policies’ on the other. Legal propositions seem to be both
indicative and imperative at once.”
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, August 7th 1943 [19,
p. 12])
What Prior sees as Wittgenstein’s influence is the view that ethical
propositions are really disguised imperatives. From a letter to Bethel,
we learn that Prior “had to read up a lot aboutWittgenstein” (Grimshaw
2018 [2, p. 133]) as part of his work on “The Nature of Logic,” and
that Prior especially seems to have focused on Wittgenstein’s view of
the logical status of ethical propositions:
They [Wittgenstein and others] hold that there is no science
of Ethics, for there are no “ethical propositions” or “ethi-
cal facts” which such a science might study. Ethical state-
ments are not really statements conveying information at
all—although they may have the form of an indicative sen-
tence (e.g. “Murder is wrong”), these are really concealed
imperatives. (Grimshaw 2018 [2, p. 133])
From Prior’s answer to himself it is evident that, while he agreed
with Wittgenstein’s logical analysis, he disagreed with its application.
The indicative and imperative distinction is not really about social con-
vention or expectations of how society will react to certain behaviors. In
“Faith, Unbelief and Evil,” Prior’s answer to himself constitutes a state-
ment about the foundations of ethics that he does not appear to have
pursued further: a grounding of ethics in Christian theism. While Prior
never pursued the theory, he continued the study of the logical foun-
dations of ethics. What his letters have shown is that this study, which
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culminated in Logic and the Basis of Ethics, beganwith his return to Chris-
tianity and his urge to provide an answer to the atheism that had dom-
inated his thinking from 1942 until July 4, 1943.
5 Dealing with Popper
It is evident from Prior’s letter to Mary (quoted above) that he had con-
fided with Popper regarding the underlying reason behind “Can Reli-
gion be Discussed?” In Prior’s eyes, Popper and he had been fellow
atheists. On August 7, Prior wrote to Mary that:
[…]possibly theChristian reply to a great deal in ‘Popperism’
is simply to be silent on points where he feels a compulsion
to speak. It’s not always this, but is sometimes—and curi-
ously enough that wasmy own reaction to some of his teach-
ing as a fellow atheist.
(Arthur Prior to Mary Wilkinson, August 7th 1943 [19])
Prior had attended lectures with Popper, and at one of them he had
landed in an awkward situation because he had not disclosed his return
to Christianity to Popper. Popper had given a lecture on materialism,
which Prior gave a splendid account of in a letter to Mary on August
3, 1943. After the lecture, a discussion ensued, launched by a person
whomPrior described as a rationalist. This rationalist proceeded to give
an account of a recent affair in which a religious fundamentalist group
had encouraged a strict disciplinary action on a child. The story, from
the perspective of the rationalist, had the intended impact on Popper,
who, Prior commented, “was very sensitive to ill-treatment of children.”
[28, p. 4] The rationalist concluded it by saying: “There’s religion for
you!” To this Popper smilingly replied: “Oh, I think even rationalists
may be cruel to children sometimes!” The reply didn’t end the conversa-
tion, and Prior, to his later regret, couldn’t remain silent. The rationalist
had insisted that no rationalist would ever be cruel to another person.
At that point, Prior remarked, with biting irony: “In fact, thank God
the rationalist aren’t as other men.” [28, p. 4] The class noticed the dis-
guised reference to the account from the Gospel of Luke of the Pharisee
and the Tax collector,1 and they were with Prior to such a degree that
1Luke 18:9–14.
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Popper apparently felt compelled to explain their reaction to the poor
beleaguered rationalist. They were not attacking rationalism as such,
Popper tried to explain, but rather self-congratulation. Suddenly, Prior
had found himself in an awkward position, as Popper wanted to use
Prior, whom he considered an atheist, to prove to the rationalist that he
wasn’t being attacked by religious believers. Prior recounted the story
to Mary:
Popper endeavored to explain to the bellicose man that […]
he was not being attacked by religious people. “Mr. Prior,
for instance,” and I was highly alarmed about what was go-
ing to come next and felt I was there under false pretenses,
and said humidly, “Oh, never mind about me,” and Popper
went onmore carefully (not knowingwhatwas inmymind),
“Mr. Prior for instance is quite tolerant toward rationalists—
aren’t you?” and I muttered a little tamely “I try to be” and
then Popper went off on another tack. ([28, p. 4])
Prior emerged from the affair “feeling rather rotten” because he had
not trusted “Popper to defend the non-rationalist against the bellicose
man […] but had to jump in and attack theman.” He felt he should have
trusted Popper to defend Christianity in that situation, and that he in-
stead had pulled himself — and also, in the eyes of the class, the church
— down to the same level as the man who had attacked Christianity.
The awkward situation caused Prior to write a letter to Popper, explain-
ing to him that he had returned to Christianity and that he wanted to
apologize for his behavior. Popper wrote back to Prior on August 9. We
know this because Prior kept Popper’s letter among his personal corre-
spondence. Popper’s reply was warm and cordial — “really very nice,”
as Prior described it to Mary in his letter to her on August 9, 1943. In his
reply, Popper first addressed Prior’s return to Christianity:
You need not be afraid concerning my attitude toward your
change of mind. I liked your letter, and I feel that you are in
a better state now than you were at the time when you told
me about your atheism. These arematters in which onemay
change one’s mind more often than once or twice, and one
may even stay in a state of continuous fluctuation. (I need
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not explain to you why I say that).
(Karl Popper to Arthur Prior, undated [30, p. 1])
Prior had conversations with Popper on other topics that same
month, and it is evident from Prior’s letters toMary that he held Popper
in high esteem. The exchange with Popper, and the letter from him to
Prior, is an important new discovery. While we have known that Pop-
per and Prior knew of each other and Prior applied for the temporary
lectureship that became vacant after Popper left Christchurch, we have
not had reason to think that there was a personal contact between the
two men. (Copeland 2020, [1])
6 Conclusion
Prior apparently never published his atheistic articles “Children of the
Damned” and “Law and Order.” Neither did he, in his lifetime, pub-
lish his reply to himself in “Faith, Unbelief and Evil.” Together with the
diary note from March 25, 1942, they were kept among his scrapbooks
and unfinishedwork on seventeenth and eighteenth century Scottish re-
formed theology. The specter of Freud had been dispelled. His doubts
didn’t leave however, and in 1968 he wrote that he no longer held any
religious beliefs. (Kenny 1971 [6, p. 321]) Doubt appears to have re-
turned sooner however. Already in a letter to Mary in 1954 Prior writes
about his skepticism as a reason why he ought to step down as an elder
in the Presbyterian Church:
I don’t know there isn’t a God; but I don’t know there is ei-
ther, and I don’t know as much as by being a Kirk elder and
implicitly claim before the world to know—I don’t “know
that my Redeemer liveth”—and I don’t think my state of
mind can be rightly described even as believing the things I
implicitly profess to believe. But what to do about it I don’t
know either; I only know I don’t want to make a public fuss
about it—I don’twant tomake any sensational renunciations
—and of course the quietest thing one can do is just to go on
as long as one can being a bad and negligent Kirk-elder; but I
don’t think that’s quite the best thing either—it will do for a
while, but not for a very longwhile “/What is a longwhile?—
another sixmonths?—till the new church is started?—till we
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go to England?
(Arthur Prior to Mary Prior, May 21st 1954 [22, p. 7])
When Prior and Mary came to Oxford in 1956 in preparation for the
John Locke Lectures, they appear to have attended church several times.
However, when they ultimately moved to Manchester, they ceased at-
tending church. Nonetheless, few philosophers in the middle of the
twentieth century have done more for Christian philosophy than Prior.
In a time where philosophy still questioned whether metaphysics made
sense, Priorwas convinced thatmany of the answers to logical problems
in philosophy should be found with the Schoolmen. He remained close
with his atheistic friends, such as J.L. Mackie and J.J.C “Jack” Smart,
as well as with his Catholic friends Peter Geach, Elizabeth Anscombe,
and Ivo Thomas. Prior unfortunately died before the philosophical dis-
cussion, initiated by him, of divine foreknowledge and human freedom
turned in earnest to the theology of an open future. However, it is not
a stretch to claim, that Prior’s work on God’s foreknowledge of future
contingents was the birth certificate of that theory. For Prior, it was
fundamental that orthodoxChristian belief assumedGod’s providential
control over the future, and hence for him denying God foreknowledge
meant yet another change of mind from belief to unbelief. [4] Popper
encouragement to Prior concerning one’s change of mind on this matter
indeed turned out to have been quite true.
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to read Prior’s paper: Arthur N. (1940): ‘The
Analogy of Faith’, in order to see to what extent it offers some productive
insights into Prior’s view on logic. Our paper suggests that by viewing
The Analogy of Faith, in this light Prior’s considerations on ‘the logic of
the Word of God’ constitutes a novel and still unexplored way of making
sense of the idea of the analogy of faith. Furthermore, it also suggests that
Prior’s later achievements in Logic has its origin in his early theological
thinking.
Keywords: Metaphysics, physicalism, dualism, time, God’s Word, logic.
1 Introduction
A. N. Prior is best known for his invention of tense-logic in 1954. His
invention of tense-logic made it possible to argue against Quine’s view
that logic has to be tenseless (Quine 1953 [12]). For Prior, the work of
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the Logician was not to be in the business of metaphysics, but rather
to provide “the metaphysician, perhaps even the physicist, the tense-
logic that he wants, provided it be consistent.” (Prior 1967, 59 [11]). In
this sense, Prior argued, the Logician is like a lawyer with a client (the
metaphysician) who has a case he wants to have argued, and the lawyer
should thus spell out the best option, consistent with the clients choices
and preferences. We find this view on Logic evident in Prior’s early
work. He did not appear to be interested in pursuing intense studies
in formal logic until after his publication of Logic and the basis of ethics
(1949). As the title of that book illustrates, Prior did not feel obliged to
reserve the term Logic to Symbolic Logic or Formal Logic. Prior’s 1940
article, The Analogy of Faith, illustrates this point. Here Prior argued that
the reformers’ idea of the analogy of faith should be understood as being
about the logic of the word of God.
2 The Analogy of Faith
The Analogy of Faith, was published in the theological journal The Con-
gregational Quarterly and is an investigation of a doctrine which the re-
formers arguedwas essential in order to make correct interpretations of
Scripture. As such, it is a doctrine about how to arrive at the proofs of
the Reformers doctrines by reading the Bible. Or, in otherwords, ameta-
doctrine, motivated by the idea of Sola Scriptura. The Reformers had to
distance themselves fundamentally from the Catholic Church, as under-
standing themselves as thosewho solely relied on the authority of Scrip-
ture, which meant that they had to provide a principle, from Scripture,
fromwhich the reformed particular doctrines could be shown to follow.
The solution was ‘to say that the only authoritative interpreter of the
Scripture was the same Spirit by whose inspiration they were written.’
(Prior 1940 [8]). The good question is, then, who are ‘we’? Historically,
Luther ‘[…] used the term “our theology” during his lectures on Gala-
tians in 1531’ (Hendrix 2008, 127 [6]), and Hendrix also points to the
justified view that ‘Luther did not have a personal theology.’ (ibid. 126).
The question is, however: how would one settle on the Spirit’s interpre-
tation of Scripture? Since all individuals will be able to claim for them-
selves that they, by the Spirit, interpret Scripture in accordance with the
analogy of faith, interpretation collapses into subjectivism. Priorwas, of
course, aware of the fact that the reformerswould vehemently deny this,
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and quotes several reformers to that effect. However, many still take
this perspective on the doctrine whereas Prior believed that by turning
to Karl Barth it is possible to provide an answer to the claim of subjec-
tivism. What is required, Prior argues, is to give up the idea that the
individual believer is the proper reader of Scripture, and that ‘[…] the
subject of the act of faith expressed in the Apostle’s Creed “is theChurch,
and therefore not the individual as such. (Prior 1940 [8])’”. The sub-
jectivity is thereby made relative to the right community, namely the
Church to which the proper interpretation of Scripture is given by the
author of Scripture.
In addition to the relative-subjective element, the analogy of the faith
also has an objective sense, namely the idea, also central to the reformers,
that “what God says to us in one part of the Bible is to be interpreted by
what He says in another, and cannot ultimately stand in contradiction
to itself” (Prior 1940 [8]). Here Prior quotes a reply by John Knox to
Queen Mary:
“The Word of God is plane in the self; and yf tair appear
any obscuritie in one place, the Holy Ghost, whiche is never
contrariouse to him self, explanes the same more clearlie in
other places.” ’, and this ‘[…] comparison of Scripture with
Scripture was what the Reformers understood by the “anal-
ogy of the faith”. (Prior 1940 [8])
This idea of an objectivity of interpretation of Scripture by the Spirit
who authored Scripture, is by Prior summed up as quite simply mean-
ing “The subjection of our minds to the logic of the Word of God as
well as to its particular pronouncements. (Prior 1940, section III [8]).”
Several questions arise as to what Prior more exactly means with ‘logic’
and ‘pronouncements’ of Scripture. We get an idea of this if we take a
look at Prior’s discussion of the principle in light of what he considered
an excellent example of its application by John Knox. Knox provides
an obscure proof of an interpretation to a text in Proverbs, that few, ac-
cording to Prior, would find a convincing exegesis of that text. This
proof however clearly demonstrates how the analogy of faith works in
action, since Knox’s proof is packed with echoes and allusions to Scrip-
ture. This, Prior argues, testifies that “the Bible has worked its way into
the very warp and woof of his language and his thought.” (Prior 1940,
section III [8]). On the basis of this Prior concludes:
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There is surely no higher test than this submission to “the
logic of the Word of God” of whether a man’s thought has
really grown out of the Bible, and is not merely “dragging it
in” to support ideas that come from a different source. Knox
says in effect, “It was not from my own speculations, but
from the Bible — and above all from the story of the Cruci-
fixion — that I learned of God’s power to bring good out of
evil, and where should I learn how to draw out the practical
bearings of this truth — where should I learn to ‘interpret’
this ‘Biblical’ truth, and not some quite different speculative
one — if not from the Bible too?
(Prior 1940, Section III [8])
The analogy of faith is thus about “catching the drift” of Scripture
or the general strain of Scripture, rather than that of particular passages.
The Bible should not be viewed as a collection of various tenets and
precepts on the basis of which any deduction can be made. “We must
learn how the Bible itself makes its deductions and see that our own
argumentation moves in the same way.” (Prior 1940, Section II [8]).
What this amounts to seems to be an attempt on the part of Prior
to solve the problem of the classical issue of the correct exegesis of the
Bible by suggesting an epithet to the traditional label theWord of God, viz.
the word logic: the logic of theWord of God’. So, what we have here is a
threefold conceptual configuration: ‘logic, word, God’, the combination
of which makes a philosophical question; in fact a metaphysical one,
and in order to puzzle out what Prior means by these words we will
have to offer some, not too extensive, reflections.
The nature of God is a theological question, and, whereas words are
normally considered mundane objects, the association with the entity
‘God’, and the wordword in the singular, makes the concept a little more
ethereal. Opinions differ with regard to the nature of Logic. According
to Kant (1781, 948, [7]) logic is ‘ […] der bloßen Form des Denkens
[…] and ‘Transzendentale L. [logic], eine Wissenschaft, welche den Ur-
sprung, den Umfang und die objektive Gültigkeit der Erkenntnisse a
priori bestimmt.’ But this will not help us if we do not know what pure
thought (‘bloßen Form des Denkens’) and knowledge (‘Erkenntnis’) is,
it only leaves us with the understanding that it is transcendental; maybe
implying that it is metaphysical. It may, then, be feasible to suggest,
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along these lines, an epistemological physicalism, in which a distinc-
tion is made “between the different kinds of entities that may be known
or not known to exist.” (Götzsche 2013, 68 [5]). Prior seemed averse
however to such epistemological dualities. In amodern contextMichael
Dummett is in line with Kant in that he says that there is a ‘philosophy
of thought [logic]’ (Dummett 1991, 2 [1]) but then he has it that:
We should investigate howour language [logic] actually func-
tions; the answers to those questionswill then determine the
answers to the metaphysical ones. (Dummett 1991, 338 [1])
That is, things are turned on their heads: what logic appears to be
is not ontological, nor is it metaphysical; logic is actually the basis of
metaphysics, i.e. logic comes before metaphysics (cf. the title of Dum-
mett’s book). This would appear to be Prior’s view, also manifested in
his invention of tense-logic. In The Analogy of Faith (1940) [8] how-
ever, Prior’s does not offer a clarification of the notion of ‘logic’, and his
overall view is perhaps that expressed in (Prior 1955 [9]) that ‘The best
way to discover what logic is about is simply by doing logic’ (Prior 1955,
1 [9]). In order to appreciate Priors presentation of the matter in ques-
tion, and get closer to what relation his paper has to his later work we
shall turn to another historical treatment of logic within the reformed
tradition.
3 The logic of Calvinism
Prior is not the only one who has focused on the logic of Calvinism as
it is expressed in the Westminster Confession. The Westminster Confes-
sion clearly makes a claim about the logical relation that holds between
Scripture and the reformed doctrines:
The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary
for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either
expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary
consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which
nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revela-
tions of the Spirit, or traditions of men.
(Westminster Confession 1.6)
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Seizing upon the phrase “good and necessary consequence […] de-
duced from Scripture” Bovell (2009) [2] has argued that this phrase in
the Westminster Confession was influenced by the growing epistemo-
logical influence of skepticism in the seventeenth century which caused
philosophy and theology to emulate the certainty of the conclusions
within mathematics where conclusions are deduced from axioms.
Protestant theologians were not immune to mounting
cultural pressures to propose an “analogy of science” for
their theologies. The certainty associated with mathemati-
cal method and knowledge was the only ray of hope.
(Bovell 2009, 3 [2])
According to Bovell, seventeenth century theologians in general
sought to focus their work on achieving “a sure basis for normativity
in theology”, and they sought “to contrive an absolute certainty for the-
ology, a certainty that would be capable of providing the psycholog-
ical stability requisite for serious religious commitment, especially in
the face of rampant skepticism.” (Bovell 2009, 4 [2])
Much speaks in favour of the view that seventeenth century protes-
tant theology and philosophy aimed at achieving a certainty in which
Logic was a key instrument. Indeed, this development happens early
in the seventeenth century, much earlier than Descartes’ first publica-
tion Meditationes de Prima Philosophia (Meditations On First Philosophy)
published in 1641. In 1606, the protestant Jacob Lorhard (1561-1609)
in Ogdoas Scholastica coined the word Ontology (Øhrstrøm, Schärfe &
Uckelman 2008 [13]). Lorhard worked with theology as well as ethics,
logic, astronomy and physics, and looked upon ontology in much the
same way as Aristotle looked upon what later has been labelled meta-
physics, namely as first philosophy, or as the knowledge that makes
knowledge possible. Furthermore, Lorhard’sworkdisplays a clear influ-
ence of the reformed logician and rhetorician Petrus Ramus (1515-1572).
These aspects indeed suggest that inspiration flowedbothways between
rationalistic philosophers and seventeenth century theologians. Prior’s
analysis of the analogy of faith, as a logic of the word of God, suggests
furthermore, that there is more to Westminster Confession’s emphasis
on “good and necessary deductions,” than an attempt to emulate the
mathematical certainty sought for by Descartes. The earlier motive was,
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if Prior is right, the idea of sola scriptura, the self-authenticating founda-
tion that would set the reformed churches on a foundation in which the
sole authority was that of Scripture and not that of the Church, or even
worse, that of Aristotle. In his analysis of the analogy of faith, Fuller
points out that the reformers perceived Aristotle, and medieval scholas-
ticism, with deep distrust for that reason:
The reformers […] realized that theologians had kept the
Bible from speaking for itself because they were so prone to
construe its statements in terms of medieval scholasticism,
which drew so heavily upon the philosophy of Aristotle.
(Fuller 1997, 65 [4])
The central concern of the Reformers was to defend the claim that
the bible is enough—sola scriptura—and was not in need of any first
philosophy or tradition of the Church in order to make its own mes-
sage clear and authoritative. It came with its own logic. Thus Luther
lamented the influence of Aristotle on the university where he, “this de-
funct pagan has attained supremacy […] and almost suppressed, the
Scripture of the living God.” (Fuller 1997, 65 [4]). Calvin also stressed
the different stand of the reformed Church with regard to Aristotle con-
cerning its doctrines’ dependence on Scripture alone.
The doctrine which we have put forward has been drawn
from the pureWord ofGod, and rests upon its authority. Not
Aristotle, but the Holy Spirit teaches that the body of Christ
from the time of his resurrection was finite, and is contained
in heaven even to the Last Day. (Fuller 1997, 65 [4]).
Prior’s claim about the analogy of faith is not that it sought a cer-
tainty derived from having its fundamental axioms proven, but rather
that it was a consequence of the views of Luther and Calvin concerning
the sovereign authority of the Bible. Bovell’s claim is stronger, namely
that theWestminster divines were seeking a Cartesian foundationalism:
The innovative step taken in the Westminster Confession is
its cultural adaptation of a Cartesian-like foundationalism,
“[we seek] what we can [either] clearly and evidently intuit
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or deduce certainly; for in no other way is knowledge ac-
quired,” into a biblicist foundationalism, “The whole coun-
sel of God […] is either expressly set down in Scripture, or
by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from
Scripture. (Bovell 2009, 8 [2])
However much speaks in favour of this, it also appears quite plau-
sible, that a line of reasoning within the reformed tradition goes back
to the attempt by the reformers to view Scripture as self-authenticating.
In an unpublished article, written in the first half of the 40s Prior began
an investigation into what he termed The Logic of Calvinism. Like Bovell,
Priors turns to the Westminster Confession which “is not just a collec-
tion of offhandpronouncements on various subjects strung together like
beads on a rosary, but has a definite inward order and pattern.” (Prior
2014, 149 [i]) His use of ‘logic’ here means much the same as in the logic
of the word of God, namely, that of an inward order and pattern. His in-
vestigation into the pattern leads him to trace the ramified structure to
the influence of Petrus Ramus. It is evident that what Prior calls the
Logic of Calvinism, and what he seeks to trace back from the Westmin-
ster Confession, is not an attempt of theologians to model theological
certainty on that of mathematics. It is rather an explication of central
Calvinistic dogma into a Ramified structure that makes it evident that
the sole authority of the Calvinist tradition is the word of God.
1. The Authority of the Word of God.
2. TheContents of theWordofGod. (“God andHisWorks”).
2.1. Of God.
2.11. Of God’s general attributes.
2.12. Of God as the Holy Trinity.
2.2. Of God’s Works.
2.21. Of God’s Works in Eternity — His Decree.
2.211. Of God’s General Decree.
2.212. Of God’s Special Predestination of Men and Angles.
2.22 Of the Execution of God’s Decree in Time.
2.221 Of Creation.
2.2211. The Creation of the World.
2.2212. The Creation of Man.
2.222. Of God’s Providence.
2.2221. God’s General Providence.
94
2.2222. God’s Providence in Relation to Sin.
2.22221. The Covenant of Works and its Breaking.
2.22222. The Covenant of Grace.
2.222221. The Purchase of the Covenant of Grace.
2.222222. The Application of the Covenant of Grace.
2.2222221. The Inward Work of Grace.
2.2222222. The Outward Means of Grace.
2.22222223. The Fruition of Grace in Glory.
It is evident in this list, that the logic of Calvinism, can be viewed
as a ramified structure branching out from two original tenets, 1. The
authority of the Word of God, and 2. The Content of the Word of God.
What Prior thus describes as The Logic of Calvinism is away of thinking
aboutChristian dogma inwhich it is evident that the tenets of Calvinism
rests solely upon Scripture. It is of course evident that, while opponents
of Calvinismwould dismiss such a logic as subjectivism, Prior would be
able to assert the same of the logic of Calvinism as he did for the analogy
of faith.
Prior’s ‘Logic of Calvinism’ and ‘Logic of the word of God’ is a view
on Logic that takes subjectivism seriously, in the sense of accepting an
inward, felt and experienced order seriously. It is not mere subjectivism
however, because it is an ordering of the subject’s interpretations of
what he considered an objective feature of reality. In the early 1940s
Prior did this with regard to Scripture and Doctrine within the Calvin-
ist tradition, but later he did the same for ethics and tenses.
4 Prior’s contribution to Logic and Analysis
Prior’s contribution to logic differs significantly from that of Russell,
especially with regard to his willingness to make analytic investigations
into philosophical topics where the charge of subjectivism is often
brought up. The analogy of faith is perhaps themost vivid and early exam-
ple, but it points toward the much more serious formal investigations
into ethics and tenses. For Russell, all proper philosophical analysis
would end up either with the conclusion that the assumed philosoph-
ical problem was just a logical problem, or with the conclusion that it
was meaningless (Russell 1914 [i]). For that reason Russell’s philoso-
phy implied a criticism of Bergson’s philosophy of evolutionism, which,
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according to Russell, implied a harmful rejection of logic (Russell 1914,
18 [i]). Prior agreed with Russell in rejecting Bergson’s view on logic,
but he discovered that philosophywithmodal logic, in various interpre-
tations, could give a much more rigorous sense to Bergson than what
Russell was capable of. This discovery caused him to make the follow-
ing reflection in an unpublished note, most likely written in the early
50s:
Perhaps you could call my logic a mixture of Frege and Ko-
lakowski. — I want to join the formal rigorism of the one
with the vitalism of the other. Perhaps you regard this as
a bastard mixture — a mesalliance. — I think it is a higher
synthesis. And I think it important that people who care for
rigorism and formalism should not leave the basic flux and
flow of things in the hands of existentialists and Bergsoni-
ans and others who love darkness rather than light, but we
should enter this realm of life and time, not to destroy it, but
to master it with our techniques.
(Prior, MS i box 6, Bodleian Library)
Prior’s early philosophy and analysis of theology suggests that he
was working with a much broader understanding of Logic than Russel,
and for that matter also Bovell. This understanding undoubtedly owes
much to the influence of J.N. Findlay. Reflecting upon his teaching of
Prior, Findlay writes that he “greatly admired and valued his steadfast
subordination of symbolic skill to metaphysical insight” (Findlay 1985,
26) [3]. While Prior never succeeded in writing up a ‘Logic of the word
of God’, or for that matter ‘Logic of Calvinism’, he undoubtedly con-
tributedmuch to analytic theology through his important analysis of the
problem of foreknowledge and free will in Formalities of Omniscience
(1962) [10].
5 Conclusion
Prior’s early article ‘TheAnalogy of Faith’ offers productive insights into
Prior’s view on logic because it presents us with one of his earliest at-
tempts to apply logic to a field against which the charge of subjectivism
has often been raised. We have argued that Prior’s view on the analogy
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of faith provides a novel perspective on the idea that should be seen to-
gether with his work of the logic of Calvinism. ‘The Analogy of Faith’,
like ‘The Logic of Calvinism, is about the particular reformed way of
thinking about Christian dogma in which it is evident that the tenets of
Calvinism rest solely upon Scripture. Prior seems to have lost interest
in pursuing these inquiries rather soon and, with regard to Calvinism,
turned his interest towards the more historical aspects of reformed the-
ology. When, however, Prior later undertook intense studies into formal
logic he turned his logical acumen into other areas where the charge of
subjectivism often has been raised. His conviction that logic should not
leave the flow and flux to existentialist philosophers like Bergson is al-
ready present in his earliest work on theology.
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Abstract
In the four years before creating his first system of tense logic, A.N. Prior
developed a quantificational theory of modality based on the idea that
propositions express states of affairs, whilemodal operators quantify over
them. This theory is outlined in the unpublished 1950-51 manuscript
“The Craft of Formal Logic” and further elaborated in several journal ar-
ticles written in the two subsequent years. It was also in this period that
he became familiar with the logic of Łukasiewicz and adopted his formal-
ism and proof theory, but disagreed with his view on modality. Some of
Prior’s most important papers from the early period argue against Łuka-
siewicz’s truth-functional understanding ofmodality and its treatment in
many-valued logic. Prior wrote on the quantificational nature of modal
operators, on possible states of affairs as an extra-logical parameter of
truth and on the bivalent character of logical modality that, in his opin-
ion, reflected more naturally the meaning of the modal predicates. This
paper surveys issues concerning the nature of modality that preoccupied
early Prior.
Keywords: Arthur Prior, modal logic, logical modality, truth-functional
modality, history ofmodal logic, Łukasiewicz’smodal logic, many-valued
logic.
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1 Early Prior
The “early Prior” period is the first phase of Arthur Prior’s original con-
tribution to modal and temporal logic. It is bounded at the lower end
by the publication of Prior (1949), where we see his initial interest to set
ordinary and modal logics apart, and at the upper end by the creation
of his first tense logic papers, when in the first half of 1954 he emerged
as a more matured author. During these five years, Prior developed a
quantificational theory of modality based on the idea that propositions
express states of affairs and modal operators quantify over them. He
believed that it was these non-ordinary, ‘peculiar’ objects of quantifica-
tion that provided the distinctive character of modal logic compared
to ordinary predicate logic. This theory is outlined in the unpublished
textbook “The Craft of Formal Logic” and further elaborated in a series
of articles.
It was during this period that Prior gradually became familiar with
the logic of Łukasiewicz and his followers. Łukasiewicz had profound
and long-lasting influence on Prior’s logic, although their views of mo-
dality differed significantly. Prior immediately adopted Łukasiewicz’s
formalism, but took critical position towards the truth-functional
treatment of modal operators and the many-valued approach to modal
logic. His debateswith Łukasiewicz on the nature ofmodality are found
on the pages of Prior (1952), where he promoted ‘states of affairs’ as
an extra-logical parameter of truth, in Prior (1953), where he argued
against the truth-functional nature of modal operators, in Prior (1953b),
where he identified two different types of modality, in Prior (1954),
where he constructed translational semantics for modal logic. These
and several other articles, as well as Prior’s correspondence with Łuka-
siewicz, Meredith, Popper and others from this period, show the devel-
opment of the ideas and notions that are built in his mature modal and
tense logics.
2 Setting up the Framework
Prior’s quantificational theory ofmodality began to develop after he crit-
ically reviewed Boole (1847). Prior was impressed by Boole’s sugges-
tion to ground his algebraic propositional logic in a domain that would
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provide values for propositional symbols. The domain was a proposi-
tional universe, imagined as a collection of ‘all conceivable cases and
conjunctures of circumstances’ in which the considered propositions
were true. Prior saw it as “an exhaustive collection ofmutually exclusive
‘truth-possibilities’,” and an anticipation ofWittgenstein’s ‘logical space’
whose boundaries were drawnwith the ‘truth-tables’ (Prior 1949, p. 176
[19].) But a closer look revealed to Prior that Boole’s assumption gener-
ated only modal interpretation for the propositional expressions of the
calculus. Wanting a formal system that could also handle contingent
propositions and arguments, Prior went on to correct Boole and in “The
Craft of Formal Logic”1 sketched his own propositional universe and a
semantic theory for modality. Modalities were classified and defined
in analogy with the quantificational theory. Using the phrase ‘true in a
state of affairs’, Prior described ‘necessarily p’ as ‘p is true in all possible
states of affairs’, ‘possibly p’ as ‘p is true in some possible states of af-
fairs’ and ‘p’ without a modal adjective as ‘p is true in the actual state of
affairs’. Modal operators ‘L’ and ‘M’, borrowed from Feys (1950), were
treated as the universal and existential quantifiers over ‘possible states
of affairs’. What made these operators distinct from ordinary quanti-
fiers were the objects of quantification. Prior believed that the distinct
object of quantification was the key element in his theory that kept the
modal system from collapsing into ordinary quantifier logic.2
Simultaneously with setting up the new theory, Prior decided to for-
malise as many of his ideas as possible, using the symbolism of Łukasie-
wicz. He claimed that it enabled him to bring out the logical relations
more clearly than ordinary language, especially the similarity between
modal operators and quantifiers and the analogy between their respec-
tive logics. The analogy was the bases of his theory of modality. There
were features of Łukasiewicz’s logical language that Prior found very
helpful in that respect. One was the use of so-called truth-functors,
which formed truth-functions out of single propositions. Their vari-
ables, symbolised with ‘𝛿’, 𝜀, ‘𝜙’, etc., stood for any one-place truth-
1A.N. Prior wrote “The Craft of Formal Logic” during 1950-51. It remained unpub-
lished because after the reviewers advised Prior to make substantial changes to it, he
wrote a completely newmanuscript, which appeared in 1955 under the title Formal Logic.
The manuscript of “The Craft” is kept in the Bodleian Library in Oxford, as part of the
collection of Prior’s material. It is digitised and available online on the Virtual Lab for
Prior Studies.
2See Markoska-Cubrinovska (2016).
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functor, like ‘–’, ‘→ q’, ‘q & ’, etc., while the expression ‘𝜙p’ symbol-
ised any of the respective truth-functions. When the propositional vari-
ables in a formula are substituted with truth-functional variables, the
resulting formula, like ‘(𝜙p & 𝜙–p) → 𝜙q’ (known as Leśniewski’s pro-
tothetic), takes a far more general form than the original one. “The
chief technical difference between the elementary propositional calcu-
lus, without variable functors, and the 𝛿-extension seems to be that, in
the first, if two theses can interact […] there is a most general form of
their result, unique apart from re-lettering; whereas, in the second, if
there is interaction, there are in general an infinity of different results”
(Meredith 1952, [17]). Functor-variables seemed to suit early Prior’s
view of propositionswell. Their use in Polish logic tradition encouraged
him to promote his favourite view of propositions as propositional func-
tions and the syntactic similarity between higher-order propositional
functions and predicates. It enabled him to express modal propositions
as propositional functions of basic propositions representing possible
states of affairs. Another feature that he borrowed from Łukasiewicz
were the quantifiers. Unlike the usual quantifiers that range over in-
dividual objects of predication, Łukasiewicz’s ‘Π’ and ‘Σ’ quantified
propositions. It made them good candidates for translating modal op-
erators, which Prior at the time already analysed as quantifiers of pos-
sible states of affairs. In Prior (1954) he would formally translate the
necessity and possibility operators as Łukasiewicz’s quantifiers.
Prior soon realised that his general approach to modality differed
significantly from that of Łukasiewicz. Still using Łukasiewicz’s sym-
bolism and proof methods, he continued developing his rudimentary
theory ofmodality, but ended up arguing against some of Łukasiewicz’s
theses on the nature of modal operators and the relevance of many-
valued logic for modal contexts.
3 Modality is not Truth-Functional: Prior contra
Łukasiewicz #1
The framework that Prior developed in “The Craft” was based on the as-
sumption that modal operators are similar in nature to quantifiers. The
difference between the two fields was due, insisted Prior, to the nature
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of the objects of quantification. But that also meant that modal opera-
tors were not truth-functors, as Łukasiewicz claimed. Right from the
start, this was one of the main points of disagreement with the logic of
Łukasiewicz. It was also the topic of his two earliest modal logic papers
(Prior 1952, 1953), andhis correspondencewith Bochenski, Łukasiewicz
and Popper from that period.
Łukasiewicz used Leśniewski’s protothetic to analyse and reject cer-
tain modal theorems, on the basis that modal operators yield unwanted
results when substituted for the truth-functor ‘𝜙’: “Professor Łukasie-
wicz has pointed out that if we let the ‘𝜙’ in Leśniewski’s theorem be a
modal operator, we are liable to obtain curious results. For example, if
we let it be M, we obtain CKMpMNpMq [(Mp & M–p) → Mq], ‘If both
P and not-P are possible then any proposition at all is possible.’ This is a
fantastic contention; for it is plainly possible, at least logically, both that
every man should be mortal and that not every man should be mortal,
but many other things, e.g. that there should be some man who is not a
man, are as plainly not possible. The obvious conclusion to draw from
this (though it is not the one drawn by Professor Łukasiewicz) is that
Leśniewski’s theorem is not applicable to modal functions” (Prior 1950-
51, pp. 728-9 [20]). This discussion makes the core of Prior (1953), the
first paper on modal logic that Prior wrote.3
“On Propositions neither Necessary nor Impossible” argues against Łu-
kasiewicz’s exclusion of contingent possibility from modal logic. Łuka-
siewicz claimed that Aristotelian thesis ‘Mp ↔ M–p’, where ‘M’ means
‘neither necessary nor impossible’, “implies a contradiction” (Prior 1953,
p. 105 [25]) and “that any systemwhich admits propositions of the form
Mp must reject the Aristotelian thesis ‘Mp ↔ M–p’, on pain of landing
itself in absurdities” (Prior 1953, p. 106 [25]). In his earlier criticism of
Boole, Prior (1949) already commented on the need for logic to include
material premises as well, “such as ‘If I didn’t plant potatoes in the sec-
ond row, I planted them in the fifth’” (Prior 1949, p. 178-9 [19]). By
early Prior’s standards, ‘Mp ↔ M–p’ should be allowed in a system of
modal logic. But, why did Łukasiewicz want to reject it? The nerve of
3Prior (1953) is Prior’s earliest written modal logic paper, received by JSL on 5
November 1951. It was clearly submitted before Prior (1952), which mentions it in
a footnote on p. 139 as forthcoming. By then, the main argument of Prior (1953) was
already known to Bochenski, who sent his comments to Prior in a letter from 26October
1951.
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Łukasiewicz’s argument against contingent possibility was its applica-
tion in Leśniewski’s thesis ‘(𝜙p & 𝜙–p) → 𝜙q’, which predicts that “if
anything is true both of a given proposition P and of its contradictory,
then it is true of any proposition whatsoever” (Prior 1950-51, p. 727
[20]). If Aristotle’s ‘Mp ↔ M–p’ is allowed, then the implication ‘(Mp
& M–p) → Mq’, obtained from Leśniewski’s formula, leads to the ab-
surd conclusion that any contingent proposition is true in that system.
In other words, “it follows from this thesis, together with the assump-
tion that some propositions are ‘possible’ in the Aristotelian [contin-
gent] sense, that any proposition whatever is ‘possible’ (in that sense).”
(Prior 1953, p. 105 [25]).
The rejection of the contingent possibilitywas unacceptable for Prior,
since he believed that any useful logic should be able to say something
about contingent propositions. He put Łukasiewicz’s conclusion un-
der scruteny and found that it was based on a wrong interpretation
of Leśniewski’s formula. Łukasiewicz thought of modal operators as
truth-functors and freely substituted ‘M’ for ‘𝜙’. For Prior that was the
crucial mistake: ‘M’ was not a truth-functor and it could not replace
a functor-variable. Leśniewski’s thesis worked for truth-functions, but
did notwork formodal operators, and Łukasiewicz shouldn’t have used
it inmodal context. To prove this, Prior constructed a reductio argument:
he substituted the propositional operator ‘𝜙’ in ‘(𝜙p & 𝜙–p) → 𝜙q’ with
the operator ‘not necessary’. The meaning of ‘not necessary’ coincided
with the meaning of ordinary ‘M’. The result of the substitution, “if it
is true of any given proposition that both it and its contradictory are
not-necessary, then it is true of any proposition whatever that it is not-
necessary”, was equally absurd as the Łukasiewicz’s original one. It
would hardly be acceptable to reject ‘Necessary p’ or ‘Possibly p’ from a
modal logic, says Prior, because “it is surely a poor sort of modal logic
which will not allow us to say both that some propositions are neces-
sary and some are neither-necessary-nor-impossible” (Prior 1953, p. 106
[25]). He further pointed out that the absurd conclusion in his exam-
ple was not even dependent on the Aristotelian thesis ‘Mp ↔ M–p’. It
clearly followed solely from the interpretation of ‘(𝜙p & 𝜙–p) → 𝜙q’.
The thesis holds only if ‘𝜙’ is substitutedwith truth-functional operators,
like ‘–’, ‘p → ’ etc. “What the above argument shows, I would suggest,
is simply that modal operators such as ‘It is necessary that’ and ‘It is
neither necessary nor impossible that’ are just not operators of this sort,
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and that is why Leśniewski’s formula is inapplicable to them” (Prior
1953, p. 107 [25].) Prior’s conclusion is that modal operators are not
truth-functional by nature. He compares them to quantifiers, for which
he also claims are not truth-functional and do not feature well in place
of the functor variable.
The nature of modal operators was a matter of discussion between
Prior and Bochenski soon after Prior sent him the manuscript of Prior
(1953). “Łukasiewicz takes for granted that the Aristotelian functors
(modal) are to be interpreted as truth-value functors. And there the
whole difficulty lies – for once you assume so much, you do get a con-
tradiction […] About the theorem of Leśniewski […] you simply cannot
doubt it (if interpreted) in bivalent logic. To me it […] is even intuitive
in itself.” Bochenski had positive comments about Prior’s argument
for non-truth-functionality and suggested him to contact Łukasiewicz:
“The proof you give in your second letter is amazingly simple. Could
you not send it directly to Łukasiewicz?” (Bochenski 1951, [3]). Pop-
per expressed a similar opinion on Prior (1953): “I agree with your
view concerning Łukasiewicz ’s criticism ofmodal logic. I toowas aston-
ished by his argument ‒ after all, Leśniewski’s “thesis” is not a thesis of
logic, it only states a fact about the functors of non-modal logic” (Popper
1952, [18]). But Łukasiewicz did not find Prior’s argument compelling
enough to reconsider his position: “I did not forget that the modal func-
tions are different from the functions of the so-called ‘material impli-
cation’, but I believe that the best and the most reasonable approach to
them is to treat them as ‘truth-functions’.” He agreedwith Prior’s obser-
vation that they do not work in Leśniewski’s principle of bivalence, but
suggested a different explanation from his. “The two-valued logic is,
of course, not applicable to them[…] All systems of modal logic, so for
instance the systems of Lewis, are many-valued systems” (Łukasiewicz
1953b, [10]).
In the 1951 letter, Bochenski directed Prior’s attention to Church
(1951) and his comments on Łukasiewicz’s dismissal of Aristotle’s
modal thesis ‘Mp→M–p’ in the context of the principle of bivalence.
Church gives a concrete advice on how modal logic should avoid the
undesirable consequences of the contingent possibility operator. “Ad-
vocates of modality may meet it either by rejecting the principle of bi-
valence or by distinguishing between variables having truth-values as
their values (to which the principle of bivalence is applicable) and vari-
105
ables having propositions as their values (to which the connective or
‘functor’ M is applicable)” (Church 1951, pp. 229-230 [5]). Church’s di-
rection had almost immediate effect on Prior, visible already in his next
paper. It also had a longer term effect on his general view of modal-
ity, giving him the confidence to stick to the position that modal logic
should make use of values other than truth-values.
4 Modal Logic is not Many-Valued: Prior contra
Łukasiewicz #2
Church’s suggestion thatmodal logic can coexistwith the principle of bi-
valence ifmodal operators are applied to “variables having propositions
as their values” coincides with Prior’s own thesis defended in his inau-
gural piece onmodal logic in “The Craft”. Prior insists there that modal
concepts can be expressed in ordinary propositional logic as an exten-
sion of it, and can stay distinct from it only if variables behindmodal op-
erators are taken as propositions representing possible states of affairs
and not as truth-values. Church’s modal dilemma was saying practi-
cally the same thing: if you want to build a logical system for modality,
either reject the bivalence principle ‘(𝜙f & 𝜙–f) → 𝜙g’, or accept vari-
ables that stand for something other than truth-values. Hearing it from
Church and emphasised by Bochenski must have been a strong encour-
agement for Prior to continue with this approach to modal logic. Soon
after Bochenski’s letter, Prior wrote Prior (1952).4
“In what sense is modal logic many-valued?” aims to show that a satis-
factory interpretation for modality is possible without the use of many-
valued logic. Prior proposed to analyse Lewis’s ‘strict implication’, C’pq
or L(p → q), as a special case of Russell’s ‘formal implication’ ∀x(fx →
gx), by interpreting the necessity operator according to his theory in
“The Craft”, as a universal quantifier of ‘possible states of affairs’. For
that purpose, he assumed a propositional universe with two possible
states of affairs, generating four possible values for each proposition:
true in neither state, true in the first state only, true in the second state
only, and true in both states. Using these four values for both the an-
4Prior (1952) came out in June 1952 and is Prior’s earliest published piece on modal
logic, although he wrote it after Prior (1953).
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tecedent and the consequent, he constructed a truth-table for ‘p strictly
implies q’ in a two-state universe. The resultingmatrix resembled those
in Łukasiewicz’s multi-valued logic, but in essence was a very different
one.
Prior’s matrices differed from the matrices of many-valued logic in
two significant aspects. The critical difference consisted in the type of
input values in the matrix. Łukasiewicz’s matrices operated exclusively
with truth-values. Input values in the matrices of Prior (1952) were or-
dered pairs in which only the first element was a truth-value and the
second was not. The second element was a set of propositions describ-
ing a ‘possible state of affairs’, or, as Prior himself had put it earlier
in “The Craft”, “entities which already have a modal character” (Prior
1950-51, pp. 744 [20]). The other difference was in the number of truth-
values that appeared in the matrices. While propositional variables in
Łukasiewicz’s matrices could have one of three or more truth-values, in
Prior’s case they could only be assigned truth or falsehood.
Prior announced in the title that he wanted to examine the treat-
ment of modality in terms of many-valued propositional calculi devel-
oped by Łukasiewicz. Łukasiewicz believed “that the logic of modality
cannot be satisfactorily studied unless we use a many-valued calculus
for its formal expression,” but Prior wasn’t ready to give up the princi-
ple of bivalence so quickly, “for being necessary, being impossible and
being neither are surely not alternatives to being true and being false”
(Prior 1952, p. 138 [21]). If modal logic is not resolvable in bivalent
terms, there has to be some sense of many-valuedness other than truth-
valuedness that can explainmodalmeanings, without leaving bivalence
aside. He took up Church’s advice and implemented a Fregean resolu-
tion by “distinguishing between variables having truth-values as their
values […]and variables having propositions as their values” (Church
1951, pp. 229-230 [5]). In other words, truth-functional propositions
would be treated in bivalent terms, and modal propositions in some
kind of many-valued terms. The only “sense in which modal logic is
many-valued” (Prior 1952, p. 138 [21]), according to Prior, was to view
propositions as if expressing possible states of affairs and modal oper-
ators as quantifiers over them. In that way, modal propositions would
appear to express more than two values. In the rest of the article, Prior
reinterpreted propositions as predicates of possible states of affairs and
illustrated his sense of many-valuedness by constructing various value-
107
tables for ordinary and modal propositions.
The theory outlined in Prior (1952) is a continuation of the one in
“The Craft”. While in “The Craft” Prior drew the parallel between quan-
tification and modality from syntactic standpoint, in this paper he went
a step further and made a semantic parallel. The first result of the se-
mantic parallel is the following assumption: themodal value of a propo-
sition is “the set of possible states of affairs in which the proposition in
question is true” (Prior 1952, p. 140 [21]). Prior proposed that the sets of
possible states of affairs in which propositions are true be called ‘modal
extensions’, in accordance with the values of predicate functions. Then
it becomes obvious that “there is multiplicity of modal values... just as
there are of quantificational values” (Prior 1952, p. 141 [21]). For exam-
ple, if the extension of ‘f’ = {a, b}, then ‘fa’ is true; if themodal extension
of ‘p’ = {w, u}, then ‘p(w)’ is true. The multi-valued character of ‘quan-
tified predicates’ is due to the multiplicity of objects in the predicates’
extensions. Similarly, the multi-valued character of modal propositions
is due to the multiplicity of possible states of affairs in the propositions’
modal extensions.
There was very little understanding at the time for Prior’s position
on many-valued logic and modality. Łukasiewicz insisted that modal-
ity can only be analysed in many-valued logic and that “[a]ll systems of
modal logic, [including] the systems of Lewis, are many-valued
systems.” (Łukasiewicz 1953b, [10]) Popper openly expressed his dis-
agreementwith the approach tomodality andmany-valuedness in Prior
(1952): “I do not think the question in this [paper] forms a good ques-
tion, and I do not think that the answer you give is a satisfactory answer.
Surely, modal logic in your sense is, simply, not a many valued logic in
the sense in which this term was used by Łukasiewicz” (Popper 1952,
p. 1 [18]). But Prior stood firmly to his views, replying to Popper: “I
agree, I think, with the substance of your objections to my paper ‘In
what sense are modal logics many-valued?’ So far as I can see that pa-
per does give the only sort of sense in which logical necessity, possibility,
etc. can be represented by value-matrices, and as I insist, and you still
more strongly, the matrices I give aren’t at all truth-value-matrices; but
since I wrote that paper I have come to see a great deal more point in
associating certain non-logical senses of the modal words with matrices
that are much more like truth-value matrices” (Prior 1952d, p. 3 [24]).
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5 Logical vs Truth-Functional Modality: Prior
contra Łukasiewicz #3
After suggesting that modality can be analysed with the two classical
truth-values and the propositional universe as an extra-logical element,
Prior went back to Łukasiewicz’s three-valued system in order to ex-
amine its relevance for modal logic and understand the reasons behind
Łukasiewicz’s insistence on the truth-functional nature of modality and
its treatment in many-valued logic. The result was Prior (1953b).5
“Three-Valued Logic and Future Contingents”was inspired by Łukasie-
wicz’s original three-valued logic,6 designed to deal with Aristotle’s fu-
ture contingents. Unable to evaluate future contingents as true (1) or
as false (0) at the time of utterance, Łukasiewicz introduced for such
indeterminate cases the third value (1/2).
What seems to have particularly fascinated Prior was how in three-
valued logic the notion of ‘possibility’ was introduced solely from truth-
value calculations. It had been observed that thematerial implication ‘If
not-p then p’, (‘–p → p’, or the so-called consequentia mirabilis), “is true
so long as Np [not-p] is no closer to truth than p is; but whereas in two-
valued logic the only way for this to happen is by Np being false and p
true, in three-valued logic it may also happen by Np and p both having
the value 1/2.” The latter case, when ‘If not-p then p’ is true “whether
because p is true and Np [not-p]... false, or because p has the value
1/2 and Np... the same,” is identical to saying ‘It is possible that p’, or
‘possibly p’, or ‘Mp’ (Prior 1953b, p. 321 [26].) Prior realised that this
definition of ‘Mp’ was indeed truth-functional, as Łukasiewicz insisted.
Thematrix for ‘M’, derived from the truth table for ‘–p → p’ showed that
truth-functional ‘Mp’ is truewhen ‘p’ is true or indeterminate, and from
there other modalities were defined: ‘It is necessary that p’ as ‘–M–p’,
5Prior (1953b) was very likely written in themiddle of 1952, before Prior sent a draft
copy to J. Smart for an opinion and J. Smart replied: “Thanks for the letter and the article.
I’m glad the P.Q.will be publishing something in pure logic. It’s time they did!” (Smart
1952, p. 1 [31]). and then went on discussing sentences that are neither True nor False.
6Prior’s main sources for Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic were (Łukasiewicz 1951)
and (Lewis and Langford 1932). Originally, three-valued logic was developed and dis-
cussed by Łukasiewicz, Tarski andWajsberg in Polish, in several papers from 1920, 1930
and 1932. It was first introduced in English by Lewis in (Lewis and Langford 1932), but
without the use of Łukasiewicz’s symbolism and unrelated to its original purpose – to
deal with the future contingents. Prior aimed in Prior (1953b) to correct this.
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‘It is impossible that p’ as ‘–Mp’ and ‘It is contingent that p’ as ‘Mp &
M–p’.
Yet, Prior wasn’t convinced that this was the right way to express
modality. It bothered him that “certain features of the modal truth-
tables […] seem a little peculiar, from the point of view of ordinary
modal logic.” (Prior 1953b, p. 321-2 [26].) Łukasiewicz’s modal func-
tions did not entirely match Prior’s intuitions about the corresponding
modal notions. In the three-valued system, ‘Impossibly p’ is true when-
ever ‘p’ is false, although ‘p’ may contingently be false, in which case ‘p’
is not impossible in ordinary sense. In a similar way, ‘It is contingent
that p’ is automatically false if ‘p’ happens to be true/false, although
it may contingently be true/false; ‘It is necessary that p’ is true when-
ever ‘p’ is true, although it could just be contingently true; and ‘It is
possible that p’ is always false when ‘p’ is false, although ‘p’ could be
true while actually false. Analysing the discrepancy between the infor-
mal meanings and the truth-tables, Prior traced its source in the use of
the third value. The third value was essential for defining modality in
Łukasiewicz’s system. In the cases where ‘p’ has one of the two classic
truth-values, the operators do not differ from ordinary truth-functors.
In those cases ‘Mp’ is equivalent to ‘p’, ‘–Mp’ is equivalent to ‘–p’, ‘Qp’
is equivalent to ‘p & –p’, etc. By introducing the third value, it becomes
possible to differentiate ‘Mp’ from ‘p’, but the formal properties of ‘M’
and the other operators do not match “those of ordinary modal opera-
tors.” What ‘M’ actually described, according to Prior, was the indeter-
minate truth-value of “propositions about the future” that are “neither
true nor false when they are uttered, on the ground that there is as yet
no definite fact with which they can accord or conflict” (Prior 1953b,
p. 323 [26].) He concluded that Łukasiewicz’s three-valued systemwas
perfectly suitable to deal with “the problem which it was originally de-
signed for handling – the problem of ‘future contingents’” (Prior 1953b,
p. 322 [26]), but was not good enough basis for modal logic.
Among the arguments supporting his claim, Prior emphasised the
fact that Łukasiewicz’s modal functions never produced the third truth-
value. The basic modal function ‘Mp’, defined as ‘–p → p’, is never in-
determinate, being either true or false for all three values of ‘p’. Conse-
quently, no modal functions derived from ‘Mp’ can obtain the indeter-
minate value. This confirmed to Prior that modal logic was not many-
valued: ”For ‘It is possible that p’ is definitely true not only when p is
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definitely true but also when it is not yet either true or false […] This pe-
culiarity accords well enough with our intuitive notion of a ‘possibility’
as that which is somehow real even when that of which it is a possibil-
ity is not yet so; and it has the effect of giving a two-valued character to
the modal part of the three-valued system. […] [T]he question as to the
truth, falsehood or indeterminacy of a proposition of [a three-valued]
system is a question as to present and therefore determinate fact, so that
the logic or part of logic with which we handle such a question is itself
in effect two-valued” (Prior 1953b, p. 323-4 [26].)
In the summary of his divergence from Łukasiewicz’s many-valued
modal logic, Prior concluded that what the two of them spoke about
were different types ofmodality. Łukasiewicz analysed truth-functional
modality, while what Prior had in mindwas ‘logical’ modality. He illus-
trated the distinction with the notion of necessity. “[L]ogical necessity
is not what the ‘NMN’ [–M–] of Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic refers
to. For ‘NMNp’ is in this system a truth-function, while ‘It is logically
necessary that p’ is in no system a truth-function, but rather expresses a
consequential higher-order characteristic of some truth-functions.”
(Prior 1953b, p. 324 [26].) He further explained the difference between
truth-functional and logicalmodality in terms of their formal evaluation
and consequences. “In Łukasiewicz’s system, whenever Np is true we
have not only NMp but also, and consequently, CNpNMp [–p → –Mp]
[…] And since CNpNMp [–p → –Mp] is […] true, it is (in these cir-
cumstances) ‘necessary’.” But ‘–p → –Mp’ is not logically necessary. Its
truth-table shows that it is true when ‘p’ is true or false, but not when ‘p’
is indeterminate, which means that it is not a logical law. “If it did turn
out to be a logical law, CMpp [Mp → p] would also be a logical law […]
[and] since in any case CpMp [p → Mp] is a law, ‘p’ and ‘Mp’ would
be mutually inferable, the distinction between truth and indeterminacy
would disappear […] and the three-valued logic would collapse into a
two-valued one” (Prior 1953b, p. 325 [26].) Prior realised that his dis-
agreement with Łukasiewicz’s approach to modal logic was the result
of fundamentally different understanding of modality. Łukasiewicz’s
‘truth-functional’ modality was formally defined within a system of or-
dinary logic, and it was possible to keep the modal area from collapsing
into the ordinary one precisely because of the three-valued semantics.
The other type of modality that Prior called ‘logical’, was defined by
‘logical laws’ derived from the principle of bivalence, which were in fact
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Aristotelian type of self-evident reasoning principles, like ‘p → p’.
Prior’s correspondence reveals that he tried to clear up these points
of disagreement directly with Łukasiewicz, sending him letters andma-
terial on the topic ever since Bochenski urged him to do so in October
1951. Łukasiewicz did not reply himself immediately, sending instead
messages through others. In August 1952 Prior received his first let-
ter from Meredith: “Professor Łukasiewicz has asked me to send you a
copy of my paper on his C-𝛿 calculus” (Meredith 1952 [17]). When he
finally replied, Łukasiewicz confirmed that his understanding ofmodal-
ity was fundamentally different from Prior’s: “I cannot agree with your
explanation of modal logic […] There are […] points I cannot accept.
(1) That modal functors are not truth-functors; it is not possible to con-
struct otherwise a modal calculus, – all modal functors of Lewis are
truth-functors” (Łukasiewicz 1955, p. 1 [11]). But he also admitted that
Prior’s criticism of the three-valued system was justified: “I agree with
your remarks on my trivalued [sic] system treated as modal logic. In
my opinion, this system is now obsolete as modal logic. But it was
once historically important as the first many-valued system of logic”
(Łukasiewicz 1956, p. 6 [12]). Łukasiewicz updated his three-valued
system with a new, four-valued modal system and suggested to Prior
to look at it instead. “I shall send you a paper on modal logic which I
have recently finished and which will appear in the Journal of Comput-
ing Systems” (Łukasiewicz 1953b, [10]). The paper was Łukasiewicz
(1953), and it came to Prior at the right time to help him crystallise the
distinction between the different notions of modality.
6 Understanding Modality through Formal
Translation
Łukasiewicz’s newmodal system inŁukasiewicz (1953)was constructed
as an extension of his δ-propositional calculuswith two special functors,
‘Δ’ for ‘Possibly’ and ‘Γ’ for ‘Necessarily’, which satisfied certain condi-
tions. The conditions consisted of axioms that were asserted,
like ‘⊢Γp→p’ and ‘⊢p→Δp’, and others that were rejected, ‘⊣p→Γp’,
‘⊣Δp→p’ and ‘⊣Δp’. The rejection of the latter was to ensure that the
systemwould staymodal. Łukasiewiczwas aware “that amodal system
may be made pointless not only by asserting ‘Δp→p’ and so identifying
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‘Δp’ with the plain ‘p’, but also by asserting ‘Δp’ itself and so identify-
ing it with the tautological function ‘p → p’. That is, ‘Possibility’ may
be misunderstood not only as a definite ‘Yes’ but also as saying nothing
at all” (Prior 1958, p. 273 [30]). He set it up as four-valued because
no two-valued or three-valued truth-functions satisfied all the required
conditions for modality.
As this modal system was entirely truth-functional, Prior was in-
spired to use its base as a tool for expressing modality in extensional
terms. Moreover, he was hopeful to do that for different notions of
modality. Although in Prior (1953b) he distinguished between truth-
functional and logical necessity, he did not say clearly what he meant
by logical modality. Now he felt he was able to formally describe both
notions, which prompted him to write Prior (1954),7 where he com-
pared Łukasiewicz’s modal logic, representing truth-functional modal-
ity, with those of Lewis and von Wright that Prior associated with
logical modality. The analysis of both systems of modal logic he did
through formal translation of modal expressions into extensional.
“The Interpretation of Two Systems of Modal Logic” assumed that the
differences between various modal systems were consequences of how
the core notion of possibility was understood. The differences between
Łukasiewicz (1953) and Lewis and Langford (1932) or von Wright
(1951) were “due simply to the fact that what Łukasiewicz on the one
hand and Lewis and von Wright on the other mean by ‘Possibly’ are
quite different things, and I shall offer a pair of simple interpretations
which will adequately account for the peculiarities of each” (Prior 1954,
p. 201 [27].)
He first informally described the nature of Lewis’s and vonWright’s
modalities. In their systems, ‘Possibly p’means that the truth of pwould
not violate any logical laws, while ‘Necessarily p’ means that the false-
7Prior (1954) was written sometime in the middle of 1953, between Łukasiewicz’s
letter (2 May 1953) that recommended Łukasiewicz (1953) and 15 October 1953, when
the journal received Prior’s manuscript. There is a letter from J. Smart to Prior from 19
November 1953 in which he thanks Prior for sending him the paper. “Thanks for letting
me see your ‘interpretations of modal logic’. You seem to have mastered that variable
functor stuff OK. Most ingenious, it appears” (Smart 1953, p. 1 [32]). About the same
time, Ivo Thomas also mentioned to have seen it. “Your paper on the interpretation
of the two modal systems seems to me of the first importance, and most helpful to me
personally just at this moment, when I must write something coherent on Aristotelian
modes” (Thomas 1953, p. 1 [33]).
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hood of p would violate some logical law. All other features of these
systems follow from the above principles. Thus, there are propositions
such that the truth of both p and Np wouldn’t violate any logical law,
meaning that both are possible in that sense, “but the truth of KpNp
[p & –p] would always violate a logical law” (Prior 1954, p. 201 [27].)
It was the reason why Lewis, and Prior too, objected to Łukasiewicz’s
thesis ‘(⋄p & ⋄–p) → ⋄(p & –p)’. On the other hand, von Wright’s rule
of necessitation ‘⊢ 𝛼 → ⊢𝛼’ looks natural when ‘𝛼’ means that the
truth of ‘𝛼’ is guaranteed by a logical law.
Next, he used a formal procedure to translate logical modalities into
the system of Łukasiewicz (1953). Saying that no logical laws were vi-
olated with the truth of ‘Possibly p’ or that some were violated with
the falsehood of ‘Necessarily p’, suggests that Prior thought of logical
modalities in quantificational terms. So it seems natural that for express-
ing these modalities formally, he used Łukasiewicz’s symbolic
language with propositional functors and quantifiers. The functors en-
abled expressing complex propositions as predicates of basic proposi-
tions, while Łukasiewicz’s quantification over propositions enabled
straightforward translation of modal operators into quantifiers.
Since modalities in Lewis’s and von Wright’s systems are proper-
ties of propositions, Prior interpreted their modal propositions as high-
order propositional functions. He transformed propositional variables
‘p’, ‘q’, ‘r’ etc., of their modal calculi into high-order propositional func-
tions ‘δp, γp, εp’, the possibility operator symbolised as ‘Δ’ into the exis-
tential quantifier ‘Σp’, and the necessity operator symbolised as ‘Γ’ into
the universal quantifier ‘Πp’, and then translated the rules and axioms
of Von Wright’s strongest system M’’ into the extended C-N-δ calculus
of Łukasiewicz and Meredith. The rule ‘⊢ α↔β → ⊢ Δα ↔Δβ’ became
‘⊢ α↔β → ⊢ Σpα ↔Σpβ’; the necessitation rule ‘⊢α → ⊢ Γα’ became
‘⊢α → ⊢Πpα’, the axiom ‘p → Δp’ became ‘δp → Σpδp’ and so on.
It turns out that von Wright’s ‘translated’ rules and axioms “are
provable in the two-valued propositional C-N-δ calculuswith the single
axiomCδpCδNpδq [δp → (δ–p → δq)], supplemented by Łukasiewicz’s
rules […] for the introduction of quantifiers,” which makes the trans-
lated M’’ “simply an incomplete fragment of this C-N-δ-Π calculus”
(Prior 1954, p. 202 [27]). All usual axioms and rules for the two-valued
calculus in ‘C’ and ‘N’ continue to hold when ‘p, q, r’ are systematically
replaced with ‘δp, γp, εp’ etc. Slightly more complicated was the ex-
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tension of the rule of substitution to cover introductions of Δ, but Prior
made some adjustments that he justified with some derivations and re-
jection of certain disputed formulae. The novelty of Łukasiewicz’s sys-
tem was the rejection operation ‘⊣’, and he kept his modal system from
collapsing by rejecting the axioms ‘⊣ Δp → p’ and ’⊣ Δ p’. This feature
made the new modal logic a complete system. In Lewis-von Wright
systems there is no way of disproving the formula ‘Δp → p’, which,
according to Prior, reflects their fragmentary character relative to the
complete C-N-δ-Π system. Prior called their fragmentary character in-
completeness, and compared it to the incompleteness of Łukasiewicz’s
earlier three-valued calculus. The fact that the translation was done in a
two-valued system signalled to Prior that modal logic didn’t really need
many-valued logic in order to be formalised.
Reviewing Łukasiewicz’s newmodal system, Prior complained that
although it was complete, it did not allow any “intelligible interpre-
tation” of ‘Possibly’. The system was four-valued, with each functor
(including the possibility operator Δ) ranging over the values S (same
as p), V (always true), N (same as not-p) and F (always false). Łukasie-
wicz insisted that any system of modal logic must be many-valued, be-
cause there was no functor of one argument in two-valued logic that
could satisfy the formulae ’⊢ p → Δ p’, ’⊣ Δ p → p’, and ’⊣ Δ p’. But
Prior claimed that if ‘Δ’ was made into a variable functor, by restricting
its possible values to S and V, both Łukasiewicz’s and Lewis’s systems
could receive two-valued interpretations. For example, “a formula like
‘Δ(2 + 2 = 5)’ has not a third or a forth truth-value, but no truth-value
at all, for it is not a proposition, but a proportional function. It only ac-
quires a truth-value, when the variable ‘Δ’ has been assigned one of its
two possible values, and then it would be either simply true or simply
false. ‘Δ(2+2 = 5)’ yields a true proposition with the substitution Δ/V
and a false one with the substitution Δ/S” (Prior 1954, p. 204 [27].)
The result of Prior’s formal translation of Łukasiewicz’s modal logic
into a two-valued high-ordered calculus is that the possibility operator
was interpreted as a variable functor. Prior addressed Łukasiewicz’s
worry that two-valued system could not preserve the modal part of a
propositional logic by giving his explanation how it could be preserved.
In order for a form Δp to be readable as ‘possibly p’, the form Δp must
be deductively weaker than p itself, (which is obtained by asserting
‘p → Δp’ and rejecting ‘Δp → p’), without being too weak to be tauto-
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logical (obtained by rejecting ‘Δp’). In case there are no formulae more
elementary than 𝛿p, these conditions are met by ‘Σpδp’ or ’𝛿p∨ 𝛿 −p’,
which gives the modalities regulated by Lewis and von Wright. In Ł-
modal systems, δp is deductivelyweaker than pwithout being tooweak
by standing ambiguously for Sp (i.e. ‘p’ itself) and the tautological form
Vp. Prior then gives an alternative axiomatisation of Łukasiewicz’s sys-
tems for this interpretation.
This discussion was repeated in condensed form in Prior (1957), in
the first essay, “Basic Modal Logic and Ł-Modal System”, where Prior
would say that “the form ‘Possibly p’ has many meanings but there is
as it were an upper and a lower limit to what it may mean.” He claimed
that although Ł’s operatorMwas introduced as a constant, it turned out
to behave like a variable, standing “either for the plain ‘It is the case that’
or for ‘If it is the case that (so-and-so) then it is” (Prior 1957, p. 4 [29].)
7 Early Prior on Logical Modalities
In early Prior’s writings, ‘logical’ modality is associated with the vague
notions of ‘logical law’ and ‘logical form’.
Prior clearly described his understanding of logical modality in a
letter to Popper from 1952: “I take modal assertions to be assertions
about the forms of propositions, and have such definitions as
Mδp̂ = Σpδp,
meaning, ‘The functor δ is Possible = There is at least one p such that
δp’. If, now, you take a true assertion of possibility such as ‘MNp̂’ (‘The
negation of a proposition is a Possible propositional form’ […]), and ex-
pand it by the definition, you get ΣpNp. This exemplifies many propo-
sitional forms – it is, e.g., a proposition of the form Σpδ̂p – but so far
as I can see one of the forms which it exemplifies is itself a Necessary
propositional form, i.e. one such that all propositions of that form are
true” (Prior 1952c, p. 4 [23]).
Prior’s view of logical modalities is presented also in Bennett (1952):
“In this [article8], propositions about the necessity of propositions are
8A. Prior “On the Symbolising of Modal Functions”, Mind, 1953. The article that
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reduced to propositions about the truth of all propositions exemplify-
ing a given form. On this basis it is easily shown that what is necessary
is necessarily necessary. For where it would normally be said that p is
necessary, Mr Prior says that all propositions exemplifying some form
exemplified by p are true, and he is able to show that assertions of this
sort all exemplify a form of which all exemplifications are true. Thus,
∼3∼p.J . ∼33∼p” (Bennett 1952, pp. 86-87 [1]). These are the same
formulations that appear in “The Craft” as well as in Prior (1955). This
matter was previously discussed between Prior and Bennett in their cor-
respondence: “Your demonstration of the truth of your analogue of the
view that CLpLLp [Lp → LLp] depends, of course, entirely on your
reduction of modal distinctions to distinctions of quantity. If […] an as-
sertion of the necessity of a given proposition is an assertion of the truth
of all propositions which are like the given one in a certain respect, then
CLpLLp [Lp→LLp] does hold and my criticisms don’t affect it” (Ben-
nett 1952b, p. 1 [2]).
In Prior (1954), the notion of ‘logical law’ defines the predicates ‘pos-
sibly’ and ‘necessarily’, although it itself is not characterised any further
and is assumed as self-evident. Prior often resorts toAristotelian type of
self-evident reasoning principles, like ‘p→p’ tomakemodal arguments.
“[T]he assertion that ‘If Socrates is dead he is dead’ is logically necessary
is not automatically made true by the fact that its argument, ‘If Socrates
is dead he is dead’, has the truth-value it has, namely truth; it is true,
rather, because the function ‘If p then p’, which ‘If Socrates is dead he is
dead’ exemplifies, is true no matter what the truth-value of p may be”
(Prior 1953b, p. 324 [26].) He similarly uses the principles of identity,
contradiction and the excluded middle in Prior (1955). The article “Is
Bennett quotes has never been published, nor its manuscript located. Beside the exten-
sive quotes in Bennett (1952), this article is also discussed in the 1952 correspondence
between Bennett and Prior, Prior and Popper, and Mackie and Prior. As one of the edi-
tors of Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Mackie mentions receiving Prior’s manuscript
on modal functions and informs him about their technical capacities for printing the
logical symbolism in that manuscript. He first wrote: “I have had your letter of May
25th with the enclosed… article…. A quick glance at [it] suggests that its symbolism
(with the possible exception of ◊) would be not beyond out printers, but whether it
would be beyond our readers is another matter!” (Mackie 1952, p. 1 [13]). Then, a few
days later, he wrote again: “We can’t do 3 (in yourModal Functions) but it didn’t seem
to be essential to the argument: you could just refer to the fact that Lewis uses another
symbol.” (Mackie 1952b, p. 2 [14]).
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Necessary Existence Possible?”9 discusseswhether the self-evident logical
laws can be used in ontological arguments andwhether “it makes sense
to distinguish between necessary and contingent being” (Prior 1955, p.
545 [28]). Prior dismissed logical necessitation as a candidate for ontol-
ogy, since objective properties could not have logical form and thus be
logically necessary properties.
8 Conclusion
When early Prior sketched his modal theory in “The Craft of Formal
Logic”, he decided that the best tool to formalise it was the logical lan-
guage of Łukasiewicz. Two features of that language fitted Prior’s goal
perfectly: Łukasiewicz’s propositional quantifiers ‘Π’ and ’Σ’ and the
use of the 𝛿-truth-functor. Prior’s theory was quantificational in nature,
based on the assumption that modal operators quantify states of affairs:
‘Necessarily p’ was short for ‘p is true in all possible states of affairs’,
‘possibly p’ for ‘p is true in some possible states of affairs’ and the plain
‘p’ for ‘p is true in the actual state of affairs’. Łukasiewicz’s ‘Π’ and ‘Σ’
were good candidates for representing modal operators conceived as
quantifiers, since they were designed to quantify propositions. Truth-
functors seemed to suit well his view of propositions as propositional
functions of states of affairs.
But Prior’s general approach to modality differed significantly
from that of Łukasiewicz. He disagreed with him regarding the nature
of modal operators and the relevance of many-valued logic for modal
contexts. Assuming that modal operators are a special kind of quanti-
fiers, Prior insisted theywere not truth-functors, as Łukasiewicz claimed.
His argument against the truth-functional nature of modality is given
in Prior (1953), his earliest written modal logic paper. His next paper,
(Prior 1952), followed a similar line of thought, arguing against Łu-
kasiewicz’s claim that modality can only be analysed in many-valued
logic. Early Prior was convinced that modality couldn’t be represented
solely on truth-value basis. Something other than truth-values was also
needed. In Prior (1952), he used ‘possible states of affairs’ beside the
9Prior (1955) was written in mid-1953. In a letter to Prior sent in September 1953,
Mackiemakes extensive comments on themanuscript of this paper (Mackie 1953, [15]).
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two classical truth-values in order to complete the description of modal-
ity.
After showing thatmodality can in fact be analysed in bivalent terms
with the use of ‘states of affairs’ as an extra truth-parameter, in Prior
(1953b) Prior reassessed Łukasiewicz’s three-valued modal logic. He
concluded that Łukasiewicz’s three-valued system was perfectly suit-
able to deal with “the problemwhich it was originally designed for han-
dling – the problem of ‘future contingents’” (Prior 1953b, p. 322 [26]),
but was not good enough basis for modal logic. The three-valuedness
was a condition sine qua non for the purely truth-functional definition
of modality, however, it did not produce modal meanings that matched
the intuitive use of modal words. And the intuitive use was what Prior
wanted to capture with his theory. Prior realised that his previous dis-
agreement with Łukasiewicz’s approach to modal logic was the result
of fundamentally different understanding of modality. Łukasiewicz’s
‘truth-functional’ modality was formally defined within a system of or-
dinary logic, and it was possible to keep the modal area from collapsing
into the ordinary one precisely because of the three-valued semantics.
The other type ofmodality that Prior called ‘logical’, was defined by ‘log-
ical laws’, which were in fact Aristotelian type of self-evident reasoning
principles, and was essentially dependent on the principle of bivalence.
Although in Prior (1953b), Prior distinguished between truth-func-
tional and logical necessity, he did not say clearly what he meant by log-
ical modality. Łukasiewicz’s new modal system in Łukasiewicz (1953)
was constructed as an extension of his δ-propositional calculus with
two special functors, ‘Δ’ for ‘Possibly’ and ‘Γ’ for ‘Necessarily’, which
satisfied certain conditions. Prior now felt he was able to formally de-
scribe both notions, which prompted him to write Prior (1954), where
he compared Łukasiewicz’s modal logic, representing truth-functional
modality, with those of Lewis and vonWright that Prior associatedwith
logical modality. The analysis of both systems of modal logic he did
through formal translation of modal expressions into extensional.
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Abstract
Irish logician Carew Arthur Meredith linked his work with that of two
great logicians, Jan Leopold Łukasiewicz andArthur Prior. In order to un-
derstand his systems of logic, these connections should be taken into con-
sideration. This paper focuses on the first of them, stressing the extent to
which Meredith’s system of modal logic was influenced by Łukasiewicz,
who developed his system of modal logic at the same time. As well as
dealing with Łukasiewicz’s direct impact onMeredith, the paper also dis-
cusses his indirect one—through Łukasiewicz’s introduction of Meredith
to the work of his former pupil, Mordchaj Wajsberg, who suggested the
first semantics for Lewis’s systems of strict implication. A better under-
standing of the connection between the systems of these three logicians
could shed light on some of the systems’ troublesome features.
Keywords: CarewArthurMeredith· Jan Leopold Łukasiewicz·Mordchaj
Wajsberg· four-valued logic· Meredith’s modal logic· property calculus·
extended class calculus.
1 Introduction
Although Carew Arthur Meredith spent most of his academic career in
Ireland, he was considerably influenced by Jan Leopold Łukasiewicz, a
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member of the Lvov-Warsaw School who immigrated to Ireland after
World War Two (see, e.g. Meredith 1977, 514, [21]). However, the con-
nection between Łukasiewicz’s and Meredith’s systems of modal logic
has yet to be given sufficient deliberation. Therefore, the first aim of this
paper is to stress the links that connectMeredith’s system ofmodal logic
with that postulated by Łukasiewicz.1 Nor was Łukasiewicz the only lo-
gician to influence Meredith’s work on modal logic. Meredith also con-
tinued in the work of Mordchaj Wajsberg, Łukasiewicz’s student and a
Holocaust victim. Consequently, I will also discuss the extent to which
Meredith’s system was influenced by Wajsberg’s extended class calcu-
lus, which Surma (1977, 9, [32]) considers to be the first semantics of
Lewis’s calculus of strict implication.
All three systems presented in this paper have certain problems. Me-
redith’s andWajsberg’s systems are rather unknown; nevertheless, both
have their place in the history of modal logic. There are also problems
with the interpretation of certain features of Meredith’s system, while
understanding Łukasiewicz’s is problematic, too. In his system, Łuka-
siewicz included certain non-standard features, causing some authors
not to consider it a system of modal logic at all (see, e.g. Haack 1974,
89–90, [5]). Finally, despite all three systems concerning modal logic,
they are all extensional.2
In this respect, a comparison of these three systems could be
beneficial in demonstrating the interaction between them. A better un-
derstanding of this interaction could in turn help to resolve certain in-
terpretational problems. This is particularly important in the case of
Meredith’s system ofmodal logic. In his paper published in this same is-
1In spite of adopting certain features of Łukasiewicz’s system ofmodal logic, Mered-
ith also focused on Łukasiewicz’s system itself. Specifically, he suggested a shorter and
more concise axiomatisation of the system, introducing as a primitive operator an op-
erator of necessity ‘H’. In this way, Meredith created a system with just three axioms
(see Meredith and Prior 1962, 121, [19]):
1. ⊢ 𝑝 ⊃ (𝛿𝛿𝐻𝑝 ⊃ 𝛿𝑞)
2. ⊣ 𝑝 ⊃ 𝐻𝐻𝑝
3. ⊣ 𝐻𝑝 ⊃ 𝑝
The symbol ’⊣’ is reversed turnstile and it means that the formula which follows is not
a thesis of the system. In contrast, ‘⊢’ turnstile means that the formula which follows is
a thesis of the system. The symbol ‘𝛿’ stands for a functorial variable. Its meaning will
be explained later.
2This issue is discussed in more depth in the papers by Font and Hájek (2002, 173–
174, [4]) and Surma (2012, 166–167, [33]).
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sue, Per Hasle (2019 [6]) argues that Meredith’s contingent constant ‘𝑛’
and his property calculus played an important role in Arthur N. Prior’s
development of hybrid logic. In addition, in 1956 Meredith and Prior
postulated U-calculus, which is based on Meredith’s property calculus
and was one of the first systems of modal logic to combine quantifica-
tion over possibilia with accessibility relation and contain evidence of
possible worlds semantics (see Copeland 2002, 99–100, [1]).
2 Łukasiewicz’s Four-Valued System of Logic
Jan Leopold Łukasiewicz became renowned primarily as the founder
of many-valued logic. The system of three-valued logic and the system
of 𝑛-valued logic, which he introduced in the early twenties of the twen-
tieth century, made his name well known far beyond the borders of his
homeland. The lesser known fact is that Łukasiewicz’s investigation of
systems of many-valued logic did not stop at their development. After
WorldWar Two, he (1970d, 396–397, [14]) began to be critical of the sys-
tems of many-valued logic that he had presented previously. In 1953,
he announced his final system of many-valued logic (see Łukasiewicz
1970c, 391–392, [13]). It was a system of four-valued logic, and it will
be referred to in this paper as Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic.
Łukasiewicz had two reasons for introducing his system of modal
logic. First, he had attempted to formalise Aristotle’s syllogistic and in
his view none of the contemporary systems of modal logic were suited
to this purpose (see Łukasiewicz 1957, v, [10]). In contrast to other
contemporary systems of modal logic, the semantics of Łukasiewicz’s
many-valued logic is based on truth-values (seeWoleński 1999, 77, [36]).
Therefore, Łukasiewicz’s many-valued systems of logic do not require
the existence of possible worlds or time instants, and are extensional,
hence truth-functional. Łukasiewicz (1998, 261, [15]) was convinced
that any decent system of modal logic had to be extensional. Conse-
quently, the main objection that Łukasiewicz (1970c, 363–364, [13]) had
against contemporary systems of modal logic was that they did not ac-
cept the rule of extensionality.3
3The rule of extensionality that Łukasiewicz discussed several times appeared in
Łukasiewicz’s writings in different forms. When he presented his objections against
Von Wright, he claimed that Von Wright’s system did not fulfil the formula (𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞) ⊃
(𝛿𝑝 ⊃ 𝛿𝑞). Later he also introduced the rule as (𝑝 ↔ 𝑞) ⊃ (𝛿𝑝 ↔ 𝛿𝑞) (see Łukasiewicz
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In discussing Łukasiewicz’s views on the systems of modal logic
of his contemporaries, it is important to point out that his philosophy
of logic was different from when he developed his three-valued and
𝑛-valued systems of logic. When he (1970a, 173–176, [11]) dealt with
his previous systems of many-valued logic in his paper Philosophical Re-
marks on Many-Valued Systems, Łukasiewicz argued that only his three-
valued and 𝑛-valued logic were genuine systems of many-valued logic,
and was critical of the systems of contemporaries such as Emil Leo Post
and Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer. Łukasiewicz was convinced at that
time that there is only one true system of logic in the reality and it could
be identified empirically, which one it is (see Surma 2012, 85 [33]).
However, Łukasiewicz changed hismind afterWorldWar Twowhen
presenting his own system of modal logic. He shifted to conventional-
ism and pragmatism in logic and he argued that systems of logic are just
instruments. According to him, we would probably never have been
able to decide which of these instruments was true (see Łukasiewicz
1970c, 378–379, [13]). Surma (2012, 86–87 [33]) suggests that Łukasie-
wicz held in his later period a view called ‘local pluralism’, i.e. the view
that various logical systems are true in various fields of ontology.
Secondly, Łukasiewicz (1970c, 370–371, [13]) did not consider his
previous systems of logic to be sufficient for the formalisation of modal
logic either. He criticised the notion of possibility that occurred in these
systems: specifically, the view that possibility is an intermediate value
‘1/2’ between the truth ‘1’ and the falsehood ‘0’ as postulated in three-
valued logic, and that possibility has infinitelymanydegrees in the inter-
val between truth and falsehood (1, 0) as postulated in 𝑛-valued logic.
After World War Two, Łukasiewicz differentiated two different truth-
values— ‘2’ and ’3’ between truth ‘1’ and falsehood ‘4’. He (1957, 159–
160, [10]) described these four truth-values using the classical two truth-
values, where ‘1’ is the truth and ‘0’ the falsehood:
1 = <1,1>
2 = <1,0>
3 = <0,1>
4 = <0,0>
1970c, 376 [13]) or (𝑝 ↔ 𝑞) ⊃ (𝛿𝑝 ⊃ 𝛿𝑞) (see Łukasiewicz 1970b, 316 [12]). Themeaning
of the functorial variable ’𝛿’ will be explained later.
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Another difference from previous systems of many-valued logic lay
in the relation of Łukasiewicz’s modal logic to the calculus of proposi-
tions and determinism. All tautologies of the classical calculus of propo-
sitions are also tautologies of Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic (see
Font and Hájek 2002, 161–162 [4]). This is not the case in previous sys-
tems: for instance, the rule of contradiction ¬(𝑝 ∧ ¬𝑝) and the rule of
excluded middle 𝑝 ∨ ¬𝑝 are not tautologies in these systems (see Mali-
nowski 2006, 14–15, [16]).
The question then arises of whether the postulation of a four-valued
systemof logicmeant that Łukasiewiczwas no longer interested in deny-
ing determinism, as rejection of these rules was important for his denial
of determinism. The answer to this question is complicated. On the
one hand, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek (2002, 92, [8]) points out that the
four-valued system of logic contains theses that violate indeterminism.
On the other, even in his last book Łukasiewicz (1957, 207–208, [10])
was eager to reject determinism and convinced that Aristotle’s concept
of contingency could be used for this issue.
Łukasiewicz (1957, 166–168, [10]) suggested two versions of axioms
for his system of many-valued logic. The system where a primitive
modal operator is an operator of the possibility ’Δ’:
1. ⊢ 𝛿𝑝 ⊃ (𝛿¬𝑝 ⊃ 𝛿𝑞)
2. ⊢ 𝑝 ⊃ Δ𝑝
3. ⊣ Δ𝑝 ⊃ 𝑝
4. ⊣ Δ𝑝
and axioms where the primitive operator is an operator of necessity ‘2’:
1. ⊢ 𝛿𝑝 ⊃ (𝛿¬𝑝 ⊃ 𝛿𝑞)
2. ⊢ 2𝑝 ⊃ 𝑝
3. ⊣ 𝑝 ⊃ 2𝑝
4. ⊣ ¬2𝑝
In this system he used turnstiles, which means that the formula is
a thesis of the system; and reversed turnstiles, which implies that the
127
formula is not a thesis of the system (see Łukasiewicz 1970c, 352–353,
361, 370, [13]). He did so in order to deal with the issue of triviality of
modal logic raised by Timothy Smiley (see Prior 1967, 77, [25]). Smiley
had proved the completeness of modal logic, but his proof also demon-
strated that the laws of modal logic as 2𝑝 ⊃ 𝑝 and 𝑝 ⊃ Δ𝑝 collapse into
𝑝 ⊃ 𝑝 (see Meredith and Prior 1962, 115, [19]).
Łukasiewicz also added into the system a functorial variable ‘𝛿’,
which could be replaced by a truth-value, an operator or a fragment
of a logical formula transformed into a function as, e.g. (𝑝 ∨ 𝑞) ∧ or
¬ 𝑝 ∧ (see Łukasiewicz 1970b, 313–315, [12]).4 In addition, the system
contains twomodal operators ‘Δ’; that is, a primitive modal operator in
the axioms of the system, and ’∇’ which is defined as 𝛿(Δ𝑝 ⊃ 𝑝) ⊃ 𝛿∇𝑝
(see Łukasiewicz 1970d, 393, [14]). He (1970c, 370, [13]) described his
modal operators as twins since they are indistinguishable when they
are separated, but can be distinguished when they are together. Specif-
ically, Łukasiewicz’s system holds that ⊣ ΔΔ𝑝 and ⊣ ∇∇𝑝 but ⊢ Δ∇𝑝
and ⊢ ∇Δ𝑝. Łukasiewicz argued that the operators of possibility repre-
sent different kinds of possibility, but their interpretation was an issue
with which several of his followers struggled (see Surma 2012, 159–160,
[33]).
He defined implication in his system of modal logic as (see Tab. 1.):
Tab. 1. The matrix for implication in Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic
(see Łukasiewicz (1970c, 361, [13]))
⊃ 1 2 3 4
1 1 2 3 4
2 1 1 3 3
3 1 2 1 2
4 1 1 1 1
and negation and modal operators as (see Tab. 2.):
4It is important to point out that it has to be a fragment of a formula. ’𝛿’ could not be
replaced by a formula, as the result would not be a well-formed formula.
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Tab. 2. The matrix for negation, necessity and two possibility operators in
Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic (see Łukasiewicz 1970d, 393, [14])
¬ 2 Δ ∇
1 4 2 1 1
2 3 2 1 2
3 2 4 3 1
4 1 4 3 2
The truth-values of the necessity operator reveal a unique feature of
Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic (see Tab. 2.): namely, that the for-
mula bound by a necessity operator could never be true. No apodictic
statement is true in Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic. He (1957, 169,
[10]) considered this feature one of the most important advantages of
his logic. Consequently, he (1970c, 375, [13]) claimed that in his system
of four-valued logic, the formula ⊣ 2𝛼 holds. The variable ’𝛼’ could be
replaced by any formula. Therefore, the thesis ⊣ 2𝛼 is stronger than
theses ⊣ Δ𝑝 and ⊣ ¬2𝑝. The thesis ⊣ 2𝛼 in his system of modal logic
avoids the paradoxes of modal logic formulated by Willard Van Orman
Quine. For instance, Łukasiewicz (1957, 171, [10]) cited the paradox:
1. The Morning Star is necessarily identical with the Morning Star.
2. But the Evening Star is not necessarily identical with the Morning
Star (being merely identical with it in fact).
3. But one and the same object cannot have contradictory properties
(cannot both be A and not be A).
4. Therefore, the Morning Star and the Evening Star are different ob-
jects.
that Quine introduced (1947, 47, [28]) andArthurN. Prior (1957a, §160,
[23]) reformulated. In Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic, the para-
dox does not arise because premises 1. and 2. are not true (their truth-
value is not ’1’ ). They have the form 2(𝑎 = 𝑎) and ¬2(𝑎 = 𝑏) respec-
tively. If ’𝑎’ stands for ’Morning Star’ and ’𝑏’ for ’Evening Star’, and are
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factually identical as they are both the planet Venus, the truth-value of
premise 1. would be ’2’ and of premise 2. it would be ’3’.5
BesidesQuine’smodal paradoxes, there is another reasonwhy Łuka-
siewicz rejected true apodictic statements. In his (1957, 205, [10]) view,
the acceptance of apodictic statements has a disastrous effect on logic,
metaphysics and the philosophy of science:
Under the influence of Plato’s theory of ideasAristotle devel-
oped a logic of universal terms and set forth views on neces-
sity which were, in my opinion, disastrous for philosophy.
Propositionswhich ascribe essential properties to objects are
according to him not only factually, but also necessarily true.
This erroneous distinction was the beginning of a long evo-
lution which led to the division of sciences into two groups:
the a priori sciences consisting of apodeictic theorems, such
as logic and mathematics, and the a posteriori or empirical
sciences consisting chiefly of assertoric statements based on
experience. This distinction is, in my opinion, false.
Because of his rejection of true apodictic statements, Łukasiewicz
also rejected the rule of necessitation: ⊢ 𝛼 ⊧ ⊢ 2𝛼 . He (1970d, 395–396,
[14]) called this rule Aristotle’s law, because it appeared for the first
time in Aristotle’s On Interpretation. It means that whatever is a theo-
rem is necessarily a theorem. This rule, which is accepted in several
standard systems of modal logic, leads, according to Łukasiewicz, to
similar paradoxes to those that the acceptance of true apodictic state-
ments does. Besides, Łukasiewicz (1957, 206, [10]) considered this rule
superfluous. When something is asserted it is sufficiently true, accord-
ing to him. There is no need to strengthen the truthfulness of a state-
ment by the addition of the operator ‘2’ to create ‘super-true’. As he
(1970c, 377, [13]) argued:
I think, roughly speaking, that true propositions are simply
truewithout being necessary, and false propositions are sim-
ply false without being impossible. This certainly does not
5If (𝑎 = 𝑎) has a truth-value ’1’, then2(𝑎 = 𝑎) has a truth-value ’2’; and if (𝑎 = 𝑏) has
a truth-value ’1’ and 2(𝑎 = 𝑏) has a truth-value ’2’, then ¬2(𝑎 = 𝑏) has a truth-value
’3’.
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hurt our logical intuitions, and may settle many controver-
sies.
Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic is not just the least known of
his many-valued systems of logic; it is also the most controversial. The
features that he found important, including the extensionality of the
system of modal logic, the rejection of true apodictic statements and
the rejection of the rule of necessitation, made his system unacceptable
to several logicians (see, e.g. Prior 1969, 35–39, [26]; Haack 1974, 89–90,
[5]). Furthermore, the use of two truth-values and twomodal operators
for possibility made its interpretation difficult (see Font andHájek 2002,
173 [4]). Evaluations of Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic were not
favourable. As Prior (1957b, 3, [24]) argued:
Ever since this system was put forward in 1953 logicians, in-
cluding Lukasiewicz himself, have been finding new oddi-
ties in it.
and Peter Simons (2017, [31]) wrote:
Despite a number of attempts tomake sense of the system, it
has generally been concluded that because of these oddities
it is not really a system of modal logic.
There is, however, one system of modal logic that historians of logic
have so far overlooked, which continued Łukasiewicz’s system ofmodal
logic and could bring a valuable interpretation to it—the system of his
co-operator, Carew A. Meredith.
3 Wajsberg’s Extended Class Calculus
Despite a certain closeness to Łukasiewicz’s system of modal logic,
Meredith’s system of modal logic was based on C. I. Lewis’s system S5
(see Meredith and Prior 1965, 99, [20]). This feature of Meredith’s sys-
tem of modal logic was influenced, however, by the work of logicians
from the Lvov-Warsaw School, as Meredith adopted the semantics that
Mordchaj Wajsberg had proposed prior to World War Two.
Mordchaj Wajsberg postulated an extended class calculus that is
equivalent to Lewis’s system of strict implication, and proved its com-
pleteness (see Wajsberg 1977, [34]). Historians of the Lvov-Warsaw
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School consider Wajsberg’s achievement to be the first proof of the
semantic completeness of Lewis’s calculus of strict implication (see Wo-
leński 1989, 134, [35]; Surma 1977, 9, [32]). Łukasiewicz probably drew
Meredith’s attention to Wajsberg’s calculus because the property calcu-
lus that Meredith postulated was very close to Wajsberg’s original in-
tentions (see Copeland 2006, 379, [2]).
Wajsberg was not the first to formalise a class calculus. He was
preceded by David Hilbert and Wilhelm Ackermann (1950, 44–54, [7])
who, in their bookGrundzüge der theoretischen Logik [Principles ofMathe-
matical Logic], presented, amongother systems, a class calculus. Hilbert
and Ackermann (1950, 27, [7]) began their investigation of the calculus
of propositions, postulating its axioms as:
1. (𝑋 ∨𝑋) → 𝑋
2. 𝑋 → (𝑋 ∨𝑌 )
3. (𝑋 ∨𝑌 ) → (𝑌 ∨𝑋)
4. (𝑋 → 𝑌 ) → [(𝑍 ∨𝑋) → (𝑍 ∨𝑌 )]6
The variables ’X’, ’Y’ and ’Z’ are propositional variables here. Later
in their book, Hilbert and Ackermann were curious as to whether sim-
ilar variables could also be used in the formalisation of Aristotle’s syl-
logistic (see Hilbert and Ackermann 1950, 44–48, [7]). The answer was
yes. To do so without the use of quantifiers, they suggested an inter-
pretation of variables ’X’, ’Y’ and ’Z’ in which they stood for classes. In
this interpretation, ’X’ stands for the class of all objects belonging to the
class 𝑋, 𝑋 ∧ 𝑌 is an intersection of classes 𝑋 and Y, and 𝑋 ∨ 𝑌 is a
union of those classes. Thus, a universal affirmative statement would
be formalised as ¬𝑋 ∨ 𝑌 and it would mean:7 ‘The union of the class
of not-men and the class of mortals comprises all things’ (see Hilbert
and Ackermann 1950, 47, [7]). The range of variables in this calculus is
indicated by the use of vertical lines. Namely ∣ 𝑋 ∨ 𝑌 ∣ means ’X or Y
6The operator ’→’ stands for implication (elsewhere in the paper ’⊃’ is used). The
axioms are introduced in the form in which they appeared in Hilbert and Ackermann’s
book. However, in order to make the formulas clearer I have added round brackets.
7Hilbert and Ackermann originally used a different type of negation, but due to
presentational difficulties I have replaced it with the negation used elsewhere in the
text.
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holds for all objects’, while ∣ 𝑋 ∣ ∨ ∣ 𝑌 ∣ means ’X holds for all objects or
Y holds for all objects’. Similarly, ’∣ ¬𝑋 ∣’ stands for ‘not-X holds for all
objects’, while ’¬ ∣ 𝑋 ∣’ stands for ’X does not hold for all objects’. In this
way, Hilbert and Ackermann (1950, 47–49) were able to define all four
statements of Aristotle’s syllogistic:
SaP: ∣ ¬𝑋 ∨𝑌 ∣
SeP: ∣ ¬𝑋 ∨¬𝑌 ∣
SiP: ¬ ∣ ¬𝑋 ∨¬𝑌 ∣
SoP: ¬ ∣ ¬𝑋 ∨𝑌 ∣
Hilbert and Ackermann (1950, 53ff, [5]) did not present axioms for
their class calculus. However, in the second edition of their book they
pointed out that Wajsberg had postulated axiomatization for their class
calculus, as well as an interesting extension of it.
Wajsberg (1977, 52, [34]) used the axioms that Hilbert and Acker-
mann had postulated for the calculus of propositions as a basis for the
axioms in his paper from 1933. He also added the operators that limit
a range of variables in Hilbert and Ackermann’s class calculus. Wa-
jsberg’s interpretation of these operators and variables differs slightly
from that presented by Hilbert and Ackermann, however. Specifically,
Wajsberg introduced ’∣ 𝑋 ∣’ as ’X is necessary’ and ’∣ ¬𝑋 ∣’ as ’X is im-
possible’. Similarly, he defined a strict implication ‘⇒’ as ∣ 𝑋 → 𝑌 ∣. The
axioms of his system are (see Wajsberg 1977, 52, [34]):
1. (𝑋 ∨𝑋) ⇒ 𝑋
2. 𝑋 ⇒ (𝑋 ∨𝑌 )
3. (𝑋 ∨𝑌 ) ⇒ (𝑌 ∨𝑋)
4. (𝑋 → 𝑌 ) ⇒ [(𝑍 ∨𝑍) → (𝑍 ∨𝑌 )]
5. (𝑋 ⇒ 𝑌 ) ⇒ (∣ 𝑋 ∣⇒∣ 𝑌 ∣)
6. ∣ 𝑋 ∣⇒ 𝑋
7. ¬ ∣ 𝑋 ∣⇒∣ ¬ ∣ 𝑋 ∣∣
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Wajsberg (1977, 52, [34]) claimed that this concept of strict implica-
tion was similar to Lewis’s calculus of strict implication, and that ‘∣ 𝑋 ∣’
is Lewis’s ’2𝑝’. In Wajsberg’s extended class calculus, the notion of ne-
cessity is closely connected with quantification, as can be demonstrated
by the change in the interpretation of ’∣ 𝑋 ∣’ (see Meredith and Prior
1962, 120, [19]).
4 Meredith's System of Modal Logic
Meredith (1953, [17]) postulated his system of modal logic in 1953, in
the same year that Łukasiewicz published the first paper on his system
of modal logic. Nonetheless, the only paper in which Meredith intro-
duced this system appeared considerably later, in 1965 when the intro-
ductory manuscript Note on my Modal System was included in Meredith
and Prior’s joint paperModal Logic with Functional Variables and a Contin-
gent Constant (see Meredith and Prior 1965, 105–108, [20]; Hasle 2019,
[6]).
Meredith’s system of modal logic contains two primitive operators
’⊃’ and ’2’, two primitive constants ’0’ and ’𝑛’, and one primitive func-
torial variable ’𝛿’. It is a system of logic of propositions, and is many-
valued. Apart from the traditional truth-values—the truth ’1’ and the
falsehood ’0’—it contains the truth-value ’𝑛’ which stands for contin-
gently true, i.e. (1,0), and ’ṅ’ which stands for contingently false, i.e.
(0,1) (see Meredith and Prior 1965, 99–100, [20]).8 Both truth-values
thatMeredith introduced into this system also play the role of constants.
Consequently, they could appear in well-formed formulas of the sys-
tem. As previously mentioned, ’𝑛’ is a primitive constant of the system,
whichmeans that it is contained in the axioms of the system (seeMered-
ith and Prior 1965, 103, [20]):
1. 2{𝛿[(𝑝 ⊃ 0) ⊃ (𝑞 ⊃ 𝑟)] ⊃ 𝛿[(𝑟 ⊃ 𝑝) ⊃ (𝑞 ⊃ 𝑝)]}
2. 2𝑝 ⊃ [𝛿(𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞) ⊃ 𝛿𝑞]
8Meredith might also have had in mind another interpretation. This appeared in
Computations and Speculations, where ’𝑛’ is defined as a sequence of truth-values where
the first value is the truth and every other value is false, namely ‘1, 0, 0, …, 0’; andwhere
‘ṅ’ is defined as the sequence where the first truth-value is false and every other value
is the truth, namely ‘0, 1, 1, …, 1’ (see Meredith and Prior 1962, 119, [19]).
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3. 𝛿0 ⊃ [𝛿(0 ⊃ 0) ⊃ 𝛿(2𝑝)]
4. 𝑛
5. 𝑝 ⊃ 2(𝑛 ⊃ 𝑝)
6. 2𝑛 ⊃ 𝑝
Aswith Łukasiewicz’s system ofmodal logic, Meredith’s system too
is based on matrices (see Tab. 3.):9
Tab. 3. The first published version of the smallest matrix satisfying the
axioms of Meredith’s system of modal logic (see Meredith and Prior 1965, 104
[20]):
⊃ 1 n ṅ 0 2
1 1 n ṅ 0 1
n 1 1 n n 0
ṅ 1 n 1 n 0
0 1 1 1 1 0
However, there is apparently a mistake in the third and fourth col-
umn of the second row as in Meredith’s Note on My Modal System the
correct version of the matrix appeared (see Meredith 1953 [17]). Prior
(1967, 78 [25]) published the corrected version of the matrix in his book
Past, Present and Future (see Tab. 4.):
9Apart from the smallest matrix, Meredith and Prior discussed also matrices where
appeared more than four truth-values. In his letter to Prior from 10th October 1956,
Meredith (1956 [18]), suggested a matrix where a contingent truth different than ’𝑛’
is represents the constant ’T’ and the constant ’F’ represents a contingent falsehood
(see Tab. 5.): Tab. 5. The alternative matrix satisfying the axioms of Meredith’s system
(⊂,2,0,𝑛,𝛿,𝑝) from Meredith’s (1956) letter to Prior.
⊂ 1 T n F 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
T 1 ? 0 0 0
n 1 1 1 0 0
F 1 ?0 0 ? 0
0 1 1 1 1 1
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Tab. 4. The smallest matrix satisfying the axioms of Meredith’s system
(⊃,2,0,𝑛,𝛿,𝑝) from Prior’s Past, Present and Future (see Prior 1967, 78,
[25])
⊃ 1 n ṅ 0 2
1 1 n ṅ 0 1
n 1 1 ṅ ṅ 0
ṅ 1 n 1 n 0
0 1 1 1 1 0
Despite the fact that Meredith used ’𝑛’ and ’ṅ’ instead of Łukasie-
wicz’s ’2’ and ’3’, the truth-value table for implication is similar in both
systems of modal logic. And there are further similarities between the
two systems: Meredith’s system is also extensional, and the functorial
variable ’𝛿’ is used in it. In addition, the formula ’2𝑛’ can never be true
inMeredith’s systemof logic. As ’𝑛’ is an axiom, the rule of necessitation
⊢ 𝛼 ⊧ ⊢ 2𝛼 also does not hold unconditionally in Meredith’s system of
logic. Meredith and Prior (1962, 118, [19]) pointed out that the rule of
necessitation is applicable only to those formulas that do not contain ’𝑛’.
Finally, it has been mentioned before that Meredith’s system is four-
valued, and that his definition of truth-values is close to Łukasiewicz’s
definition. This feature could shed more light on our understanding
of the truth-values of both Łukasiewicz’s and Meredith’s systems. For
Meredith’s ’𝑛’, Łukasiewicz’s truth-value ’2’ could be interpreted as con-
tingently true, i.e. true in this world but false in another. Similarly,
Łukasiewicz’s truth-value ’3’ could be understood as Meredith’s ’ṅ’ or
contingently false, i.e. false in this world but true in another. The in-
volvement of possible worlds may sound inappropriate, as neither
Łukasiewicz’s nor Meredith’s system of modal logic require possible
worlds semantics. The possible postulation ofworlds as intensional enti-
ties would be directly against Łukasiewicz’s (1998, 261, [15]) conviction
that every decent system of modal logic must be extensional. It appears
that Meredith’s system also fulfilled this condition (see Meredith and
Prior 1965, 108, [20]).
If it is the case, then ‘the world’ as the meaning of ’𝑛’ cannot be a
possible world as an intensional entity. It could, however be ‘the world’
in an interpretation suggested by Arthur N. Prior, namely ‘the totality
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of what is the case’ (see Meredith and Prior 1965, 99, [20]). Prior de-
scribed this as a conjunction of all true propositions that do not lead to
paradoxes (see Meredith and Prior 1965, 100–101, [20]).10 The contin-
gent constant ’𝑛’ is also described alternatively as a sequence of truth-
values that means true in this world and false in all other worlds (1, 0,
0, …, 0), or everything that could be said truly (see Meredith and Prior
1962, 119–120, [19]). There is no evidence that Meredith, who rarely
discussed the metaphysical implications of his systems in his papers,
held precisely this same view (see Rybaříková and Hasle 2017, 49–54,
[30]). Although, Prior found Meredith’s ’𝑛’ troublesome, his attempt
at its reformulation led to the introduction of world-propositions and
consequently that of hybrid logic, as Hasle (2019 [6]) points out.
There are also essential differences between Łukasiewicz’s and Me-
redith’s systems. Meredith’s matrix for ‘2’ differs from that of Łuka-
siewicz. In contrast to Łukasiewicz, in Meredith’s system of logic the
formula ’2𝛼’ could be the thesis of the system. Nor did Meredith in-
clude turnstiles in his system. The threat of triviality of the modal logic
is prevented in Meredith’s system by the use of contingent constants.
Finally, Meredith’s system is based on Lewis’s system S5 and the axiom
of extensionality. Hence, Meredith was also interested in Wajsberg’s ex-
tended class calculus, and for this reason developed a system of logic
that he entitled ‘property calculus’ (see Meredith and Prior 1962, [19];
Prior and Meredith 1996, [27]; Copeland 2006, 379–380, [2]).
5 Meredith’s Property Calculus
Meredith published just one paper on his system of modal logic. For
his property calculus, the situation is even worse. Throughout his life,
no paper on property calculus was printed. The only Meredith’s paper
that deals with property calculus appeared in print long after his death.
It was discovered and published by B. Jack Copeland. Copeland (2016,
3513–3515, [3]) found Prior’s and Meredith’s joint paper Interpretations
of Different Modal Logics in the ‘Property Calculus’ from 1956, in which
10Because I used Prior’s own words here I used the term ‘proposition’, while in the
rest of the text I have instead used ‘statement’. The reason is that ‘proposition’ in Prior’s
definition is not the proposition as defined by Frege, e.g. the entity placed in the third
realm; rather, he considered them to be logical constrictions (see Rybaříková 2016, 70–
71, [29]).
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property calculus was used as a semantics for systems T, S4 and S5, in
a similar manner to that of Wajsberg prior to World War Two. Meredith
and Prior (1962, 120–121, [19]) also discussed property calculus in the
unpublished manuscript Computations and Speculations, while the calcu-
lus appeared too in Prior’s (1967, 42–44, [25]) Past, Present and Future.
Property calculus differs, however, from Wajsberg’s extended class
calculus. First, Meredith used notation that better suited the notation of
contemporary modal logic, i.e. Wajsberg’s ‘∣ 𝑋 ∣’, is ’2𝑝’ in Meredith’s
property calculus. The formula ‘2𝑝’ means ’𝑝 is a property of every ob-
ject’, while ’𝑝(𝑎)’ stands for ’𝑝 is a property of an object 𝑎’. From the
meaning of the formula, it follows that Meredith considered proposi-
tional variables in property calculus to play the role of predicates. This
interpretation is, however, very close to original ideas of Hilbert, Acker-
mann, as well as Wajsberg (see Meredith and Prior 1962, 120–121, [19]).
From these initial ideas, Meredith created a genuine calculus by in-
troducing two-place predicate ’U’, as (see Prior 1967, 42, [25]):
(2𝑝)𝑎 = ∀𝑏(𝑈𝑎𝑏) ⊃ (𝑝𝑏)
and (see Prior and Meredith 1996, 133, [27]):
(⋄𝑝)𝑎 = (¬2¬𝑝)𝑎 = ∃𝑏[(𝑈𝑎𝑏)∧(𝑝𝑏)]
Prior andMeredith (1996, 133, [27]) proposed axioms of the system
as:
1. (𝑈𝑎𝑏)∨(𝑈𝑎𝑏)
2. (𝑈𝑎𝑏) ⊃ [(𝑈𝑏𝑐) ⊃ (𝑈𝑎𝑐)]
3. (𝑈𝑎𝑏) ⊃ [(𝑈𝑐𝑏) ⊃ (𝑈𝑎𝑐)]
and the relation of reflexivity that is derived from the axiom 1:
4. 𝑈𝑎𝑎
symmetricity that is derived from the axiom 3 and reflexivity:
5. (𝑈𝑎𝑏) ⊃ (𝑈𝑏𝑎)
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and transitivity, which is also axiom 2.
6. (𝑈𝑎𝑏) ⊃ [(𝑈𝑏𝑐) ⊃ (𝑈𝑎𝑐)]
It has already beenmentioned that in their paper Prior andMeredith
(1996, 133–134, [27]) gave their interpretation of T, S4 and S5 in prop-
erty calculus. Later, Prior (1967, 42–44, [25]) introduced a more elabo-
rate proof of this claim in which he interpreted variables ’a’, ’b’ and ’c’
as possible worlds and the predicate ’U’ as the relation of accessibility.
It was Peter Geach who suggested this interpretation to Prior. The inter-
pretation apparently did not correspond to the views of Meredith, who
instead described ’a’, ’b’ and ’c’ as name-variables (see Prior 1967, 42,
[25]; Rybaříková and Hasle 2017, 47, 50, [30]).
Notwithstanding the above, there is a certain connection between
Meredith’s system of modal logic and property calculus. Meredith
claimed that he developed his system of modal logic as a part of prop-
erty calculus. He described implication, negation and identity as (see
Meredith and Prior 1965, 102–103, [20]):
(𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞)𝑥 = (𝑝𝑥) ⊃ (𝑞𝑥)
0𝑥 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑥(𝑒.𝑔.¬(𝑥𝜀𝑥)) 11
(𝑝 = 𝑥) = ∀𝑥[𝑝(𝑥)]
In this way, ‘𝑛’ is also introduced as:
(𝑛𝑥) = 𝑎𝜀𝑥
2(𝑛 ⊃ 𝑝𝑥) = 𝑝𝑎
where the first formula means that ‘‘𝑎’ is a certain constant value of
‘𝑛’’. In Computations and Speculations, Meredith and Prior (1962, 120–
121, [19]) described the relationship of the contingent constant ‘𝑛’ and
the variable ‘𝑎’ as follows:
11Here, Meredith probably used the operator ’ε ’ that was introduced by Polish logi-
cian Stanisław Leśniewski. It is interpreted as the Polish ‘jest’ or Latin ‘est’, and differs
from the English ‘is’. Prior (1955, 64, [22]) and Lejewski (1954 [9]) suggested its inter-
pretation for English-speaking logicians as the operator of weak inclusion. Hence, the
interpretation of the formula ¬(𝑥𝜀𝑥) would be ‘It is not the case, that the 𝑥 is an 𝑥’.
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In Meredith’s system with n, n is represented by the prop-
erty of being identical with a selected object a, formulae
which express properties of a as well as formulae which ex-
press properties of all objects being taken as theorems. This
is analogous to the use of matrices in which the value n, or
‘true in n only’, is designated as well as the value ‘true in all
worlds’.
Since a contingent constant could also play the role of proposition,
it appears that in property calculus it stands for a proposition that is
contingently true, i.e. if it is the case that ’𝑛’, then there is an object ’𝑎’
that has this property.
6 Conclusion
To conclude, Meredith’s system of modal logic was considerably influ-
enced by the work of Jan Leopold Łukasiewicz and Mordchaj Wajsberg.
Łukasiewicz’s impact could explain why Meredith’s system was exten-
sional, and provides a better understanding of the notion of ’world’ that
appeared in Meredith’s system. Wajsberg’s extended class calculus,
namely the idea that propositional variables could also be interpreted
differently, heavily influenced Meredith’s property calculus which later
became U-calculus. Moreover, Meredith’s system was even defined as
a part of property calculus, and the origins of the contingent constant
’𝑛’ appear to be connected with property calculus. These origins could
also lead to a better understanding of the contingent constant.
Unfortunately, this interpretation could not explain all unclear pas-
sages in Meredith’s system of modal logic and his property calculus.
While it is apparent that Meredith’s interpretation of U-calculus differs
from the one suggested by Prior, it is by no means obvious, how he pre-
cisely interpreted this calculus. Łukasiewicz and Wajsberg’s views do
not provide any clues to the interpretation of the two-place predicate ‘U’
and formulas derived from it. Further historical research is needed to
answer this question.12
Łukasiewicz’s systemofmodal logicmight also have benefitted from
Meredith’s work, as Meredith’s system provides a valuable interpreta-
12I am indebted to Per Hasle for stressing this issue with the interpretation of U-
calculus to me.
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tion of his system. ThroughMeredith’s system of modal logic, his prop-
erty calculus and Prior’s work, certain ideas of Łukasiewicz penetrated
mainstream modal logic. This might have pleased Łukasiewicz, even
though he would hardly have appreciated the prevalence of intensional
systems in current modal logic.
It is more challenging to find any benefits that Meredith’s property
calculus would have had for Mordchaj Wajsberg, as the introduction of
possible worlds semantics madeWajsberg’s result interesting only from
a historical point of view. Nonetheless, Meredith’s papers made Wajs-
berg’s work more renowned. For years, Meredith’s system of modal
logic and his property calculus were not sufficiently discussed. It was
B. Jack Copeland (2002 [1], 2006 [2]) who pointed out its importance.
More recently, Hasle (2019 [6]) has also stressed its contribution to
Prior’s development of hybrid logic. Let us hope that with growing in-
terest in Meredith’s work, the work of Mordchaj Wajsberg will also be
investigated in more depth.
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Abstract
Arthur Prior and Carew Meredith cooperated on the formulation of sev-
eral systems of logic. One of themost interesting and consequential ideas
to come out of their cooperation was the notion of ‘world propositions’.
The idea was first introduced by Meredith in 1953. From 1956 to 1965
Meredith and Prior in various connections discussed the idea, leading to
a crucial paper in 1965, in which Prior decisively improved the earlier no-
tions of world propositions. This is turn led to Prior’s working out the
first versions of hybrid logic in Past, Present and Future (1967) and Papers
on Time and Tense (1968). Even though Arthur Prior himself did not use
the term ‘hybrid logic’, his contribution to this discipline from 1967 and
till his death in 1969 is by nowwell studied anddocumented, especially by
(Blackburn 2006, [1]). However the prehistory from 1953 till 1965 has so
far been largely neglected. This study fills in that gap and shows how the
idea of world propositions was discussed and developed betweenMered-
ith and Prior till 1965, leading to Prior’s hybridization in 1967 and later.
This development is also related to some of Prior’s crucial metaphysical
tenets concerning time and its logic. Paradoxically, these tenets were at
the same time promoted and challenged through the techniques of hy-
bridization, as pointed out by Blackburn. However a very late note by
Prior (written in Norway a few days before Prior’s death) does seem to
indicate that Prior upheld his metaphysics of time to the last, notwith-
standing the possible doubts induced through hybridization.
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1 The ‘Meredith n’ and the prehistory of Prior’s
hybrid logic
In 2006, Patrick Blackburn presented and analyzed Arthur Prior’s cru-
cial contribution to the development of Hybrid Logic, a storywhich had
till that time been largely ignored.1 These publications do show an early
awareness of the ideas that were to lead to the modern discipline of
hybrid logic, and indeed discuss these ideas in a manner still worth
studying. Blackburn noted that
Over the last few years the basic ideas of hybrid logic have
become increasingly familiar to modal logicians. Nowadays
most researchers inmodal logic (andmost researchers in the
neighbouring field of description logic) know how to ‘name’
worlds using nominals, and are aware that this use of ‘formu-
las as terms’ can be traced back to work of Arthur Prior from
the 1960s. (Blackburn 2006, [1], p. 329).
Blackburn 2006 [1] concentrates on Prior’s contribution in Past, Pre-
sent and Future (Prior 1967) as well as Prior’s relevant subsequent work,
especially some chapters in Papers on Time and Tense (Prior 2003, first
published in 1968, [18]). There is, however, also an interesting prehis-
tory not covered by (Blackburn 2006, [1]). The later publication (Black-
burn and Jørgensen 2016, [2]) shows a clear awareness of this fact, but
the subject is not further investigated there. It is however noted that
Meredith’s property calculus was one of the stepping stones
— perhaps the major stepping stone — on the way to Prior’s
hybrid logic, but we are woefully short on historical detail
here. (Blackburn and Jørgensen 2017, p. 3674, [2]).
1Blackburn however mentions that some writings by Hasle and Øhrstrøm (jointly
and individually) had earlier on dealt with the ideas underlying Prior’s hybrid logic —
namely (Øhrstrøm 1988, [21]), (Hasle 1991, [6]), (Øhrstrøm andHasle 1993, [22]) and
(Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995, [23]) (cf. Blackburn 2006, p. 349, [1]).
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This paper fills in most of that historical detail, at least in so far as
Meredith’s crucial idea of the contingent constant 𝑛 — and hence often
called ’Meredith’s 𝑛’ — is concerned. It is in any case evident that hy-
brid logicwas first, albeit in a very rudimentary form, anticipated by the
Irish logician andmathematician C.A. Meredith (1904-1976) in 1953. In
so far as this is accepted, the document (Meredith 1953, [9]) may be re-
garded as the foundational document of hybrid logic. At any rate, the
cooperation between Meredith and Prior between 1956 and 1965 cru-
cially contributed to Prior’s ideas about world propositions and instant
propositions, which are the essential prerequisite for Prior’s hybridiza-
tion in Past, Present and Future and later.
The first known contact between the two is a short letter fromMered-
ith to Prior dated 20August 1952 (found in box 2, Prior’s Papers, Bodleian
Library, Oxford). The letter was sent together withMeredith’s paper on
Łukasiewicz’s 𝐶 −𝛿 calculus, a move which was suggested to Meredith
by Łukasiewicz himself. However, there is no known further exchange
betweenMeredith and Prior before the spring of 1956, when Prior went
to Ireland. The trip was planned in order to meet Łukasiewicz, who
however died in February 1956, while the Priors were in the process of
organizing their trip to Ireland. They went nonetheless, and Prior in-
stead met with other Irish logicians, including Meredith (cf. Copeland
2006, pp. 374-375, [4]). This in turn led to an invitation from Prior to
Meredith to attend the Logic Colloquium, which Prior organized in Ox-
ford in the summer of 1956.2
The first place in the exchanges betweenMeredith andPriorwherein
we find an explicit mention of ‘Meredith’s n’ is in a letter from Mered-
ith to Prior, dated 10 October 1956 (Meredith’s letter is found among
Prior’s Papers, Box 2, Bodleian Library, Oxford). It cannot be excluded
that the idea had been discussed between them before this letter, some-
time between Prior’s visit to Ireland and October 1956. However in all
likelihood this is the first exchange about it, and Meredith’s note from
1953 could well have been sent at the same time. But in any case, the
2The ’Logic Colloquium’was held at Balliol College inOxford on 14th-15th July, 1956.
The programme is found in Prior’s Papers, Box 11, The Bodleian Library. C.A. Meredith
gave a presentation entitled ’ Theory of Deduction in Combinatory Logic’. This collo-
quium was the first in what turned out to be a series of logic colloquia in the United
Kingdom. It played an important part in reviving philosophical and formal logic in the
United Kingdom at a timewhere the field had beenmore or less put aside by “Ordinary
Language Philosophy”. See also (Kenny 1970, p. 338).
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importance of these inputs to Prior took quite some time to mature. In
the October letter, Meredith – always a man of few words and many
formulas, at least in writing — simply wrote ’n = the world’, and went
on to state several axioms for n, the three most characteristic ones being
(with a small modification by Prior, and in modern notation)3:
A. 𝑛
B. 2𝑛 ⊂ 𝑝
C. 𝑝 ⊂ 2(𝑛 ⊂ 𝑝)
ByA, 𝑛 is itself an axiom, thus asserting that such a constant express-
ing ‘theworld’ unquestionably is itself the case, even though contingent.
B exactly captures the contingency of 𝑛, since it says that 2𝑛 implies
anything, i.e. that 2𝑛 is false (B is equivalent to asserting ¬2𝑛). And
𝐶, Meredith noted, says that ’the world is everything that is the case’.
Note that the assertion of 𝑛 as an axiom requires the ordinary modal
logic rule of necessitation ⊢ 𝛼 →⊢ 𝛼 to be restricted, or we should have
a conflict with A.4
Meredith presented his systems in several versions with small devi-
ations among the axioms, depending on how he could refine (and that
in his work above all meant abbreviate) axioms and proofs, but to all
extents and purposes the above axioms are the same as those found in
his 1953 note. We do not know of any immediate reaction from Prior
to the letter or the note, but at the beginning of the sixties these ideas
found their way into a joint book manuscript by Meredith and Prior en-
titled Computations and Speculations (Meredith and Prior c1962, [10]).5
The manuscript was at one time submitted to Oxford University Press,
but it was not accepted and never published in its entirety. However,
3The designations A, B and C are not Meredith’s; they are introduced here simply
for subsequent ease of reference.
4This was also noted by Prior in (Meredith and Prior c1962, p. 118, [10]): “An inci-
dental consequence of 𝑛’s being a theorem but 2𝑛 decidedly not one is that the ’rule
of necessitation’ (if α is a theorem so is 2𝛼) only holds without exception for that part
of Meredith’s system in which 𝑛 doesn’t occur”.
5For more information on this manuscript, see (Rybaříková, Z. and Hasle, P. 2017,
[20])
148
from its contents five papers were extracted and published.6 One of
these, and a crucial one for this study, was the paper ‘Modal Logic with
Functorial Variables and a Contingent Constant’ (Meredith and Prior
1965; submitted 1964, [11]). As part of this paper, Meredith’s 1953-note
was published almost exactly as written in 1953 with only one minor
change (Meredith and Prior 1965, the pages 105-108, [11]).7 It is quite
evident already in 1964/1965 that Meredith’s contingent constant n was
a crucial inspiration to Prior’s idea of world propositions as introduced
in that very same paper – even if this inspiration appeared in part as a
correction to a problem with Meredith’s n, of which Prior had become
aware. Before analyzing this issue, and presenting Prior’s first idea of
world propositions (or instant propositions, as Prior also called them
later on), there is an intermediate stage to remark on.
In 1961, Prior paid a visit to Poland and gave several talks in that con-
nection. One of them was ‘Logic in England Today’ (Prior 1962a, [12]),
which was translated into Polish and published as (Prior 1962b, [13]).
Prior in this talk and paper devoted quite some attention to Meredith.
In the original English manuscript (Prior 1962a, [12]), we find a long
passage on Meredith’s 𝑛, in which Prior states:
For all his virtuosity in […] formal manipulations, and his
training beingmathematical,Meredith likes to dophilosoph-
ical jobs with his logic too. He has a modal system with a
contingent constant n for ‘the world’ in Wittgenstein’s (Trac-
tatus) sense of ‘everything that is the case’ — the logical
product of all true propositions […] Meredith’s 𝑛 […] has
such laws as 𝑝 ⊂ 2(𝑛 ⊂ 𝑝) p ￿ ￿(n ￿ p) — any true proposi-
tion is strictly implied by n, since it is a conjunct of it. And a
possible world is a proposition which, though possibly true,
says so much that if any proposition be conjoined with it the
6There are two versions of Computations and Speculations among Prior’s Papers in the
Bodleian Library (Box 8). For a closer analysis and account of the manuscript, see (Ry-
baříková and Hasle 2017, section 6: Appendix on Computations and Speculations, [20]).
This appendix also lists the five papers stemming from the manuscript.
7The change was about one short formula in (Meredith 1953, [9]), which was er-
roneously asserted to be valid. Prior made a note about this by hand in the copy sent
to him, and this small correction is followed in (Meredith and Prior 1965, [11]). The
Meredith manuscript with Prior’s notes is found in Prior’s Papers, Box 16, Bodleian Li-
brary.
149
result will be either an impossibility or strictly equivalent
to the original. In a metaphysical mood Meredith once re-
marked that ‘worlds’ are the only real individuals; it is cer-
tainly true that his own interests have seldom taken in the
ordinary calculus of names and predicates. (Prior 1962a,
pp. 9–10, [12]).
Two things must be noted about this statement. Firstly, it can be
questionedwhether philosophical issues reallymatteredmuch toMered-
ith, at least in relation to his logical work (see Rybaříková and Hasle
2017, [20]). Secondly, Meredith never himself directly described his n
as a conjunction (at least in any letters and documents known to us). It
is true that his associating this very special contingent constant with the
Tractatus notion of ‘the world’ makes such a thought rather obvious, but
it is not a formal necessity in Meredith’s systems to regard the n in this
way. On the other hand, this Priorean description must have occurred
in discussions between the two without Meredith objecting to it. Thus
in their joint work on Computations and Speculations, though in a passage
clearly written by Prior, we find the following words:
But the constant used byMeredith is ’theworld’, in the sense
of Proposition 1 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, i.e. ’everything
that is the case’. One can think of this as a conjunction of
all truths, or perhaps of all ’atomic’ truths. Meredith sym-
bolises it simply as 𝑛, and gives axioms which bring out its
special character. (Meredith and Prior c1962, p. 117, [10])
Two things must be noted about this statement. Firstly, it can be
questionedwhether philosophical issues reallymatteredmuch toMered-
ith, at least in relation to his logical work (see Rybaříková and Hasle
2017, [20]). Secondly, Meredith never himself directly described his n
as a conjunction (at least in any letters and documents known to us). It
is true that his associating this very special contingent constant with the
Tractatus notion of ‘the world’ makes such a thought rather obvious, but
it is not a formal necessity in Meredith’s systems to regard the n in this
way. On the other hand, this Priorean description must have occurred
in discussions between the two without Meredith objecting to it. Thus
in their joint work on Computations and Speculations, though in a passage
clearly written by Prior, we find the following words:
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But the constant used byMeredith is ’theworld’, in the sense
of Proposition 1 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, i.e. ’everything
that is the case’. One can think of this as a conjunction of
all truths, or perhaps of all ’atomic’ truths. Meredith sym-
bolises it simply as n, and gives axioms which bring out its
special character. (Meredith and Prior c1962, p. 117, [10])
Both of these reservations take on some significancewhendiscussing
the most crucial single paper in this story — and indeed the early his-
tory of the development of hybrid logic — namely (Meredith and Prior
1965, [11]).
2 The Introduction of the Priorean Notion of World
Propositions
The paper ‘Modal Logic with Functorial Variables and a Contingent
Constant’ (Meredith and Prior 1965; submitted 1964, [11]) marks the
decisive step toward Prior’s hybridization in Past, Present and Future and
later. More precisely, the paper introduces that formal notion of world
propositions, which is the precondition of Prior’s subsequent hybrid
logic. In the opening lines we find an important explanation of the pa-
per and its parts:
The present [i.e. the first] section is by Prior; the two which
follow it, by Meredith. Meredith’s sections were originally
produced in 1953 and circulated among colleagues; subse-
quent references to them in the literature… may be clarified
if these two notes are made more widely available. (Mered-
ith and Prior 1965, p. 99, [11])
As already observed, one of these sections (namely the last one, sec-
tion 3) is identical with (Meredith 1953, [9]).
In the first section, it becomes clear that by 1964, Prior had come to
see a fatal problem with Meredith’s n, which he had happily endorsed
earlier on. After amore general exposition and discussion ofMeredith’s
modal system, Prior observed that
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… it is clear that there can be no such proposition as Mered-
ith’s n. For the conjunction of all truths would have to con-
tain as conjuncts (a) itself, (b) its own double negation, (c)
every fact as to what it implies; to name only a few of the
impossibilities. (Meredith and Prior 1965, p. 101)
But, Prior goes on to say, we can get something quite close to the
underlying idea of Meredith’s 𝑛 by introducing
a function 𝑊𝑝, to be read as something like ”𝑝 comprehends
all truths”, and defined by 𝑊𝑝 = 𝑝 ∧∀𝑞(𝑞 ⊃ 2(𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞)).
(Meredith and Prior 1965, p. 101, [11])
Prior notes that we then have something quite close to Meredith’s
axioms for n (i.e. A, B, and C above), but in a conditionalized form; we
may render them like this:
i. 𝑊𝑝 ⊃ 𝑝 (if 𝑝 is a world proposition, it is true)
ii. 𝑊𝑝 ⊃ (𝑞 ⊃ 2(𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞)) (if 𝑝 is a world propostion, and 𝑞 is true, then
𝑝 stricly implies 𝑞)
iii. 𝑊𝑝 ⊃ ¬2𝑝 if (𝑝 is a world proposition, it is contingent)
From here Prior proceeds to consider what he calls the ’definition of
a possible world‘, namely
𝑊(𝑚)𝑝 ≝ ⋄𝑝 ∧∀𝑞[2(𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞)∨2(𝑝 ⊃ ¬𝑞)]
And finally, Prior observes that
The concept of a set of “possible world” propositions has a
tense-logical analogue in that of a set of descriptions of the
total state of the world at given instants
(Meredith and Prior 1965, p. 102, [11])
We now have in place the fundamental notions which enable Prior’s
hybridization in Past, Present and Future (and later writings), as well
as the definitions which made precise one of Prior’s most fundamental
convictions— that instants are not entities in their own right, but rather,
they are ’logical constructions’:
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Aworld-state proposition in the tense-logical sense is simply
an index of an instant; indeed, I would like to say that it is an
instant, in the only sense in which ‘instants’ are not highly
fictitious entities. To be the case at such-and-such an instant
is simply to be the case in such-and-such a world; and that
in turn is simply to be the case when such-and-such a world-
proposition is the case. (Prior 1967, p. 189, [14])
It is altogether clear how Prior’s steps towards hybridization and the
idea of instant propositions took decisive inspiration from Meredith’s
ideas, but also how he significantly improved these, in fact taking the
first and decisive step already in 1964/65. That raises a final question
about the 1965 paper. It is an oddity about this paper that after Prior’s
objections in section 1, the paper without further discussion proceeds
to present Meredith’s system and his 𝑛, which has just been declared
an impossibility. Of course, the first sentences of the paper’s section 1
about making available these hitherto inaccessible notes couldmotivate
the step of presenting them “nonetheless”, but this does not seem quite
enough. It would seem that Meredith did not perceive Prior’s obser-
vations sufficient grounds for discarding his system. As already noted
the idea of 𝑛 as a conjunction was not necessary for Meredith’s system.
It was a philosophically interesting idea, but not an inherent condition
of the viability of his system. And as for the concomitant philosophi-
cal issues, Meredith was apparently willing to consider them, but they
were definitely not first on his agenda.
3 Prior's Hybrid Logic --- the Third Grade of Tense
Logical Involvement
In Past, Present and Future chapter V, Prior again gave an exposition of
Meredith’s modal system and the n. He did not here reiterate his crit-
icism about the ’impossibility’ of Meredith’s n in (Meredith and Prior
1965, [11]). He did howevermake this observation in theAppendix B of
Past, Present and Future, where he further elaborated his ideas on instant
propositions:
[W]e should avoid the temptation to think of world-propo-
sitions as being singled out from others in virtue of their
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form, or as having a certain extensiveness of intuitive con-
tent (as asserting that so-and-so, the ”so-and-so” being a
conjunction whose conjuncts are or could be all facts about
what is, what has been, and what will be). This conception
of a world-proposition (I start with it myself) has some use-
fulness, but we must get away from it in the end.
(Prior 1967, p. 188, [14])
In thismanner, Prior concludes the development away from conceiv-
ing world propositions as conjunctions.
While it is not the aim of this paper to discuss Prior’s philosophy in
a broad perspective, it may be worth at this point to recapitulate Prior’s
metaphysics of time and its logic – that is, his three basic and interwoven
philosophical tenets about time and tense logic:8
• Firstly, Prior believed in real human freedom (freewill), and fur-
thermore, that room for this belief could only be found in a tensed
language9 —which must hence not be reducible into an untensed
language
• Secondly, Prior believed in the primacy of the so-called A-series
notions of past, present and future, which form the core of a tensed
language, over the so-called B-series notions, consisting of a set
instants together with an earlier-later relation by which they are
ordered
• Thirdly, Prior believed that instants were not entities in their own
right, but rather, that they were logical constructions out of propo-
sitions.
Keeping this in mind, an important further step in Past, Present and
Future is the transition from the world predicate Wp and its various
8A considerable number of fine papers about Prior’s philosophy exist, many of
which have been written since 2000. As far as I can see the most recent encompassing
one is (Hasle andØhrstrøm 2016, [7]), which gives a good and comprehensive (though
practically formula-free) overview and discussion of Prior’s philosophical motivations.
Another fine and authoritative source to be mentioned is (Copeland 2017/1997, [5]).
9Cf. Prior’s letter to Kripke dated 13 October 1958 and quoted in (Hasle and
Øhrstrøm 2016, p. 11, [7]). The letter is found in Prior’s Papers, Box 4, Bodleian Library.
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versions to the use of special propositional variables a, b, c,…to stand
for worlds, respectively instants, now understood as a special kind of
propositions. We could instead still ”conditionalize” as we saw in i.-iii.
above,10 but the use of variables facilitates what Prior calls ’The develop-
ment of the U-calculus within the theory of world states’ (this is the title of
section 6 in chapter V). The U-calculus is the B-series counterpart to the
A-series tense logic, and thus the ”embedding” of this calculus within a
tense logic enriched with instant propositions goes a long way towards
Prior’s philosophical objectives implied above.
In chapter V of Past, Present and Future, Prior reiterates the defini-
tions of world propositions which we have already seen in (Meredith
and Prior 1965, [11]), and plays around with them in various ways in
a manner typical of that book (and many other Prior works) – which
delightfully reflects the richness and possible variations of these ideas,
but also makes it very difficult to recount without becoming absorbed
in intricate details. We’ll skip over these variations and just bring out
the most decisive definitions and features as stated in Tense Logic and
the Logic of Earlier and Later (Prior 2003/1968, pp. 117-138, [18]), Prior’s
fullest systematical presentation of his idea of hybridization. In that
article, Prior depicted what he (with a polemical allusion to Quine)11
called ‘Four Grades of Tense Logical Involvement’. The first grade de-
fines tenses entirely by the B-series notions of instants (as entities) and
the earlier-later relation. The second grade treats tenses (tense opera-
tors) on a par with instants and the earlier-later relation.
The third grade, which will be presented in a little more detail be-
low, lays out the hybrid logic of Past, Present and Futurewith full system-
aticity.12 The fourth grade consists in defining the necessity-operator in
terms of tense logical operators and adjusting the system accordingly;
however this last move belongs to another discussion than the issue of
10Prior notes: “In this line of investigation, as in others, we can probably dispense
with world-variables, if we wish, by adding to our theses conditions corresponding
to the axioms …e.g. in the calculus without world-variables we would aim to prove,
instead of (𝑇 𝑎 ∼ 𝑝 ≡∼ 𝑇 𝑎𝑝), the thesis ⋄𝑝∧∀𝑞 ∶ (2(𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞)∨2(𝑝 ⊃ ¬𝑞))) ⊃ (𝑇 𝑝 ∼ 𝑟 ≡∼
𝑇 𝑝𝑟”. (Past, Present and Future, p. 92).
11In the paper ’Three Grades of Modal Involvement’ (Quine 1953, [19]), Quine had
argued against the value of modal logic, and by implication, against what Prior was in
fact doing (and putting to great usefulness) in ’The Logic of Earlier and Later’.
12Blackburn and Jørgensen 2016 [2] actually characterize Prior’s third grade as the
quintessential hybrid logic of Prior, Cf. p. 3671, and especially footnote 8.
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hybridization, andwe shall now list the vital elements of the third grade.
We have already seen that from the idea of the Wp function in the
1965 paper, Prior moves on to further develop the notion of an ‘instant
proposition’, and in the 1968 article he introduces his masterpiece of
hybridization as follows:
What I shall call the third grade of tense-logical involvement
consists in treating the instant-variables a, b, c, etc. as also
representing propositions.
(Prior 2003/1968, p. 124, [18])
The essential features of the system can be seen from the following
few definitions, axioms and a few characteristic theorems (taken from
Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995, pp. 216-230 and p. 384, [23]; we shall here
adhere to their notation). These definitions and axioms are added to
ordinary minimal tense logic, i.e. the system known as Kt, and they
are:
(DB) 𝑎 < 𝑏 ≡𝑑𝑒𝑓 2(𝑎 ⊃ 𝐹𝑏) (definition of the earlier-later relation)
(DT) 𝑇 (𝑎,𝑝) ≡𝑑𝑒𝑓 2(𝑎 ⊃ 𝑝) definition of ’truth at an instant’)
Axioms for instant variables:
(11) ∃ 𝑎 ∶ 𝑎
(12) ∼ 2 ∼ 𝑎
(13) 2(𝑎 ⊃ 𝑝)∧2(𝑎 ⊃∼ 𝑝)
Some characteristic theorems:
(DL) ∀𝑎 ∶ 𝑇 (𝑎,𝑝) ≡ 2𝑝
(DG) 𝑇 (𝑎,𝐺𝑝) ≡ ∀𝑏 ∶ (𝑎 < 𝑏 ⊃ 𝑇 (𝑏,𝑝)) (with 𝐺 =∼ 𝐹 ∼)
(DH) 𝑇 (𝑎,𝐻𝑝) ≡ ∀𝑏 ∶ (𝑏 < 𝑎 ⊃ 𝑇 (𝑏,𝑝)) (with 𝐻 =∼ 𝑃 ∼)
The debt to Meredith and his contingent constant n is obvious. We
have already seen how his ideas were in (Meredith and Prior 1965, p.
101, [11]) developed into the two predicates 𝑊𝑝 and 𝑊(𝑚)𝑝 (the latter
was in Past, Present and Future called 𝑄𝑝):
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𝑊𝑝 = 𝑝 ∧∀𝑞(𝑞 ⊃ 2(𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞))
𝑊(𝑚)𝑝 ≝ ⋄𝑝 ∧∀𝑞[2(𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞)∧2(𝑝 ⊃ ¬𝑞)]
It is obvious how these definitions, perhaps especially the latter
(𝑊(𝑚)𝑝,𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑄𝑝), are captured by the axioms I2-I3. What was
once axioms about the contingent constant 𝑛 is now, in a transformed
manner, axioms about instant propositions. I1 mirrors the original ax-
iom, which we here called A, simply asserting the 𝑛 as an axiom, but
now in a one might say more cautious form, which just asserts the exis-
tence of at least one instant proposition. DB and DT are epitomes of the
power of hybridization; for one thing, they allow the free co-habitation
of A-series and B-series notions within one and the same language (and
that would be the essential point in the view of modern hybrid logic);
and for another thing, they allow for the definition of B-series notions
in terms of tense logical concepts (and that was the essential point to
Prior himself, witness his philosophical motivations).
It may be added that apart from the original exposition in Prior 1968,
the third grade is investigated in a perhaps more accessible form in the
aforementioned (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995, pp. 216-230, [23]), and
Prior’s hybridization is excellently explained in (Blackburn 2006, [1])
with a focus on its relation to modern modal logic and hybrid logic.
4 Discussion and conclusions – hybrid Heaven,
or hybrid Hell?
The path from Meredith 1953 to Prior’s instant propositions as well as
his third grade of tense logical involvement, that is, his hybrid logic, is
obvious. We have thus added the prehistory of hybrid logic, running
from 1953 till 1968, to the thorough account of its more modern history
in (Blackburn 2006, [1]).13 Blackburn focuses on the development from
ca. 1967 till our time and in this connection concentrates on modern
13It should be mentioned that we have here passed over the closely related history of
Meredith and Prior’s contribution to the development of possible world semantics. The
U-calculus can be seen as a calculus of the earlier-later relation, as has been done here,
but in fact it can also be seen as a calculus for the accessibility relation, as brilliantly
demonstrated in Copeland 2006 [4]. Making this relation clearer might enrich the ac-
count here given, but it would hardly make any change to the picture of how Meredith’
n and its consequences contributed to hybrid logic.
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(post Prior) modal logic which we have refrained from doing here. The
present paper has however been a little anachronistic when it comes
to the very term ’hybrid logic’, for this was not in use in Meredith’s or
Prior’s day. Blackburn observes that
Prior did not speak of hybrid logic; that term only gained
currency in the 1990s, long after Prior’s death; the term was
first used in passing in (Blackburn 1990),14 and the publica-
tion of Blackburn and Seligman (1995)15 was the baptismal
event. Prior regarded hybrid logic as a part of tense logic, in-
deed it was the third grade of tense logical involvement, as
he explained in his paper “Tense Logic and the Logic of Ear-
lier andLater”, which also can be found in (Prior 1968/2003).
(Blackburn and Jørgensen 2016, p. 3671, [my footnote],
[2])
The logic which Prior thus developed is aptly called hybrid, because
it allows two originally quite different languages to be unified within
one and the same language, or as Prior put it himself already in Past,
Present and Future:
This gives us all we need for moving freely in and out of U
calculi from the tense-logics to which they correspond. We
can also see more clearly the sense in which the B series is
definable in terms of the A series but not vice versa. The
tensed p can only enter the B-series logic as part of the form
T(a,p) (which, however, is itself tense-logically definable);
the B-series logic has no counterpart of the simple tensed p.
(Prior 1967, p. 197, [14])16
This was a triumphant result for Prior. Apart from being a very pow-
erful system of logic in its own right, these results allowed Prior all the
expressive power of both kinds of languages while at the same time as-
serting the primacy of the tenses, i.e. the A-series logic. It also allowed
a very clear conception of ’instants’ as being logical constructions out of
14Nominal tense logic and other sorted intensional frameworks. PhD thesis, Centre for
Cognitive Science, University of Edinburgh.
15Hybrid languages. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 4(3), 251–272.
16The inconsistent use of hyphenation is in the original.
158
propositions. In other words, this achievement seemed to strongly bear
out the crucial philosophical objectives implied earlier on. Meredith’s
original ideas had indeed been brought to full fruition.
However, Blackburn in a penetrating analysis of things to follow
makes it clear that some doubt crept in soon afterwards. For Prior soon
discovered that hybridization was not limited to tense logic, but possi-
ble and desirable when accounting for other indexicals such as I, here,
now. These observations would lead inter alia to Prior’s famous late no-
tion of Egocentric Logic (Cf. Prior 2003/1968, pp. 223-240, [18]) as well
as the work aboutWorlds, Times and Selves (Cf. Prior 2003/1968, pp. 241-
256, [18], and Prior and Fine 1977, [16]). Blackburn investigates and
charts how Prior discussed these issues in a number of papers which
were, unfortunately, to prove to be among the last ones he ever wrote
before his untimely death in October 1969.17 A particularly strong ex-
pression of some emerging doubt is, Blackburn says, to be found in the
paper ’Quasi-Propositions andQuasi-Individuals’ (Prior 2003/1968, pp.
213-221, [18]). The doubt — or at any rate an awareness of problems —
that was expressed in that paper was a preoccupation of Prior’s for the
period that remained of his career. Blackburn says
As I said earlier, I know of nothing in Prior’s publishedwork
that satisfactorily resolves the issues raised in “Quasi-Propo-
sitions and Quasi-Individuals”. What is clear is that in his
last working years he was actively struggling to reconcile his
belief in the suitability of modal and hybrid formalisms for
certain tasks, with the realisation that the expressivity of his
strong hybrid languages undercut his attempt to capture his
cherished distinction between tensed and untensed talk [i.e.
A-series talk versus B-series talk].
(Blackburn 2006, p. 366, [1])
I think it is beyond dispute that Blackburn has a point. His argumen-
tation is clear and well underpinned, and involves much more detail
than can be recounted here. With hybrid languages, the contention that
some part of the language is derived from, or based on, some other part
17Written on paper from Grand Hotel Bellevue, Åndalsnes, Norway. This was the
last place Prior stayed, before he arrived in Trondheim, where he died on 6th October
1969.
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of it comes to seem somewhat arbitrary, not to say a mere postulate. On
the other hand, if the full hybrid tense logical language does not provide
an argument per se for Prior’s philosophical tenets, that does not make
it inconsistent still to hold them. One might recall Prior’s struggle with
Relativity Theory (cf. Past, Present and Future pp. 203-205). It is beyond
doubt that Relativity Theory poses a challenge to Prior’s philosophy of
time, but also that it does not undisputably invalidate it. In ’Some Free
Thinking on Time’ (Prior 1996, [17]), where Prior— as the title suggests
— permitted himself a more direct and slightly less stringent statement
of his thoughts, we find this remarkable passage:
So it seems to me that there’s a strong case for just digging
our heels in here and saying that, relativity or no relativity,
if I say I saw a certain flash before you, and you say you saw
it first, one of us is just wrong — is misled it may be, by the
effect of speed on his instruments — even if there is just no
physical means whatever of deciding which of us it is.
(Prior 1996, p. 50, [17])
While Blackburn is certainly right in observing that Prior had be-
come aware of new challenges and struggled with them, he probably
nevertheless dug in his heels here, too. At any rate, what is likely his
last written statements seems to indicate this. Prior died in Trondheim
on 6th October 1969 whilst on a lecture to Norway. The last place he
stayed before arriving in Trondheim was in Grand Hotel Bellevue in
Åndalsnes. On a sheet of hotel paper (found in Prior’s Papers, Box 7,
Bodleian Library) he made some notes, most likely for the presentation
to be held in Trondheim. The opening sentence of that note says:
What is Time? Time is a logical construction.
(Prior 1969, [15])
And Prior adds:
What looks like propositions about time are really gener-
alised tensed propositions about other things
(Prior 1969, [15])
The rest of the one-page note is devoted to this and other cherished
A-series notions, including the (reality of) the passage of time:
160
Time flows on
= All events are becoming more past. But events are logical
constructions too. Whatever is or has been orwill be the case,
will have been the case. (Prior 1969, [15]).
This is followed by some formulas to bear home the point.
However, we of course do not know whether Prior would have re-
tained his positions in the face of the later developments of hybrid logic,
or how he might himself have contributed to these developments. One
can only hope with Blackburn and Jørgensen that ”Hopefully further
archival research will reveal more here too”. (Blackburn and Jørgensen
2016, p. 3675, [2]).
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Abstract
In this paper I revisit the debate about tense- versus tenseless theory, or
A- versus B-theory. Canonically, Arthur Prior’s seminal paperThankGood-
ness That’s Over is said to have triggered the switch from the old to the
new B-theory. I argue that Moritz Schlick made the case for indispens-
able A-sentences 25 years prior to Prior. More precisely, I assert that both
philosophers support the same theses: 1) A-notions are indispensable
and 2) A-sentences are not in general translatable into B-sentences. While
this is the case, Schlick’s argument is based in a very different context
than Prior’s and also Schlick’s reasons for holding 1) differ from Prior’s.
Therefor it is questionable whether Schlick’s paper could have had the
same influence that Prior’s paper had.
Keywords: A-theory, B-theory, tensed theory of time, tenseless theory
of time, indexicals, Moritz Schlick, Arthur Prior.
1 Introduction
There are three main areas of research in contemporary philosophy of
time.1 Firstly, there is the debate about the nature of time; secondly,
∗Earlier versions of the paper where presented at the „The Now Now“ workshop,
which took place on the 30th November 2018 at the University of Siegen; the „TheMeta-
physics of Time: Themes from Prior“ conference, held from 19th till 21st of March 2019
at Aalborg University; and the theoretical colloquium of Prof. Dr. Cord Friebe at the
University of Siegen on the 18th of April 2019.
1For a slightly opinionated introduction to philosophy of time see (Fischer, 2016b).
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there is the debate about the persistence of objects through time; the
third debate, which concerns this paper, goes under different names,
and even what is supposed to be at stake varies, depending on the dif-
ferent presentations of the debate. However, there is a clear chasm, with
notions like A-theory, tense, tensers and indexical on the one side and B-
theory, tenseless, detensers and non-indexical on the other side.
The debate that is the topic of this paper concerns the linguistic ref-
erence to the present.2 This reference can be encoded in different ways,
via the temporal indexical ‘now’, or other temporal adverbs, as well as
the tense or aspect of a sentence, and this is one of the reasonswhy there
are different names for the debate. In this paper I will simply talk about
A- and B-notions as an umbrella term to include all the ways in which
the linguistic reference to the present moment can be encoded, and I
will call the corresponding sentences A- and B-sentences.
Roughly, the story is that the so-called old B-theoreticians asserted
thatA-sentences can be translated into B-sentenceswithout loss ofmean-
ing and that they should be translated, typically, to arrive at a more
objective language. Then Arthur Prior and John Perry argued that A-
sentences and beliefs cannot be translated into their B-theoretic counter-
parts, while at the same time being indispensable for our actions. This
was one of the few moments at which philosophy got as close to objec-
tive progress as it may ever get. After the articles of Prior and Perry,
virtually everybody accepted that A-sentences are not translatable into
B-sentences. Nowadays, B-theoreticians typically follow David Hugh
Mellor, who argues that, althoughA-sentences are not translatable, they
can be made true by B-facts and B-facts only.
In this paper I will questionwhether Arthur Prior really was the first
to argue for the non-translatability of A-sentences into their B-counter-
parts. Moritz Schlick asserted, allegedly in a completely different con-
text, that a sentence containing the temporal indexical ‘now’ cannot be
translated into the corresponding sentence with a time and date indi-
cation. If Schlick and Prior really arrived at the same conclusion, the
surprising finding is that Schlick did so 25 years earlier.3 Just how sim-
2The NTT included metaphysics in a way that is not adequate to talk about merely
linguistic reference to the present moment any more (see (Fischer, 2016a, p. 69)), nev-
ertheless, the debate started out as a debate about sentences.
3We can reasonable assume that Prior did not know about Schlick’s argument.
I’ve searched the Nachlass of Prior (http://nachlass.prior.aau.dk) and the Vienna Cir-
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ilar the arguments of Schlick and Prior really are I will assess in this
paper. To do so, I will first recapitulate the canonical story of the A- and
B-theory as it pertains to my question. Then, I will sketch the context
in which Moritz Schlick presented his argument: the protocol sentence
debate. Finally, I will compare both arguments.
2 The orthodox history of tense
In this section I will present the canonical history of the A- vs. B-theory.
The rationale of the old B-theoreticians is that A-notions bring with
them a kind of variability that must be avoided. Take indexicals for
example. According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy an
indexical is a ‘linguistic expression whose reference can shift from con-
text to context’ (Braun, 2015). Philosophers like Rudolf Carnap have
claimed that the context dependence ofA-notions generates a variability
in the corresponding A-sentences that is at odds with an objective lan-
guage, which is especially troublesome in the case of scientific language.
But Carnap also thought that there is an easy fix at hand. One can get rid
of the context dependence ‘by means of the addition of person-, place-,
and time designations’ (Carnap, 1928).
Carnap’s quote pretty much captures the spirit of the old B-theoreti-
cians, who thought that all A-sentences are translatable without loss of
meaning into their respective B-counterparts. For how exactly this trans-
lationwas supposed towork they had different strategies. Gottlob Frege
supported a date indication analysis, while Bertrand Russell opted for a
token-reflexive analysis. For example, a sentence like ‘It is raining now’
would translate to something along the lines of ‘It is raining on Friday,
the 30th of November 2018’ according to Frege and ‘It is raining at the
time point co-temporal with this utterance’ following Russell.
cle Archive (http://viennacirclefoundation.nl): in both sources neither correspondence
between Prior and Schlick can be found, nor any indication that Prior knew of Schlick’s
work. David Jakobsen made me aware that also an argument from silence can be made
to the same conclusion: Prior would have written about such an important historical
precursor to tense-logic in the first chapter ofPast, Present and Future (Prior 1967). Given
how historically interested Prior was, he would have mentioned Schlick’s argument
there, if he knew about it. On top of that Martin Prior has told me in personal commu-
nication that he cannot recall his father, Arthur Prior, ever having mentioned Schlick.
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UNTRANSLATABLE A-SENTENCES
In 1959 Arthur Prior argued in his seminal paper Thank Goodness That’s
Over (Prior, 1959) that reference to the present moment is both impor-
tant for our actions and not translatable without loss of meaning into
tenseless concepts and sentences. Since Prior’s argument is right at the
heart of my paper, let me quote at length.
One says, e. g. “Thank goodness that’s over!”, and not only
is this, when said, quite clear without any date appended,
but it says something which it is impossible that any use of
a tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly
doesn’t mean the same as, e. g. “Thank goodness the date
of the conclusion of that thing is Friday, June 15, 1954”, even
if it be said then. (Nor, for that matter, does it mean “Thank
goodness the conclusion of that thing is contemporaneous
with this utterance”. Why should anyone thank goodness
for that?) (Prior, 1959)
Obviously, Prior directly addresses Frege’s date indication analysis
and Russell’s token-reflexive analysis, and obviously he dismisses both.
For Prior tensed sentences cannot be translated into tenseless ones with-
out loss of meaning. Adding date and time indications creates a differ-
ent sentence, one that is admittedly meaningful, but means something
else. Prior asserts that tensed sentences convey a meaning that cannot
be expressed by B-sentences. On top of that, but obviously related to
this, Prior rejects the idea that A-sentences are somehow incomplete.
We don’t have to look at our watch to understand sentences like ‘It’s
raining now’. In a nutshell, Prior opposes both main creeds of the old
B-theory: A-sentences are neither in need of a date and time addition,
nor can the corresponding B-sentences express the same propositions
or trigger the same actions.
20 years later (in 1979) John Perry argued quite along the same lines
as Prior. Perry made a more general point: indexicals (in general) con-
vey a sort of information that cannot be encoded in non-indexical no-
tions. Like Prior, Perry holds that A-beliefs are indispensable for our
actions. Perry’s case for temporal indexicals is taken from everyday aca-
demic life. A tardy professor, ‘who desires to attend the department
meeting on time, and believes correctly that it begins at noon, sits mo-
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tionless in his office at that time. Suddenly he begins to move. What
explains his action? A change in belief. He believed all along that the
departmentmeeting starts at noon; he came to believe, as hewould have
put it, that it starts now’ (Perry, 1979). So, according to Perry, the action
of the professor, the sudden standing up and rushing towards the loca-
tion of the meeting, can only be explained by a belief with an A-content.
The corresponding B-belief, that the meeting starts at noon, just does
not get the tardy professor moving.
Prior’s and Perry’s arguments make a strong case for the untrans-
latability of A-sentences into B-sentences, so strong indeed that nowa-
days it has been virtually universally accepted. This is acknowledged by
A- and B-theorists alike. Quentin Smith, one of the latter, accepts that
‘recent defenders of the tenseless view have come to embrace the thesis
that tensed sentences cannot be translated by tenseless oneswithout loss
of meaning.’ (Smith, 1994). It is fair to assert that here we have one of
the few cases in philosophy in which progress has nearly incontestably
been made. So, was B-theory abandoned after Prior and Perry? Surely
not! B-theory is still defended today, even by the majority.
But how is it possible to accept the untranslatability of A-sentences
and still be a B-theorist? The B-theorists, championed by David Hugh
Mellor, have developed a novel way to deal with A-sentences that has
become known as the New Tenseless Theory of Time — NTT. I will elabo-
rate on this in the next subsection, but basically the idea of the NTT is
that A-sentences are made true by B-facts, and B-facts only.
HOW TO BE A B-THEORETICIAN NOWADAYS
The NTT was chiefly devised by David Hugh Mellor in his seminal
books Real Time (Mellor, 1981) and Real Time II (Mellor, 1998). There
is an important difference between Mellor’s account in Real Time and
his account in Real Time II that we will address in what follows, but
both agree on the general point that A-sentences are made true by B-
facts. This is a remarkable twist in the debate between the two camps.
The old B-theory was firmly rooted in considerations about language.
It was concerned with whether certain sentences are equivalent or not.
By accepting the untranslatability and, as a reaction to Prior and Perry,
including B-facts into the discussion the new B-theories essentially in-
clude ontology. This is not meant as a criticism of the NTT, but merely
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as an indication of the commitments one must make to be a Mellor’ian
B-theorist.4
The novel idea of the new B-theory is to distinguish strictly between
language and ontology. By keeping these two levels apart, the new B-
theorists can accept the untranslatability of A-sentences on the language
level and at the same time maintain that reality does not have an A-
structure. The new B-theorists insist that acknowledging A-sentences
does not necessitate the acceptance of A-facts. Even when we accept A-
sentences, we can still wonder: is ‘reality itself somehow tensed […] or
is it merely that we describe a tenseless […] reality from a tensed […]
point of view? (Fine, 2006, p. 261).
Now, it is not enough to assert that for every token of an A-sentence
there is a corresponding B-fact that makes the sentence true (if true).
There must also be a constant meaning through all the tokens. I don’t
have to look atmywatch to understand a sentence like ‘It is raining now’.
Mellor’s first ideawas that A-sentencesmean a function fromutterances
(tokens) to truth conditions. With this ingenious move it is possible to
combine the desired variability in the truth values and truth makers
with the desired stability in meaning. The A-sentence in question has
different truth conditions fromutterance to utterance, and thus can both
have different truth values and be made true by different facts. In this
way, it is possible for B-theorists to accommodate that sentences like
‘It is raining now’ need not be true all the time and at the same time
to explain how such A-sentences are made true by B-facts.5 There is a
B-fact for every time that such a sentence is truthfully uttered; it will
be different B-facts in each instance, but nothing aside from B-facts is
needed. Mellor resourcefully exploited the fact that a function can have
a varying co-domain. Hence, an A-sentence can have both a constant
meaning (the function) and varying truth values and truth makers.
Challenging Mellor’s view, William Lane Craig has argued that the
NTT as a token-token-reflexive theory falls prey to the same problems
as the token-reflexive versions of the old B-theory. He uses his famous
4Note that this commitment might not have been tenable for someone like Carnap,
who shunned metaphysics throughout his career, and even had an explicitly purely
syntactical period. See (Fischer, 2016a).
5This is obviously only half of what the new B-theorist must maintain, and indeed
Mellor not only argued that A-sentences can be made true by B-facts, but also that they
cannot be made true by A-facts. His argument for the latter, however, goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
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example of ‘There are no tokens’ (Craig, 1996, p. 18) to show that the
NTT cannot give a coherent account of the truth conditions of tensed
sentences.6 In response to this, Mellor has adjusted his theory. In Real
Time II he maintains that A-sentences mean a function from time points
to truth conditions. This analysis keeps the nice features of the account
he has put forward in Real Time, while at the same time it can account
for the meaning of A-sentences if there is no relevant utterance.
This must suffice as a recapitulation of the orthodox history of the
A- versus B-theory of time.7 The observation most important for this
paper is that Prior’s argument had a huge impact on the debate. The
translatability of A-sentences was given up for good, and, though this
did not settle the debate, it shaped the future of the debate. Now the
perhaps surprising thing is that someone had already argued for the
untranslatability of A-sentences into B-sentences a quarter of a century
earlier: Moritz Schlick (Schlick, 1934). Granted, he did so in a different
context, the Vienna Circle’s protocol sentence debate. I will sketch this
context in the next section, in order properly to asses Schlick’s argument,
and then compare it to Prior’s argument.
3 ‘Here now blue’ - Schlick’ian confirmations
This section is concerned with a part of the history of philosophy that is
not normally mentioned in philosophy of time. The first subsection cov-
ers a topic that is not philosophy of time at all. The protocol sentences
debate is usually part of (the history of) the philosophy of science. Nor
does the next part, which is as clearly relevant to the debate between A-
and B-theory as Prior and Perry’s famous papers, belong to the canon
in philosophy of time. If it can be established that Schlick already made
the case for the untranslatability ofA-sentences, thismayhave to change.
But let us take one step at a time and first sketch the context in which
Schlick wrote his brilliant paper Über das Fundament der Erkenntnis .
6The development of the NTT can be nicely observed in (Oaklander & Smith, 1994).
7Of course, the debate didn’t stop there. A good staring point for an panoptic
overview of the arguments for and against theA- and B-theory areWilliamLaneCraig’s
books (Craig, 2000a) and (Craig, 2000b).
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PROTOCOL SENTENCES
In their quest to put science on a strong foundation, the Vienna Circle
searched for the elements on which ultimately all scientific knowledge
could be based.8 These basic elements are supposed to be sentences
which are infallible and thus can be the touchstone for all further hy-
potheses. They have been coined protocol sentences quite literally in rem-
iniscence of the test records that scientists write.
As logical positivists, the members of the Vienna Circle are firmly
rooted in the empiricists’ tradition. They maintain that all (meaning-
ful) sentences are either tautologies or Realsätze (real sentences). Real
sentences, then, are further classified as protocol sentences and non-
protocol sentences. The special feature of protocol sentences is that they
are synthetic sentenceswhich are not hypotheses (Schlick, 2009)[p. 514]
– at least in theory.
The philosophers of the Vienna Circle were quite divided about how
such protocol sentences ought to look, or whether they have a specific
form at all. But, just to give you an idea, Otto Neurath presents in his
paper Protokollsätze (Neurath, 1932), after which the debate is named,
the following example:
Ottos Protokoll um 3 Uhr 17 Minuten: [Ottos Sprechdenken war
um 3 Uhr 16 Minuten: (Im Zimmer war um 3 Uhr 15 Minuten ein von
Otto wahrgenommener Tisch)]
Otto’s record at 3:17: [Otto’s speech-thought at 3:16 was: (In the
room, at 3:15 was a table that was perceived by Otto)]
Protocol sentences have a quite peculiar form with two nested sets
of brackets which each contain well-formed sentences that are not pro-
tocol sentences themselves, according to Neurath. In contrast to this,
Carnap (Carnap, 1932), in accordance with his general philosophical
convictions, denied that there is any specific form in which protocol
sentences must be presented. It is even a matter of mere convention
whether they are regarded as part of the scientific language itself or not.
8As this paper is not primarily concerned with the Vienna Circle, the following
sketch of the protocol sentence debate and the context in which it arose will be quite
superficial. The interested (and German-speaking) reader is referred to the excellent
(Stöltzner & Uebel, 2009).
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Without getting entangled in the gory details of the specific way to
state a protocol sentence properly, Schlick reacts on a much more gen-
eral level, regarding protocol sentences as the rock on which (scientific)
knowledge is to be built. This requires them to have two features at the
same time. They need to be firm ground for further knowledge, i. e.
eternal, intersubjective, objective etc.; and they need to be immediately
given, not hypotheses themselves. Tautologies are out of the question,
as they contain no factual content, so protocol sentences must be real
sentences. Yet, according to Schlick, at this point a dilemma arises: The
available sentences are insufficient, and the sufficient sentences are un-
available. What he asserts in this context might seem oddly familiar:
If I make the confirmation ‘Here now blue’ this is not the
same as the protocol statement ‘M. S. perceived blue on the
n-th of April 1934 at such and such a time and such and such
a place.’ The latter statement is a hypothesis and as such
always characterised by uncertainty. The latter statement is
equivalent to ‘M. S. made […] (here time and place are to
be given) the confirmation “here now blue.” ’ And that this
assertion is not identical with the confirmation occurring in
it is clear. (Schlick, 1966)
Schlick wholeheartedly accepts the untranslatability of A-sentences;
for him it is obvious that anA-sentence and the corresponding B-senten-
ce are not identical. It is worthwhile to note the way Schlick argues for
this. According to him, the B-sentences (B1) ‘M. S. perceived blue on
the n-th of April 1934 at such and such a time and such and such a place.’
is (obviously) equivalent to (B2) ‘M. S. made […] (here time and place
are to be given) the confirmation “here now blue.” ’. Now, following
Schlick, the form (B2) reveals that this B-sentence is not equivalent to
(A1) ‘Here now blue’. (B2) contains (A1) and further semantically rel-
evant parts, and therefore they cannot be equivalent, from which it fol-
lows that (A1) and (B1) are not equivalent if the equivalence of (B1)
and (B2) is accepted.
Schlick’s argument hit home, and the quest for an immutable basis
for scientific knowledge was abandoned by the Vienna Circle. The his-
torical situation may have (unfortunately) prevented the influence of
Schlick’s position on the matter. Yet, the systematic resemblance of the
two arguments is striking. Schlick literally asserts that the indexicals
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‘here’ and ‘now’ are not replaceable by date and time indications. In the
next section I will take a closer look at what Schlick and Prior actually
assert in comparison to each other.
COMPARISON BETWEEN PRIOR’S AND SCHLICK’S ARGUMENTS
Let us begin the comparison of Schlick’s and Prior’s arguments by tak-
ing a closer look at Prior’s paper. He concedes that ‘half the time I
personally have forgotten what the date is and must look it up or ask
somebody when I need it for writing cheques, etc.; yet, even in this per-
petual dateless haze one somehow communicates, one makes oneself
understood, and with time-reference too.’ (Prior, 1959, p. 17). In a bril-
liantly casual style Prior conveys a profound philosophical insight in
this quote, namely, that A-sentences are not incomplete sentences that
need B-theoretic time and date amendments. I have succinctly summed
this up in the point that I need not look at my watch to understand the
sentence ‘It is raining now’. For Prior, A-sentences contain a special kind
of information that cannot be expressed in a B-sentence and this is im-
portant for our actions. A-notions are indispensable, according to Prior,
because only A-beliefs can trigger the relief after e. g. a stressful dentist
appointment; only they make us say ‘thank goodness, that’s over!’.
Let’s take a look at the essential Prior-quote again: ‘One says, e. g.
“Thank goodness that’s over!”, and not only is this, when said, quite
clear without any date appended, but it says something which it is im-
possible that any use of a tenseless copula with a date should convey. It
certainly doesn’tmean the same as, e.g. “Thank goodness the date of the
conclusion of that thing is Friday, June I5, I954”, even if it be said then.’
This quote captures Prior’s pivotal theses: 1) A-notions are indispens-
able and 2) A-sentences are not in general translatable into B-sentences
without loss of meaning.
Schlick agrees with this: For him, A-sentences are not translatable
into B-sentences without loss of meaning. He only says this explicitly
for confirmations, though. This is why, strictly speaking, we have to
include “in general” to 2). However, I think, his argumentation is in-
dicative. Schlick states that confirmations cannot ‘be replaced by an
indication of time and place, for as soon as one attempts to do this, the
result, as we have seen, is that one unavoidably substitutes for the ob-
servation statement a protocol statement, which as such has a wholly
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different nature.’ (Schlick, 1966, p. 225). This “wholly different nature”
depends on the indexicals used within the confirmations, according to
Schlick. The meaning of indexicals cannot be captured by definitions as
they crucially really on their context. But in contrast to Carnap, Schlick
does not think that therefor we have to get rid of indexicals. Quite the
contrary! For Schlick indexicals are indispensable. Confirmations, es-
sentially including indexicals, are the only synthetic sentences, which
are not hypotheses (Schlick, 1966, p. 226) and, thus, all knowledge (in
the sense of Erkenntnis ) depends on them (Schlick, 1966, p. 227). As
we have seen, this happens not in the way that protocol sentences have
been envisaged to work. Schlick’s account of the role of confirmations
in hypotheses-confirmation is so poetic that I feel compelled to quote
it in German: Confirmations ‘liegen keineswegs am Grunde der Wis-
senschaft, sondern die Erkenntnis züngelt gleichsamzu ihnen auf, jeden
nur in einem Augenblick erreichend und sogleich verzehrend’ (Schlick,
1934, p. 99). According to Schlick confirmations are not suitable to play
the role as the foundation of science that the Vienna Circle had intended
for protocol sentences. Nevertheless, they play a role in knowledge ac-
quisition. In Schlick’swords, knowledge flickers like a flame up towards
them, and then there is a brief moment when they nourish the flame of
knowledge, but, in doing so, they are themselves burned up.
Summing up we can establish that Prior and Schlick agree that 1)
A-notions are indispensable and 2) A-sentences are not in general trans-
latable into B-sentences. In contrast to Prior, however, Schlick goes one
step further: ‘A genuine confirmation cannot be written down, for, as
soon as I inscribe the demonstratives “here”, “now”, they lose their
meaning’. This statement might seem unreasonable, but it actually fits
well into Schlick’s way of conceiving the situation. A-sentences essen-
tially refer to the moment in which they have been uttered. By writing
down an A-sentence, one produces an artefact, e. g. a sentence in chalk
on a blackboard. This artefact persists longer than themoment to which
the expressedA-sentence essentially refers. Hence, theA-sentence quite
literally loses its intended meaning when written down.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Moritz Schlick made the case for the in-
dispensability ofA-sentences 25 year prior toArthur Prior. Both philoso-
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phers agree on the main points: 1) A-notions are indispensable and 2)
A-sentences are not in general translatable into B-sentences. However,
Schlick’s argument is based in a very different context than Prior’s and
therefor it is questionable whether it could have had the same influence
on the debate about A- and B-theory that Prior’s paper had.
Please note that I have not argued for the A-theory of time in this
paper, although I do support a version of the A-theory. I have merely
presented Prior’s and Schlick’s arguments in favour of the A-theory. Ac-
cordingly, I have not subscribed to the arguments of Prior and Schlick.
This paper merely compares the two lines of argumentation, without
assessing their persuasiveness in the debate between A- and B-theory.
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1 Introduction
In 1954, on the 27th August, Arthur Norman Prior presented his idea of
tense-logic for the first time at the Second Philosophical Congress, held
at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand.1 The letters between
Prior and his wife Mary and between Prior and his fellow philosopher
and friend J.J.C “Jack” Smart provide a window into the time leading
up to the tense-logic talk. Prior and Mary were not only a married cou-
ple exchanging letters of love when away from each other. They were
also two philosophers whose relationship was characterized by their
shared interest in philosophy. Mary had finished her MA in philoso-
phy in 1950, and in 1954 Arthur was now Professor of Philosophy at
Canterbury University College, Christchurch. Naturally, their letters
frequently turned to philosophical topics. In the following we will dis-
cuss the topics that were brought up in the letters and suggest that they
contribute to Arthur’s final presentation of tense-logic on the 27th Au-
gust in Wellington.
In August 1954 Mary was still in the Sanatorium in Christchurch
recovering from tuberculosis and preparing to return home to Arthur,
Martin and Ann. The letters between Arthur and Mary have recently
been made available to researchers and it is one of the most remark-
able collections of this kind in modern analytic philosophy as it pro-
vides a behind-the-scene view of Arthur Prior’s philosophical writings
in the 1950s.2 Mary and Arthur were both able writers and since they
were separated from each other in extended periods, as in 1954, or dur-
ing Arthur’s travels, we are in the fortunate situation of having many
letters between them. The importance of the correspondence between
Arthur and Jack Smart with regard to tense-logic has been described
elsewhere ([1] Jakobsen 2017), but its importance is highlighted by the
letters between Arthur and Mary as well. The letters make it possible
to track Arthur’s final decision a few weeks before 27th August to make
tense-logic the topic of his Presidential Address for the Philosophical
Congress. The correspondence with Smart played an important role in
this decision. Indeed, it turns out that at the end of July 1954, Arthur
1NewZealand section of theAustralasianAssociation of Psychology andPhilosophy,
Second Philosophical Congress, Wellington 27th – 30th August 1954.
2The collection of letters betweenArthur andMary after 1945 is now kept at Aalborg
University and labelled as the Martin Prior Collection (A-F folders).
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was still planning to use another of the topics discussed between him
and Jack Smart for his presidential address.
An early photo of Mary and Arthur Prior believed to have been taken in 1944,
probably at the home of Jonathan Bennett’s parents.
2 An overview of the correspondence
We have included 9 letters ranged chronologically from 15th June to 27th
August, as well as the programme of the event in Wellington. The pe-
riod is chosen because of the topics discussed in them as they serve to
stress this important period in Prior’s life. We have included the only
known letter from Prior to Smart in 1954. We have chosen to exclude
some letters from Mary to Arthur, as they do not contain philosophi-
cally relevant material, and likewise we have for the same reasons ex-
cluded 26 letters written by Jack Smart to Arthur Prior that year, but
relevant sections are quoted. The full letters from Smart can be found
in Box 3 at the Bodleian Library, Oxford, in the Prior Collection.
Table 1. The list of letters included or discussed. The content of these
letters is also briefly sketched. The letters from Smart to Prior are part
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of the Prior Archive at the Bodleian Library, and have not been included
here due to potential copyright restrictions. Also included, but not listed
here, is the program of the Second Philosophical Congress.
Heading Date Author Content
5.1 15th June, 1954 Arthur toMary
Political and religious ques-
tions from the Presbytery
Public Questions Commit-
tee
5.2 1st July, 1954 Arthur toMary
Encloses letter to Smart
written the day before (5.3)
5.3 30th June, 1954 Arthur toSmart
Abstract entities and
Quine’s New Foundation for
Mathematical logic
5.4 8th July, 1954 Arthur toMary
Deals with political ques-
tions related to freedom in
preparation for speech
20th July, 1954 Jack toArthur
Concerns the topic of ab-
stract entities in reply to
Arthur’s 30th June letter
5.5 29th July, 1954 Arthur toMary
Discusses major points in
Smart’s 20th July letter
30th July, 1954 Jack toArthur
On tense-logic, determin-
ism and Diodorus
5.6 9th August, 1954 Arthur toMary
On modal logic, the
ontological argument,
Diodorus, and attitudes to
time in medieval logic and
theology
9th August, 1954 Jack toArthur
An extensive argument
against Arthur’s tense-
logic.
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5.7 13th August, 1954 Mary toArthur Abstract entities and time
5.8 17th August, 1954 Mary toArthur
Necessary existence and
the ontological argument
5.9 27th August, 1954 Arthur toMary
Report from the first day of
the philosophical congress
3 Topics on Metaphysics and Time
The letters touch upon five main topics:
A. Freedom (political and philosophical point of view)
B. Abstract entities
C. Modal logic including the ontological proof for the existence of
God
D. Religion and theology
E. The logic of time
We shall focus on each of these in turn.
A. FREEDOM
In the letter to Mary of the 8th July [5.4], Arthur writes about a talk he
is planning to give on “the philosophical basis of freedom”. He doesn’t
like the title, but emphasizes that freedom should be treasured not be-
cause of some philosophical basis, but for its own sake. He also points
out that “a philosopher can properly urge people to be consistent about
their basic belief”. In the letter his main emphasis is on political free-
dom, i.e. freedom from oppression, and this involved a duty to act and
live in coherence with the basic freedom. He says:
if we have a duty to defend the free world, then we have a
prior duty to be the free world.
([2] Arthur to Mary 8th July, 1954)
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There is an explicit mention of pacifism in 5.4. Until 1942 Prior had
been a pacifist, but then changed and joined the Royal New Zealand
Air Force. And his comment to Mary makes it clear that in his mind
the notion of political freedom is somehow also related to personal and
existential freedom.
This relation becomes obvious in Smart’s letter, 30th July 1954. In
this letter, the first paragraph deals with political freedom, whereas the
paragraph following deals with Diodorus and determinism, i.e. the log-
ical analysis of existential freedom. Mary alsomentions Diodorus in her
letter to Arthur on the 20th August 1954. Determinism and free choice,
were clearly important themes to Mary and Arthur’s religious views.
At that time, they were members of the Presbyterian Church and ob-
viously aware of the tension between Calvinism and the notion of free
choice. Obviously, the religious vocabulary also gives rise to a number
of reflections on abstract entities and time in general.
B. Abstract entities
Arthur Prior’s work in the 1950s on abstract entities shows that his posi-
tion on this topic differed from theWittgenstein-inspired nominalism in
which abstract entities such as classes, propositions and sets are mean-
ingless. Prior, on the other hand, writes to Smart [5.3]:
Nothing is meaningless, in short (leaving out cases in which
a word like ‘pob’ is just used without any meaning being
assigned to it), except what is ungrammatical in a simple
schoolboy sense, and certain ‘statements’ which themselves
purport implicitly or explicitly to be about meaning’ (like
the heterological stuff and the Liar).
([3] Prior to Smart, 30th June 1954)
Indeed, according to Prior, it was “a safe principle of philosophical
methodology, that if Wittgenstein says that a thing is meaningless, it is
a necessary truth” ([4] Prior 2014). For Prior, propositions about such
entities were either true or false and not meaningless. In his criticism of
this position he had found inspiration from Quine’s New Foundation for
Mathematical Logic [5]. While inspired by Quine however, he disagreed
with him on the view that we are ontologically committed to all the
entities we quantify over. Prior wasmuch involvedwith this topic in his
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discussion with Smart, and also enclosed a copy of his letter to Smart in
his letter to Mary on the 1st July. [6] Smart’s reply came back on the
20th July. It turns out, that Smart, like Prior, disagreed with Quine on
ontological commitment as a consequence of quantifying. Smart writes:
I can’t myself see that quantifying over predicate variables
entails Platonism. Quine’s arguments on this score are of a
general philosophical kind and are weak.
([7] Smart to Prior, 20th July, 1954)
In Arthur’s letter to Mary on the 29th July, he seems to have decided
that he should present his thoughts on Platonism and abstract entities
at the philosophical congress.
I’ll definitely devote the larger part of my Wellington thing
to a discussion of whether the question of Platonism v. nom-
inalism is purely a verbal question.
([8] Arthur to Mary 29th July 1954)
He didn’t do so.3
Prior’s view on abstract entities are however relevant for the discus-
sion of tense-logic. According to Prior, we are not ontologically commit-
ted to the temporal entities (dates, instants, moments etc.) over which
we quantify in the so-called l-calculus (the logic of earlier and later).
Prior’s point is that, although the temporal entities do not exist in a
strictly ontological manner, they can be seen as logical constructions
over which we can quantify. He says:
the l-calculus should be exhibited as a logical construction
out of the PF calculus rather than vice versa.
([9] Prior 1958, p. 116)
This position is still one of the main differences between the propo-
nents of tense-logic, i.e. the A-theory, and the defenders of the priority
of the earlier-later calculus, i.e. the B-theory.
3Editors’ note: Prior is probably referring to the conference that took place in
Wellington 27th-30th August, 1954. However, at this conference his main contribution
was his paper “The Logic of Time-Distinctions”.
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C. Modal logic including the ontological proof for the existence of
God
In 1955Arthur Prior published Is Necessary Existence Possible? [10] From
Smart’s letters we can see that already he had begun his work on nec-
essary existence and the ontological argument in November 1953. On
Smart’s recommendation, Arthur sent a paper on necessary existence to
the journal Analysis. Though he disagreed with Arthur, he nonetheless
stated:
Your defence of the ontological argument is immune to my
criticism. … I must say it is difficult to find a knock down
proof of the contradiction of your thesis. You ought to send
it to some journal and see if the big brains can find a hole in
your reasoning! ([11] Smart to Prior, 23th November 1953)
Arthur followed Smart’s recommendation and sent it to Analysis.
From Smart’s letter in February 1954 we can see that the article was re-
jected and Smart takes a swipe atMacDonald, a logician and co-founder
of the journal Analysis. He writes:
The exchange with M. Macdonald4 shows her up as what I
thought – somewhat narrow minded, which an editor
shouldn’t be. She has an anti-metaphysical bias in thewrong
sort of way. Your note on the ontological argument5 [sic] is
a piece of analysis. And a much more interesting piece of
analysis than the dull, and often quite mistaken, stuff so fre-
quently published in Analysis.
([12] Smart to Prior, 3rd February 1954)
On Monday 9th August 1954, Arthur Prior was attending a univer-
sityworkshop at OtagoUniversity, Dunedin. At this event he gave a talk
on the history of logic which he sketched in a letter to Mary. One of the
things he considered in his talk was modal logic, which has been “ne-
glected after the end of the Middle Ages until very recently”. Further-
more, he considered Leibniz’ modification of the ontological proof and
4 Margaret Macdonald (1907-1956). Macdonald had been one of Wittgenstein’s stu-
dents at Cambridge. (We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out).
5Smart abbreviates ontological argument as ont. argt.
186
the related thesis of modal logic CMNMpNMpwhich in fact turns out to
be equivalent with the thesis CMLpLp. This means for instance that if it
is possible that God’s existence is necessary, then God’s existence is nec-
essary. (Arthur Prior to Mary, 9th August 1954 [5.6]) Arthur appears
to expect that Mary understands the importance of the distinct modal
thesis necessary for the ontological argument. From her subsequent re-
sponse, it is clear that she supported Arthur’s work on the ontological
argument. She writes [5.8]:
I’ve been thinking about your necessary existence thing and
drawing morals from it. It seems to me to be a paradigm of
philosophical argument. I mean the argument against has
a philosophical rigour which objections like “what Q. could
that answer?” just haven’t. It would be rash to claim that
to any philosopher it is clear that the argument is no good
because there are people who’ll object to logic itself! But its
clear that to most philosophers of whatever school and its
good to see a philosopher dealing w. an argument as an
argument, and not simply brushing {2} it up in order to se-
cure his own particular “school” against another. To be in-
terested in “what is” instead of “what ism,” wh. is the curse.
And that is what logical formulation can do so well – get
philosophy into a common language and clear from the lan-
guage of the cliques. The best philosophy has always had
that rigour e.g. Moore[’]s Nat. Fall.6 Stuff and the ontolog-
ical argument itself. It was to the strength of Berkeley – or
so it appears to me to be, a rigour which gave no quarter.7
Somuch “philosophical” argument consists of changing the
subject instead of arguing it out and I think Berkeley and
Hume did try to argue out specific problems.
([13] Mary to Arthur 17th August 1954 [5.8])
Arthur definitely agreed with Mary that the ontological argument
was a paradigm of a philosophical argument and hewas very interested
in the various systems of modal logic applied in the analysis of the ar-
gument. Among other things he discussed, in Formal Logic (1955)[14],
6 Editors’ note: This is a reference to G.E. Moore’s Natural Fallacy. A.N. Prior ad-
dressed problems regarding this idea in Logic and the basis of Ethics (1949).
7 Editors’ note: A military term which means to give no clemency.
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an S5 modal version of the argument ([15] Jakobsen & Øhrstrøm 2017).
It turns out that modal logic provides a nice syntax for reasoning in a
number of contexts, including temporal reasoning as shown in his talk
in Wellington on the 27th August 1954.
D. Religion and theology
In 1954 Prior was an elder at St. Martin’s, one of the Presbyterian
Churches in Christchurch. From a letter to Mary, 15th June 1954, he was
invited to take part as a co-optedmember of the Public Questions’ Com-
mittee. TheCommittee has a long record going back to 1917when itwas
established in order to draft resolutions on social questions for the Gen-
eral Assembly. The question raised at the meeting had to do with war,
peace and the hydrogen bomb.8 In 1954 this scary bomb had been tested
at the Bikini Islands. The question for the Presbyterian Committee had
to do with the possible response, if any, of the Church. The chairman
of the committee suggested that the Church could actually make a dif-
ference in this matter, and indeed “had the one solution in its hand”.
At least four of those present objected, each on their own grounds. On
theological grounds the Presbyterian minister to the Dutch Reformed
Church, Willem van Wyngen argued against the position. He did so
referring to eschatological perspectives. The view seems to be that the
final future of this world would occur according to a divinemaster plan,
which is certainly not in the hands of any human being. On a fatalistic
ground, the pacifistAlanBrash suggested that even if thewhole commu-
nity became communist, God could be trusted to preserve his kingdom.
Arthur found that suggestion silly, and argued that we could similarly
say that “even if we were all blown up, God could be trusted.” Again,
the idea seems to be that a divinemaster planwill unfold independently
of anyhuman intervention. On ethical grounds, GrahamMiller objected
that it would be dishonest to say that the church has the solution in its
hands, because the truth is that “we don’t know where we are.” Finally,
8The General Assembly had earlier recommended the following as a consequence
of the hydrogen bomb: “In view of the dreadful destructive power which the recent
experiments in nuclear explosions have revealed, the Presbytery urges the government
to support, as a matter of greatest urgency, and by all means available to it, the ef-
forts now being made to establish international control over the production of atomic
weapon.” (Private correspondence with assistant archivist Andrew Smith, The Presby-
terian Archives, New Zealand)
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Arthur mentioned that the Chairman’s suggestion was “taking God’s
name in vain”, and would merely be pious nonsense. This causes him
to write about his earlier reflections on the relationship between Barthi-
anism and atheism. In his youth Prior was a strong adherent of the
Swiss theologian Karl Barth. Barth’s theology, often characterized as
neo-orthodox, sought to strike a path between liberal and conservative
theology. Contrary to liberal theology Barth emphasized that theology
must be based upon the Bible as God’s word, and contrary to traditional
conservative theology, Barth rejected the need for a philosophical de-
fence of Christian beliefs. While Prior agreed with Barth on both views,
he criticised Barth for being too influenced by Philosophical idealism.
I was reminded of years ago, and the feeling I used to have
that the Barthian is somehow closest of all Christians to the
atheist. The closeness lies in the common recognition that
the Church’s destiny isn’t only to correct the world, but also
to be corrected by it; not only to make claims, but to make
confessions. ([16] Arthur to Mary, 15th June 1954)
From the time Prior entered Knox College in 1932, he had been a
member of the Presbyterian Church and considered himself a Barthian
Calvinist. As a Barthian thinker he reflected on how Barthian theology
should relate itself to scepticism. His search for an answer, in coherence
with Barthian fideism9 of Christian beliefs, would ultimately depend
on Predestination, not on being able to provide a rational defence of
Christianity. His words toMary suggest that his Barthianismwas of the
past. Although he found it “extraordinarily difficult to break with these
people [fellowPresbyterians]”, he had nonetheless considered stepping
down as an elder. He writes: “just going on being a bad elder is a solu-
tion which, when it comes to a point like this, I just reject.”
E. The logic of time
On the 27th August 1954, Prior presented tense-logic publicly for the first
time, doing so for the Presidential Address at the Second Philosophical
9Fideism, from faith (fides) in Latin and is the view that faith is independent of
reason.
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Congress.10 He later published the manuscript, “The Syntax of Time-
Distinctions”, in Franciscan Studies (1958)[9]. As stated earlier, his plan
at the end of July had been to give a talk on abstract entities. However, it
appears that further correspondence with Jack Smart made him change
his mind. We are not in possession of the letter by Prior to Smart in
which hewrites about tense-logic andDiodorus, but from Smart’s letter,
30th July 1954, it is evident that Prior has written to him about these
matters. Smart writes:
I don’t feel the problem of Diodorus as a live one. Why
shouldn’t we say that what has happened might not have
happened? Of course the universe is deterministic and if by
‘impossible’ we don’t mean ‘ruled out by the laws of nature’
but (rather eccentrically) ‘ruled out by the laws of nature
+ initial conditions’ then what happens is ‘necessary’ and
what doesn’t happen is ‘impossible’. But ‘past’ and ‘future’
doesn’t come into the matter – they only date events w.r.t.
the moment we are at present discussing the matter in. I
don’t believe in any metaphysical difference between past
and future – in fact I believe the assertion of such difference
can be refuted. And here I have Quine on my side – cf his
article on Strawson inMind. But I onlymention this because
you are a friend of Willard’s.11
([19] Smart to Arthur, 30 th July 1954)
In his letter toMary dated 9th August 1954 Arthur reported from his
talk at the university workshop at Otago University, Dunedin. Among
other thing he had discussed the “Diodoran solution” (probably of the
so-called Master Argument) as well as “different attitudes to time in
medieval logic theology”.
It appears from Smart’s letter also dated 9th August 1954 [21], that
the discussion on tense-logic continued betweenPrior and Smart. Prior’s
Presidential Address on the 27th August may be seen as a response to
Smart’s way of seeing things. Smart was present at the conference and
Prior was not only aware of his coming, but they were both looking for-
10NewZealand section of theAustralasianAssociation of Psychology andPhilosophy,
Second Philosophical Congress, Wellington 27th – 30th August, 1954.
11Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000).
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ward to seeing each other again. Smart’s reference to Quine and Straw-
son was important information for Prior and was in fact included in his
Address. During his talk Prior presents the basic tense-logical formal-
ism involving four operators:
Fp for “it will be the case that p”
Pp for “it has been the case that p”
Gp for “it will always be the case that p”
Hp for “it has always been the case that p”
Among other things, Prior considered the following two important
implications:
PF1: 𝑝 ⊃ 𝐺𝑃𝑝 (“What is the case will always have been the case”)
and
PF2: 𝑝 ⊃ 𝐻𝐹𝑝 (“When anything is the case, it has always been the
case that it will be the case”)12
According to Prior it was his earlier teacher in logic J.N. Findlaywho
in “Time: a Treatment of Some Puzzles”, 1941, invented tense-logic. In
the important footnote Findlay writes:
And our conventions with regard to tenses are so well
worked out that we have practically the materials in them
for a formal calculus... The calculus of tenses should have
been included in the modern development of modal logics.
It includes such obvious propositions as that x present = (x
present) present x future = (x future) present = (x present)
future; also such comparatively recondite propositions as
that (x).(x past) future; i.e. all events, past and future will
be past.”13
Mary Prior recalls that “it was probably as late as in 1954 or early 55,
perhaps he was working on the John Locke Lecturers, that he came and
sat on the bed in high excitement. He read the all important footnote.
12Prior is in fact using Polish notation, i.e. CpGPp and CpHFp.
13“Time: a Treatment of Some Puzzles,” in A.G.N. Flew’s Logic and Language (first
series, 1951), p. 52
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He felt he could formalise tense distinctions, drawing inspiration from
this footnote of Findlay’s. I date this from the fact that I have a vivid
memory of the event occurring in a sunporch in the house we moved
into inmid-1954.” ([22] Hasle 2003, p. 297) There is however a problem
with this date. Namely, that Mary from January to August was in the
sanatorium and, according to Martin Prior, she quite possibly did not
come to the house before the end of August. If that is true, then it would
mean that the “bedside story” took place in 1953, in the earlier house
on 18 Grange Street in Christchurch. Actually, Martin Prior recollects a
sunporch in that house aswell. It is of course also possible that the event
took place at the sanatorium. At least it is obvious thatMary knewwhat
Arthur was going to present in Wellington, including the use of tense
operators. In Arthur’s letter to Mary on the 27th August it is clear that
she already then knew about tense-logic. Here Arthur writes: “I put up
my formulae on blackboard & and started organising last night-&-this-
morning’s party; & then when the hour was due, delivered my piece. I
felt very laboured in giving it, but was assured that it didn’t look that
way, & the discussion was lively.” ([23] Arthur to Mary, 27th August
1954). What speaks for placing the event at the sanatorium is the fact
that there is nomention of tense-logic in the letters fromSmart toArthur
before July 1954. Given the intensity of the correspondence between
Smart and Prior it is unlikely that they would not have discussed a new
finding of that kind.
One of the important observations in Prior’s Address is that there
is an asymmetry between PF1 and PF2. It is hard to imagine a tense-
logical system without PF1. If something is the case now, then it will
always have been the case. On the other hand, it is not difficult to imag-
ine a tense-logical system without PF2. The reason is, that although p
is the case now it might not have been going to be the case at any ear-
lier time. Prior illustrates this in the Address referring to Łukasiewicz’s
three-valued logic, according towhich future contingents, have the truth-
value “indefinite”. This means that PF2 is not true in all cases. As Prior
understands it, this tense-logic (Prior’s PF-calculus) is in accordance
with medieval logic, but not with medieval theology, e.g. conceived in
the Thomistic manner, which is more in accordance with what Prior
calls the l-calculus:
Time, onemight say, figures in the 1-calculus not as it does in
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medieval logic … but rather as it does in medieval theology,
in which God is said to behold all events in an unchanging
present. ([9] Prior 1954/8, p. 117)
It is evident that Prior, like William of Ockham (c. 1285-1347) and
several other medieval logicians, as opposed to some medieval theolo-
gians, “took tenses farmore seriously than our own common logic does”
(Ibid). A reference to Quine is most likely assumed here.
It appears that one of the participants at the Wellington Congress
reacted very negatively towards this claim. In his letter to Mary, Prior
records this encounter:
There was a very pugnacious priest at the back who said
that he was ‘a Thomist & a strict Thomist’, that this was the
first exhibition he had seen of ‘logistics’, & that (this very
aggressively & totally irrelevantly) he wanted to know if I
was a ‘realist’. I had a great deal of pleasure in telling him
that I was far more of a realist than he was, & that he would
in fact classify me as an ‘extreme’ realist.”
([23] Letter from Arthur to Mary Prior, 27 Aug. 1954)
Prior’s ontological realism concerning time is the driving force be-
hind tense-logic. Taking tenses seriously – which is a phrase most likely
used for the first time in “the Syntax of Time Distinctions” – means for
Prior the acceptance of the reality of the present. The present is, he later
argued, the same concept as the real “considered in relation to two par-
ticular species of unreality namely the past and the future” ([24] Prior
1970, p. 245). Mary and Arthur shared a philosophical foundation in
the Scottish Common Sense tradition. Commenting on Arthur’s dis-
cussion with Smart on abstract entities with regard to time, Mary men-
tioned the tradition. Disregarding truths about abstract entities would,
to Mary, be “skimping the carving on the underside of the seat because
only God and the carving will ever know what it’s like?” ([25] Mary
to Arthur Prior, 13th August, 1954). In this manner tense-logic is fun-
damentally a recognition of the “carving on the underside of the seat”;
a modelling of the tensed way reality presents itself to us as what has
been, is and will be.
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4 Conclusion
A.N. Prior’s presentation of tense-logic on the 27th August 1954 reflected
a number of topics and discussions, in particular thosementioned in his
correspondence with Mary during June, July and August of that year.
Arthur used his earlier work with modal logic for his formulation
of tense-logic. As we have seen, he had been occupied with systems of
modal logic as a part of his formalisation of the ontological proof for the
existence of God. Furthermore, he was for this purpose able to benefit
from his substantial correspondence with G.H. von Wright on modal
logic.
The discussion on topics like political freedom, determinism and fu-
ture contingency formed a fruitful background for Prior’s formulation
of tense-logic, and he was able to relate to medieval logic and theology.
In fact, he included basic ideas from the logic of William of Ockham,
and in his presentation of tense-logic he took a stand against the view
of Thomas Aquinas on the relation between time and eternity. In this
way it also became obvious that his ideas were relevant in the context of
the discussion regarding divine foreknowledge and human freedom.
Prior’s tense-logic also reflected his discussions on abstract entities
mentioned in his letters to Mary and Jack. As we have seen, he did not
accept any ontological commitment to the existence of temporal instants
or dates, although he did quantify over such logical constructions in his
Wellington paper. It is often taken for granted, by objectors to Prior’s
presentism, that since presentists quantify over non-present objects they
are committed to a realist position on non-present objects ([26] Jakob-
sen 2011). Recent work by Craig (2017)[27] however, has made it plau-
sible that Quine’s principle should be rejected in metaphysics. In this
context it is highly interesting that Smart as well as Prior dismissed
Quine’s principle. Smart considered it “philosophical arrogance” ([7]
Smart to Prior 20th July 1954), and Prior considered Quine’s view “a
piece of unsubstantiated dogma” ([28] Prior 1971, p. 48) The history of
tense-logic that unfolds in the correspondence between the B-theorist
Smart and the A-theorist Prior suggests instead, that tense-logic should
be considered a paradigm case of why existence, contrary to Quine, can-
not be defined as being the value of a bound variable.
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5 Appendix: Letters between Mary and Arthur Prior,
and Arthur Prior and J.J.C Smart
5.1 Letter from Arthur to Mary Prior, 15, June, 195414
23 Vernon Terrace
Hillsborough
Tues. 15/6/54.
Darling,
O’Brien on Ogden v15 Richards16, with discussion, went off very
pleasantly. Albert Rose drove me home, and I took him up and showed
him round the house. He’s more or less in process of shifting himself, to
a place in lower Dyers’ Pass Rd., and was very interested in our floors.
He also thought the extension of our hot water system to the wash-
house wd. be feasible, so I saw Gordon Ritchie about this again today,
and asked him to recommend a plumber; he mentioned one and I’ve
rung him, but he’s out; but I’ll be ringing him again tonight.
Bob Sprackett17 called this morning just after breakfast to ask if I
minded being co-opted (non-votingly, of course) on to the Presbytery’s
Public Questions Committee18, and could I go along to a discussion of
War there this morning. It was feasible, so I did; he called for me at 10,
and the meeting went on till c. 11.30. I moved on from it to College,
and collected letters there from (a) you and (b) Ivo Thomas. Ivo had
a solution (most neat and ingenious) to one of the three problems I’ve
14Editors’ note: This letter has been edited byMartin Prior, PeterØhrstrømandDavid
Jakobsen. It is part of the Martin Prior Collection, presently kept at Aalborg University
folder B, item 5. The letter is written on standard unheaded writing paper. The letter
was written while Mary was hospitalised with tuberculosis. - The use of { } indicates
the page number in the handwritten letter.
15Editors’ note: This looks like v (‘versus’), but it might also ‘&’
16Editors’note: Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards (1923) The Mean-
ing of Meaning.
17Editors’ note: Colston Robert (Bob) Sprackett (1916-1993) was the minister of St.
Martin’s Presbyterian Church in Christchurch. His wife JoanwasMary’s second cousin.
During the war he was a pacifist.
18Editors’ note: “This Committee was first established in 1917, to draft resolutions on
social questions for the General Assembly.” See http://thecommunityarchive.org.nz/
node/71236/description
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submitted to the JSL; and also describes the Boole celebrations he went
to in Dublin. Mail at home included a note from Jack Smart and letters
from Masterton, containing a gift of £26 to help pay nurse. I {2} banked
this, together with a Bldg. Soc. cheque for £6-7-6 that came the other
day, before 3 this afternoon. By my calculation, our overdraft with the
Bank of N.Z now stands at about £3760; and we have £112-16-8 in the
Savings Bank.19
Have rungWall saying you’d do Priestley; he’s not sure if he still has
it but will send it to you if he has. The Grenell girl at 3YA20 also wants
to speak to me about something, but I don’t know what as I haven’t yet
been able to catch her in.
The clock has just struck 5 which means that I may now permit my-
self to slip off andbuy 10 cigarettes. Which I shall proceed to do, without
delay.
5.55 p.m. – havemanaged to get on to La Grenelle. It was an enquiry
from Wellington about Gilbert’s visit, and esp. about his part in the
Congress. I referred them to George.
7.55 p.m. Ann back home. I thought of posting this on thewayhome,
but missed the plumber again, and will have to ring him after 8.30, so
might as well post this then.
Gillian told me last night that {3} she has been offered the £250 Ger-
man Scholarship and will be taking it; which means that we won’t have
her in the second term. I made a hurried arrangement with Michael to
lecture to Stage II on Utilitarianism after she’s gone, while I take over
her Stage I stuff. This will mean as a further by-product that I can’t be
completely free on Thursdays in the 3rd term, but will have a 3-4 lecture.
However, may be you’ll be home by then (September).
The Home Laundry is collecting what we want collected this Thurs-
day.
At the Pub. Questions Committee meeting this morning there was a
very healthy uneasiness about the Government’s present moves in con-
nection with the Indo-China situation (towards a Pact with the Yanks,
Aussies, French &c for defending that area; a pact which the actual
19Editors’ note: Colston Robert (Bob) Sprackett (1916-1993) was the minister of St.
Martin’s Presbyterian Church in Christchurch. His wife JoanwasMary’s second cousin.
During the war he was a pacifist.
20Editors’ note: The 3YA was a Christchurch radio channel which links up to YA
services throughout New Zealand. The letter 3 means the Canterbury region.
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neighbours of Indo-China, India, Indonesia, Burma &c. – don’t want to
have formed). With luck there will be some resolution about it in Pres-
bytery, and Farquhar suggested getting in touch with the correspond-
ing Anglican body to see if something can’t be done there. – United
general principles about war and peace and the hydrogen bomb &c. we
couldn’t arrive at; not surprisingly. The people there included Bob, Far-
quhar, Alan Brash21, Alun Richards22, van Wyngen,23 Graham Miller24,
Walter Hendrie25. Alan B. was {4} propounding a rather silly sort of
pacifism. Said that even if we did get all Communised God could be
trusted to preserve His Kingdom &c. I couldn’t forebear pointing out
that you could equally argue that even if we were all blown up, God
could be trusted &c. &c.
- The people that talked most sense were Graham Miller and van
Wyngen – oddly close together in spite, I’m sure, quite vast theologi-
21Editors’ note: Alan Anderson Brash OBE (5 June 1913 – 24 August 2002). He was
a pacifist and leading minister of the Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa New Zealand.
He was deputy general-secretary of the World Council of Churches in Geneva, from
1974 to 1978. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=
2352093.HewastheuncleofJonathanBennett(pc.MartinPrior).
22Editors’ note: Rev. Alun Morgan Richards (1907-2000). Born South Wales, came
to New Zealand with parents age 5, campaigned between wars against Compulsory
Military Training. Like Arthur Prior, he travelled through France and Nazi-Germany
in the 1930swith hiswife. They also visitedCommunist Russia. Organizer for extension
studies at Victoria University 1938. Lost his job when spoke against the war, and the
professorial board voted to dismiss him. Editor of “Outlook”Christchurch, fromMarch
1948 to April 1955. See https://www.presbyterian.org.nz/archives/Page194.htm
23Editors’ note: Rev. Willem van Wijngen (in English name usually spelt Wyn-
gen); born 27.3.1913; brought to NZ to minister to Dutch settlers 1951 Wanganui
6.3.1952. Died 16.8.1993 in the Netherlands. https://www.presbyterian.org.nz/
archives/Page206.htm
24Editors’ note: Rev. John Graham Miller (1913-2008). Studied Law at Otago Uni-
versity 1932 to 1936. Law Society Prizeman in Conveyancing 1936. Ordained Evange-
listic Missionary to New Hebrides (Vanuatu) 1941, Papakura SAP 5.2.1953 - resigned
12.12.1965 then to Australia. Further work in Australia and Vanuatu (New Hebrides).
Retired in 1980. See https://www.presbyterian.org.nz/archives/Page183.htm
25Editors’ note: Rev Walter Max Hendrie; born: 10 December 1912 in Glasgow, Scot-
land; died: 23 April 1997. Ordained 1942. He was called to Inverbervie (Scotland)
parish in 1949. He thenmoved toNewZealand to take up the position of YouthDirector
for the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand, a position he occupied with considerable
distinction. After seven years in that position he returned to parish work at St Giles
in Papanui, Christchurch. (from Obit.) https://www.presbyterian.org.nz/archives/
Page168.htm
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cal differences. The closeness came out e.g. when the chairman (May)
wanted to have a statement concluded with a few remarks to the effect
that the Church has the one solution in its hands etc. vanWyngen sat on
this on eschatological grounds; Miller on the ground that it was dishon-
est, and that it was better to tell the public frankly that we don’t know
where we are; me, on the grounds that it was a sort of conventional pi-
ous appendage which committees seem to think they must tack on to
everything they say. – “taking God’s name in vain, isn’t it?” I asked,
turning to van W., and he agreed. I was reminded of years ago, and
the feeling I used to have that the Barthian is somehow closest of all
Christians to the atheist. The closeness lies in the common recognition
that the Church’s destiny isn’t only to correct the world, but also to be
corrected by it; not only to make claims, but to make confessions. – It
is extraordinarily difficult to break with these people. Maybe I should
have said No then to Bob: but {5} just going on being a bad elder is a
solution which, when it comes to a point like this, I just reject.
- O’Brien said last night that the work of Ogden26 & Richards, un-
doubtedly aided in the understanding of literature27 and that people
felt rightly that fruitfulness is a sign of truth, so he tried to separate
the truth in them from its “materialistic” accretions. It was not done
brilliantly; yet not badly either. He gave at the end some quite price-
lessly ridiculous quotations from O. & R. They assert for example that
until man started actually dissecting brains, it was thought that inside
the brain you would find a soul; now that brains have been opened up,
we know that this isn’t so. – O’Brien’s job wasn’t all that easy; I have
a harder one – to dissect the true from the false, or the believable from
the unbelievable, in Christianity. Plischke28 complained the other day
that people like John Beaglehole retain the moral points of Christianity,
but cut them off from the root, and that’s “illogical”. I suggested that
JCB mightn’t see it that way – might argue that even in Christians the
real roots of their morality &c. were not what they thought they were;
that he was building on what have been the real roots all the time, these
being by Christians erroneously described.
Walther Hendrie objected thismorning to the “pragmatic” character
26Editors’ note: This looks like v (‘versus’), but it might also ‘&’.
27Editors’ note: The word is difficult to read.
28Editor’s note: Ernst Anton Plischke (1903-1992) was the architect St. Martin’s Pres-
byterian Church, Christchurch.
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of a lot of the material before us; that our starting-point oughtn’t to be
{6}what a terrifying thing the hydrogen bomb is, and so on, but ought
to be the Gospel – that’s what we ought to be talking about. I just asked
“But is it necessary to say it in Hebrew?” and the company dissolved.
Must push off and post. Love and love and love. See you tomorrow.
Skig
X O X O X O X O X
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5.2 Letter from Arthur to Mary Prior, 1, July, 195429
23 Vernon Terrace
Hillsborough
Thurs. 1/7/54.
Darling,
I enclose (a) a communication that came for you today; and (b) my
letter to Jack Smart.30
We got a wire from Andy31 today saying that he had the Wellington
senior registrarship, and would be starting on July 12. So I sent him a
Congratulations wire from the 4 of us.
Also got Ivo’s32 reply to my cable – an affirmative – and have in-
formed Goodell. So that clears that up.
Have just marked a Stage II Logic test I sprung on them a couple of
weeks ago – will be able to hand it back to them tomorrow. Martin’s not
done so badly at his lessons today, and is taking more kindly to them.
Ann has a bit of a cold in her nose. But temp’s not particularly high
(under 99).
29Editors’ note: This letter has been edited byMartin Prior, PeterØhrstrømandDavid
Jakobsen. It is part of the Martin Prior Collection, presently kept at Aalborg University
folder B, item 5. The letter is written on standard unheaded writing paper. The letter
was written while Mary was hospitalised with tuberculosis. The letter had enclosed
with it a letter to Smart dated 30th June, 1954 (see 5.3).
30Editor’s note: This is a reference to Arthur’s letter to Smart, B5 from 30. June 1954.
Mary Prior had studied an MA in Philosophy a few years earlier and showed a lot of
interest in the philosophical questions Arthur Prior worked with.
31Editors’ note: Andy is Mary’s brother Andrew Cameron Howitt Wilkinson (1923-
1999). He graduated in Medicine from Otago University and later worked as a general
practitioner. When Mary first contracted tuberculosis it was first diagnosed as pneu-
monia about which Andrew was strongly sceptical and was very persistent in getting
the diagnosis corrected.
32Editors’ note: Ivo Thomas (1912-1976), born Herbert Christopher Thomas. He en-
tered the Order of Preachers and did philosophical studies 1936-1938. He became pro-
fessor of Philosophy at Hawkesyard Priory. He received the Dominican highest and
most distinguished degree, that of Master of Sacred Theology. He wrote a dissertation
on The Logic of Kilwardby. (Otto Bird, In Memoriam. Ivo Thomas. Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Formal Logic, vol. 18, nr. 2, 1977, s. 193). He and Arthur wrote many letters to
each other kept in the Bodleian Library Oxford.
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I was busy about town this morning, and with the kids this after-
noon (it being Miss B’s afternoon off).33
This is the scrappiest of scrappy letters, but at least I’ve been giving
you some decent enclosures.
Heaps and heaps of love
- Skig
X O X O X O X O X
33Editors’ note: This is a reference to Miss Brown, the second nurse who took care of
Martin and Ann in 1954, when Mary was hospitalised.
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5.3 Letter from Arthur Prior to J.J.C. Smart, 30th June, 1954
23 Vernon Terrace
Hillsborough
Christchurch N.Z.
30/6/54
Dear Jack,34
Have you read Quine’s New Foundations for Mathematical Logic,35
in his collection From a Logical Point of View?36 Maybe you read it years
ago in its original setting; I read it for the first time a fewweeks ago, and
it has been seeping intomymind and re-shapingmy thinking ever since.
Not my thinking about formal logic, but my thinking about philosophy.
– You know how I have always been irked by these linguistic prohibi-
tions which people throw about these days. I want to say, for example,
that there is no such thing as the sum of theMoon and ten; and I am told
that I mustn’t say “the sum of theMoon and ten”. And Iwant to say that
redness isn’t red; and I am told that I mustn’t even raise the question
of whether it is red or not. And I want to say that while “hits doesn’t
sprint well” doesn’t make sense, for it has a verb where a noun ought
to be, “hitting doesn’t sprint well” not only makes sense but is demon-
strably true (for abstract objects don’t sprint at all, and therefore don’t
sprint well, and hitting is an abstract object, ergo hitting doesn’t sprint
well); but I am told that I mustn’t put that sort of words into that sort
of sentence-frame (though I’m never told at all clearly why I mustn’t).
But irked as I have been by these authors, I have felt obliged to pay some
attention to them because it has appeared that only by so {2} doing can
I avoid contradictingmyself. And nowQuine tells me in effect that I can
say all these things I have always wanted to say without contradicting
myself, and has shown me one way of doing it. So I am experiencing a
34Editors’ note: This letter has been edited byMartin Prior, PeterØhrstrømandDavid
Jakobsen. It is part of the Martin Prior Collection, presently kept at Aalborg University
folder B, item 5. The letter is written on standard unheaded writing paper. The letter is
attached to 5.2 dated 1th July 1954 to Mary and appears to be a copy of the actual letter
to Jack. It is one of the few letters we have from Arthur Prior to J.J.C. Smart.
35Editors’ note: Quine, W.V., New Foundations forMathematical Logic, The American
Mathematical Monthly Vol. 44, No. 2 (Feb., 1937), pp. 70-80.
36Editors’ note: Quine, W.V., From a Logical Point of View, Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research 15 (4):574-575 (1955).
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sense of liberation very much like that to which Russell testifies, when
he and Moore discovered that they could believe that trees are really
green, etc.; only it is liberation from a prison which Russell himself later
constructed. – It boils down to this (Quine doesn’t talk about charac-
ters and properties, as I do, but about classes; but that’s an irrelevant
fad.)37:- It is clear that if there were any such character as the charac-
ter of non-self-characterisation it would have contradictory properties;
therefore there can be no such character. But if there is no such char-
acter, then that character does not characterise redness. And it seemed
to me to follow from this that redness does not fail-to-characterise-itself,
and since it obviously does not characterise itself, either then we must
either say that there is no such character as redness (which is absurd)
or go in for theories of types, categories, linguistic prohibitions and all
that. But if I deny that the inferential form
X is Y
∴ X is characterized by Y-ness
{3} universally holds, I am spared all this humiliation; and that seems to
me a very small price to pay for this liberty. The exceptions will occur
when there is no such character as Y-ness – which is, of course, a differ-
ent case from that in which there is nothing that is Y. And even in these
cases I can make intelligible and true statements which are ostensibly
about the character of Y-ness, just as I can make intelligible and true
statements which are ostensibly about the present king of France or the
integer between 3 and 4. Nothing is meaningless, in short (leaving out
cases in which a word like “pob” is just used without any meaning be-
ing assigned to it), except what is ungrammatical in a simple schoolboy
sense, and certain “statements” which themselves purport implicitly or
explicitly to be about meaning (like the heterological stuff and the Liar).
– Popper’s on to this line too, in the latest Mind. It’s the revolution of
the year – I’m not, as you know, one for climbing on band-wagons; in
fact, I probably tend to err a bit in the contrary direction; but this is a
band whose tune I like, and I’m getting out the bloody trumpet and
preparing to blare forth with the boys. – Some specimen statements
37Editors’ note: This is in the margin.
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and arguments I am prepared to commit myself to (to bring out the full
frightfulness of my position [)]: - {4}
1. My pencil does not characterise itself (for only characters charac-
terise and my pencil is not a character).
2. Non-redness does characterise itself.
3. The character of non-self-characterisation does not characterise it-
self.
4. The character of non-self-characterisation is not characterised by
non-self-characterisation. (The contradictory of this does not fol-
low from (3)).
5. The character of being the present queen of England, and the
present Queen of England, “exists” in the same sense as of “ex-
ist”. [They are different objects, andmore over very different sorts
of objects, but are nevertheless both objects, in the same sense of
“objects”.]38
6. The character of non-self-characterisation, and the present King of
France, and the sum of the Moon and 10, and the integer between
3 and 4, do not exist (in the same sense of “do not exist”).
7. The character of being the present King of France exists, and the
present King of France does not exist.
8. Whatever is red is extended, but the character of redness is not
extended.
9. The relation of strict implication exists, but does not strictly imply
anything, and is not red.
10. If statements (1)-(9) are not all true (as I think they are), then
some of them are {5} false, but none of them are meaningless.
11. It is possible that there should be a Necessary Being, but if there
is He exists in the same sense of “exist” as you and I do. [The doc-
trine of “analogy” goes overboard with the theory of types. They
38Editors’ note: This is added in the margin.
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are the same thing anyway.]39 (My present position removes a
possible objection to my defence of the possibility of Necessary
existence but entails the second part of statement 11).
12. I cannot take a photograph either of the other side of the moon or
of the number 2 (and here I say exactly the same thing of the two
objects, though of course it is true for very different reasons in the
two cases).
13. I do not live in England, and neither does my power of standing
on my head live in England.
14. I do not like tripe, and neither does the fourth figure of the syllo-
gism like tripe. (I and the fourth figure of the syllogism constitute
a pair of non-tripe-likers; though only I, and not the fourth figure,
am a tripe-detester).
15. The fourth figure of the syllogism40 is not aware that it is different
from consequentia mirabilis41 and neither is my grocer aware that
he is different from the consequentia mirabilis, and neither is my
cat; for the fourth figure of the syllogism is not aware of anything,
and my grocer is not given to logical reflection {6} and I have no
cat. (Despite the difference of these reasons it is the same predi-
cate
“() is aware that () is different from the consequentia mirabilis”
that is used, along with “it is not the case that”, in all these cases, and
rightly thus used. Though there may be certain disguised differences
of structure between the first two statements and the third. – It will
be noted that the integer between 3 and 4 is not aware that it is differ-
ent from consequentia mirabilis for the same reason that my cat is not;
though it is also not aware of it for a further reason, which it shares not
with my cat but with the fourth figure of the syllogism. And the fourth
figure has this advantage over my cat that it is unaware of its differ-
ence from the consequentia mirabilis, whereas my cat is neither aware
39Editors’ note: This is added in the margin.
40Editors’ note: The fourth figure can be represented as the implication:
𝑥(𝑃,𝑀)&𝑦(𝑀,𝑆) ⊃ 𝑧(𝑆,𝑃) where 𝑥,𝑦 and 𝑧 are quantors (all, some, none, not all)
41Editors’ note: The consequential (∼ 𝜙 ⊃ 𝜙) ⊂ 𝜙.
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of it nor unaware of it. At this point my cat is in the same boat with the
property of non-self-characterization and the barber who shaves all and
only those who do not shave themselves, though it is knowable a priori
that the prop. of non-s.c.42 and the aforesaid barber are in this posi-
tion, while that my cat is so is a purely empirical fact. The property
of being at once ten feet tall and not ten feet tall is {7} not, I should
say, in this position,{7}not, I should say, in this position, but shares
with my grocer and the 4th syllogistic figure the privilege of being un-
aware of its difference from the consequential mirabilis; for this prop-
erty exists, though it necessarily has no instances. – When I say, by the
way, that my cat is neither aware nor unaware of its difference from the
consequentia mirabilis, I do not mean that the 2 statements “My cat is
aware …” and “My cat is unaware …” are without truth-values, but that
they are both false and that in consequence “It is not the case that my
cat is aware …” and “~ my cat is unaware …” are both true. Similarly
with my cat’s fellow travellers).
Now if you tell me that nobody ever says these things, or that these
questions don’t arise, I shall consider it a personal affront, for I have just
said these things, and I have raised these questions.
- Yours,
Arthur
P.S. I’m inclined to think that if God does necessarily-exist, that’s some-
thing He hasn’t on His own. I should say that the existence of most
abstract objects, where they exist, is necessary. Maybe He’s the only
concrete necessary existent. But I’m only feeling my way about in this
new paddock – gambolling around experimentally, and sniffing the
grass.
42Editors’ note: non-self-characterization.
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5.4 Letter from Arthur to Mary Prior, 8, July, 195443
23 Vernon Terrace
Hillsborough
Thurs. 8/7/54
Darling,
It’s 8.30, and I’ve just more or less finished the dishes, so there isn’t
much time to write. While I was doing the dishes I was thinking about
what I was going to say next Wednesday about Freedom and so forth,
and I think I can rough out a pretty good speech. Must try and get
it written reasonably early so I can get it typed and give copies to re-
porters. Roughly something like this: I’ve been asked to speak on “the
philosophical basis of freedom”, but don’t like the title much. There
are some things we do and value [because] of other things; but others
whichwe just do and value for their own sake, and that’s that. {2} In any
case there’s no need to build up an elaborate philosophical argument in
order to talk New Zealanders into believing in freedom. It’s part of our
heritage, tradition &c. But a philosopher can properly urge people to be
consistent about their basic belief – we’re being told right and left about
our duty to “defend the free world”, and I don’t want to dispute that –
am a returned man myself and all that. But if we have a duty to defend
the free world, then we have a prior duty to be the free world.
- Then a crack at sundry politicians (needn’t name them).
- And an answer – by – anticipation to the charge that I’m being ide-
alistic. Can’t in one breath ask blokes to be idealistic enough to risk
their life for freedom, and then in other breath say we shouldn’t be too
idealistic about it. [And Westerners who want to filch freedom in the
name of freedom are like commies44 filching peace from us in name of
peace.]45 – These anti-freedom blokes are in fact being subversive, in
43Editors’ note: This letter has been edited byMartin Prior, PeterØhrstrømandDavid
Jakobsen. It is part of the Martin Prior Collection, presently kept at Aalborg University
folder B, item 5. The letter is written on standard unheaded writing paper. The letter
was written while Mary was hospitalised with tuberculosis.
44Editors’ note: A “commie” is New Zealand slang for a “Communist.”
45Editors’ note: Written in the margin.
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a more subtle and sinister sense than the handful of uninfluential com-
mies and pacifists that the term is usually applied to. – And after {3}
this theory, a bit of the practical NZ is a pretty free country for most
of us; I certainly have nothing to complain of but I’m worried about
the way the shoe’s beginning to pinch the school-teaching profession.
Small-scale and large-scale intolerance; probable bad effect on quality
of teaching &c. And finish with that.
Must apologize for treating you like a public meeting. But aforesaid
the thing was going around in my head while I was dish-washing, and
inevitably kept encircling when I turned to this immediately thereafter;
esp. when pressure of time made it impos. for me to sit down and
let such things subside (work’em of on a bit of note paper for use next
Wednesday).
Heaps and heaps of love
- Skig
XOXOXOXOXOX
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5.5 Letter from Arthur to Mary Prior, 29th July 195446
CANTERBURY UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
CHRISTCHURCH, N.Z.
Thursday. 29/7/54
Darling honey,
Re Jack’ letter – I’ll definitely devote the larger part ofmyWellington
thing47 to a discussion of whether the question of Platonism v. nominal-
ism is purely a verbal question. I shall contend that
1. The question as to whether there are abstract entities isn’t a verbal
question or a question about language at all.
2. The question as to whether “there are abstract entities” is true is
partly a verbal question, exactly as the question as to whether ‘My
eyes are brown’ is partly a verbal question. (If ‘brown’ is being
used tomeanwhat it ordinarilymeant by “square”, it’s false, since
my eyes aren’t square, while if it’s being used as usual, it’s true;
since my eyes are brown).
3. Platonism isn’t a thesis about language. Whether nominalism is,
is more or less up to the nominalists.
4. Nominalism is just amatter of language if it is nomore than a pref-
erence for using the word “entity” in a restricted sense, to mean
what I’d call a ‘concrete entity’. In this sense of “nominalist”, I’m
quite prepared to become one. Let’em have “entity” in their re-
stricted sense, and for what I {2} previously called an ”entity” I’ll
use the word ”object” instead. Or if they want to restrict the sense
46Editors’ note: This letter has been edited byMartin Prior, David Jakobsen and Peter
Øhrstrøm. It is part of theMartin Prior Collection, presently kept at Aalborg University
folder B, item 4a, dated 29/7/54. The letter is written on Canterbury University College
writing paper. It is sent by Arthur from the family home in Christchurch to Mary, who
was still in the sanatorium.
47Editors’ note: Prior is probably referring to the conference that took place in
Wellington 27th-30th August, 1954. However, at this conference his main contribution
was his paper “The Logic of Time-Distinctions”. This makes it uncertain, whether Prior
presented his thoughts on Platonismversus nominalism at that occasion. Hemight sim-
ply have changed his plans.
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of “object”, they can have that one too, and all familiar words, and
instead of ”entity” or ”object” I’ll say “bimps”. And if they want
to restrict the sense of “bimp” I’ll take any word they care to give
me. But since they give me none, I’ll use “bimp” in what follows.
5. Nominalists, then, want to restrict words like ”entity”, ”object”,
“being” &c. to concrete bimps. O.K., let’em, and I’ll follow suit.
They also, so far as I can see, wish to shroud abstract bimps in
a blanket of silence, and not talk about them. This does, indeed,
raise a difficult question of etiquette. What does common courtesy
require of me when I am in the presence of a man whom I know
to be afflicted by this extraordinary phobia? Ought I to say, “look
here, old man, I’m sure you’d be happier if you left the room for
a while – we’re going to talk about abstract bimps? And perhaps
after a while a convention would grow up by which I need only
say, and politeness would only allow me to say, ‘We’re going to
talk about you-know-what’. However, I argue that if this is how
things stand, there’s no real difference of opinion bet.48 me and
the nominalists, and it is only a matter of words.
6. Or perhaps it is the word ‘not’ whose meaning the nominalist
wishes to restrict. He doesn’t want to {3} admit that virtue is not
square, because hewants to use ‘not’ tomean ‘of some shape other
than –’. Again, so be it. If this is what ‘not’ means – and let’s not
quarrel about how we shall use a word – I too will refuse my as-
sent to ‘Virtue is not square’. Indeed, I’ll say that in this sense of
‘not’ it’s definitely false; for it is false that virtue is of some shape
other than square. How the nominalist says ‘Virtue has no shape’
I don’t know; but I can say it for him, if he’ll give me some other
word to use for ‘not’ in my sense. (And if he won’t I’ll make one
up).
7. But I know that this modus vivendi will not satisfy the nominalist.
He doesn’t want to say that it is false that virtue is not square. He
wants to say that both ‘Virtue is square’ and ‘Virtue is not square’
are neither true nor false, but meaningless. Though I gather that
he wants now to modify that to the contention that they are mean-
ingless in his language, but not meaningless in mine, and that we
48Editors’: Probably an abbreviation for ‘between’.
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can talk either language as we please. If he means this last modifi-
cation seriously then it implies that there are truths which are ex-
pressible in my language, but aren’t expressible in his. If it doesn’t
imply this, then how does he express the truth which I express by
saying that virtue is not square? – or, for that matter, the truth
which I express by saying that virtue has no shape?
8. Do I believe thatmathematics is the ‘physics of the supersensible’?
I can’t say that I like this description much. The over-and-under
talk is a political metaphor that I {4} don’t see the point of, and
why physics? (Why not, say, the ‘chemistry of the supersensi-
ble[’]?) I insist only that there are nonsensible bimps, and that
we may study them; I am indifferent as to whether we call the
study of them ‘mathematics’, ‘physics’ or even ‘metaphysics’. As
to ‘mathematics’, I gather that many people would like to use that
word for symbolic games in which the symbols are uninterpreted;
me, I think these games are good fun, and useful too, and I don’t
mind at all if they are called ‘mathematics’, so long as the study of
non-sensible bimps, which is something quite different, is called
something; or at all events, so long as it goes on.
The bit in all this that I’ll have to givemost thought to is 7 – it is there
that the central issue lies I think.
Parton49 and Crowther50 were shrouded in gloom at morning-tea to-
day, about the way the voting went yesterday. They reckon the Council
won’t proceed with caution and fall back on the second proposal when
it’s clear that a suitable rector can’t be found, but will regard us as hav-
ing given them the green light andwill appoint one by hook or by crook.
– One is tempted to regard the vote yesterday as a revealing one, in a neg-
ative sort of way; it seems to show, in particular, that neither Garrett51
nor Allen belongs to the real hard-core academic party here, which con-
sists (with Parton going) of Philips52, Crowther and myself; but I guess
49Editors’ note: H.N. Parton had been teaching Chemistry at Canterbury University
College since 1930.
50Editors’ note: Allan Crowther was appointed Professor of Psychology at the same
time as Prior was appointed Professor of Philosophy. At that point, subsequent to
Sutherland’s death, the Department of Philosophy and Psychology was split.
51Editors’ note: John Garrett was Professor of English Canterbury University College
in Christchurch.
52Editors’ note: Neville Phillips taught History at Canterbury University College.
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that’s smug.
{5} Rang John McLeod about PAS for Martin this afternoon, and
he quite unsolicited started talking to me about you and assured me
that there was no evidence of cavitation in your tum53, and that he’d be
surprised if your stomach content or whatever it is was positive.
Kids get their X-rays tomorrowmorning – I gaveMartin a little touch
of school this afternoon – he seems to have just now an irritating little
cough, which I must tell John Mac about on Wed. – Both their temper-
atures are reasonable and Ann has kept the bed dry for the past few
nights, so maybe that bout of wetting it is over.
Today I answered an ad. in the paper for fixing fireplaces – rang a
phone-number and left a message for the joker that does it. He may
be round tonight or tomorrow morning, or may ring me at College in
morning.
Hell, aren’t these evenings cold! Must post this and get to bed. I
wish you were going to be in it.
I love you and love you and love you
Skig
X O X O X O X O X O X
PS. Left some turps at ???54 to be taken up to you today.
53Editors’ note: The word is not totally readable. The following line may suggest that
it has to do with the stomach.
54Editors’ note: Theword is not readable: it could be “Corry”, short for “Coronation”,
but it is unclear how this would apply. The word “turps” is short for turpentine and
suggests that Mary was doing some oil painting at the Sanatorium.
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5.6 Letter from A.N. Prior to Mary Prior 9th August 195455
Law Court Hotel
Dunedin
Mon. 9/8/54
Darling mine,
Here I am snug in bed after a bath at last. It’s been a good day, -
Ron met me at train and we came to the hotel; I changed my shirt and
washed, and then we had a Benedictine in the Lounge. Then went to
DIC56 and bought a shirt and a couple of handkerchiefs; to Modern
Books to see their stock; to Dick White’s57 (dropping your letter in at
Moray Place P.O. on the way), where I found no books worth buying
and noDick and learnt that hewas convalescing from some illness or op-
eration, and on to Knox58. Tea at the Master’s table with Hubert, Ron, a
Dr. Hornbrook who is Assistant Master and a Dr. Morris or something
like that who is Dr. H’s room-mate. {2} Then coffee in Hornbrook’s
room, at which Hubert and Jocelyn appeared; main other guest (beside
Ron and me) John Allen59 (your cousin) after that down to Ron’s room
for the fray, Jocelyn didn’t come to this but Hubert did, and drove me
here afterwards.
The position about the Phil. chair is that applications haven’t yet
closed. (They will at end of month; there’s been somemuddling delay).
55Editors’ note: This letter has been edited by Martin Prior, Fatima Sabir, Peter
Øhrstrøm, Farshad Badie and David Jakobsen. The letter is written from Dunedin by
A.N. Prior to his wife Mary Prior and is part of the Martin Prior Collection, presently
kept at Aalborg University (Folder A – Item 3, 8pp, the letter is written on Canterbury
University College Christchurch writing paper). Prior was attending a university work-
shop at Otago University.
56Editors’ note: DIC is a departmental store.
57Editors’ note: Dick White is the husband of Mary Prior’s paternal grandmother’s
sister. His nicknamewas EefieWhite, after thewell-knownDunedin rag-and-boneman.
White was assistant in the Newbold’s Bookshop, which was known for its antiquarian
books.
58Editors’ note: Knox College. Prior was a student here from 1932 to August 1936,
when Prior got married to Clare Hunter. According to Martin Prior, it has been erro-
neously said that he was expelled from the college and stated that he was very sorry
and would not do it again. In fact, Prior resigned by his own decision (Grimshaw, M.
2013. ‘A.N. Prior on James Joyce’, Philosophical Enquiries, 193-202).
59Editors’ note: John Allen is Mary Prior’s mother’s sister’s son, who became a Pres-
byterian minister.
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The show in Ron’s study went, I think, pretty well. I kept going im-
promptu for quite a time, on such lines as these[:]
Philosophy in a very live condition today, and pursued by a vari-
ety of methods. Ordinary speech approach at Oxford, and logical
approach. {3}
Sketch history of logic – Aristotle concentrated on ‘All’[,] ‘Some’
and ‘Not’, Stoics on ‘If’ and ‘And’ and ‘Or’ (a few stock dilemmas
to show what Stoics were interested in) both interested in neces-
sity and possibility; ancient logic ends with Boethius; new origi-
nal work done towards end of Middle Ages; anti-logical repercus-
sions of Reformation and Renaissance and at first of new science
also, but latter issues at last in de Morgan’s logic of relations; then
mathematico-logical tie-up of modern times.
Modern ideas illustrated by discussion of existence (mixture of
Quine and Russell on dragons dished out here).
Modal logic neglected after end ofMiddle Ages until very recently
– specimens of new {4}work beingdone – votes taken onCMMpMp,
CMNMpNMp and CMNpMNMp – problem of deciding between
first two; some consequences of acceptingCMNMpNMp (effect on
validity of Leibniz’s modification of ontological proof – ontologi-
cal proof gone into as preparation for this).
Possibility of deciding aboutCMMpMp andCMNMpNMp bydefin-
ing ‘possible’ – Diodorus’s definition of ‘possible’ – relations of
truth and time; different attitudes to time in medieval logic and
theology – reversion to problem of CMMpMp etc. and Diodoran
solution.
Question of necessary existence, whether meaningful if existence
not a predicate; my answer briefly sketched.
Itwas, in short, a {5}wide-ranging ramble giving amongother things
a pre-view of tomorrow’s and Thursday’s lectures. And it was amost in-
telligent and responsive audience (gathered, I was told, from all sorts of
faculties). Ron kicked off the discussion, and was very good at getting
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balls rolling. Discussion rambled over all sorts of things – the notion
of unrealised possibilia; the historical origins of the divergent medieval
approaches to Time; the place of Latin in education; Hubert told me,
and I more or less gathered as much from Ron, that there’s been quite a
craze for asking people to like this this year. They’ve had in particular a
variety of blokes {6} on the body-mind problem – Passmore (a very hot
discussion with him, I gathered from Hubert), some medical johnny,
Helmuth Rex, Dennis Gray. And other birds on other things.
Talking of Dennis – Ron tells me he’s got the Armidale chair; the
news came out last week. So must congratulate him tomorrow.
It’s just gone midnight – will turn in.
All my love and love
Arthur.
Tues. afternoon – Went along to the University this morning and was
taken to along by Passmore to morning tea with Sofer. The latter seems
a very sound and competent bird – a very considerable contrast to poor
old Henry. At Prof. Board here tomorrow night, I gathered, a rather
sticky issue is coming up. I’ve forgotten {7} the precise form in which
it’s coming up but the background to it is that the Liaison Officer here
seems to regard himself primarily as a careers advisor rather than as
having a job to encourage people to take culturally worthwhile courses,
with the result that subjects that aren’t good ‘teaching subjects’ tend to
get left out in the cold. The proposal that’s coming up is for some sort
of change in the machinery of giving advice to freshers; Sofer is anxious
to get something done about it while preventing the feud the Liaison
Officer is in from coming into the open. Probably a Committee will be
set up. In the course of conversation about this I mentioned that little
booklet about the various subjects that has been got out at CUC60, and
both Sofer and Passmore were highly interested in it, so must write to
Gorden T.61 and get him to send them down copies.
After that was yarningwith Passmore for a bit and then in with Den-
nis Gray, who turned on some very fine sherry. Then back here to the
pub for lunch, and I’m now writing this in the writing room; will be
wandering back to University later to be there about 3. The lecture’s 5-6,
60Editors’ note: Canterbury University College.
61Editors’ note: Probably Gordon Troup from the French Department at Canterbury
University College.
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then I go to Passmores for evening meal and for evening’s discussions.
I gather that Mackie, Hubert and Baier62 are likely to be in for the
Chair, and that Ryle is likely to give Baier a big push when he’s down
here. But they have a {8} good local committee and a good English
one. The local committee includes Hubert Ryburn, Morell and Manton;
I’ve forgotten who else. But they all sounded the sort of people who’d
enjoy JohnMackie on the philosophy of education, so I shall see to it that
Hubert gets that. – At the same time, Passmore tells me that there are
bods in Australia trying to persuade John M. to hold his horses for a job
that’s coming up at Canberra. – John P. is supporting Mackie all right;
and I’ve the impression that Hubert will attach considerable weight to
his recommendation. John P’s annoyance over John M’s review of his
Hume book is partly due to the fact that most of the things that Mackie
said ought to have been in Passmore’s book in fact were in Passmore’s
lectures that Mackie attended.
It’s about 5 to 2 now; must scribble a line to Gordon T., and post this
and other letters on my way to University.
I love you and love you and love you – * *63 like yesterday only
haven’t time to say so – lots of love darling
- Skig
X O X O X O X O X
62Editors’ note: Kurt Baier (1917-2010) an Austrian moral philosopher, who taught
at Melbourne University. In 1958, he married the New Zealand moral philosopher, An-
nette Stoop (1929-2012).
63Editors’ note: These two words are unreadable, but the second word could be
“same”.
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5.7 Letter from Mary to Arthur Prior, 13th August 195464
Dearest,
Your same blue and same father is intriguing. How does one rec-
ognize the same blue in disparate things anyhow. This seems the basic
problem. The father travelling thru time65 w. his tail light is after all de-
stroyed by one blink. We have to be assured from moment to moment
that it is the same father-with-tail-light procreating that we saw before,
etc. etc. So the problem is the same as with blue. Only w. the father
there is at least a hypothetical way of lessening uncertainty, while w.
blue the uncertainty is greater. And in fact we do make mistakes about
shades and even colours notoriously often. I am not sure the Q. is not
psychological to some extent, though the chore seems irreducible. Am
inclined to go very Scottish Common Sense66 and regard memory as ir-
reducible and a necessary thing in recognition. Am not sure that I want
to say that we go carrying {2} blue samples in our mind by the sackful,
tho’ perhaps that’s O.K.
(Doctor’s on his round and the nearer he gets the less I can think.
It’s John MacL67. today.)
The fact is tho’ that the seeing of 1 blue thing does tend to evoke com-
parison w. other blue things. No doubt there’s some quite behaviorist
way of putting that but do we want it? Isn’t it short circuiting – skimp-
ing the carving on the underside of the seat because only God and the
carving will ever know what it’s like?
I’m afraid I’m no real help. Just trying to dredge up a few things
– esp. those we tend to have phobias about, and perhaps Platonists
shouldn’t. I mean think of the awful Qs. One wd. have to answer if
one were to plonk for anything as crude as this ragbag of samples in the
mind. Yet don’t we say when in a shop choosing materials e.g. paint or
64Editors’ note: This letter has been edited byMartin Prior, PeterØhrstrømandDavid
Jakobsen. It is part of the Martin Prior Collection, presently kept at Aalborg University
folder C, item 10. The letter is written on standard unheaded writing paper. It was kept
in an envelope stamped 13th August 1954.
65Editors’ note: The text is not clear.
66Editors’ note: The reference to Scottish Common Sense is interesting. The Priors
were inspired by the tradition, especially the philosophical realism of Thomas Reidwho
is mentioned in Logic and the basis of ethics (1949).
67Editor’s note: JohnMacLeodwas a doctor at the Sanatorium, recollection of Martin
Prior.
217
paper or cloth – “that’s just the color I was thinking of”. Well I dunno.
Anyway this is no help to you as you’ll get it in Chch when you return.
Perhaps as well.
Lovely to think I’ll be seeing you again on Sunday.
XXX
m.68
68Editor’s note: Apparently written in lipstick.
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5.8 Letter from Mary to Arthur Prior, undated69
Monday night
Dearest,
I’ve been thinking about your necessary existence70 thing and draw-
ing morals from it. It seems to me to be a paradigm of philosophical ar-
gument. I mean the argument against has a philosophical rigour which
objections like “what Q. could that answer?” just haven’t. It would be
rash to claim that to any philosopher it is clear that the argument is
no good because there are people who’ll object to logic itself! But its
clear that to most philosophers of whatever school and its good to see
a philosopher dealing w. an argument as an argument, and not simply
brushing {2} it up in order to secure his own particular “school” against
another. To be interested in “what is” instead of “what ism,” wh. is the
curse. And that is what logical formulation can do so well – get phi-
losophy into a common language and clear from the language of the
cliques. The best philosophy has always had that rigour e.g. Moore[’]s
Nat. Fall.71 Stuff and the ontological argument itself. It was to the
strength of Berkeley – or so it appears to me to be, a rigour which gave
no quarter.72 So much “philosophical” argument consists of changing
the subject instead of arguing it out and I think Berkeley and Hume did
try to argue out specific problems.
Tuesday – Lunch Time: Because I’m on the library today I can skip out
of {3}lunch early. But as Gilly has dishes to do we can’t make an early
start, so here I am already to go, the shacks around me empty and un-
naturally silent. I can hear the kids at Beckenham school out playing. It
69Editors’ note: This letter has been edited byMartin Prior, PeterØhrstrømandDavid
Jakobsen. It is part of the Martin Prior Collection, presently kept at Aalborg University
folder C, item 11. The letter is written on standard unheaded writing paper. It was kept
in an envelope stamped Tuesday 17. August 1954. It was partly written Monday night.
The other part on Tuesday 17. August.
70Editors’ note: During 1954 Arthur worked with the ontological argument, and at
several occasions discussed it with Mary.
71Editors’ note: This is a reference to G.E. Moore’s Natural Fallacy. A.N. Prior ad-
dressed problems regarding this idea in Logic and the basis of Ethics (1949).
72Editors’ note: A military term which means to give no clemency.
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carries me back to the Balfour St house when you were away when that
same noise assailed me. The very same noise as the blue of 2 chairs can
be the same.
I’m glad you find Mrs Kirk73 so good and sensible, and glad she
finds M.74 “good”. Here the quotes mean she said it, not me. Don’t let
M. miss next hour for the sake of school. Here nothing is allowed to
interfere w. ours.
After all the cold today is a pleasure. It[’]s so warm here. I’m sitting
in the sun, just loving it.
That book of Snow[’]s is good. He gets so well the excitement of
science – even the physical appearance typical of scientists too – not
white coated figures, but dressedw. an {4}air of “mucking about” about
them. So many scientists seem to do half their work in the clothes they
go tramping in when they can get away w. it.
There[’]s pictures tonight, and I’m expecting to go. Think it[’]s a
reasonable thing but a DRRRRRAMA wh. is a bit tiresome. Why is
tragedy usually corny or gruesome and quite uncathartic on the films?
How started sewing up my new pink frock.
Now I’ll stop and get ready to meet Gilly. She can[’]t be long.
All kisses
Polly.
73Editors’ note: According to Martin Prior, Mrs Kirk gave him lessons in the latter
part of his year with tuberculosis.
74Editors’ note: ‘M’. is for ‘Martin’.
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5.9 Letter from Arthur to Mary 27th August 195475
26 Wade St.
Wadestown
Wellington
Saturday, 27/8/54
Darling,
It’s 2.15 a.m., & I’m at last in bed at the end of the 1st. day of Congress,
wh. has gone very pleasantly.
Picked up Jack in town this yesterday morning & brought him up
here for lunch. He was vastly struck with Elespie76 & enjoyed the visit,
& after lunch& couple of beersweproceeded toCollege. I put upmy for-
mulae on blackboard & started organising last night-&-this-morning’s
party; & then when the hour was due, delivered my piece. I felt very
laboured in giving it, but was assured that it didn’t look that way, &
the {2} discussion was lively. Passmore, Jack, Ryle & I had a cup of
tea in one of them little tea-shops, & then Jack & I proceeded up here.
Ian77 was late back for dinner, & so missed us, but Elespie drove us over.
The speakers for the evening were Pat Hutchings & Erle Robinson, on
‘Essences’. There were good spots in both, but they were shockingly
long, & it was just about 10 o’clock before the discussion so much as
started. And when it subsided, about 11, a mob of us started for here
– Jack & George & Ryle & Passmore & Denis & Pat & Erle & Michael
Shorter & Pat’s girl Susan & Rosemary & her husband &Michael’s host-
ess Mrs. Somebody & Ron Butler & Brian Stewart & sundry hosts. And
everyone enjoyed themselves thoroughly, both the philosophers & Ian
& Elespie. Denis said I did have nice relations & asked me how I man-
aged it. And Ian wants Jack {3} across to lunch today, when he’ll be
home. Charles Brasch’s78 idea that Ryle was at Eunoe’s wedding ap-
pears to be incorrect; but Ryle is a brother of some vastly important
75This letter has been edited by Martin Prior, David Jakobsen and Peter Øhrstrøm.
76Elespie Prior (born Forsyth, 1919-2003) was the wife of Ian (see the next footnote).
77IanAmberryMiller Prior (1924-2009)was the half-brother ofA.N. Prior. He and his
wife lived at the address of this letter. He was a cardiologist and a prominent member
of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear movement.
78Charles Brasch (1909-1973)was a cousin of Elespie and awell-knownNewZealand
poet
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medico who wrote a book that Ian has & who invented the ‘Ryle tube’79
which is used in gastric lavages, & [I] will be able to tell Ann all about
it & how it was invented & first tried out on the inventor’s wife & all
that. - Apparently Ryle’s brother was, moreover, a sufferer from angina
& his book contains some classical description of one of the subsidiary
mental features of the condition. (I have this from Ian. It’s apparently
in the book he has).
Day-Time (still morning – 10.40).
In the discussion of my paper yesterday, I had one occasion to mention
Entities, & on this particular occasion I think the Ryleans were quite
glad that I {4} was able to speak as I did.
There was a very pugnacious priest at the back who said that he was
‘a Thomist & a strict Thomist’, that this was the first exhibition he had
seen of ‘logistics’, & that (this very aggressively & totally irrelevantly)
he wanted to know if I was a ‘realist’. I had a great deal of pleasure in
telling him that I was far more of a realist than he was, & that he would
in fact classify me as an ‘extreme’ realist.
George Hughes was interested in the bit about the hidden assumption,
in common talk about time, that it is infinite, & asked a question which
got me bringing that out more fully. And Ryle asked the question I had
hoped he would, enabling me to bring out the fact that there are no
inverted commas implicit in my formulae. {5} Jack spoke much as in
his letters, being supported by Passmore, who also had a little axe of his
own to grid which I was able to deal with quite amicably.
Must buzz off now & post this & meet Jack.
Love & love & love (& do get some sleep! And God I hope you’re home
now – I think you will be, or there’d have been a wire or something) &
love & love & love
Skig80
79The ‘Ryle tube’, a thin flexible tube, which is inserted into the stomach through the
mouth or nose of a patient and is used forwithdrawingfluid from the stomach or for giv-
ing a test meal. [ J.A. Ryle (1889–1950), British physician] (http://www.encyclopedia.
com/caregiving/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/ryles-tube
80This is one of the nicknames Prior used of himself in letters. Martin recollects ‘Skig-
gers’ and assumes that ‘Skig’ is an abbreviation.
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6 The programme for the Second Philosophical
Congress
NEW ZEALAND SECTION OF THE
AUSTRALASIAN OF PSYCHOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY
SECOND PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS
Wellington 27th – 30th August, 1954
Friday 27th: 2.30 p.m.
Presidential Address by Professor Prior (Christchurch)
Subject: “The Syntax of Time-Distinctions”
Chairman: Dr. Williams, Principal, Victoria University College. Room
A1
8. p.m.
Mr. Hutchings and Mr. Robinson (Wellington)
Symposium on “Essences”.
Chairman: Professor Passmore (Dunedin).
Staff Common Room.
Saturday 28th: 2.30 p.m.
Dr. Becroft (Auckland)
Subject: “The Theory of Mental Dispositions”
Chairman: Mr. Hudson (Wellington) Law Reading Room
8. p.m.
Professor Ryle (Oxford)
Subject: “Inferring”.
Chairman: Professor Hughes (Wellington) Staff Common Room
Sunday 29th: 10.30 a.m.
Mr. Bradley (Auckland)
Subject: “The Meaning of Freedom”
Chairman: Mr. Durrant (Dunedin)
Law Reading Room
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8.p.m
Mr. Hinton (Wellington)
Subject: “Logical Necessity”
Chairman: Mr Shorter (Christchurch)
Staff Common Room
Monday 30th: 10 a.m.
Mr Grey (Dunedin)
Subject: “Cartesian Logic and the Cogito”.
Chairman: Professor Smart (Adelaide)
Room A1
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Abstract
This paper explores the evolution of Arthur Prior’s views on the spe-
cial theory of relativity. It focusses on unpublished texts that can be
found in his online Nachlass. I will compare and contrast the views ex-
pressed in this material with his mature views, which were most fully
expressed about a decade later in his best-known book, Past, Present and
Future (1967). The intervening decadewas a productive one for Prior, and
his views on relativity developed significantly. Prior’s views in the Nach-
lass material center on two, relatively straightforward, standpoints: (1)
Time is not relative to an observer, and (2) The language of time in the
special theory of relativity is artificial and does not describe what I shall
call ontological time. However, by the time he published Past, Present and
Future, these two standpoints seem to have been modified, or at least to
have slipped into the background somewhat.
Keywords: Special Relativity, Arthur Prior, The Nachlass of A.N. Prior,
Modal logic, Temporal logic, Multiple Keyword Search.
1 Introduction
Arthur Norman Prior (1914 - 1969) viewed tense logic as the language
of temporal metaphysics and his metaphysical views were shaped by
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both theological issues and his interest in science, particularly physics.
The story of how issues concerning predestination helped shape the de-
velopment of temporal logic is now well known; for a detailed account,
see [5]. However less is known about howhis views of Einstein’s special
theory of relativity changed and developed.
This paper is part of a larger attempt to explore the development of
Prior’s views on science in general, and the special theory of relativity
in particular, and to investigate how they interacted with the develop-
ment of tense logic. Given the centrality of time in Prior’s work, it would
have been both odd and disappointing if Prior had not been interested in
the special theory of relativity. But he was interested, and his views on
relativity and the development of his views are of considerable interest.
In this paper, I shall focus on a small but significant portion of the
story: the ideas expressed in the unpublished material on the special
theory of relativity from around 1957-58 that can be found in the Prior
online Nachlass [9]. I shall compare and contrast these early views with
Prior’s mature views as expressed in his 1967 book Past, Present and Fu-
ture, and in particular, with the detaileddiscussion given inAppendix B.5
of that book. As the material in the appendix makes clear, Prior’s ma-
ture views were both technical and nuanced. The views to be found in
Prior’s earlier Nachlass material, on the other hand, seem to center on
two, relatively straightforward, standpoints:
i . Time is absolute and not relative to an observer, and
ii . The language of time in the special theory of relativity is artificial and
does not describe ontological time.
However, as I shall discuss, by the time he wrote Past, Present and
Future, Prior seems to have softened his initial standpoints or switched
focus, and I will discuss the changes involved.
Furthermore, it should be added that the term ontological in the sec-
ond standpoint can be discussed since this is not a term that Prior uses
in any of the included text. But as you will see he uses phrases like “the
real passage of time” in quote (3) and in quote (3) he compares “having
happened” with “existing”, however to avoid these related meanings I
will use ontological as a term of art.
Some historical background will be useful. In the late 1950s (where
this paper starts) and in late 1967 (where it ends) Arthur Norman Prior
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was at two very different places in his career. Indeed, he was located in
two geographically and intellectually distinct places as well. In the late
1950s he was living in Christchurch, in the province of Canterbury in
the south island of New Zealand, far away from many newly-found col-
leagues engaged in logic and philosophy. He had met these colleagues
in 1956 during his one year long sabbatical at Oxford University. Ac-
cording to [3], this had been a very happy year for Prior: he had given
the JohnLockeLectures, and these hadbeenpublished as awell-received
book Time andModality — The John Locke Lectures [13] by Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
However, he then had to return to the isolation ofNewZealand. Dur-
ing his short period back inChristchurch (hewould return to Europe for
good in 1959) Prior wrote several texts where special theory of relativ-
ity was mentioned; these form the basis of this paper. They are not the
earliest of Prior’s writings that mention relativity, but they are the earli-
est texts by Prior the successful tense logician: theywere written shortly
after the 1957 publication ofTime andModality, a bookwhich does not di-
rectly mention the special theory of relativity.1 None of these texts were
published by Prior himself; they were either speech notes, lecture notes,
letters or sketches. One of them [16] was posthumously published (in
[2]). Another is from his brief exchange of letters with the young Saul
Kripke, then a Harvard undergraduate.
In 1967, on the other hand, Arthur Prior was at the height of his
career. Among other things, he had by then been a professor at Manch-
ester (where he had supervised the PhD theses of Robert Bull and Max
Cresswell), he had visitedUCLA in 1965 andmet the “Californian Tense
Logicians”,2 and was now a fellow at Balliol College at Oxford Univer-
sity. His book Past, Present and Future thus reflects the efforts of an intel-
lectually intense decade.
The special theory of relativity does not play a prominent role in
Past, Present and Future — the book addresses several themes, the dom-
inant one being (in)determinism and branching time semantics. How-
ever, unlike Time and Modality, it does explicitly treat the special (and
even the general) theory of relativity as an important topic for tempo-
ral logic to explore, and contains Prior’s most developed discussion of
1Though ‘space-time’ is mentioned in passing on page 28 and page 31.
2Nino Cocchiarella, Richard Montague, Hans Kamp, E. J. Lemmon, Dana Scott and
others; see [10] for a useful account.
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the topic: “Relativity, theory of” appears in the book’s index, relativity
is briefly discussed at three places in the main text, and (most impor-
tantly) it is explored from a logical perspective in the two and half page
longAppendix B.5. Sadly, Prior himself was unable to develop the ideas
expressed here further, as he started to fall ill and died soon afterwards
in 1969 while lecturing in Trondheim, Norway [3].
There is significantmaterial by Prior on relativity that will not be dis-
cussed in this paper. First, there is a recently discovered text ?Essays Sci-
entific?, published with other of Prior?s early writings [? ]. ?Essays Sci-
entific? was written by Prior in September 1931 (when he was 16 years
old) and it is clear that it is an interesting and valuable find. Second, the
special theory of relativity is mentioned in the last two pages of what is
often regarded as the founding text of Priorean tense logic, “The Syntax
of Time Distinctions” [17]. This paper, which was based on a 1954 talk
Prior gave in NewZealand, uses what he calls “the time series of special
relativity” to give an example of non-linear time that falsifies 3¬3𝑝 →
¬3𝑝.3 Third, there are other papers addressing themes from the special
theory of relativity; an interesting example is the posthumously pub-
lished [19] with its “distant pulsating body” argument. However the
focus in the present paper is on the texts in the Nachlass, and how the
two standpoints expressed there link with Prior’s mature views as ex-
pressed in Past, Present and Future.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I shall briefly de-
scribe Prior’sNachclass and the systematicmultiple keyword searchused
to find the material on which this paper is based. In Section 3, the two
standpoints will be presented with the help of Prior’s own words from
theNachlass. Section 4 contains a brief presentation of the content of Ap-
pendix B.5 from [18], and in Section 5, I discuss what became of the two
standpoints in this mature work. Section 6 concludes by noting topics
for further research.
3There is a brief but interesting discussion of “The Syntax of Time Distinctions” and
this example on page 41 of Past, Present and Future. There Prior explicitly remarks that
the counterexample was given in his 1954 address, says that his proof in the paper was
“a little sketchy and unsure”, and compares his counterexample to a related example
proposed by Kripke.
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2 Exploring the Nachlass
Thework reported here beganwith amultiple keyword search of Prior’s
onlineNachlass for texts discussing special relativity.4 This search found
five texts written by Prior which mention the special theory of relativ-
ity [12], [16], [20], [21] and [15]. The texts are:5
[12] Is there a Problem with Science and Religion? (1956-61). Edited by
Martin Prior, JørgenAlbretsen, David Jakobsen andPeterØhrstrøm.
This text, with the editor’s comments, is just over seven pages long.
The text is a coherent draft paper, with minor omissions and re-
workings; the editors provide detailed comments. The text is un-
dated, but the editors note that it refers to Michael Ramsey as the
archbishop of York, whichmeans it was written between 1956 and
1961
[16] Some Free Thinking about Time (1958). Edited by Peter Øhrstrøm.
This text is about three and half pages in length. The text is clean;
the editors note only one possible brief omission. An earlier ver-
sion was posthumously published in 1996 in [2].
[20] 1. Parts of Speech (Text 105) (19??). Edited by Adriane Rini, Max
Cresswell and Martin Prior. An undated text, just over two pages
long. The text is fragmented: it seems that either something is
missing, or that the text is personal jottings. The part that men-
tions special relativity is the last paragraph, where Prior quotes
and briefly comments on Kurt Gödel’s views on relativity.
[21] The Place of Time in Logic (19??), Edited by Peter Øhrstrøm and
Fabio Corpina. This text is less than two pages in length, and at
least 10 pages are missing from the manuscript. The extant com-
ments about special relativity occur in the very last paragraph.
[15] Letter from Prior to Kripke 27/10/1958 Edited by Thomas Ploug and
PeterØhrstrøm. Just over one page long. Prior’s response toKripke’s
4All this material is available for download at https://nachlass.prior.aau.dk/.
5The search also foundKripke’s letterwhich led to Prior’s response listed below. The
three preceding letters [14], [7] and [8] provide crucual background; a closer study of
these letters is conducted in [11].
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letter of October 13, 1958 in which Kripke suggested that a tense-
less logicmight be preferable to a tensed logic for relativistic physics.
These are all the texts in the online Nachlass [9] in which Prior men-
tions the special theory of relativity. The paragraphs where the special
theory of relativity is mentioned are the sources of the two standpoints
discussed in the following section.
However, before presenting the standpoints, I will briefly discuss
how the multiple keyword search that found these texts was conducted.
Prior’s Nachlass can usefully be divided into three parts. First, there is
the physical Nachlass material. The largest part of this is contained in
28 boxes at the Bodleian library in Oxford, but new material (such as
the 1931 text “Essays Scientific” mentioned earlier) continues to come
to light. Second, there is a photographic record of this physicalNachlass;
the image files aremade available inwhat is called theVirtual Lab. After
this, volunteers transcribe the material in the Virtual Lab and make it
publicly available in the onlineNachlass as a pdf file. This is an important
step, as pdf files (unlike image files) are searchable. These transcribed
files were the resource I made use of.
As mentioned earlier, this paper is part of a larger attempt to investi-
gate Prior’s views on science, and for this purpose a search engine more
powerful than the one already contained in the online Nachlass is re-
quired: what is needed instead is a search engine that works with big-
ger libraries (including books and published papers), that can search on
multiple words at one time, and that returns a savable output file. So I
developed a prototype Python program that can work through a collec-
tion of pdfs, searching several pdfs for multiple words at one time. The
program outputs a list with the texts in which the individual search-
words occur, stating where and how many times they were found.
Such a tool is useful for several reasons. First, it helps if the library
of texts is large; when the searches for this paper were carried out there
were already 68 items in the online Nachlass. Second, it is important
to be able to search for multiple words. For example, Prior does not
always talk of ‘special theory of relativity’. He also uses terms like ‘rel-
ativistic physics’, ‘special relativity’ and so on. All of these should be
searched for simultaneously. Third, searches can reveal relevant new
search words. So it can be useful to be able to extend the list of search
words with the new items, and then repeat the search and to have files
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recording the results of various search results. Writing a small Python
program that let some of this be done seemed sensible. The way the
program carries out the search is shown in Figure 1.
Look in file 𝑥 and print: 𝑥
Does search-word 𝑎 occur in file 𝑥?
Print: 𝑎 occurs on page 𝑛
Are there more search-words?
Replace 𝑎 with 𝑏
Replace 𝑥 with 𝑦
Yes
No
Yes
No
Figure 1: Structure of the search program.
The five texts listed above are the relevant results of the program
searching the complete online Prior Nachlass for the words: ‘relativity’,
‘relativistic’ and ‘physics’.
3 Two Standpoints from the Nachlass
After the search program had found the relevant texts, a careful reading
was conducted. This suggested that Prior’s views in the onlineNachlass
make two main points about how time and the special theory of relativ-
ity go together (or do not go together): (1) the present is absolute and not
relative to an observer, and (2) that the language of the special theory of relativ-
ity is artificial and does not describe ontological time. It is certainly open to
discussionwhether this simple classification adequatelymirror’s Prior’s
views in the Nachlass, but it seems a useful first summary. In any case,
in the following pages I will present them by extensively quoting Prior’s
own words, so the reader will be in a reasonable position to judge.
The first standpoint is clearly present in Some Free Thinking about
Time [16]:
People who are doing relativity physics are concerned with
the relations of before and after and simultaneity, but these
aren’t the first things as far as the real passage of time is con-
cerned - the first thing is the sequence of past, present, and
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future, and this is not just a private or local matter, different
for each one of us; on the contrary, pastness, presentness and
futurity are properties of events that are independent of the
observer; and under favorable conditions they are perceived
properties of events. [page 3]
Here an explicit statement of the first standpoint (“pastness, present-
ness and futurity are properties of events that are independent of the
observer”) is being used as part of an argument in support of the sec-
ond standpoint — it provides a reason for thinking that the question
‘did A happen before B?’ is not a meaningless question, even though the
“people who are doing relativity physics” think it is.
The first standpoint appears again in [16]; I have included the part
where ‘having happened’ is compared with ‘having existed’ — a com-
parison that we will meet again.
When an event X is happening, another event Y either has
happened or has not happened - ‘having happened’ is not
the kind of property that can attach to an event from one
point of view but not from another. On the contrary, it’s
something like existing; in fact to ask what has happened is
a way of asking what exists, and you can’t have a thing ex-
isting from one point of view but not existing from another,
although of course its existencemay be known to one person
or in one region, without being known to another person or
in another region.[page 3]
Moreover, the first standpoint turns up again in ‘Parts of Speech’
[20]; unfortunately this text is very fragmented and it comes to an abrupt
end at a particularly frustrating point. Nonetheless, the following quote
is fascinating: it offers an argument that seems similar to that used in
quote (3) and (3), and here Prior draws on the writings of Kurt Gödel
to support this line of thought:
“But the special theory of relativity requires us to admit that “each
observer has his own set of ‘nows’, & none of these various systems
of layers can claim the prerogative of representing the objective
lapse of time.” In a footnote Gödel dismisses the possibility that
the lapse of time may be “relative”, i.e. may take place differently
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for each observer, & nevertheless be “objective”, each observer’s
own time-lapse being perfectly real. “A relative lapse of time, how-
ever”, Gödel says, “would certainly be something entirely different
from the lapse of time in the ordinary sense, which means a change
in the existing. The concept of existence cannot be relativized with-
out destroying its meaning completely.” What this mean, I take it,
is that if I ask the question “When I was taking my Easter holidays
in 1941, had that stellar explosion I am now observing taken place
or not?”, it” [page 2]
Here the text stops, so we do not quite know what Prior meant by
bringing these remarks into the text, but the text clearly does express
the first standpoint, and we again meet the similarity (and maybe even
the equality) between ‘happened’ and ‘existed’ that we saw in quote 3.
Moreover the first standpoint is again being used to support the second
standpoint: this is seen in the contrast between “relative lapse of time”
and “lapse of time in the ordinary sense”, because “the concept of exis-
tence cannot be relativized without destroying its meaning completely”
and therefore a relativized lapse of time will lose its meaning as well.
Recall the second standpoint: the language of the special theory of
relativity is artificial and does not provide a description of ontological
time. In the online Nachlass material, this standpoint is presented in far
more detail and more frequently than the first.
In Is there a Problem with Science and Religion? [12], Prior says that the
religious tendency of “holding fast to a creed” may be felt by a scien-
tist to be “intellectually disreputable”, and that he himself agrees that
it probably is. However, he then goes on to say that science has it own
forms of intellectual disreputability, and it is the second standpoint that
he uses as an example to illustrate this:
On the other hand, scientists have their own kind of intel-
lectual disreputableness, namely this:- If a question doesn’t
lend itself to solution by the scientific techniques of the day,
scientists may invent a language in which this question just
can’t be formulated but in which the questions that can be
answered are formulated with great precision and neatness.
An example of this sort of thing is the special theory of rel-
ativity, which consists at least partly in the construction of
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a language in which the question as to which of two events
happened first in many cases just can’t be asked. (...) Well,
so far, that’s all right, and not intellectual disreputable at all.
But then a scientistmay go on to say that the questions he has
thrust on one side just don’t exist, and so the scientific pic-
ture of the world gets more and more impoverished. And I
can’t seewhy a religious person, or for thatmatter even a per-
son who isn’t religious, shouldn’t be prepared sometimes to
fight the scientists at this point, and to risk being called un-
scientific because he insists on the reality of positions which
someone for one reason or another has pushed on one side.
InSome Free ThinkingAbout Time [16] Prior presents the second stand-
point several times. Here the discussion is not a ‘fight’ between science
and religion as in the previous quote, but a fight between Prior’s view
on time — the A-theory of time — and what Prior calls the “tapestry
view of time”, or the B-theory of time, as it is usually called. Prior starts
his argument as follows:
(...) there is no way of determining whether the light-signal
first crossed my path or yours. And the conclusion drawn
in the theory of relativity is that this question - the ques-
tion as to which of us is right, which of us really saw it first
- is a meaningless question; outside our private paths, the
time-direction and space direction just aren’t as distinct as
that.[Page 3]
But Prior forcefully denies that there is anything ‘meaningless’ here:
Coming back to this allegedly meaningless question as to
whether you or I saw the light- flash first, surely what it
means is just this: When I was seeing the flash, had you
already seen it, or had you not? In other words, when my
seeing it was a present fact, had your seeing it become a past
fact, or had it not? And I just cannot be persuaded that such
a question ismeaningless - itsmeaning seems tomeperfectly
obvious.[page 3]
Which leads him to conclude that the theory of relativity isn’t about
real space and time. Rather it offers an elegant but artificial tapestry that
links observed facts together in a simple way:
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So it seems to me that there’s a strong case for just digging
our heels in here and saying that, relativity or no relativity,
if I say I saw a certain flash before you, and you say you saw
it first, one of us is just wrong - or misled it may be, by the
effect of speed on his instruments - even if there is just no
physical means whatever of deciding which of us it is. To
put the same point another way, we may say that the the-
ory of relativity isn’t about real space and time, in which the
earlier-later relation is defined in terms of pastness, present-
ness and futurity; the ’time’ which enters into the so-called
space-time of relativity theory isn’t this, but is just part of
an artificial frameworkwhich the scientists have constructed
to link together observed facts in the simplest way possible,
and from which those things which are systematically con-
cealed from us are quite reasonably left out.[Page 4]
Prior makes a simular point in his 27th October 1957 [15] response
to Kripke’s letter of 13th October:
There are areas of science within which certain questions
arising out of ordinary tense- distinctions aren’t answerable,
and in which ‘it is better to use a language in which such
questions cannot even be stated; and I take it that the moral
of Special Relativity is that the theory of light- propagation
is such an area. [Page 1]
Summing up, both standpoints are presented as they appear in the
online Nachlass material, however Prior’s main statements concerning
relativity physics in this period are centered on the second standpoint.
Indeed, he tends to use the first standpoint as an explanation of the
meaning of the allegedly meaningless question ‘did A happen before
B?’. Putting it the other way around, one might say that if one admits
that the question ‘did A happen before B?’ is meaningless, then one can-
not accept the first standpoint.
4 Special Relativity in Past, Present and Future
This section briefly summarizes and explains some technical aspects of
Appendix B.5 of Past, Present and Future [18] that I will refer back to
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in Section 5. The appendix is devoted to the tense logic of the special
theory of relativity, and is the most detailed piece Prior published on
the subject.
First, a quick overview. In the appendix, Prior argues that a tense
logic for special theory of relativity should be at least as strong as the
modal logic S4.2.6 Prior writes modal logic here instead of tense logic be-
cause he refers to theDiodorean modal logicwhere𝜑 is defined in tense
logical terms as 𝜑 ∧ 𝐺𝜑 and 3𝜑 is defined as 𝜑 ∨ 𝐹𝜑, this terminology
is also seen in his earlier publications Time and Modality from 1957 [13]
and Diodoran Modalities from 1955 [22].
According to Prior, in the mid 1960s, the modal logic S4 was com-
monly accepted as the logic for relativistic physics. Prior’s reason for
choosing the stronger logic S4.2 instead of the weaker S4 is that S4 al-
lows too much: though S4 might be appropriate for the general theory
of relativity, it isn’t for the special theory, as Prior states it himself in
Appendix B.5:
(...) if our tense-logic is geared to the earlier-later relation, or one
of the earlier later relations, of relativistic physics, the resulting
Diodorean-modal system is S4. This seems to me to need a small
correction, and I would suggest that while S4 does indeed give the
Diodorean-modal logic appropriate to the general theory of relativ-
ity, the Diodorean-modal logic appropriate to the special theory is
at least S4.2. [p. 203]
Both relativistic theoriesmake use of an indefinite number of frames
of reference (each of which has a ‘local proper time’ conforming to the
still stronger modal logic S4.3, the linear tense logic of classical physics)
and each frame of reference may disagree with another frame of refer-
ence on the order of events 𝑎 and 𝑏. However, Prior then says of special
relativity that:
This, however, is only true within limits, and in some cases
an event 𝑏 is earlier or later than an event 𝑎 with respect to
all frames of reference, and so may be said to be ‘absolutely’
earlier or later. In particular, if the space-time points 𝑎 and
6The axioms of S4, S4.2 and S4.3 are noted below. For more detailed information
about these and other modal logics, see [1]. In what follows I will use contemporary
logical notation rather than the Polish notation that Prior favoured.
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𝑏 could conceivably be linked by the path of a light signal,
one of themwill be absolutely earlier than the other, and the
other absolutely later[Page 203]
This quote is peculiar, since it seems to refer to some absolute initial or
final event in time, a point that Prior does not mention further. How-
ever, it is this that leads him to argue that “the Diodorean-modal logic
appropriate to the special theory is at least S4.2” [Page 203], a logic lying
between S4 and S4.3.7
Let us look at the details. The modal logic corresponding to general
theory of relativity is S4, the logic of transitive and reflexive structures.8
In S4, temporal branching is permittedwith no restrictions. On the other
hand, the modal logic corresponding to classical physics is S4.3, the
logic of transitive, reflexive and connected structures; such structures do
not allow for temporal branching at all.9
Prior claims that the modal logic of special relativity should lie be-
tween these two extremes. More specifically it should be at least as
strong as S4.2,10 the logic of transitive, reflexive and convergent struc-
tures; such structures dopermit branching, but only in those caseswhere
the branches meet up again. Prior writes that:
[i]t is not immediately obvious that the line-patterns associ-
ated with these theories have anything to dowith the theory
of relativity (...)[Page 204]
By “the line patterns associated with these theories”, Prior seems to
mean the different degrees of branching associated with the modal log-
ics S4, S4.2 and S4.3. He then goes on to show, with the help of a
space-time diagram, that although it may not be “immediately obvi-
ous”, 𝐹𝐺𝑝 → 𝐺𝐹𝑝, the key axiom for S4.2, is indeed valid in (special
relativistic) space-time. The space-time diagram depicted in Figure 2 is
a modified version of the one he gives in Appendix B.5. It shows three
7There are infinitely many distinct modal logics between S4 and S4.3. Indeed, there
are even infinitely many distinct Diodorean modal logics between S4.2 and S4.3, as G.
E. Hughes, another philosophical logician from New Zealand proved; see [6].
8The axioms of S4 are 𝐺𝜑 → 𝐺𝐺𝜑 (transtivity) and 𝐺𝜑 → 𝜑 (reflexivity).
9The axioms of S4.3 are those of S4 plus 𝐺(𝐺𝜑 → 𝜓)∨𝐺(𝐺𝜓 → 𝜑).
10The axioms of S4.2 are those of S4 plus 𝐹𝐺𝜑 → 𝐺𝐹𝜑, which guarantees conver-
gence.
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‘light-cones’, so called because the lines are light signals emitted from
each point. Let us focus on point 𝑎: everything that is inside the light-
cone above point 𝑎 is in 𝑎’s possible future, and everything inside the
light-cone beneath point 𝑎 was (possibly) in 𝑎’s past. Points lying outside
the light-cone cannot intersect with point 𝑎 because of the universality
of the speed of light — but they can, as Prior points out, intersect with
𝑎’s future. Let us go through Prior’s presentation of the validity of the
𝑎
𝑏 𝑐
𝑑
Figure 2: Space-timediagram showing an absolute future point in space-
time 𝑑 that is future in both 𝑎’s and 𝑏’s future light-cone, where 𝑎,𝑏,𝑐 and
𝑑 are points in space-time.
S4.2 axiom in special relativity with the help of Figure 2. Suppose that
𝐹𝐺𝑝 holds at 𝑎. That is, suppose that at 𝑎 there is some point in the
future (point 𝑏, say) where 𝑝 will always be the case — that is, 𝑝 will be
the case everywhere in 𝑏’s future light-cone. Given this, then it is true
that for any point in 𝑎’s forward light-cone, say 𝑐, that 𝑝 will eventually
be the case in 𝑐’s future light-cone. So 𝐺𝐹𝑝 must hold at 𝑎. So the truth
of the antecedent 𝐹𝐺𝑝 at an arbitrary point 𝑎 in a space-time diagram
guarantees the truth of its consequent 𝐺𝐹𝑝, thus the S4.2 axiom is valid.
When he introduces the S4.2 axiom, Prior also notes the correspond-
ing B-language formula:11
𝑎 < 𝑏 → (𝑎 < 𝑐 → ∃𝑑(𝑏 < 𝑑 ∧𝑐 < 𝑑))
Here 𝑎 < 𝑏 is to be read as 𝑏 lies within the future light-cone of 𝑎.
This formula is the B-language expression of the convergence property
11Here I have changed notation: Prior used Polish notation and the U-calculus in
which 𝑎 < 𝑏 would be written 𝑈(𝑎,𝑏).
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relevant to special relativity: if both 𝑏 and 𝑐 lie in the future light cone
of 𝑎, then there exists some point 𝑑 that lies in the future light cones of
both 𝑏 and 𝑐. Prior concludesAppendix B.5 by showing that Formula (4)
can be derived from the axiom 𝐹𝐺𝑝 → 𝐺𝐹𝑝 in the U-calculus. That is:
𝐹𝐺𝑝 → 𝐺𝐹𝑝 is a simple axiom that axiomatically captures the content of
convergence as expressed in the more complex B-language expression.
A fourth point that Prior makes in the appendix is that any two dis-
tinct points are connected “by some sequence of 𝑃 s and 𝐹 s”. As he
puts it “In this space-time, we might say, all futures tends to merge, but
if time stopped some futures would be left separated” [p. 205]. For ex-
ample in Figure 2 points 𝑏 and 𝑐 are not directly connected with each
other: neither of the points lies in the other ones future or past light-
cone, but at 𝑑 both points are past. Hence from point 𝑏 we can reach 𝑐
using a two-step 𝐹𝑃 sequence via point 𝑑 and vice versa. More gener-
ally, as Prior notes, if we assume that the future is unbounded, then we
can reach any space-time point using a two-step 𝐹𝑃 sequence. For this
reason, Prior suggests that the full logic of special relativity should con-
tain the axiom 𝐺𝑝 → 𝐹𝑝 (time is unbounded towards the future). He
also suggests adding axiom 𝐺𝐺𝑝 → 𝐺𝑝 (density).
So the main points Prior makes in the appendix of Past, Present and
Future are that: (1) in some cases one event is earlier or later than an-
other with respect to all frames of reference, (2) the modal logic of spe-
cial relativity is at least as strong as the converging logic S4.2, (3) the
characteristic S4.2 axiom 𝐹𝐺𝑝 → 𝐺𝐹𝑝 is strong enough to derive the cor-
responding B-language formula describing convergence, and (4) any
two space-time points can be connected by some sequence of 𝑃 s and
𝐹 s, and indeed, connected by a two step sequence if the future is un-
bounded.
5 Where Did The Standpoints Go?
The main question asked in this section is suggested by its title: what
became of the two Nachlass standpoints in Past, Present and Future? As
we shall see, the first standpoint is present, but only in aweakened form.
Moreover, the second standpoint is not found there at all; one has to look
elsewhere in Past, Present and Future to find it.
Recall the first standpoint: time is absolute and not relative to an ob-
server. This standpoint is present, though in a weaker version. It is a
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weaker version because, as Prior states in Quote (4), in some cases an
event is ‘absolutely’ earlier or later with respect to all frames of refer-
ence, in particular “if the space-time points 𝑎 and 𝑏 could conceivably
be linked by the path of a light signal”. Here Prior tacitly admits that
there might be cases where disagreements on the order of events can
occur. This becomes explicit when we consider the way he proves the
validity of the characteristic S4.2 axiom: the intermediate points 𝑏 and 𝑐
both lie in the light cone of 𝑎, and they cannot be temporally compared.
What can be said is that at some future point 𝑑, these two points can
be temporally ‘reconciled’, and that this reconciliation can always be ac-
complishedwith a two-step 𝐹𝑃 sequence if time is unbounded towards
the future.
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing (since occasionally Prior’s lan-
guage seems to suggest otherwise) that the S4.2 axiom does not guaran-
tee the existence of some unique perspective which unites all observers;
the reconciliation it offers is conditional. The simplest way of proving
this is by considering a temporal modal structure based on two disjoint
copies of the real numbers. Here we have two independent ‘parallel
temporal universes’, or (to use the language of Appendix B.4) we do not
have a unique time series. Nonetheless, in any suchmodel 𝐹𝐺𝑝 → 𝐺𝐹𝑝
is valid (and so is the unbounded future axiom 𝐺𝑝 → 𝐹𝑝).
Recall that this says that: the language of the special theory of rel-
ativity is artificial and does not describe ontological time. As we saw
in Section 3, in theNachlassmaterial Prior writes more frequently about
the second standpoint, so it is remarkable that this standpoint isn’t men-
tioned in Appendix B.5 in any obvious way. Was it not important to
Prior any more? Or was it left out — temporarily suspended — for the
sake of focus?
Indeed, in the modal logic S4.2, standpoint one only holds in a very
weakened form. In this logic, convergence allows the perspectives of
observers suitably arranged in space-time to eventually be reconciled by
zigzagging through a sequence of 𝐹 and 𝑃 steps. So there has been a
change of emphasis regarding standpoint one. But why? This brings us
to standpoint two.
Oneplausible answer to these questions can be found inAppendix B.4,
which is called The uniqueness of the time-series. There, three pages before
the start of Appendix B.5, we find the following quote:
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I am sure that these observations [about several non-overlapping
time-series] have some bearing on the topic of the next sec-
tion [B.5], tense-logic in the theories of relativity; I wish I
were clearer as to what that bearing is. In anticipating that
section, I feel a bit like someone who, having delivered a
Berkeleian attack on the differential calculus, will shortly be
nevertheless using it. Point-instants (and even events) seem
as mythical to me as matter did to Berkeley; and what I un-
derstand of the theory of relativity leavesme about as happy
as the calculus left him. Still, it’s Science, so in the meantime
we can only try (as I shall be trying in the next section) to
do our sums right, however obscure their meaning; andwait
for Weierstrass.” [Page 200]
Clearly Prior did not discard his previous opinion on the ontology of
time. In Appendix B.4 he is admitting that he will essentially do his sums
right. That is, he will work with an artificial system, his hope perhaps
being that the physicists will eventually realize that their view of time
needs augmentingwith a deeper analysis. Prior’s language in appendix
B.4 is strikingly reminicent of that used in his 1958 fragment Some Free
Thinking About Time:
When that formidable mathematical engine the differential
calculus was first invented, its practitioners used to talk a
mixture of excellentmathematics andphilosophical nonsense,
and at the time the nonsense was exposed for what it was,
by the philosopher Berkeley, in a pamphlet entitled ‘A De-
fence of Free Thinking inMathematics’. And themathemati-
cians saw in the end that Berkeley was right, though it took
them about a century and a half to come round to it. They
came round to it when they became occupied with prob-
lems which they could only solve by being accurate on the
points where Berkeley had shown them to be loose; then
they stopped thinking of the things he had to say as just a
reactionary bishop’s niggling, and began to say them them-
selves. Well, itmay be that someday themathematical physi-
cists will want a sound logic of time and tenses; and mean-
while the logician had best go ahead and construct it, and
abide his time. [Page 4]
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So even though Prior still considered time in the special theory of rel-
ativity artificial, he would not just ignore it. Rather he will develop his
own sound logic within the special theory of relativity - however obscure
its meaning. In this connection, one point is well worth emphasizing:
Arthur Prior did indeed get his sums right. In 1980, Robert Goldblatt
(anothermodal logician fromNewZealand) published a paper proving
that S4.2 was indeed the modal logic of Minkowski space-time; see [4].
This answers both questions posed at the beginning of this para-
graph: Yes, Prior’s early standpoints were still important to him, and
yes, the second standpoint seems to have been suspended during the
writing of Appendix B.5 for the sake of focus. However, as his remarks
in Appendix B.4 make clear, these standpoints are difficult to reconcile
with the physics (and indeed the logic) of the special theory of relativ-
ity.
So it seems that Prior keeps the second standpoint, but modifies the
first. This fits well with the conclusion I drew in section 3: if one accepts
standpoint one, one has to accept standpoint two as well. As we have
just seen, Prior does not keep to a strong version of standpoint one in
Appendix B.5: he allows periods where the time can be relative to an
observer and periods where time is not relative to an observer. In peri-
ods where time is not relative to an observer, they will not disagree on
the order of events, and ‘did A happen before B?’ is therefore a mean-
ingful question, but in the periods where time is relative to an observer,
they then can disagree on the order of events (and they can also not
disagree). Does that yield the question ‘did A happen before B’ a mean-
ingless question or not? It seems that sometimes the question is mean-
ingless — or better perhaps: undefined — and sometimes it is not. So
the ‘softening’ of standpoint one leads to a view which seems to match
quite well with the scientifically-aware layperson’s view of what relativ-
ity tells us: such people know that in everyday life we can rely on our
temporal intuitions, but when dealing with topics such as cosmology
and particle physics, it is wiser to defer to the language of physics.
6 Conclusion
Aspart of a larger attempt to explore Prior’s ideas about science, hiswrit-
ings about the special theory of relativity in the onlineNachlasswere col-
lected through a small search program developed for the purpose. The
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five texts which resulted from the search were read and Prior’s argu-
ments concerning the special theory of relativity were condensed into
two main standpoints: (i) time is not relative to an observer, (ii) the lan-
guage of time in the special theory of relativity is artificial and does not
describe ontological time.
These two standpoints were then compared with the mature views
expressed in Past, Present and Future, particularly Appendix B.5. The
comparison was done to see whether (and how) Prior’s view on time
in the special theory of relativity developed during the last decade of
his life. As we have seen, Prior turned from insisting that there is only
one absolute frame of reference, and that we can not disagree about the
order of events without one of us being wrong, to proposing S4.2 as
the modal logic of relativity. As S4.2 allows for changes of reference
frame, this might suggest that Prior ‘softened up’ during the decade.
But the motivation of Appendix B.5 (and the remarks in Appendix B.4)
make it somewhat unclear what Prior’s final position really was. It is
nowwidely accepted that Prior got it right: as Goldblatt confirmed, S4.2
is indeed the modal logic of Minkowski space-time, that is, the modal
logic of relative time. But would Prior have agreed that S4.2 is the logic
of ontological time, orwas he ‘playing along’ with the physicists, without
giving up any of his original standpoints? On balance, it seems that he
would have viewed S4.2 as the logic of an elegant but artificial tapestry.
Clearly thework reported here is only the first step towards a deeper
understanding of Prior’s views on relativity. Obvious further questions
to explore include: ifmore papers had been includedwould other stand-
points have appeared? How would the two standpoints presented here
look in that light? Were the standpoints discussed in this paper prefig-
ured in the newly discovered text “Essays Scientific” that Prior wrote
when he was 16? Finally, from a logical perspective, it might be inter-
esting to explore the underlying logic of Minkowski space-time with a
more expressive A-series language such as hybrid logic.
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Abstract
The paper considers the question: how should God’s eternity be under-
stood? Should divine eternity be conceived as timelessness or as omni-
temporality? I consider three arguments in favor of divine timelessness:
the argument fromGod’s knowledge of future contingents, the argument
from the special theory of relativity, and the argument from the incom-
pleteness of temporal life. I show that these arguments are at best
inconclusive. Furthermore, I consider three arguments in favor of divine
omni-temporality: the argument from the impossibility of atemporal per-
sonhood, the argument from divine action in the world, and the argu-
ment from divine knowledge of tensed facts. I show that while the first
argument is weak, the latter two arguments are rather strong. In the last
section of the paper I point out that the defender of divine timelessness
can escape the arguments for divine temporality by embracing the tense-
less theory of time. I conclude that if we are to understand divine eternity,
wemust first settle the question of the tenseless vs. tensed theory of time.
Keywords: Eternity, divine foreknowledge, the special theory of relativ-
ity, the tenseless theory of time, the tensed theory of time.
1 Introduction
“God,” declares the prophet Isaiah, “is the high and lofty One who in-
habits eternity” (Is. 57.15). But being a prophet and not a philosophical
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theologian, Isaiah did not pause to reflect upon the nature of divine eter-
nity. Minimally, to be eternal means to exist without beginning and end.
To say that God is eternal means minimally that He never began to exist
and will never cease to exist. To exist eternally is to exist permanently.1
There are, however, at least two ways in which something could ex-
ist eternally. One way would be to exist omnitemporally throughout
infinite time. In this case God would have an immemorial and ever-
lasting temporal duration. The other way in which a being could exist
eternally would be by existing timelessly. In this case God would com-
pletely transcend time, having neither temporal location nor temporal
extension.
Philosophical theologians have been sharply divided with respect
to God’s relationship to time. What are the principal arguments which
they have offered for divine timelessness and temporality?
2 Arguments for Divine Timelessness
ARGUMENT FROM SIMPLICITY OR IMMUTABILITY
Traditionally Christian theologians like Thomas Aquinas argued for
God’s timelessness on the basis of His absolute simplicity and immu-
tabilıty (Summa theologiae 1a. 10. 3). The argument can be simply for-
mulated. As a first premiss, we assume either
1. God is simple
or
1’. God is immutable.
Then we add
1For an analysis of what it means to be permanent, see Brian Leftow, Time and Eter-
nity, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1991), p. 133; cf. Quentin Smith, ”A New Typology of Temporal and Atemporal
Permanence,” Noûs 23 (1989): 307-30. According to Leftow an entity is permanent if
and only if it exists and has no first or last finite period of existence, and there are no
moments before or after it exists.
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2. If God is simple or immutable, then He is not temporal, from
which it follows that
3. Therefore, God is not temporal.
Since temporality and timelessness are contradictories, it follows that
4. Therefore, God is timeless.
I agree that God’s timelessness can be deduced from either His sim-
plicity or immutability. Is this a good reason for thinking that God is
timeless? That depends on whether we have any good reason to affirm
(1) or (1’). Here we run into severe difficulties. For doctrines of divine
simplicity and immutability which are sufficiently strong to support di-
vine timelessness are even more controverted than the doctrine of di-
vine timelessness itself. Philosophically there seem to be no good rea-
sons to embrace these doctrines and weighty objections lodged against
them.2 These cannot be discussed here; the point is that (1) and (1’￿)
are even more difficult to prove than (4), so that they do not constitute
good grounds for believing (4).
ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE KNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE
CONTINGENTS
Many thinkers have argued that God’s knowledge of future contingent
events, for example, future human free actions, implies divine timeless-
ness. The reasoning seems to go as follows:
5. A temporal being cannot know future contingent events.
6. God knows future contingent events.
7. Therefore, God is not a temporal being.
Again, if God is not a temporal being, then it follows that God is
timeless.
2See discussion in Thomas V.Morris,Anselmian Explorations (Notre Dame, Ind.: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1987), pp. 98-123; Christopher Hughes, On a Complex
Theory of a Simple God, Cornell Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1989).
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Despite the denial of (6) on the part of awide range of contemporary
thinkers from process theologians to so-called “open” theists, a biblical
doctrine of divine omniscience makes (6) incumbent upon an orthodox
theologian.3 The argument hinges, therefore, on the truth of (5). On
behalf of (5) it is usually claimed that contingent events, not being de-
ducible from present causes, can be known only insofar as they are real
or existent. Given (6), it follows that future contingent events are real
or existent for God. Defenders of divine timelessness such as Boethius,
Anselm, and Aquinas thus typically maintained that all events in time
are real to God and therefore can be known by Him via His scientia vi-
sionis (knowledge of vision).
How can we make sense of this claim? The most plausible move
for the defender of divine timelessness to make will be to hold that the
four-dimensional space-time manifold exists tenselessly and that God
transcends that manifold. A good many physicists and philosophers
of time and space embrace such a tenseless view of time (spacetime
realism). Such a viewmakes sense of the traditional claim that all events
in time are present to God and therefore known to Him via His scientia
visionis.
But is spacetime realism a necessary condition of God’s knowledge
of future contingents? I think not. In assessing the question of howGod
knows truths about temporal events, we may distinguish two models
of divine cognition: the perceptualist model and the conceptualist model.
The perceptualist model construes divine knowledge on the analogy
of sense perception: God looks and sees what is there. Such a model
patently underlies the classic doctrine of scientia visionis. Absent a tense-
less theory of time, the perceptualist model of divine cognition does
encounter real difficulty concerning God’s knowledge of future contin-
gents, for, if future events do not exist, there is nothing there to per-
ceive.4
3I take for granted that there are contingent events such as human free acts; see also
my The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Bookhouse, 1987.
4Notice, however, that if we think of statements or facts as with in God’s perceptual
purview, then even on a perceptualist model, God must know the future, so long as
the Principle of Bivalence holds for future-tense statements. For He perceives which
future-tense statements presently have the property of truth inhering in them or which
future-tense facts presently exist. Thus, bymeans ofHis perception of presently existing
realities He knows the truth about the future.
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By contrast on a conceptualist model of divine knowledge, God does
not acquire His knowledge of the world by anything like perception.
His knowledge of the future is not based on His “looking” ahead and
“seeing” what lies in the future (a terribly anthropomorphic notion in
any case). Rather God’s knowledge is more like a mind’s knowledge
of innate ideas. It is therefore inappropriate to speak of God’s acquiring
knowledge at all. Rather as an omniscient being, God has essentially
the property of knowing all truths; there are truths about future events;
ergo, God knows all truths concerning future events. So long as we are
not seduced into thinking of divine foreknowledge on the model of per-
ception, it is no longer evident why knowledge of future contingents
should be impossible.
We can go further, however. For the doctrine of middle knowledge
(scientia media) is a version of the conceptualist model which allows us
to say considerably more about the basis of God’s foreknowledge of fu-
ture contingents. Divine foreknowledge is based on (i) God’s middle
knowledge of what every creature would freely do under any circum-
stances and (ii) His knowledge of the divine decree to create certain sets
of circumstances and to place certain creatures in them. Given middle
knowledge and the divine decree, foreknowledge follows automatically
as a result without any perception of the created world. This complex
and interesting doctrine must be pursued at another time.
In sum, the argument from God’s knowledge of future contingents
is inconclusive, since a conceptualist model of divine cognition remains
a viable alternative to perceptualist accounts.
ARGUMENT FROM SPECIAL RELATIVITY
A third argument for divine timelessness arises from the concept of time
in Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (STR). According to Einstein’s
theory, there is no unique, universal time and so no unique, worldwide
“now.” Each inertial frame has its own time and its own present mo-
ment, and there is no overarching, absolute time in which all these di-
verse times are integrated into one. So if God is in time, then the obvious
question raised by STR is: Whose time is He in? The defender of divine
timelessness maintains that there is no acceptable answer to this ques-
tion.
We can summarize this reasoning as follows:
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8. STR is correct in its description of time.
9. If STR is correct in its description of time, then if God is temporal,
He exists in either the time associated with a single inertial frame or the
times associated with a plurality of inertial frames.
10. Therefore, if God is temporal, He exists in either the time associ-
ated with a single inertial frame or the times associated with a plurality
of inertial frames.
11. God does not exist in either the time associated with a single
inertial frame or the times associated with a plurality of inertial frames.
12. Therefore, God is not temporal.
What can be said in response to this argument? Although it may
come as something of a shock to many, the most dubious premiss of the
argument is (8). For STR’s concept of time rests upon decrepit episte-
mological foundations. Einstein’s re-definition of simultaneity in terms
of clock synchronization by light signals simply assumes that the time
which light takes to travel between two relatively stationary observers
A and B is the same from A to B as from B to A in a round-trip jour-
ney. That assumption presupposes that A and B, while at relative rest,
are not both in absolute motion, or in other words that neither abso-
lute space nor a privileged inertial frame exists. What justification did
Einstein have for so radical a presupposition? The answer, in a word,
is verificationism. It is empirically impossible to distinguish uniform
motion from rest relative to such a frame, and Einstein believed that if
absolute space and absolute motion or rest are undetectable empirically,
they therefore do not exist (and may even be said to be meaningless).
Historians of science have shown that at the philosophical roots of Ein-
stein’s theory lies a verificationist epistemology, mediated to the young
physicist chiefly through the influence of Ernst Mach, which comes to
expression in Einstein’s analysis of the concepts of time and space.5
5See especially Gerald J. Holton, “Mach, Einstein and the Search for Reality,” in
Ernst Mach: Physicist and Philosopher, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1970), pp. 165-99: idem, “Where Is Reality? The Answers of
Einstein,” in Science and Synthesis, ed. UNESCO (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1971), pp. 45-
69; and the essays collected together in idem, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought. See
also Lawrence Sklar, “Time, Reality, and Relativity,” in Reduction, Time and Reality, ed.
Richard Healey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 141.
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The untenability of verificationism is so universally acknowledged
that it will not be necessary to rehearse the objections against it here.6
Verificationism provides no justification for thinking that Newton erred,
for example, in holding that absolute time, grounded in God’s sempiter-
nal duration, exists independently of our physical measures of it and
may or may not be accurately registered by them. With the demise of
verificationism, the philosophical underpinnings of STR have collapsed.
In short, there is no reason think that (8) is true.
Moreover, contrary to (9), it does not follow from the correctness of
STR that if God is in time, then He is in the time of one or more inertial
frames. Because according to General Relativistic cosmological models,
space itself is expanding, there is no universal inertial framewith which
God can be associated, even though there does exist a preferred foliation
of spacetime and so a cosmic time in which God can be conceived to
exist.7 Based on a cosmological, rather than a local, perspective, cosmic
time serves to restore the classical notions of universal time and absolute
simultaneity which STR denied.
ARGUMENT FROM THE INCOMPLETENESS OF TEMPORAL LIFE
Brian Leftow, aswell as Eleonore Stump andNormanKretzmann, argue
that the fleeting nature of temporal life is incompatible with the life of
6Verificationism proposed a criterion ofmeaning that was so restrictive that it would
consign vast tracts of apparently perfectly intelligible discourse to the trash heap of non-
sense; moreover, the criterion seemed to be self-refuting. See the excellent discussion in
Frederick Suppe, “The Search for Philosophical Understanding of Scientific Theories,”
in The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2d ed., ed. F. Suppe (Urbana, Ill.: University of
Illinois Press, 1977), pp. 3-118.
7Cosmic time is related to the local times of a special group of observers called “fun-
damental observers.” These are hypothetical observers, associated with the galaxies,
who are at rest with respect to the expansion of space itself. As the expansion of space
proceeds, each fundamental observer remains in the same place, though his spatial
separation from fellow fundamental observers increases. Cosmic time relates to these
observers in that their local times all coincidewith cosmic time in their vicinity. Because
of their mutual recession, the class of fundamental observers do not serve to define a
global inertial frame, technically speaking, even though all of them are at rest. But since
each fundamental observer is at rest with respect to space, the events which he calcu-
lates to be simultaneous will coincide locally with the events which are simultaneous
in cosmic time. One could say that God exists in the time of the inertial frame of every
fundamental observer; but then there is no problem, since all their local times fuse into
one cosmic time.
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a most perfect being such as God. A temporal being is unable to enjoy
what is past or future for it, possessing only the fleeting present. The
passage of time thus renders it impossible for any temporal being, even
God, to possess all its life at once. By contrast a timeless God lives all
His life at once because He literally has no past or future and so suffers
no loss. Therefore, since God is the most perfect being, He is timeless.
We can formulate this argument as follows:
13. God is the most perfect being.
14. The most perfect being has the most perfect mode of existence.
15. Therefore, God has the most perfect mode of existence.
16. Temporal existence is a less perfect mode of existence than time-
less existence.
17. Therefore, God has a timeless mode of existence.
The key premiss here is (16), which rests on very powerful intuitions
about the irretrievable loss that arises through the experience of tempo-
ral passage, a loss which intuitively should not characterize the expe-
rience of a most perfect being. Some philosophers of time might try to
avert the force of this consideration by adopting a tenseless view of time
according to which things and events do not in fact come to be or pass
away. The difference between past, present, and future is a subjective
illusion of consciousness. On this view of time no temporal being ever
really loses its past or has not yet acquired its future; it (or its temporal
parts) just exists tenselessly at its various temporal locations. A tempo-
ral God would exist at all temporal locations without beginning or end
and so would not lose or acquire portions of His life.
The problem with this escape route is that it fails to appreciate that
the argument is based on the experience of temporal passage, rather than
on the objective reality of temporal passage itself. Even if the future
never becomes and the past is never really lost, the fact remains that for
a temporal person the past is lost to him and the future is not accessible
to him. For this reason, it would be futile to attempt to elude the force of
this argument by postulating a temporal deity in a tenseless time.
Perhaps, however, the realization that the argument is essentially
experiential in character opens the door for a temporalist alternative.
When we recall that God is perfectly omniscient and so forgets nothing
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of the past and knows everything about the future, then time’s passage
is not so tragic for Him. His past experiences do not fade as ours do, and
He has perfect prescience of what the future holds. So it is far from ob-
vious that the experience of temporal passage is so melancholy an affair
for an omniscient God as it is for us. Moreover, the life of a perfect per-
son may have to be characterized by the incompleteness which would
in other contexts be considered an imperfection. Timelessness may not
be the most perfect mode of existence of a perfect person. All this goes
to call into question (16). Still, this last argument, like the argument
from divine foreknowledge, does have some force and so needs to be
weighed against whatever arguments can be offered on behalf of divine
temporality.
3 Arguments for Divine Temporality
ARGUMENT FROM THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ATEMPORAL
PERSONHOOD
One argument frequently raised in the literature is that timelessness and
personhood are incompatible. Some philosophers have denied that a
timeless God can be a self-conscious, rational being because He could
not exhibit certain forms of consciousness which we normally associate
with personal beings (namely, ourselves). For example, Robert Coburn
has written:
Surely it is a necessary condition of anything’s being a per-
son that it should be capable (logically) of, among other
things, doing at least some of the following: remembering,
anticipating, reflecting, deliberating, deciding, intending,
and acting intentionally […] But nowan eternal beingwould
necessarily lack all of these capacities in as much as their
exercise by a being clearly requires that the being exist in
time […] Hence, no eternal being, it would seem, could be a
person.
(Robert C. Coburn, “Professor Malcolm on God”,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1963): 155)
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Since God is essentially personal, He therefore cannot be timeless.
We can formulate this argument as follows (using x, y, z to represent
certain properties allegedly essential to personhood):
18. Necessarily, if God is timeless, He does not have the properties
x, y, z.
19. Necessarily, if God does not have the properties x, y, z, then God
is not personal.
20. Necessarily, God is personal.
21. Therefore, necessarily, God is not timeless.
The defender of divine timelessness may attempt to turn back this
argument either by challenging the claim that the properties in question
are necessary conditions of personhood or by showing that a timeless
God could possess the relevant properties after all. With respect to the
second strategy, even if Coburn were correct that a personal being must
be capable of exhibiting the forms of consciousness he lists, it does not
follow that a timeless God cannot be personal. For God could be capable
of exhibiting such forms of consciousness but be timeless just in case He
does not in fact exhibit any of them. In other words, the hidden assump-
tion behind Coburn’s reasoning is that God’s being timeless or tempo-
ral is an essential property of God. But that assumption seems dubious.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that God is in fact temporal. Is it
logically impossible that God could have been timeless instead? Since
God’s decision to create is free, we can conceive of a possible world in
which God alone exists. If He is unchanging in such a world, then on
any relational view of time God would be timeless. But then it seems
that there are possible worlds in which God exists temporally and possi-
ble worlds in which He exists timelessly. God’s temporal status is thus
plausibly a contingent rather than essential property.
So if timelessness is a merely contingent property of God, He could
be entirely capable of remembering, anticipating, reflecting, and so on;
only were He to do so, then He would not be timeless. So long as He
freely refrains from such activities He is timeless, even though He has
the capacity to engage in those activities. Thus, by Coburn’s own lights
God must be regarded as personal.
At a more fundamental level, it is in any case pretty widely recog-
nized that most of the forms of consciousness mentioned by Coburn
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are not essential to personhood or could be exemplified timelessly. Take
deciding, intending, and acting intentionally, for example. All of these
forms of consciousness are exhibited by a timeless God. With respect to
deciding, omniscience alone precludes God’s deciding in the sense of
making up His mind after a period of indecision. Even a temporal God
does not decide in that sense. But God does decide in the sense that
His will inclines toward one alternative rather than another and does
so freely. Because God is omniscient, His free decisions are either sem-
piternal or timeless rather than preceded by a period of ignorance and
indecision.
As for intending or acting intentionally, there is no reason to think
that intentions are necessarily future-directed. One can direct one’s in-
tentions at one’s present state. God, as the Good, can timelessly desire
and will His own infinite goodness. Such a changeless intention can be
as timeless as God’s knowing His own essence. Moreover, in the empty
world we have envisioned, God may timelessly will and intend to re-
frain from creating a universe. Hence, it seems that God can timelessly
intend, will, and choose what He does.
In short, the argument for divine temporality based on God’s per-
sonhood cannot be deemed a success.
ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE ACTION IN THE WORLD
In our thought experiment above, we abstracted from the actual exis-
tence of the temporal world and considered God existing alone without
creation and asked whether He could exist timelessly. But, of course,
the temporal world does exist. The question therefore arises whether
God can stand in relation to a temporal world and yet remain timeless.
It is very difficult to see how He can. Imagine once more God existing
changelessly alone without creation, but with a changeless determina-
tion ofHiswill to create a temporalworldwith a beginning. SinceGod is
omnipotent, Hiswill is done, and a temporalworld comes into existence.
Can God remain untouched by the world’s temporality? It seems not.
For at the firstmoment of time, God stands in a new relation inwhichHe
did not stand before (indeed, there was no “before”). Even if in creat-
ing the world God undergoes no intrinsic change, He at least undergoes
an extrinsic change. For at the moment of creation, God comes into the
relation of sustaining the universe or, at the very least, of co-existing with
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the universe, relations in which He did not stand before. Since He is
free to refrain from creation, God could have never stood in those rela-
tions, had He so willed. But in virtue of His creating a temporal world,
God comes into a relation with that world the moment it springs into
being. Thus, even if it is not the case that God is temporal prior to His
creation of the world, He nonetheless undergoes an extrinsic change at
the moment of creation which draws Him into time in virtue of His real
relation to the world. So even if God is timeless without creation, His
free decision to create a temporal world also constitutes a free decision
on His part to exist temporally.
The argument can be summarized as follows:
22. God is creatively active in the temporal world.
23. If God is creatively active in the temporal world, God is really
related to the temporal world.
24. If God is really related to the temporal world, God is temporal.
25. Therefore, God is temporal.
This argument, if successful, does not prove that God is essentially
temporal, but that if He is a Creator of a temporal world— as He in fact
is —, then He is temporal.
One way to escape this argument is to deny (23). This might not ap-
pear to be a very promising strategy, since it seems obvious that God is
related to His creatures insofar as He sustains them, knows them, and
loves them. Remarkably, however, it was precisely this premiss that me-
dieval theologians like Aquinas denied. Thomas agrees with (24). On
his view, relational properties involving God and creatures, like God’s
being Lord, first begin to exist at themoment at which the creatures come
into being (Summa theologiae 1a. 13. 7). Hence, if God stands in real rela-
tions to His creatures, He acquires those relational properties de novo at
the moment of creation and thus undergoes change. And anything that
changes, even extrinsically, must be in time. Thomas escapes the conclu-
sion that God is therefore temporal by denying that God stands in any
real relation to the world. Since God is absolutely simple, He stands in
no relations to anything, for relations would introduce complexity into
God’s being. Aquinas holds, paradoxically, that while creatures are re-
ally related to God, God is not really related to creatures. The relation of
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God to creatures exists only in our minds, not in reality. On Aquinas’s
view, then, God undergoes no extrinsic change in creating the world.
He just exists, and creation is creatures’ coming into existence with a
real relation to God of being caused by God.
This is certainly an extraordinary doctrine. Wholly apart from its
reliance on divine simplicity, the doctrine of no real relations is very
problematic. God’s sustaining the world is a causal relation rooted in
the active power and intrinsic properties of God as First Cause. Thus, to
say the world is really related to God by the relation is sustained by, but
that God is not really related to the world by the relation is sustaining
seems unintelligible. It is to say that one can have real effects without a
real cause–which seems self-contradictory or incomprehensible.
Moreover, God is surely really related to His creatures in the follow-
ing sense: in different possible worlds, God’s will, knowledge, and love
are different than they actually are. For example, if God had not cho-
sen to create a universe at all, He would surely have a different will
than that which He has (for He would not will to create the universe);
He would know different truths than the ones He knows (for example,
He would not know The universe exists); He would not love the same
creatures He actually loves (since no creatures would exist). It is the
implication of Aquinas’ view, however, that God is perfectly similar in
every possible world: He never wills differently, He never acts differ-
ently, He never knows differently, He never loves differently. Whether
the world is empty or chock-full of creatures of every sort, there is no
difference in God. But then it becomes unintelligible why this universe
or any universe exists rather than just nothing. The reason cannot lie
in God, for He is perfectly similar in all possible worlds. Nor can the
reason lie in creatures, for we are asking for some explanation of their
existence. Thus, on Thomas’s view there just is no reason for why this
universe or any universe at all exists. Therefore, Thomas’s attempt to
evade the present argument by denying (23) is implausible.
Recent defenders of timeless eternity have turned their guns on (24)
instead. Brian Leftow as well as Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretz-
mann have tried to craft theories of divine eternity which would permit
God to be really related to the temporal world and yet to exist timelessly.
I do not have the time to discuss these theories now; suffice it to say that
the general consensus is that they have failed to make good on their
promises. In summary, it seems that we have here a powerful argument
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for divine temporality from God’s relation to the world.
ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE KNOWLEDGE OF TENSED FACTS
Defenders of divine temporality have argued that a timeless God can-
not know certain tensed facts about the world — for example, what is
happening now — and therefore, since God is omniscient, He must be
temporal.
We can formulate the argument as follows:
26. A temporal world exists.
27. God is omniscient.
28. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows
tensed facts.
29. If God is timeless, He does not know tensed facts.
30. Therefore, God is not timeless.
Again, this argument does not prove that God is essentially tempo-
ral, but, if successful, it does show that if a temporal world exists, then
God is temporal.
Defenders of divine timelessness have attempted to refute this argu-
ment either by arguing that a timeless God can know tensed facts or by
arguing that God may still qualify as omniscient even if He is ignorant
of tensed facts.
Let us look first at the plausibility of denying (29). Can a timeless
Godknow tensed facts? Although JonathanKvanvig, EdwardWierenga,
and Leftow have all argued that God can know the facts expressed by
tensed sentences, an analysis of their respective positions reveals that
in the end they all embrace the view that the factual content expressed
by tensed sentences is tenseless.8 Despite first appearances to the con-
trary, they all accept the truth of (29). Kvanvig, Wierenga, and Leftow’s
8Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New York: St. Mar-
tin’s, 1986), pp. 150-65; Edward R. Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine
Attributes, Cornell Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1989), pp. 179-85; Leftow, Time and Eternity, pp. 312-37. See also Jonathan L.
Kvanvig, “Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig,” Faith and Philosophy 18 (2003):
369-76; Edward R. Wierenga, Omniscience and Time, One More Time: A Reply to
Craig,” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004): 90-7.
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accounts are the most sophisticated attempts to explain how a timeless
God can know the facts expressed by tensed sentences, yet they all fi-
nally deny that God knows tensed facts. Thus, (29) seems secure.
The defender of divine timelessness has no recourse, then, but to
deny (28). Hemust deny that omniscience entails a knowledge of tensed
facts. He can do this either by revising the traditional definition of om-
niscience or else by maintaining that tense, while an objective feature of
time, does not strictly belong to the factual content expressed by tensed
sentences. Let us examine each strategy in turn.
Leftow entertains the idea of revising the definition of omniscience
in such a way that omniscience does not entail knowledge of all truths.
He argues, in effect, that there are many sorts of truths which God can-
not know, so there is no harm in admitting one more class of truths
(namely, tensed truths) of which God is ignorant.
The problem is that such a consideration should not affect the def-
inition of “omniscience” as such. In any case, does Leftow succeed in
showing that there are truths which God cannot know? It seems not.
His examples of things God cannot know include how it feels to be one-
self a failure or a sinner. But Leftow has confused knowing how with
knowing that. Knowing how does not take truths as its object. God can
know such truths as Being a failure feels lousy, Sinners feel guilty and hope-
less, and so on. God’s not knowing how it feels to be Himself a failure or
a sinner is not an example of truthsHe fails to know and so does not con-
stitute a restriction on His omniscience. Leftow furnishes no example
of any truth which might be conjoined with “knows that” such that we
cannot say, “God knows that ____,” where the blank is filled by the truth
in question. Therefore, he has not adequately motivated denying that
knowledge of tensed truths properly belongs to omniscience. The tra-
ditional definition of omniscience requires it, and we have no grounds
which do not involve special pleading for revising the usual definition.
So what about the second strategy for denying (28), namely, main-
taining that tense does not, strictly speaking, belong to the factual con-
tent expressed by tensed sentences, even though tense is an objective
feature of the world? Tense might be analyzed as a feature of the mode
in which the factual content is presented to someone expressing it, or
of the way in which a person grasps the factual content, or of the con-
text of someone’s believing the factual content. On such analyses, an
omniscient being could be timeless because omniscience is traditionally
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defined in terms of factual knowledge and tense is not part of the factual
content of tensed sentences. Tense is an objective feature of the world,
but since it does not belong to the factual content of a sentence, a be-
ing which knew only tenseless facts could on the traditional definition
count as omniscient.
Even though such analyses are plausible and attractive, they do not
ultimately save the day for the defender of divine timelessness. For as
the greatest conceivable being, God is not merely factually omniscient,
but also maximally excellent cognitively. Just as it is a cognitive perfec-
tion to have first-person knowledge de se, it is a cognitive perfection to
know what time it is, what is actually happening in the universe. A be-
ing whose knowledge is composed exclusively of tenseless facts is less
excellent cognitively than a being who also knows what has occurred,
what is occurring, and what will occur in the world. This latter person
knows infinitely more than the former and is involved in no cognitive
defect in so knowing. On the analogy of knowledge de se, we can refer to
such knowledge as knowledge de praesenti (knowledge of the present).
A beingwhich lacks such knowledge is more ignorant and less excellent
cognitively than a being which possesses it. Accordingly, if we adopt
views according to which tense is extraneous to the factual content ex-
pressed by a tensed sentence, we should simply revise premiss (28) to
read
28’. If a temporal world exists, then if God is maximally excellent
cognitively, then God has knowledge de praesenti
and, with appropriate revisions, the argument goes through as be-
fore.
4 Eternity and the Nature of Time
On the basis of our foregoing discussion, we have seen comparatively
weak grounds for affirming divine timelessness but two powerful ar-
guments in favor of divine temporality. It would seem, then, that we
should conclude that God is temporal. But such a conclusion would be
premature. For there does remain one way of escape still open for de-
fenders of divine timelessness. The argument based on God’s action in
the world assumed the objective reality of temporal becoming, and the
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argument based on God’s knowledge of the temporal world assumed
the objective reality of tensed facts. If one denies the objective reality
of temporal becoming and tensed facts, then the arguments are under-
cut. For in that case, nothing to which God is related ever comes into or
passes out of being, and all facts are tenseless, so that God can be the
immutable, omniscient Sustainer and Knower of all things and, hence,
exist timelessly.
In short, the defender of divine timelessness can escape the argu-
ments for divine temporality by embracing the tenseless theory of time.
It is noteworthy, however, that almost no defender of divine timeless-
ness has taken this route. Virtually the only proponent of timeless eter-
nity to embrace consciously the tenseless theory of time in defending
God’s timelessness is Paul Helm.9
It seems, then, that in order to adjudicate the question of the nature
of divine eternity and God’s relationship to time, philosophical theolo-
gians have no choice but to grapple with a further question, one of the
most profound and controverted issues of metaphysics: Is time tensed
or tenseless? This is difficult and mysterious territory. But we have no
choice: if we are to understand eternity, we must first understand time.
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Abstract
This paper deals with topics at the intersection of theology, philosophy
of law, and philosophy of time. It explores the relation between legal
pardon, tensed time, and the expiation of guilt. I first discuss the bibli-
cal notion of God’s forgiveness of sins. I argue that we ought to think of
divine forgiveness, at least in part, on the analogy of a legal pardon. I
then point out that the idea of pardon as defined in the American justice
system by the U.S. Supreme Court requires that tense be taken seriously.
The Court recognizes that the pardoned offender was guilty, but as a re-
sult of his pardon he is now innocent in the law’s eyes. I emphasize that
although an advocate of tenseless time may hold that guilt is a property
that a personmay have and then no longer have, the theory of tensed time
is needed in order to fully represent the content of a Priorean statement
like “Thank goodness, I’m forgiven!” (including the relief and gratitude
it implies). The reason is that a statement of this kind concerns a tensed
fact. I conclude that matters of time and tense have important and per-
haps unexpected application in the philosophy of law and theology.
Keywords: the idea of pardon, the expiation of guilt, divine forgiveness
and time, tenseless time, the tensed theory of time, A.N. Prior.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I wish to explore the relation between legal pardon, tensed
time, and the expiation of guilt. The distinction between personal for-
giveness and legal pardon is well-known and widely recognized in the
literature on forgiveness.1 The philosophical literature typically treats
forgiveness as a subjective change of attitude or judgement on the part
of the person wronged, a determination to put away feelings of resent-
ment, bitterness, or anger, a relinquishing of the desire for revenge or a
claim to requital. By contrast, the issuing of a pardon by an executive
authority effects an objective change in the legal status of the pardonee,
regardless of the subjective attitudes of the governing authority toward
the person accused of a crime.
2 Divine Forgiveness as Legal Pardon
Theologians have a stake in this matter because divine forgiveness is in
some respects much more akin to legal pardon than to personal forgive-
ness.There are at least two reasons for thinking that divine forgiveness
implies a legal pardon of sinners on God’s part.
First, God stands in a governmental relationship to human beings. In his
classic A Defence of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction of
Christ, against Faustus Socinus (1617) the famed international juristHugo
Grotius identified Socinus’ “fundamental error” in his critique of tradi-
tional atonement theories as his assumption that God is to be construed
on the model of an offended party in a personal dispute, such as be-
tween a creditor and a debtor (II). For such a private person has no right
to punish another. Certainly, God is offended by sin, but He does not
act as merely the offended party in punishing it. Rather God should be
considered to act as a Ruler. “For to inflict punishment, or to liberate any
one from punishment […] is only the prerogative of the ruler as such,
primarily and per se; as, for example, of a father in a family, of a king in
a state, of God in the universe” (II). God as Supreme Ruler is responsi-
ble for the administration of justice in the universe and so has the right
of punishing and the right of forgiving wrongdoing. Although God has
1See, e.g., Hughes, 2014, §3.1.
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the right to forgive sins, Grotius thinks it would be unjust of God to let
certain sins go unpunished, such as sins of the unrepentant. Therefore,
it would be inconsistent with the justice of God that He should remit all
punishment whatsoever.
On the contemporary scene legal philosopher Jeffrie Murphy has
made a similar distinction between the private and public spheres in
an effort to carve out conceptual space for exercises of mercy consis-
tent with the demands of retributive justice. Distinguishing between a
creditor in a civil lawsuit and a judge in a criminal case, Murphy main-
tains that as a litigant in a civil lawsuit, the creditor occupies a “private
role” and so does not have “an antecedent obligation, required by the
rules of justice, to impose harsh treatment” by demanding repayment
of the debt owed (Murphy, 1988, pp. 175-6). He is therefore free to
show mercy without prejudice to justice. By contrast a judge in a crim-
inal case “has an obligation to do justice—which means, at a minimum,
an obligation to uphold the rule of law. Thus if he is moved, even by
love or compassion, to act contrary to the rule of law—to the rules of
justice—he acts wrongly” (Ibid., p. 175). Murphy thinks that the judge
qua judge cannot, like the creditor, act mercifully without prejudice to
the demands of justice. Like Grotius Murphy thinks that the executive
power can exercise mercy but only within the limits of individualized
justice.
Given God’s status as Judge and Ruler of the world, it is more ac-
curate to think of divine forgiveness on the analogy of a legal pardon
by a Ruler rather than on the analogy of the forgiveness extended by a
private person. Kathleen Moore has made the point forcefully by ob-
serving that when people ask God to forgive their sins, they are clearly
hoping that God will not inflict the full measure of punishment they
know they deserve. “These people would discover the seriousness of
their conceptual confusion if God forgave their sins and punished them
nevertheless–which is always an option for God” (Moore, 1989, p. 184).
God’s forgiving sins should have the character of a legal pardon by the
executive power of the state.
Second, the consequences of divine forgiveness as described in biblical rev-
elation imply God’s pardon of sinners. The Levitical system of sacrificial
offerings in the Tabernacle and Temple, offerings which New Testament
writers took to prefigure Christ’s own death as the ultimate sacrificial
offering (Rom 3:21-26; 8.3; Eph 5:2; Heb 9.6-14; 10.1-18), aimed, not
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merely at the cleansing of consecrated objects from impurity, but more
fundamentally at the expiation of the sins of the people and their for-
giveness. Repeatedly the promise is given, “the priest shall make atone-
ment on your behalf for the sin that you have committed, and you shall
be forgiven” (Lev 4.35; cf. 4.20, 26, 31, etc.). At the heart of the new
covenant prophesied by Jeremiah lay the forgiveness of sins: “I will for-
give their iniquity, and remember their sin no more” (Jer 31.34). Chris-
tians considered Jesus, by his sacrificial death, to have inaugurated that
new covenant (Mt 26.28; Mk 14:22-24). So in the Acts the consistent
apostolic proclamation is that “everyone who believes in him receives
forgiveness of sins through his name” (Acts 10.43; cf. 2.38; 5.31; 13.38;
26.18). In short, in Christ “we have redemption, the forgiveness of sins”
(Col 1.14; cf. Eph 1.7).
It is noteworthy that the object of divine forgiveness is just as often
said to be sins as sinners. Not only are people forgiven for their sins,
but their sins are forgiven. God is said to “take away” (aphaireō) our
sins (Rom 11.27). This fact makes it evident that divine forgiveness is
not (merely) a change of attitude on God’s part toward sinners.2 Divine
forgiveness has as its effect, not (merely) God’s laying aside feelings of
resentment or bitterness or anger (or what have you, according to one’s
favorite analysis of forgiveness), but rather the removal of the liability to
punishment that attends sin. As a result of divine forgiveness, a person
who formerly deserved punishment now no longer does so. Because
of the forgiveness that is to be found in Christ, one is no longer held
accountable for one’s sins. “There is therefore now no condemnation
for those who are in Christ Jesus” (Rom 8.1). On the contrary, they are
now reckoned by God to be righteous in His sight (Rom 4.5-8). The
biblical concept of forgiveness thus entails God’s pardoning people for
their sins, freeing them of liability to punishment and constituting them
2We encounter here the debate over whether the Levitical sacrifices and Christ’s sac-
rificial death served to propitiateGod, to changeHis attitude toward sinners fromwrath
to acceptance. It has become conventional wisdom among contemporary theologians
that because the New Testament authors use katalassō (“reconcile”) and its cognates
only with respect to human beings, not God, God does not need to be reconciled to
humanity, but only humanity to a welcoming God. I leave aside whether such an ar-
gument from silence is cogent. But if God does not need to be reconciled to sinners,
that fact shows all the more that divine forgiveness is not a change of attitude on God’s
part, in the way that forgiveness is usually understood by contemporary philosophers
analyzing human relationships.
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righteous before God.3
On the basis of God’s role in the government of the world and the
biblical consequences of God’s forgiveness of sins, we ought to think
of divine forgiveness, at least in part, on the analogy of a legal pardon.
Now, of course, there will be significant disanalogies between divine
pardon and the pardoning power as it exists in human justice systems –
for example, the U.S. President may issue pardons for personal political
advantage— but, still, given the similarities between divine forgiveness
and legal pardon, we may expect to gain a good deal of insight into
divine forgiveness by exploring the pardoning power vested in heads
of government.
3 Pardon and Its Effects
From ancient times, heads of state have exercised the power to pardon
crimes. So when the framers of the U.S. Constitution met in Philadel-
phia in 1787 they naturally included in the Constitution the pardon-
ing power. Since this power is not defined in the Constitution, U.S.
courts have interpreted the presidential power to pardon on the model
of the pardoning power of English monarchs, which the framers doubt-
less presupposed. The power of English monarchs to pardon was, in
turn, understood as a divine right, an act of grace reflecting God’s abil-
ity to pardon sins. In Kathleen Moore’s pithy conclusion, “Presidents
used pardons as they chose, having been given a pardoning power pat-
terned after that of the English Kings, which was patterned after God’s”
(Moore, 1989, p. 51).
Chief Justice John Marshall, in a landmark decision, describes a par-
don as follows:
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power en-
trusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
3The characterization of divine forgiveness as legal pardon does not prejudice the
question of the basis of divine forgiveness. In the New Testament, God’s forgiving us
our sins is based upon Christ’s satisfying for us the demands of divine justice. Grotius
was a strong defender of a penal substitutionary theory of the atonement and argued
against Socinus that the satisfaction of God’s retributive justice by Christ was not incon-
sistent with God’s issuing a pardon to us on those grounds (Defence of the Catholic Faith
concerning the Satisfaction of Christ VI).
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individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
(United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 (1833))
Marshall’s descriptionwas later cited by the Supreme Court as a cor-
rect characterization in Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 89 (1915).
According to this characterization a pardon is an act of mercy, com-
ing from the person(s) possessing the power of the executive, which
removes a criminal’s liability to punishment for a specific crime he has
committed.
Marshall’s description seems an apt characterization of a divine par-
don as well. God is the power Who executes His divine torah, and His
pardon is an act of grace by which He exempts elect sinners, who have
violated His law, from the punishment they deserve.Every element of
Marshall’s definition finds a theological analogue. No wonder Daniel
Kobil characterizes Marshall’s vision of a pardon as “something akin to
divine forgiveness” (Kobil, 1991, p. 594)!
What are the effects of a pardon?Marshall says that it exempts the in-
dividual from the punishment prescribed by the law for his crime.This
much is uncontroversial.But pardons do much more than merely ex-
empt a convicted criminal from punishment for his crime. A pardon
removes all the legal consequences of the criminal’s conviction. A par-
don thus restores to a person any civil rights which were restricted as a
result of his conviction, such as the right to vote, to serve on a jury, or to
obtain a business license (Knote v. United States 95 U.S. 153 (1877)). We
shall return to the effect of a pardon in restoring a person’s civil rights,
a feature of pardons which is also uncontroversial, even if in some cases
difficult to adjudicate.
The truly controversial question is whether a pardon serves to re-
move the criminal’s guilt. Following the English model, the U.S. courts
were at first emphatic as to the effect of a pardon in expiating guilt. In
Ex parte Garland (1866) the Supreme Court famously declared:
[…] the inquiry arises as to the effect and operation of a par-
don, and on this point all the authorities concur. A pardon
reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and
the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it re-
leases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt,
so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
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if he had never committed the offence. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities
consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and re-
stores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
(Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380-1 (1866)
Like Marshall’s description of a pardon, this characterization of the
effects of a full pardon is an apt description of a divine pardon. God
in His mercy is similarly said to “blot out my transgressions […] and
blot out mine iniquities” (Ps 51. 1, 9 KJV). Paul exults, “If anyone is in
Christ, he is a new creation; the old has passed away, behold, the new
has come” (II Cor 5.17). The pardoned sinner’s guilt is expiated, so that
he is legally innocent before God.
But as a description of the effects of humanpardons,Garland’s sweep-
ing assertions have been eroded by subsequent court decisions.4 In
the Harvard Law Review of 1915 Samuel Williston published what has
been called a “seminal” and “landmark” article, “Does a Pardon Blot
Out Guilt?,” in which he criticized Garland and its judicial progeny and
which has been frequently cited by the courts. Williston complained,
“Everybody […] knows that the vastmajority of pardoned convictswere
in fact guilty; and when it is said that in the eye of the law they are as
innocent as if they have never committed an offense, the natural rejoin-
der is, then the eyesight of the law is very bad” (Williston, 1915, p. 648).
The truth, saysWilliston, is rather as Lord Coke wrote: Poena mori potest,
culpa perennis erit.5 A moment’s reflection suggests that Williston must
understand by “guilt” simply the property or fact of having committed
the crime. On this understanding, to be guilty of a crime is just to have
committed the crime.
That this is how Williston understands guilt is evident from the re-
mainder of his article.He blames the verdict of the English Court in Cud-
dington v. Wilkins (80 Eng. Rep. 231 (K.B. 1615)) as laying the main
foundation for the view that after a pardon the law could not see the
criminal’s guilt. Cuddington had brought an action against Wilkins for
4For a thorough review of the relevant judicial decisions see In re SangMan Shin, 125
Nev. 100, 104-9 (2009); Robertson v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 169, 176-9 (2013).
5“Punishment may expire, but guilt will last forever.”
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calling him a thief. Wilkins justified this appellation because Cudding-
ton had once been convicted of theft. But Cuddington replied that he
had been pardoned by the king for the alleged felony. The Court de-
cided for Cuddington, “for the whole court were of opinion that though
he was a thief once, yet when the pardon came it took away, not only
poenam, but reatum.”6
Williston disagrees. According to Williston,
The true line of distinction seems to be this: The pardon
removes all legal punishment for the offense. Therefore if
the mere conviction involves certain disqualifications which
would not follow from the commission of the crime without
conviction, the pardon removes such disqualifications. On
the other hand, if character is a necessary qualification and
the commission of the crime would disqualify even though
there had been no criminal prosecution for the crime, the fact
that the criminal has been convicted and pardoned does not
make him anymore eligible.
(Williston, 1915, p. 653)
The point is this: a pardon removes the legal disqualifications
(abridgement of civil rights) resulting from the fact of conviction; but a
pardon does not affect any disqualifications resulting from the commis-
sion of the crime. The fact that a crime has been committed cannot be
erased. It is this fact thatWilliston identifies as guilt. Though pardoned,
the person still stole or lied or acted recklessly and so remains guilty of
the crime he committed.As such he may, despite his pardon, be disqual-
ified from certain activities, such as giving testimony or practicing law.
Henry Weihofen in a later review, citing Williston’s criticism, com-
plains of “the mischief that results when a court applies literally the un-
founded dictum of Ex parte Garland that a pardon ‘blots out’ guilt, and
makes the offender a ‘new man’, etc.” (Wiehofen, 1939, p. 181; cf. pp.
189-90). The effect of a pardon (other than on grounds of innocence)
is “to absolve from further punishment and restore civil rights, but not
to undo what is past or blot out of existence a fact, namely, that the person
has committed a crime and been sentenced and punished for it” (Ibid., my
emphasis).
6Hob. 67, 81, cited by Williston, 1915, p. 651.
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An examination of various district, state, and appellate court cases
walking back the assertions of Garland reveals that the courts in such
cases tend to presuppose this same understanding of guilt as the prop-
erty of having committed a crime.7 These cases have typically to dowith
whether a pardon serves to expunge one’s criminal record or to remove
a particular disqualification (such as disbarment, banishment from the
trading floor, or denial of veteran’s benefits) suffered by the pardonee as
a consequence of his being convicted of the crime for which he received
a pardon. In holding that Garland overstepped in asserting that a par-
don blots out guilt because a pardon does not blot out the past conduct
leading to the conviction, these courts equate guilt with having carried
out the conduct which led to the conviction.
While such an understanding of the word “guilt” may accord with
much of ordinary language, a little reflection reveals that, given stan-
dard retributive theories of justice, such a conception of guilt has bizarre
consequences. For on this viewaperson’s guilt could never be expunged,
whether by pardon or punishment. Even if a person has served his full
sentence and so satisfied the demands of justice, he remains guilty, since
it will be ineradicably and forever the case that once upon a time he did
commit the crime.But then on standard theories of retributive justice,8
he still deserves punishment! For it is an axiom of retributive theories
of justice that the guilty deserve punishment. Such an understanding
of guilt would thus, in effect, sentence everyone to hell, even for the
7See, e.g., Groseclose v. Plummer 106 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1939); People ex rel. Prisa-
ment v. Brophy 287 N.Y. 132, 137-8 (1941); State Ex Rel. Wier v. Peterson, 369 A.2d.1076,
1080, 1081 (Del.1976); Dixon v. McMullen 527 F. Supp. 711, 717-18 (N.D.Tex.1981);
In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 7, 10-11 (D.C. 1997); R.J.L. v. State, 887 So.2d 1268, 1280-
81(Fla.2004); Hirschberg v. Commodity Futures Trading Com’n, 414 F.3d 679, 682, 683
(2005); Fletcher v. Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 362-363 (Ky.2006); In re Sang Man Shin,
125 Nev. 100, 110 (2009); Robertson v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 169, 179 (2013)). For
discussion of some of these cases see Steiner (1997), who makes the same equation.
8Theories of justice may be classified as broadly retributive or consequential-
ist.Retributive theories of justice hold that punishment is justified because the guilty
deserve to be punished.Consequentialist theories of justice hold that punishment is
justified because of the extrinsic goods that may be realized thereby, such as de-
terrence of crime, sequestration of dangerous persons, and reformation of wrong-
doers.Retributivism may be either positive (“the guilty deserve punishment”) or neg-
ative (“the innocent ought not to be punished”). There has been over the last half-
century or so a renaissance of theories of retributive justice, accompanied by a fading
of consequentialist theories.
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most minor of crimes, since guilt could never be eradicated and, hence,
the demands of justice satisfied.Indeed, even a divine pardon would
not serve to remove guilt and save us from punishment, since even God
cannot change the past. But such a conclusion is incoherent, since it is
the function of pardon to cancel one’s liability to punishment. There-
fore, this understanding of guilt is incompatible with standard theories
of retributive justice.
TheGarland court and its progeny should not be thought to consider
a pardon to be a sort of judicial time machine, capable of erasing the
past.9 It is logically incoherent to bring it about that an event which has
occurred has not occurred, and it would ungracious to attribute to our
courts the absurd opinion that a pardon can erase from the past a per-
son’s wrongdoing or conviction for a crime. Rather what the Garland
court was doing, and what its detractors have failed to do, is what con-
temporary philosophers of time call “taking tense seriously.”10 When
the Supreme Court declared that a pardon “blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offence,” it takes seriously the tenses of the
verbs involved. It recognizes that the offender was guilty, but as a re-
sult of his pardon he is now innocent in the law’s eyes. Moreover, the
counterfactual conditional “as if […]” reveals that the law is not blind
to his offense. The law can see his offense, but as a result of the pardon
the offender is now as innocent as he would have been if he had never
9Incredibly, the Polish logician Jan Łukasiewicz actually proposed a view according
to which the past, like the future, has a branching structure, so that the past could be
undone and thus guilt expiated. Hewrote, “In the life of each of us there occur grievous
times of suffering and even more grievous times of guilt. We should be glad to wipe
out these times not only from our memories but from reality. Now we are at liberty
to believe that when all the consequences of those fatal times are exhausted, even if
this happened only after our death, then they too will be erased from the world of
reality and pass over to the domain of possibility” (Jan Łukasiewicz, Z Zagadnien Logiki
i Filozofii [Problems of Logic and Philosophy]: “O Determinizmie,” p. 126). I am indebted
to Per Hasle for this reference. For a critical discussion of Łukasiewicz’s view see Ulrich
Meyer, “Double Time,” paper presented at the conference “The Metaphysics of Time,”
University of Aalborg, Denmark, March 19-21, 2019.
10The phrase was apparently inspired by the great Oxford tense logician A. N. Prior,
who, in reaction toW.V. O. Quine’s extolling the tenselessness of modern logic, praised
medieval logic because it “took tenses far more seriously than our own common logic
does” (Prior (1958), 117). I’m grateful to Prior scholar David Jakobsen for alerting me
to Prior’s article, which was originally Prior’s presidential address to the New Zealand
Congress of Philosophy in 1954.
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committed the offense.
From the beginning courts which held that a pardon expunges a per-
son’s guilt recognized the importance of tense. In Cuddington v. Wilkins,
for example, the court opined that while Cuddington was once rightly
called a thief, as a result of the king’s pardon he should no longer be
called a thief. In Hobart’s report on the case, we read, “It was said, that
he could no more call him thief, in the present tense, than to say a man
hath the pox, or is a villain after he be cured or manumised, but that he
had been a thief or villain he might say.”11 The court’s decision turns
upon taking tense seriously.
Moreover, contrary to the opinions of several lower courts,12 Garland
is wholly consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Burdick v. U.S.
that the pardon of an accused person, if accepted, actually implies his
guilt (otherwise there would be nothing to be pardoned), for Garland
has no interest in denying that the offender was guilty, so that the par-
don, in taking away his guilt, implies that he was guilty. A pardon does
not have an “appellate” function, as the courts have recognized, in that
it does not imply a miscarriage of justice; the correctness of the guilty
verdict rendered is not undermined. But now the person is pardoned,
and so the effect of that verdict is canceled: though once guilty, the par-
donee no longer is.13
The opinion inGarlandwasproperly explicated in In re Spenser (1878)
as follows:
This is probably as strong and unqualified a statement of the
scope and efficacy of a pardon as can be found in the books.
11Hob. 81, 82 (1615), cited in Williston, 1915, p. 652. Williston notes that “The prin-
cipal case was followed in Leyman v. Latimer, 3 Ex. D. 15 (1877), on very similar facts,
and the court upheld the validity of the distinction taken in Cuddington v. Wilkins,
between the legality of using the present and the past tense” and yet fails himself to
appreciate the importance of this distinction.
12E.g., In re Sang Man Shin, 125 Nev. 100, 105 (2009).
13A number of scholars have noted that pardons differ from other forms of executive
clemency in that the latter, unlike pardons, do not negate the criminal’s conviction but
leave intact the judgement of guilt. For example, President Carter, in proclaiming an
amnesty for Vietnam War draft-dodgers, said poignantly that their crimes have been
forgotten, not forgiven. Similarly, recipients of commutations and reprieves remain
guilty (Kobil, 1991, p. 577; Stacy Caplow, 2013, p. 299: Messing, 2016, p. 672; Schoen-
burg, 2016, p. 924). This distinction seems to make sense only if a pardon annuls the
guilt of the offender.
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And yet I do not suppose the opinion is to be understood
as going the length of holding that while the party is to be
deemed innocent of the crime by reason of the pardon from
and after the taking effect thereof, that it is also to be deemed
that he never did commit the crime or was convicted of it.
The effect of the pardon is prospective and not retrospective.
It removes the guilt and restores the party to a state of inno-
cence. But it does not change the past and cannot annihilate
the established fact that he was guilty of the offence.
(In re Spenser, 22 F. Cas. 921, 922 (1878))
The opinion in Garland is thus fully in accord with the prevailing
view that a pardon has no effect upon the criminal conduct and convic-
tion of the person pardoned. Garland is thus in accord with the prevail-
ing opinion that a pardon serves to release a person from all the legal
consequences of his conviction, including punishment, taken in abstrac-
tion from the wrongdoing itself.
It is obvious that theGarland court has a very different conception of
guilt than lower courts which see themselves as departing fromGarland.
Rather than assume the incoherent understanding which equates guilt
with the facticity of a past event,Garland assumes that guilt is a property
which can be temporarily exemplified and then lost though pardon or
appropriate punishment. Sowhat is this property? In criminal law guilt
is typically determined by establishing that someone has committed a
wrongful act (actus reus) while possessing a blameworthy mental state
(mens rea).14 Perhaps guilt is the property of being a culpable wrong-
doer, a property which can be temporarily exemplified but lost through
sufficient punishment or pardon. But wrongdoing and culpability are
merely sufficient, not necessary, conditions for guilt. Guilty verdicts in
cases of strict liability (in which there may be neither wrongdoing nor
culpability) show that guilt cannot be equated merely with being a cul-
pable wrongdoer.15 So what is guilt? It may be convenient to think of
guilt just as liability to punishment. A verdict of “Guilty” is plausibly a
14These just are the conditions Moore identifies as just desert (1997, pp. 33, 91, 168,
403–4).
15On strict liability see L. H. Leigh, Strict and Vicarious Liability: A Study in Admin-
istrative Criminal Law, Modern Legal Studies (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1982);
David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011), chap.7.
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declaration that the person is liable to punishment. To be guilty of a
crime is to be liable to punishment for that crime. Such an understand-
ing of guilt makes it perspicuous why punishment or pardon serves to
expiate guilt. A person who has served his sentence has “paid his debt
to society” and so is now no longer guilty, that is to say, no longer li-
able to punishment. Similarly, a person who has been pardoned is by
all accounts no longer liable to punishment for the crime he committed.
In any case, however we define guilt, if at all, given a retributive theory
of justice, guilt entails liability to punishment. It follows logically the
if a pardon removes one’s liability to punishment, then it also blots out
guilt. It is impossible that a person be pardoned and yet remain guilty.
4 Theological Application
To return, then, to the concerns of theology, it seems to me that Gar-
land’s statement of the effects of a pardon is a marvelous description of
the effects of a divine pardon of a person’s sins. By taking tense seri-
ously, we understand how a person who was once guilty may, in virtue
of a pardon, be no longer guilty, despite the ineradicable fact that he
did commit the sin for which he was justly condemned. The decisions
of certain lower U.S. courts do not compromise Garland, for they are
assuming a different understanding of guilt which equates guilt with
the facticity of the past offense, which Garland would not think to deny.
Like punishment, pardon expiates a person’s legal guilt, so that he is no
longer condemned and liable to punishment.
While an advocate of tenseless time might also hold to the insight
of those who take tense seriously that guilt is a property that may be
temporarily exemplified and then lost, what he cannot say (with A. N.
Prior)16 is “Thank goodness I’m forgiven!” For the relief and gratitude
expressed by those words concern a tensed fact which cannot be cap-
tured in any tenseless idiom.
These debates over the effects of a pardon provide insight into the
nature of divine justification. Our legal pardon by God no more trans-
forms our character and makes us virtuous people than does a human
pardon a convicted criminal. Again and again, the courts have insisted
16See A.N. Prior: “Thank Goodness That’s over”, Philosophy, Vol. 34, No. 128, (Jan.,
1959), pp. 12-17.
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that a person may suffer various disabilities, despite his pardon, be-
cause of the flawed character that led to his conviction. The conviction
alone, now pardoned, may not serve as grounds of disability, but it may
serve as evidence of a corrupt character and conduct that are disabling.
So, for example, in the case In re Abrams Elliott Abrams was deemed
unfit to practice law despite his pardon because a pardon did nothing
to restore the moral character necessary for him to continue to practice
law. Such cases nicely illustrate Williston’s point that “while pardon
dispenses with punishment, it cannot change character, andwhere char-
acter is a qualification for an office, a pardoned offence as much as an
unpardoned offence is evidence of a lack of the necessary qualification”
(Williston, 1915, p. 657).
Similarly, while a divine pardon makes us legally innocent before
God, free of liability to punishment, it is powerless of itself to effect
moral transformation of character. To that end we need regeneration
through the Holy Spirit and His sanctifying influence to make us over
time into the men and women that God wants us to be. Sanctification
is not a forensic transaction but a moral transformation of character and
is not therefore wrought by divine pardon alone.
In conclusion, I think we can see that matters of time and tense have
important and perhaps unexpected application in the philosophy of law
and theology.
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Abstract
Future-biased agents care not only about what experiences they have, but
alsowhen they have them. Many believe that A-theories of time justify fu-
ture bias. Although presentism is an A-theory of time, some argue that it
nevertheless negates the justification for future bias. Here, I claim that the
alleged discrepancy between presentism and future bias is a special case
of the cross-time relations problem. To resolve the discrepancy, I propose
an account of future bias as a preference for certain tensed truths prop-
erly relativized to the present.
Keywords: time bias, future bias, A-theory, presentism.
1 Introduction
One reason to fear death might be that death is a form of nonexistence.
Yet nonexistence is not always so fearsome. After all, people do not
usually fear how the world was before they were born. Yet being pre-
natal is also a form of nonexistence. So what is there to fear in the one
but not the other?1 Here is an intuitive answer: To be deceased is to
be a thing of the past, and things of the past no longer exist. But to
be prenatal is to be a thing of the future, and things of the future will
exist.2 The value asymmetry between them is thus supposed to corre-
spond to a like metaphysical asymmetry between pastness and futurity.
1This question poses Lucretius’ Puzzle. See Harman 2011, [13], p. 129.
2An answer like this one is implicit in Brueckner and Fischer (1986, [2])
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That said, thinking through the difference in this manner takes a cer-
tain controversial conception of the world in time for granted: namely,
the A-theory of time. A-theory comes from a distinction that J.M.E. Mc-
Taggart raised as a way to frame and support his argument that time is
unreal.3 In this connection,McTaggart argued thatwhen something hap-
pens can be understood in two importantly different ways. According
to the “A-series,” events instantiate the intrinsic temporal properties of
being past, present, or future. According to the “B-series,” by contrast,
events instantiate the extrinsic temporal relations of being earlier than,
later than, or simultaneous with other events.
There is no exact definition of A-theory.4 But it is safe to say that
it stands for a group of doctrines whose common denominator is that
the A-series irreducibly represents the temporal dimension and that it
is typically associated with the following metaphysical doctrines.
Privilege: There is a metaphysically privileged time that is,
in some sense, more real than other times.
Passage: Which time hasmetaphysical privilege changes. In
this connection, privilege transitions from earlier times to
later times.
Tense: There are irreducibly tensed properties intrinsic to
their bearers.
What justifies the asymmetry in our attitudes towards being
deceased and being prenatal, despite the fact that being deceased and
being prenatal are both ways for people not to exist, is that being de-
ceased and being prenatal are related to time differently, at least accord-
ing to the A-theory of time. This metaphysical difference is supposed
to correspond to a like difference in the value between being one rather
than the other. Consider the fact that themetaphysically privileged time
passes from earlier to later times. This may justify attaching greater
value to being prenatal because prenatal things have a future intowhich
the privileged timewill pass, but deceased things do not. Many philoso-
3McTaggart (1908, [19]).
4See Cameron (2015 [3], p. 2) and (Skow 2015, [28], p. 18).
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phers have arrived at a similar conclusion regarding matters that exem-
plify some sort of temporal value asymmetry, which are asymmetries
in how we evaluate things according to their relationship with time.5
With respect to the value difference between being deceased and being
prenatal, the temporal value asymmetry is that future nonexistence, in
the form of being deceased, is worse than nonexistence in the past, in
the form of being prenatal. This value asymmetry can be considered a
generic version of what some call “future bias,” which is a preference
for certain things that are present or future rather than past or for cer-
tain things that are past rather than present or future. People are most
susceptible to engaging in future bias when they evaluate pleasurable
and painful experiences. As aforementioned, some philosophers think
that future bias is justified by some part of themetaphysics of time, such
as the passage of time. Derek Parfit, for instances, writes that:
Pains matter only because of what they are like when they
are in the present, or under the scope of “now.” This is why
wemust caremore about our pains whenwe are now in pain.
“Now” moves into the future. This is why past pains do not
matter.6
Similarly, Caspar Hare writes that “if a painful experience is in my
future, then it’s going to happen to me — I still have to experience it — it’s
yet-to-be-experienced.”7 As Parfit andHare gesture towards, there’s some-
thing about an experience’s being future which individuates it from be-
ing past, and it’s this difference-maker in virtue of which futurity mat-
ters more than pastness. That said, many philosophers, including Hare,
think that appealing to the passage of time is insufficient to justify fu-
ture bias. To say that futurity matters more than pastness with respect
to certain goods because time passes into the future is just to say that
futurity matters more because it is futurity.8 Indeed, A-theory might
even be inconsistent with certain temporal value asymmetries. In this
5See (Prior 1959 [24), Schlesinger (1976 [26]), Craig (1999 [4]), and Deng (2015
[7]).
6Parfit (1984, [23], p. 180). In this connection, Elizabeth Harman is sympathetic, but
she disagrees with Parfit that past pains do not matter (2011, [13], p. 138).
7Hare (2013, [12], p. 510).
8Moller (2002, [22], p. 81). For additional criticism, see Suhler and Callender (2012,
[30]).
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regard, for instance, Caspar Hare has argued that a popular version of
the A-theory of time—namely, presentism, according to which only the
presentmoment exists—seems inconsistent with the grounds that some
A-theorists give for justifying future bias, that is, the ground that there is
some intrinsic difference between pastness and futurity.9 More recently,
Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan have also argued that presentism
doesn’t “give us a metaphysical reason to favor future experiences over
past ones”10 For presentism entails that being past and being future are
both ways for things not to exist. In that case, what is there more valu-
able or disvaluable in being one rather than the other?
It would be a remarkable conclusion that presentism entails that an
experience or event is no more valuable or disvaluable when it is past
than when it is future. A-theory is commonly regarded as a way to jus-
tify the intuition that it is rational to value goods when they are present
or future more than when they are past. However, as a predominant
version of A-theory, presentism seems to defeat that supposed justifica-
tion. The argument for this position, whose conclusion both Hare as
well as Greene and Sullivan seem to endorse, might be ultimately based
on something like the following argument. First, Future bias is based on
an ontological asymmetry between futurity and pastness. Second, Any
justification for future bias must then properly reflect the ontological
asymmetry it presupposes in the grounds for why it is rational to be fu-
ture biased. Otherwise, it would be arbitrary to prefer goods when they
are future rather than past and to prefer bads when they are past rather
than future. However, presentism implies that there is no ontological
asymmetry between pastness and futurity because they are both forms
of nonexistence. Therefore, if presentism is true, there would be no non-
arbitrary reason to be future biased. Briefly, I think the argument un-
derwriting the supposed conflict between future bias and presentism
traffics in a contentious conception of being biased towards the future.
In order for the argument to work, one needs to define future bias as an
attitude toward experiences located in the past, present, or future. But
framing future bias in this way guarantees that presentism and the ratio-
nality of future bias are incompatible. In order for presentism to be free
to accept that future bias is rational, there must be something asymme-
try between pastness and futurity that corresponds to a like and proper
9Hare (2007 [11], p. 363).
10Greene and Sullivan (2015 [10], p. 953).
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difference in value between an experience that is either past or future.
But the sort of requisite asymmetry needed in order to justify the ra-
tionality of future bias need not be between things located in the past
or future. That is, with respect to future bias, what grounds the asym-
metry between pastness and futurity need not be non-present sorts of
things.
2 Future Bias and Presentism
We say there’s no time like the present. For presentists, there’s also no
time but the present. Consider, for example, Ned Markosian’s defini-
tion:
According to Presentism, if we were to make an accurate list
of all the things that exist –i.e. a list of all the things that
our most unrestricted quantifiers range over – there would
be not a single non-present object on the list.11
Or Kris McDaniel’s:
Presentism […] the view that there is exactly one metaphys-
ically fundamental sense of “∃” such that “∼ ∃𝑥 (𝑥 is a past
or future object)” is true.12
It would be an understatement to say that some people believe that
presentism is true; at the very least it is an initially intuitive ontology of
time. Many people are probably not going to take seriously the idea that
the times at which they were born exist or the times at which they will
be dead also exist, but that these other times exist in different regions
of spacetime. To be sure, the point is not about what many or most
people believe. Rather, the point is that for the many who do believe in
presentism, it would be highly counterintuitive for them if presentism
entails that they should value an experience when it is in their past to
the same extent that they should value the experience when it is in their
future.
11Markosian (2004, [17], p. 47).
12McDaniel (2017, [18], p. 83).
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For the same reason onemight question our disproportionate fear of
death given that being dead and being prenatal are equivalent forms of
nonexistence, one might similarly put into question our disproportion-
ate dread for pains when they are future rather than past because being
future and being past are equivalent forms of nonexistence according
to presentism. This analogy between, on the one hand, questioning the
rationality of the value asymmetry between being deceased and being
prenatal, and questioning the rationality of the temporal value asym-
metry between being future and being past, on the other, helps frame
and clarify what Hare as well as Greene and Sullivan mean when they
claim that presentism provides no reason to favor futurity over past-
ness if it is true. Let’s call their claim the “Symmetry Objection” against
future bias, since the argument for this claim might be framed as a con-
sideration that counts against justifying future bias by appealing to the
A-theory of time.
First, I will argue that the Symmetry Objection is just a special case
of the cross-time relations problem for presentism that depends on, just
as other special cases of the problem seem to depend on, an assump-
tion about the nature of the relevant cross-time relation that is objection-
able by the standards of presentism.13 Roughly, the cross-time relations
problem for presentism is the problem of accounting for the fact that
entities enter into diachronic relations with each other, e.g., causal re-
lations, which entails the fact that the entities in such relations exist at
different times. The standard response to any special case of the cross-
time relations problem is to reduce and paraphrase these sorts of rela-
tions into synchronic relations between abstract or concrete entities that
currently exist. For instance, A. N. Prior responded to a variant of this
problem by arguing that we can reduce and paraphrase facts about di-
achronic comparative relations, such as the fact that Prior is taller than
his grandfather, to a complex relation between facts about presently ex-
isting entities.14 First, there is the present-tensed fact that Prior has a
certain height H. Second, there is the past-tensed fact that his grand-
father has a certain height H*. Finally, there is the present-tensed or
perhaps atemporal fact that H is a greater height than H*. Accordingly,
the fact that Prior is taller than his grandfather just is the conjunction of
the foregoing facts.
13Sider (2003, [27], p. 27-8). For further review, see Ciuni and Torrengo (2012, [33]).
14Prior (1967 [25], p. 170-1).
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Following Prior’s lead, one can respond to the Symmetry Objection
by arguing that we can reduce and paraphrase the metaphysical dif-
ference between past and future experiences that provide a reason to
favor certain experiences when they are future rather than past. To
demonstrate how this might be possible, I propose that we compare the
Symmetry Objection to another special case of the cross-time relations
problem according towhich presentism and time travel are incompatible:
namely, the “Nowhere Argument.”15 What the comparison between
the Nowhere Argument and the Symmetry Objection is supposed to
demonstrate is that, like the Nowhere Argument, the Symmetry Ob-
jection relies on an assumption about the nature of certain diachronic
relations that is presentists should reject. To that end, I formulate the
Nowhere Argument as follows. First, time travel is like spatial travel:
there must be some time to go to and some time to come from. But if
presentism is true, then there exists neither a past nor a future to go to
or to come from. Therefore, time travel is impossible if presentism is
true.16
What is objectionable about the Nowhere Argument for the incom-
patibility between time travel and presentism is its implicit assumption
that time travel involves a causal relation between events that occur at
different times. But there is a conception of time travel that is compat-
ible with presentism if we take Prior’s response to the cross-time rela-
tions problem seriously. In this connection, Simon Keller and Michael
Nelson have argued that presentists are free to accept a conception of
time travel according to which it consists in a sequence of tensed truths
properly relativized to the present that merely describe causal facts be-
tween events that occur at different times. To illustrate their argument,
consider the following thought experiment, which is inspired by the
thought experiment that Keller and Nelson provide:17
Jennifer’s Journey. Jennifer is a glum fourteen year oldmillen-
nial listening to sad music in her room one night and read-
ing articles about the replication crisis in science. Suddenly,
out of nowhere, a stranger appears and surprises Jennifer,
who tells her how to become a successful physicist whose
15Keller and Nelson (2001, [15], p. 334-5).
16Cf. Dowe (2000, [8], p. 442), who calls it the “no destinations paradox.”
17Keller and Nelson (2001, [15], p. 335-338).
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experiments will be applauded for their replicability. The
stranger then twiddles with a weird looking device in their
hand and vanishes. Jennifer follows the stranger’s advice
and becomes a Nobel laureate in physics. By the time Jen-
nifer retires, she has forgotten about the prescient stranger
from her past and has come to believe that all of her success
was due to good luck, effort, innate talent, and friendly assis-
tance. For her retirement project, Jennifer invents a time ma-
chine, presumably the first of its kind. Whimsically, Jennifer
operates the machine. Because of this, it was the case that Jen-
nifer randomly appears as if from nowhere in the room of
her younger millennial self, who was listening to sad music
and reading articles on the internet. Feeling sorry for herself,
it was the case that Jennifer surprises her past self, who does
not recognize her, and tells her past self how she to become
a successful physicist like her. Afterwards, it was the case
that Jennifer twiddles with a weird looking device in her
hand and vanishes. Because it was the case that the device
she twiddles with is a time machine, Jennifer will reappear
a second after the moment in which she disappears after op-
erating the time machine in the future. Now, in the present,
the second after Jennifer operates the timemachine, Jennifer
reappears, feeling like more than a second has passed, but
withmemories of having spoken to her younger self for quite
some time, having finally made the connection between her-
self and the once forgotten prescient stranger from her past.
Jennifer’s Journey is supposed to represent a time-travel narrative that
is compatible with presentism because putatively no single proposition
that the narrative expresses necessarily depends for its truth on the ex-
istence of things that do not exist in the present. In other words, the
facts in virtue of which Jennifer is a time traveler are all facts made true
by presently existing entities. There are the facts that a stranger sud-
denly appears in front of Jennifer as a young millennial, who has a dis-
cussion with her and disappears into the future because it will be the
case that Jennifer operates the time machine with the intention of hav-
ing a discussion with her younger self until she reappears. And when
that time comes, it was the case that Jennifer suddenly appears in front
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of her younger self and has a discussion with her until she leaves. As-
suming that presentism is compatible with the possibility of Jennifer’s
Journey, then, it seems that time travel is not incompatible with presen-
tism if time travel is reduced and paraphrased in a manner that is not
objectionable by the standards of presentism.
I believe that there is a constructive elaboration on the way Keller
and Nelson reconcile presentism and time travel that can similarly rec-
oncile presentism and future bias. That is, perhaps presentism is com-
patible with future bias conceived as a preference for certain sorts of
tensed truths that are properly relativized to the present. Rather than
ascribing an intentional relation between a preference of mine and an
experience of mine located in the past or future, we can ascribe an inten-
tional relation between myself, the preference, and the truth value of a
tensed proposition representing an experience that occurs tome. Under-
stood as such, the asymmetry that future bias presupposes is supposed
to be grounded in or a function of metaphysical differences between
past, present, and future tensed propositions about certain experiences,
which corresponds to a like difference in the value between these propo-
sitions.
Having sufficiently characterized my proposal, I offer the following
definition of future bias with respect to pleasure.18
An agent S is biased towards the future with respect to plea-
sure iff for two inconsistent propositions about a pleasure
that S experiences, P1 and P2, where P1 describes an expe-
rience that is at least as pleasurable as the experience that
P2 describes, S prefers the truth of P2 because it is a present-
tensed or future-tensed proposition rather than past-tensed.
Inversely, with respect to pain, the definition is this:
An agent S is biased towards the future with respect to pain iff for
two inconsistent propositions about a pain that S experiences, P1 and
P2, where P1 describes an experience that is at most as painful as the
experience that P2 describes, S prefers the truth of P2 is because it is a
past-tensed rather than a present-tensed or future-tensed proposition.
According to my proposal, future-biased agents prefer the truth val-
ue of certain sorts of tensed propositions about pleasures or pains that
18This definition structurally parallels Greene and Sullivan’s definition of future bias
with respect to pleasures and pains. (2015, [10], p. 949).
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theymight experience. Of course, it might be immediately objected that
it’s not clear how past-tensed and future-tensed propositions could be
true if the things that they are describing do not currently exist. This
is also a worry for Keller and Nelson’s argument for the compatibility
between presentism and time travel. But there are seemingly viable so-
lutions to variants of this problem, which people call the “grounding
objection” or the “truthmaker problem.”19 In general, such solutions is-
sue from what Rognvaldur Ingthorsson calls the “relocation strategy,”
according to which truths about the past or future are made true by
presently existing entities.20 In this connection, for example, there’s
John Bigelow’s proposal that there are past- and future-directed prop-
erties such as “the property of being burdened with a certain sort of
past.”21 I presume that presentists can account for their tensed truths
by locating whatever makes them true in the way the world currently is.
If so, presentists have a way to justify being biased towards the future
because they are able to maintain a metaphysical difference between
past-tensed and future-tensed propositions, and which putatively cor-
responds to a like difference in the value between these sorts of tensed
propositions.
3 BIAS TOWARDS THE ERSATZ FUTURE
In the previous section, I presented a definition of future bias that ap-
pears to be compatible with presentism. In order to frame andmotivate
my argument, I showed how Keller and Nelson argue for the compati-
bility between presentism and time travel. Given the structural parallel
between my argument and their own, it would stand to reason that my
argument is susceptible to structural objections that Keller andNelson’s
argument faces. In this connection, Ted Sider has raised such an objec-
tion, claiming that Keller and Nelson’s argument misrepresents time
travel:
That I will view a dinosaur in my personal future amounts
merely to the fact that I once viewed a dinosaur, and more-
over that this is caused by my entry into a time machine.
19See Davidson (2013, [6]) and Crisp (2007, [5]).
20Ingthorsson (2017, [14], p. 88).
21Bigelow (1996, [1], p. 46-47).
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Since this fact bears little resemblance to the facts that con-
stitute a normal person’s genuine future, I could not enter
the time machine with anticipation and excitement at the
thought of seeing a dinosaur, for it is not true that I am about
to see a dinosaur, nor is the truth much like being about to
see a dinosaur. If anything, I should feel fear at the thought
of being annihilated by a device misleadingly called a “time
machine”. The device causes it to be the case that I once
viewed a dinosaur, but does not make it the case in any real
sense that I will view dinosaurs.22
Sider’s argument is basically this. Backwards time travel can be fu-
ture-looking: When someone time travels into the past, they experience
that travel as part of their future. But backwards time travel that is recast
in presentist-friendly terminology represents a form of time travel that
cannot be future-looking. Take Jennifer’s Journey for example. When
Jennifer operates the time machine, it is not that she will experience
what was the case. To be sure, her operation of the time machine in the
present is that in virtue of which it is true that it was the case that she ap-
pears as if out of nowhere in front of her past self, among other things.
But that is not a future-looking event for Jennifer. Instead, what hap-
pens is that Jennifer disappears for a second. And because of this she
makes certain past-tensed propositions true. Suddenly, she reappears
and acquires certain episodic memories in virtue of which she believes
that she had a first-hand experience of time travel. But her experience
of time travel was not first-hand, but rather second-handed—or so Sider
contends. In sum, we are supposed to believe that Jennifer is a time trav-
eler because three things involving her are the case. First, it is the case
that Jennifer operates the time machine and disappears. Second, be-
cause of this, many past-tensed truths about events involving Jennifer
are arranged and related to each other in the sort of way that one would
expect from a time-travel story. Finally, it is the case that Jennifer reap-
pears and acquires certain episodic memories about the past. However,
is this really time travel?
A similar sort of critical question can be raised against my argument
for the compatibility between presentism and future bias. That is, is it
really a form of future bias to prefer the truth of a proposition about
22Sider (2005, [28], p. 333).
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pleasures when they are in the present or future tense rather than the
past tense? What we care about when we care about when an experi-
ence occurs seems not to be about whether a true proposition about an
experience we are having is in the past, present, or future tense. Rather,
it is about the very experience that the proposition describes. The ob-
jection, then, is that my presentist-friendly account of future bias does
not properly reflect the fact that to be future biased is to be biased to-
wards the experiences themselves and not the truth value of the tensed
propositions about them.
Basically, the objection states future-tensed propositions about ex-
periences are not made true by experiences located in the future, but
only something abstract and in the present. Why would future-biased
agents care about such things? One reason to doubt this sort of objection
is that, when we think closely about what future-biased agents want of
experiences is not their futurity or pastness. Rather, they want a certain
relation to the present to obtain. Otherwise, future-biased agentswould
always get what they want if, for example, there is a pleasure in their
future that would never come. Indeed, consider the following thought
experiment from Meghan Sullivan (2018, [32], p. 28):
Suppose Eternal Eddie will live an infinitely long life. And
suppose God offers Eddie the promise of a single experience
of bliss at one time in his life. Further, God promises that for
every day Eddie waits to schedule the bliss, God will make
the bliss even better. Poor Eddie; if all he cares about is bliss-
ing out as much as possible, he’ll never schedule his bliss.
If Eternal Eddie is future-biased, andwhat future-biased agents care
about is merely the timing of their experiences, then Eternal Eddie’s fu-
ture bias does not give him a reason to be frustrated because he will
never schedule his bliss. For his bliss will always be future. But of
course, what Eternal Eddie should do is schedule his bliss. Reflecting on
what Eternal Eddie should do tells us something interesting about what
future-biased agents really care about. That is, future-biased agents do
not care whether their experiences are past or future per se, but whether
their experiences are present, will be present, or were present. This
is why it would be rational for Eternal Eddie, were he a future-biased
agent, to schedule his future bliss for some arbitrary time, because then
his future bliss will eventually be present, which is what matters to
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future-biased agents. Havingmade it sufficiently clear that future-biased
agents do not care about the pastness or futurity of certain experiences,
but whether certain experiences are present, will be present, or were
present, we can also clarifywhymypresentist-friendly account of future
bias accords the truth value of a tensed proposition about an agent’s ex-
periences its proper role as the object of future-biased preferences. For
a true future-tensed proposition about a pleasure represents part of the
way the present will be, and a past-tensed proposition about a pain rep-
resents part of the way the present neither is nor will be for an agent,
and what future-biased agents care about is how the present was, is, or
will be. Therefore, such propositions are appropriate objects of concern
for future-biased agents.
4 CONCLUSION
I sought to draw more attention to the connection between the meta-
physics of time and temporal value asymmetry, especially the meta-
physics of presentism and the rationality of future bias. In this con-
nection, I have put into better focus a potentially problematic objection
against an approach to justifying future bias that appeals to theA-theory
of time. The potential objection is that presentism, a popular form of A-
theory, entails that future bias is unjustified because presentism entails
that past and future experiences are not importantly different because
neither of them exist. In turn, I have framed this objection as a special
case of the cross-time relations problem for presentism.
In accordance with the usual sort of response philosophers make
to special cases of the cross-time relations problem, I proposed an ac-
count of future bias that demonstrates its compatibilitywith presentism.
In turn, I have responded to a potential objection against my account,
which is based on a misunderstanding about future bias, or so I argued.
Although the argument is beyond the scope of this paper, I also believe
that my conception of future bias is compatible with other A-theories
of time. Indeed, there are other versions according to whose ontolo-
gies, for instance, the past and present exist, but the future doesn’t.23
Or the past, present, and future are ontologically on a par, but meta-
23Referred to as the ‘Growing Block View,” see Miller (2017, [21]) and Forbes (2015,
[9]).
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physically dissimilar in that the properties of past or future things are
non-qualitative.24 Finally, it is worth making explicit a question implicit
in the rich interplay between our temporal value asymmetries and the
metaphysics of time. That is, is it not to the A-theorist’s dialectical ad-
vantage that it accommodates an attitude we regularly summon from
our inegalitarian perspective on time?25 We regularly respect the au-
thority of our shared evaluative or normative dispositions. If displaying
a bias towards the future is one of them, we might thereby be tempted
into a kind of wishful thinking against metaphysical views that enjoin
us to disrespect or abandon such practices. Some metaphysical views
have already been accused of paving a road to indifference.26 In con-
trast, others have found a metaphysics of time more attractive because it
respects our practical concerns.27 In any case, these sorts of questions
warrant further discussion and debate.
For example, whereas this paper considers the question, “Does A-
theory justify time bias?”, Alison Fernandes has considered the con-
verse: “Do time biases justify A-theory?” She aims to show one affir-
mative argument, the “Normative Argument,” is an unsound answer
to her question.28 The argument is this:
P1. The temporal value asymmetry is best explained by its being
justified.
P2. If the temporal value asymmetry is best explained by its being
justified, it is justified.
P3. The temporal value asymmetry is justified (P1, P2).
P4. The temporal value asymmetry can only be justified by objec-
tive (non-relative) facts about which events are past and future.
C. Therefore there are objective facts about which events are past
and future.
24Sullivan’s “Minimal A-theory” (2012 [31]), for instance, or Cameron’s “enriched
presentism” (2015, [3], p. 209).
25See Yehezkel’s “Theories of Time and the Asymmetry in Human Attitudes” (2014,
[32]), which argues that our time biases do not help settle the debate between A- and
B-theorists.
26I am referring to “A Road to Indifference,” in David Lewis (1986, [16], p. 123-128).
27For instance, see Zimmerman (2008, [33], p. 214).
28See Fernandes (2019, [10], forthcoming).
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Fernandes provides reasons against P1 and P4. Elsewhere, I have
argued for a thesis entailing P4 is false: some time biases, or temporal
value asymmetries, are consistent with the B-theory of time.29 In that
same paper, however, I also took into consideration some issues bearing
on P1. One such issue is whether the temporal value asymmetry is best
explained by a scientific rather than metaphysical explanation, and Fer-
nandes thinks various features of the symmetry suggest the value asym-
metry arises from evolutionarily-advantaged emotional biases “gener-
alised through temporal framing and associative mechanisms to pro-
duce general temporal asymmetries of emotion and value.”30 Although
I have some concerns about Fernandes’ arguments, nevertheless it raises
several compelling challenges for anyone who thinks temporal value
asymmetries are justified for normative rather thanmerelymotivational
or descriptive reasons, as the emotional bias account suggests.
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Abstract
The last fifty years have witnessed a renewed and lively philosophical de-
bate over the problem of divine omniscience and human freedom. This
debate was largely inspired by Nelson Pike’s “Divine Omniscience and
Voluntary Action,” and most participants in the debate (following Pike’s
own example) have left unexamined the assumption that there are fu-
ture contingent truths for an omniscient being to know. This is exactly
the assumption challenged in Prior’s “The Formalities of Omniscience,”
published three years before Pike’s essay. Prior is concerned with both
the futurity and the contingency of future contingents. Since so much at-
tention has already been devoted to Prior’s critique from contingency, I
focus on the critique from futurity. Prior was a presentist, and presentism
offers some obvious grounds for denying divine foreknowledge of future
contingents. I argue that they come up short; nevertheless, the recent his-
tory of the foreknowledge debate shows how prescient Prior was to insist
that future contingent truth not go unchallenged.
Keywords: aporetic problem, fatalism, foreknowledge, future contingency,
God, omniscience, Peircean semantics, presentism, Prior.
The increased attention philosophers have paid to the problem of
divine foreknowledge v. human freedom during the last fifty years is
almost entirely due to Nelson Pike’s “Divine Omniscience and Volun-
tary Action” [17]. Interestingly, Arthur Prior’s “The Formalities of Om-
niscience” [18], published just three years earlier, is not evenmentioned
by Pike, and figures hardly at all in the extensive debate stirred up by
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Pike’s essay. At least this was true until quite recently. In a remarkable
reversal of fortune, Prior’s concerns about the argument for “theologi-
cal fatalism,” once largely ignored, have nowmoved to the center of the
debate, and his relevance is at last being recognized.1
Here’s one reasonably perspicuous way of laying out the argument
for theological fatalism as it has developed over the course of the debate
inspired by Pike’s paper. (The perspicuity of this formulation rests on
its having a distinct premise corresponding to each of the main points
at which the argument has been challenged.) The argument is designed
to show that certain assumptions about God are incompatible with free
agency. There are three such assumptions, which collectively constitute
what I’ll call the “God Assumption”:
(i) God is omniscient (if p, then God knows that p)
(ii) God is essentially inerrant, i.e., infallible (necessarily, if God be-
lieves that p, then p)
(iii) God exists “eternally” (there is no time such that the proposition
God exists, if asserted at that time, would be false)
The argument proceeds as follows. Suppose someone X performs an
action A at a time T3. Let T2 be a time prior to X’s birth and T1 any time
prior to T2. Then
(1) It is true at T1 that X will do A at T3. (The Omnitemporality of
Truth)
(2) God knows at T1 that X will do A at T3. (God Assumption (i) and
(iii))
(3) God believes at T1 that Xwill do A at T3. (Analysis of Knowledge:
X knows that p entails X believes that p)
1An interesting record of this shift may be found in JohnMartin Fischer’s two edited
anthologies on the problem of theological fatalism, published 26 years apart. The first,
God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom [4], includes only one paper—Alfred J. Freddoso’s “Ac-
cidental Necessity and Logical Determinism”—that engages Prior’s position, which it
dismisses in short order. The second, Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge [6], has an
entire section on “The Logic of Future Contingents,” including Prior’s classic “It Was
To Be.”
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(4) It is accidentally necessary at T2 that God believed at T1 that X
will do A at T3. (Necessity of the Past)
(5) It is accidentally necessary at T2 that X will do A at T3. (God
Assumption (ii), Transfer of Necessity Principle)
(6) X cannot refrain from doing A at T3. (Incompatibilist Analysis of
“Can”)
(7) X does not do A at T3 freely. (Principle of Alternate Possibilities)
The same argument can be given for any agent, action, and time. So no
one ever does anything freely, if the God Assumption is granted.2
Before turning to the steps Prior rejects, I should comment briefly on
some of the other steps in the argument. Step (3) looks like a step back-
ward. But the reason the strongest versions of the argument proceed via
(3) rather than the stronger (2) is that (3), given divine infallibility, is
strong enough, and it’s a stronger candidate than (2) for use at step (4).
Knowledge entails truth, so the fact set forth in (2) is in part constituted
by the fact that X will A at T3, and that makes it a “soft fact” relative
to T2, to use the terminology employed in contemporary “Ockhamist”
critiques of the argument—or, in the terms Prior himself favors, it ex-
presses a “contingent future-infected past” [18:49]. Assuming that (3)
fares better on this score, it looks like (4) and (5) are irresistible, for rea-
sons that Prior articulates as follows: God’s precognition of the agent’s
future action would then be “necessary, if only because it’s past, and so
beyond anyone’s power to prevent,” in which case “anything that fol-
lows from this necessary, i.e. now-unpreventable, truth, must itself be
now-unpreventable” [18:45]. Step (6), of course, would be denied by
compatibilists, and step (7) by philosophers persuaded by Frankfurt-
type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.3 But
Prior, who takes (5) to establish the argument’s no-freedom conclusion,
does not get into intramural debates between compatibilists and incom-
patibilists. His contribution to the argument lies elsewhere.
2This formulation is identical to the one I give in [12].
3Harry Frankfurt’s famous article, published just four years after Pike’s, presents us
with another case of two conversationswhose relevance to each otherwasn’t recognized
untilmuch later. For a defense of a “Frankfurtian” solution to the problemof theological
fatalism, see [10], [11], and [13]. I argue that Augustine anticipated this solution in [8]
and [9].
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Where does Prior believe that the argument goes wrong? It is clear
in “The Formalities of Omniscience” that he rejects step (2) of the argu-
ment, because he rejects
(8) For all p, if (it is the case that) p, God has always known that it
would be the case that p. [18:43]
There are at least two general grounds on which Prior disputes (8). The
first belongs to reasons for rejecting (8), and so for rejecting (2), even if
one accepts
(9) For all p, if (it is the case that) p then it has always been the case
that it would be the case that p. [18:44]
For the sake of contrast, I’ll mention two such reasons that Prior does
not endorse.
The classic challenge to (2) comes from a Boethian conception of
God on which God has not “always known” future events because, be-
ing atemporally eternal, he has not always existed. But this challenge has
fallen out of favor among theistic philosophers, and it’s one with which
Prior is unsympathetic. Responding toAquinas’s “Boethian” view “that
God’s knowledge is in some way right outside of time,” Prior says: “I
want to argue against this view, on the ground that its final effect is
to restrict what God knows to those truths, if any, which are themselves
timeless” [18:42], adding (for considerable rhetorical effect!), “it seems
an extraordinary way of affirming God’s omniscience if a person, when
asked what God knows now, must say ‘Nothing’, and when asked what
He knew yesterday, must again say ‘Nothing’, and must yet again say
‘Nothing’ when asked what God will know tomorrow” [18:42-43].
Another challenge to (2), also grounded in a rejection of (8) but
not resting on a Boethian denial that God exists in time, comes from
philosophers like William Hasker [7], Richard Swinburne [27] and Pe-
ter van Inwagen [28]. They accept (9) but deny (8) on the grounds that
(a) there are future contingent truths, (b) God’s infallibly foreknowing
them would render them noncontingent, contradicting (a) (for there
would then be no future contingent truths), so (c) it is impossible for
God to know the contingent future. But this result is perfectly compati-
blewith classical theism, Hasker et al. argue, sinceGod’s failure to know
these truths no more compromises his Anselmian perfection than his
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failure to perform any other logically impossible task. Insofar as this
response frankly affirms the existence of future contingent truths, it’s
obviously unavailable to Prior.
Prior’s reason for rejecting (8)—putting (9) to one side for the mo-
ment—is more direct than the two challenges just mentioned. If X’s do-
ing A at T3 is, at T1, still contingent, then (he writes): “I cannot see in
what way the alleged knowledge, even if it were God’s, could be more
than correct guessing. For therewould be ex hypothesinothing that could
make it knowledge, no present ground for the guess’s correctness which
a specially penetrating person might perceive” [18:49]. This concern
about (2) has attracted increasing attention in the literature. I’llmention
just two examples. Ryan Byerly [1] has made it the focus of an entire
book, arguing that God’s ordering of times in primitive earlier-than rela-
tions can account for his infallible foreknowledge while leaving human
freedom intact. Yet more recently, John Martin Fischer [5] has devel-
oped an account of God’s foreknowledge on which he “bootstraps” to
certainty by combining an (otherwise fallible) knowledge of the contin-
gent future with self-knowledge of his own infallibility. It seems to me
that neither of these efforts succeeds and that Prior’s worry about how
foreknowledge of a contingent future is even possible has not been sat-
isfied, but I don’t propose to pursue the matter here.4 Suffice it to say
that this recent flurry of activity suggests that Prior’s doubts about how
evenGod could have knowledge of future contingents is beginning to be
recognized as a serious problem.
But Prior also, and more importantly, rejects (2) because (unlike
Hasker et al.) he denies (9), and so rejects step (1). The assumption
that there are future contingent truths is the opening wedge in argu-
ments for fatalism (theological and nontheological), and denying this
assumption allows one to nip the arguments in the bud. One can dis-
tinguish, somewhat artificially but nevertheless usefully, between ob-
jections to future contingent truths that locate the problem primarily in
their futurity and those that locate the problem primarily in their contin-
gency. The latter are typically developed via a Peircean semantics that
assigns maximal causal force to the predictive use of the word ‘will’. To
say that somethingwill happen, given a Peircean tense logic, is to assign
it a probability of 1.0, and that’s incompatible with its being contingent;
4I express some doubts about Fischer’s proposal in [14].
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so there are no future contingent truths. This is the principal ground
on which (1) has been challenged, and it’s the principal concern that
Prior develops in “The Formalities of Omniscience.” But this territory
has been well explored in the literature. (In addition to the vast litera-
ture on future contingent truth, see Rhoda, Boyd and Belt [23] for an
application of Peircean semantics to the problem of theological fatalism.
For a response to Rhoda et al., see Craig and Hunt [2].) For this reason
I would like to turn instead in another direction.5
Prior’s interest in logic and semantics was very much in the service
of metaphysical issues: “Philosophy, including Logic,” he wrote, “is not
primarily about language, but about the real world” [20:45]. Regarding
the real world, Prior endorsed presentism: “the present simply is the
real considered in relation to two species of unreality, namely the past
and the future” [19:245]. For Prior, then, the futurity of future contin-
gent truths was itself a ground of reproach against them. Not all pre-
sentists deny future-contingent truth, and there are grounds for denial
other than presentism. But it’s presentist resources for avoiding fatalism
that I wish to explore in what follows.
I should first say something about why fatalism is a problem. Logical
or future-truth fatalism—the kind that worried Aristotle and the Stoics—
isn’tmuch of a problem. The simplest versions turn on amodal fallacy—
mistaking the necessity of the consequence for the necessity of the conse-
quent, to use Aquinas’s terminology—while versions designed to avoid
this defect violate what Trenton Merricks calls the “truism about truth”
that truth depends on the world.6 Theological fatalism (pace Merricks)
is much more formidable, but would seem to pose a problem only for
theists, and even then only for some theists (classical rather than open
theists, for example, and perhaps not even all classical theists, if the
Boethian conception of God as existing in timeless eternity provides an
escape from the argument). So the question whether presentism allows
one to avoid fatalism may seem to be of limited interest: unless one is
committed to the existence of an infallibly omniscient sempiternal being,
5It seems to me, following Rosenkranz [24], that rejection of the “thin red line” rests
on confusing fixing with determining (a unique future). But I’m not sure how to make
progress on this question with those possessing contrary intuitions—another reason
for taking things in another direction.
6See, e.g., [16]. Merricks explicitly distinguishes his refutation of logical fatalism
from an “Ockhamist” response relying on the soft fact/hard fact distinction.
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the fact that presentism might put one in a position to avoid fatalism is
a solution looking for a problem.
Why should the relative success of the argument for theological fa-
talism concern anyone who isn’t committed to the full God Assumption
(or the assumption of human freedom, for that matter)? The reason
is that theological fatalism is arguably not just a theological problem
but an aporetic problem. An example of an aporetic problem is Zeno’s
Achilles paradox. The relevant facts about this famous problem are
these: (1) An argument is given, starring a tortoise, renowned for its
slowness, and Achilles, Homer’s “fleetest of the Achaeans.” (2) The
argument’s conclusion is that Achilles can’t pass the tortoise. (3) It’s
surprisingly hard to say exactly where the argument goes wrong. (The
details of the argument don’t matter, so long as it’s hard to say where
it goes wrong.) Nevertheless, we’re within our epistemic rights in be-
lieving that there’s something wrong with the argument, even if we
don’t know, and perhaps have no idea, what is wrong with it. Moreover,
the problem posed by the argument cannot be solved by revising one’s
conception of the argument’s dramatis personae. Achillean revisionism
(“perhaps Achilles was a quadriplegic and this ‘fleetest of the Achaeans’
stuff was Homer’s little joke”) simply removes Achilles from complic-
ity in the problem; the same goes for testudine revisionism (“maybe
this was a super-tortoise”!). The problem is easily reinstated by sub-
stituting Hermes (or Usain Bolt) for Achilles, or a snail or glacier for
the tortoise. Zeno’s argument constitutes a thought-experiment, and its
terms can be stipulated. In sum, the argument presents a puzzle, not a
serious brief against the possibility of motion. Understood aporetically,
the solution to the problem involves discovering how best to rethink our
assumptions or sharpen our conceptual tools so we don’t fall prey to the
argument.
Consider now the problem of theological fatalism. Here are three
facts about this problem that parallel the three salient facts about Zeno’s
Achilles paradox: (1) An argument is given, starring God, an eternally
existent and infallibly omniscient being, and X, an agent who performs
a presumptively free actionA at time T3. (2) The argument’s conclusion
is that X doesn’t perform A at T3 freely. (3) It isn’t easy to see where
the argument might go wrong. But why think that this problem, like
the Achilles paradox, can be construed aporetically? I cannot defend
this judgment fully here, but I can support it with an intuition pump.
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Suppose that X’s A-ing at T3 satisfies to the highest degree your favorite
criteria for free agency, whatever they may be. These criteria might in-
clude the following, among others: that X does A willingly; that doing
A doesn’t flout any of X’s second-order desires; that X can abstain from
A-ing at T3 should he choose to do so; that X doesn’t A at T3 under
coercion or duress; that X’s A-ing at T3 is not causally determined by
events prior to the X’s birth; that X does not A at T3 in ignorance of rel-
evant circumstances; and so on. Now add one more condition: before
X was even born, God infallibly believed that X would A at T3. How
could that additional condition have as a consequence that X’s A-ing at
T3 isn’t an instance of free agency? There are conditions that clearly
would warrant such a reassessment—for example, if it were added that
X was under the influence of drugs or post-hypnotic suggestion, or con-
trolled by Martians via a chip implanted in his brain. But the idea that
the mere presence of an infallible foreknower could make this kind of
difference is deeply puzzling. We have good reason to suspect that the
argument goes wrong, even if we’re unable to determine exactly where
it goes wrong. Note that our puzzlement has nothing essentially to do
with whether the God Assumption is theologically correct. Suppose
God doesn’t exist, or doesn’t know future-contingent truths, or knows
them (truths which are future-contingent relative to us) timelessly. That
would remove God from complicity in the problem, just as Achilles
could be similarly removed from complicity in Zeno’s paradox, but a
puzzle would remain. With God out of the picture, we’re left with a
pure thought-experiment, whose terms can be stipulated. So imagine
an infallibly omniprescient being named ‘Gob’. It seems that a paradig-
matically free action shouldn’t lose this status just because Gob exists;
yet here’s an argument showing otherwise. While it is perhaps possible
that the argument gets things right in the end, it isn’t unreasonable to
approach the argument with the suspicion that it harbors an impropri-
ety somewhere, and treat it aporetically.7
That’s enough about why I think the argument for theological fatal-
ism should be of interest to all philosophers, theists and nontheists alike.
Let’s turn now to presentist resources for resisting the argument’s fatal-
istic conclusion. If there are no future-contingent truths, then step (1)
7I develop the idea that theological fatalism should be treated as an aporetic problem
in [13]. The material in the preceding two paragraphs is based very closely on that
source.
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of the argument is false, and neither God nor Gob will hold the beliefs
that fuel the argument.8 But if presentism is true, truths about the fu-
ture must supervene on the present, and there does not appear to be
anything in the present on which future-contingent truths could super-
vene.
Presentists who take this line (and not all do) must make sure that
it doesn’t equally jeopardize truths about the past. Take the proposition
Caesar was assassinated in 44 B.C. The growing block has a truth-maker in
44 B.C. for this proposition, but presentism does not; it needs a present
truth-maker. This is already a cost of presentism, in my view, since the
content of the proposition has to do onlywithwhat happened in 44 B.C.;
nothing at all is being said about present conditions from which, e.g.,
Caesar’s assassination in 44 B.C. can be inferred. (I’m tempted to say
that evidence-makers are being confused here with truth-makers.) But a
presentist may well question the assumption that the truth-conditions
for a propositionmust trackwhat it’s “about.” An assertion about Santa
Claus is made true by something else (not Santa, but a story); likewise
an assertion about the past can be made true by something else (not
the past, but the present).9 Let’s suppose that’s right. Still, the intrinsic
properties of the present seem compatiblewithmultiple pasts. Suppose
God tamped out all causal traces of Caesar’s assassination; it shouldn’t
result from this that the proposition Caesar was assassinated in 44 B.C.
is no longer true. So it’s not clear how all the truths about the past
that a good theory needs to accommodate could be grounded in the
present, at least if the grounding is supposed to be causally connected
to the truths that it grounds. For presentists who wish to deny future-
contingent truth, it’s natural to look to present causal traces to ground
truths about the past because the unidirectionality of the causal arrow
ensures that there won’t be equivalent causal “anticipations” of the con-
tingent future. But causal traces won’t do the job; the presentist will
8Since our forebeliever’s properties can simply be stipulated, perhaps (1) is unneces-
sary. Suppose “Gob” is such that, if X A’s at T3, then Gob believed at T1 that X will A at
T3, even though it was not then (at T1) true that X will A at T3 (perhaps because there
are no future-contingent truths). But Gob’s beliefs, whether or not they are true, are in-
fallible, in the sense that things cannot turn out otherwise than Gob believes. Then the
argument for theological fatalismmight be back in business, even though none of Gob’s
beliefs about future-contingents were true. Suitably developed, this might constitute a
third “fatalism for presentists,” in addition to the two discussed in the paper.
9I owe this point to Brian Leftow.
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have to look elsewhere.
Here’s a quick review of four recent (and probably familiar) propos-
als for how this problemmight be avoided under presentism. TomCrisp
[3] posits an ersatz B-series of times and suggests that the present time
is such that Caesar’s being assassinated in 44 B.C. is “temporally accessi-
ble” to it, themodel here being theway that the actual world is such that
certain other worlds or possible states of affairs are “logically accessible”
to it. This is a fact about the present, and so, on presentism, a fact about
reality. But this fact would have to be different if Caesar was not assas-
sinated in 44 B.C. The proposition about Caesar, then, does supervene
on reality in a way that is consistent with presentism. That’s because
such supervention requires there to be no difference in truth without a
difference in reality, and that requirement is satisfied by present facts
about temporal accessibility.
Michael Rea [21] looks for a model to the grounding problem for
modal truths. If true modal propositions are grounded in irreducible
modal properties, then truths about the past might be grounded in ir-
reducibly tensed properties. But how can that be, if the past or future
object is not present and so not real? Here again a parallel modal prob-
lem might help. We want to say that there are worlds in which Don-
ald Trump does not exist; but if Trump does not exist in those worlds,
there is nothing real in those worlds to ground our modal claims about
him. The trick is to suppose that we’re really talking about Trump’s
individual essence. It’s the same thing when we refer to Julius Caesar
now, when he no longer exists: we’re really talking about his individual
essence, and that essence now has the tensed property was assassinated
in 44 B.C.10
Dean Zimmerman [29] notes how a defender of brute powers, dis-
positions, or liabilities can appeal to “brute facts” to ground her claims.
The opponentwill doubtless object to such amove, but “[u]nless the op-
ponent can say a good deal more, specifically, about why it is wrong to
take dispositions as primitive or brute features of things, the truthmaker
objection amounts to little more than dissatisfied grumbling” [29:217].
Zimmerman then suggests that a presentist canmake a similar response
to the demand for present facts to ground truths about the past: “There
are ‘backward-looking’ properties that objects really have, properties
10Rea is not a presentist, but he offers his proposal on behalf of presentism; his own
objection to presentism lies elsewhere.
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like having been occupied by a dinosaur 150,000,000 years ago; and
there are real facts about which objects have these properties, facts that
make propositions about the past true.” Zimmerman adds: “The oppo-
nents of presentism have attempted to answer this challenge; but, bymy
lights, they are still in the dissatisfied grumbling stage” [29:218].
Finally, DeanZimmerman [30] andAlan Rhoda [22] have suggested
independently that, if an omniscient deity exists, then God’s present
beliefs about the past can ground truths about the past. If God now
believes that Caesar was assassinated in 44 B.C., this present fact entails
that Caesar was assassinated in 44 B.C. Zimmerman refers to this as “a
literal deus ex machina,” ready at hand to resolve presentists’ difficulties
with grounding.
It seems to me that all four of these proposals get the explanatory
order wrong. Crisp’s temporal accessibility, like logical accessibility,
should itself be a supervenient property: no difference in accessibility re-
lations without a difference in other properties. I have a similar concern
about Rea’s proposal: even irreducibly modal properties should super-
vene on nonmodal properties; there can’t be two worlds which differ
only in their modal properties. Places are presently endowed with Zim-
merman’s backward-looking properties only because those places were
once endowed with the corresponding present-tense properties. As for
the Zimmerman-Rhoda suggestion that truths about the past can be
grounded in God’s present beliefs, God surely believes that Caesar was
assassinated in 44 B.C. because Caesar was assassinated in 44 B.C.; but if
the truth of the latter is grounded in the former, we have a pernicious
circle of explanatory dependence.
This is nomore than a gesture in the direction of an objection. Rather
than pressing it against such formidable opponents, whichwould in any
case add little towhat others have already said (e.g., Sanson andCaplan
[25]), I want to ask instead how any of this helps the presentist to reject
step (1) of the argument for theological fatalism. Let’s take up this ques-
tionwith regard to Zimmerman’s proposal that truths about the past, in-
cluding those that are causally underdetermined by the present, super-
vene on brute backward-looking properties, like having been occupied by
a dinosaur 150 million years ago, that presently existing things really have.
And let’s suppose that an adequate response is available to the objection
that these backward-looking properties are surely explanatorily depen-
dent on somethingwhich, according to presentism, isn’t real and thus is
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unavailable for explanation: the way things were. Now consider the par-
allel proposal that truths about the future, including truths about the
causally contingent future, supervene on brute forward-looking prop-
erties, like going to be occupied by an agent X performing an action A at a
time T3, that presently existing things really have. One wants to object
that these forward-looking properties are surely explanatorily depen-
dent on something which, according to presentism, isn’t real and thus
is unavailable for explanation: the way things will be. But it isn’t easy
to see how this objection could be available to a presentist attracted to
Zimmerman’s line.
Such a presentist will need to explain why present objects can have
backward-looking properties but not the corresponding forward-look-
ing properties. How would such an explanation go? Try the following:
The past was once present, and when it was, the present-
tense proposition There are dinosaurs was unproblematically
true. Its truth supervened on the world, in particular, on the
properties some region of theworld had at that time. Having
exemplified the property being occupied by a dinosaur 150 mil-
lion years ago, that region then came to exemplify the prop-
erty having been occupied by a dinosaur at a later time, when
the dinosaur had left, and this property is one that that re-
gion still has today. In sum, the past, to which backward-
looking properties point, was once present and real; not so
for the future. That is why there are present backward-look-
ing properties but no present forward-looking properties.
But this reply won’t do the job. A parallel justification can be offered
for future-contingent truths, indicating that the proferred explanation
simply presupposes that there are truths about the past but not truths
about the future. Here’s the parallel explanation:
The future will one day be present, and when it is, the pre-
sent-tense proposition X A’s at T3 will be unproblematically
true. Its truth will supervene on the world, in particular,
on the properties some region of the world will have at that
time. Since it is going to exemplify the property being occu-
pied by an agent X performing an action A at T3, that region
then exemplified the property going to be occupied by an agent
310
X performing an action A at earlier times, before X began A-
ing, and this property is one that that region already has
today. In sum, the future, to which forward-looking proper-
ties point, will one day be present and real, and that is why
there are present forward-looking properties.
I’m not asking whether this is an adequate presentism-friendly justifi-
cation of future-contingent truth full stop; I’m asking whether it is an
adequate justification on the assumption that the presentism-friendly justifi-
cation of truths about the past that immediately preceded it is adequate. I might
hazard that any presentist who swallows the first justification but balks
at the second is just engaged in dissatisfied grumbling!
A similar response can be made to the other three proposals we re-
viewed. Adefender of future-contingent truthmight followCrisp’s lead
by claiming that X’s A-ing at T3 is “temporally accessible” to T1 and
maintaining that this fact grounds the future-contingent truth X will A
at T3 when T1 is present. If the temporal accessibility of a past time to
the present time is just a brute fact about the present, then it’s hard to
see why the temporal accessibility of a future time to the present time
couldn’t also be a brute fact about the present. Rea, who is not a pre-
sentist, allows that the irreducibly tensed properties grounding truths
about the past could also ground truths about the future. Reference to
X at T1, when X does not yet exist, should be construed as talk about X’s
individual essence, which at T1 has the tensed property will A at T3, a
property which grounds at T1 the future-contingent truthXwill A at T3.
Finally, Zimmerman’s and Rhoda’s appeals to God’s omniscience with
respect to the past would seem to be of equal use to a defender of God’s
knowledge of the future. Open theists like Zimmerman andRhoda hold
that God can be omniscient despite his ignorance of the contingent fu-
ture because, given presentism, there are no truths there to be known; but
it’s not clear how they can maintain this position against an advocate
of future-contingent truth who contends that such truths are grounded
in God’s present foreknowledge, since that is exactly how they defend
their own commitment to truths about the past in the face of the objec-
tion that, given presentism, there are no truths there to be known.
In sum, either presentism cannot accommodate truths about the past,
in which case it must surely be rejected, or it can accommodate them, in
which case it has no principled grounds for denying truths about the
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contingent future. So that’s the first reason why I think that presentists
cannot escape the argument for theological fatalism at step (1). But sup-
pose I’m wrong about this. Presentist opponents of future-contingent
truth are awily bunch, and it’s impossible to anticipate all the stratagems
theymight employ for countenancing truths about the past but not about
the contingent future. Unfortunately for them, the argument for theo-
logical fatalism might not require the literal truth of (1).
Here’s why. Suppose that there is nothing in the present on which
the propositions about the past and future endorsed by commonsense
can supervene. Then, on presentism, those propositions are literally
untrue. Commonsense might nevertheless be accommodated if such
propositions are “close enough” to the literal truth, differing from lit-
eral truth only on technical or theoretical grounds: close enough that
it’s understandable how commonsense might confuse them for literal
truth, and close enough that the interests of commonsense are satisfied
despite their literal untruth. Ted Sider [26] has coined the term ‘quasi-
truths’ for such propositions endorsed by commonsense. Sider’s “work-
ing idea of a quasi-true sentence is one that, philosophical niceties aside,
is true” [26:332], and Ned Markosian offers this definition: “S is quasi-
true =df. S is not literally true, but only in virtue of certain nonempirical
or philosophical facts” [15:69]. These are just the sorts of facts that pre-
sentism brings to the table. So if presentism does undermine the literal
truth of (1), it does so in such a way that (1) remains quasi-true.11
This doesn’t give us (1), but it appears to give us something close
enough to (1) that the argument for theological fatalism is back in busi-
ness. Arguably, an omniscient being must also know all quasi-truths.
That’s because, for any quasi-truth, it is true, and not just quasi-true,
that it is a quasi-truth. God therefore knows that it is quasi-true. But if
X A’s at T3, presentism is either compatible with (1)’s literal truth, or it
is incompatible with (1)’s literal truth—in which case (1) is quasi-true,
since it falls short of literal truth “only in virtue of certain nonempiri-
cal or philosophical facts,” namely, those constituting presentism. That
means that the argument for theological fatalism can be restarted with
the notion of quasi-truth:
(1#) It is true at T1 that it is quasi-true that X will do A at T3.
11Including future contingents among the quasi-truths would accommodate, among
other things, a straightforward acceptance of the commonsense practice of prediction.
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The following steps are justified in exactly the same ways as the corre-
sponding steps in the original argument:
(2#) God knows at T1 that it is quasi-true that X will do A at T3.
(3#) God believes at T1 that it is quasi-true that X will do A at T3.
(4#) It is accidentally necessary at T2 that God believed at T1 that it
is quasi-true that X will do A at T3.
(5#) It is accidentally necessary at T2 that it is quasi-true that X will
do A at T3.
At this point the notion of quasi-truth is dropped and the argument con-
tinues as in the original:
(6) X cannot refrain from doing A at T3.
(7) X does not do A at T3 freely.
Why suppose that (5#), in which accidental necessity governs a
proposition that is only quasi-true, is sufficient for (6)? Suppose that
(6) is false. If X were to refrain from A-ing at T3, it wouldn’t have been
quasi-true at any earlier time that X will A at T3. But then it can’t have
been accidentally necessary at T2 that it was quasi-true that X will A
at T3. Since the falsity of (6) is sufficient for the falsity of (5#), (5#)
is sufficient for (6). So the argument for theological fatalism based on
quasi-truth appears to be just as effective as the one based on truth.
I conclude that the aporetic problem posed by the argument for the-
ological fatalism cannot be resolved on presentist grounds. If step (1) is
where the argument goes wrong, it must be for some reason other than
a presentist commitment to the unreality of the future.
Of course Prior’s principal objection to (1) in “The Formalities of
Omniscience” is grounded in his preference for a Peircean semantics,
and that preference is defensible apart from his endorsement of presen-
tism. I haven’t done anything in this paper to address that objection.
My narrower purpose in this essay has been to argue that if the assump-
tion of future contingent truth is theological fatalism’s original sin, it’s a
mistake to assign the greater blame to futurity rather than contingency.
Hence the attention paid to presentism. But my general purpose has
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been simply to appreciate Prior’s focus on steps (1) and (2) of the ar-
gument, and especially the support provided to (2) by (1). The debate
stirred up by Nelson Pike’s paper slighted these steps, treating them
largely as prologue to the main event: the clash between divine fore-
knowledge and human freedom. But once divine foreknowledge of fu-
ture contingents is in place, it’s too late: freedom is unrecoverable, at
least on the standard view of ‘freedom’ that’s been assumed in the de-
bate. It’s the belated recognition of this fact that accounts for the recent
shift in the debate toward the question of future contingent truth. In
focusing his own examination of the argument on this question, Prior
proved to be ahead of his time.12
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Abstract
The Rietdijk-Putnam-Penrose argument is a critique of presentism and
argues from the relativity of simultaneity in the theory of relativity to a
block universe. This article argues that the argument is imprecisely for-
mulated, and can be refuted by considering its implications more pre-
cisely.
Keywords: Presentism · eternalism · Rietdijk-Putnam-Penrose argument.
1 Introduction
Presentism is here understood as the view that the present moment is
unique in the sense that only what is actualized in the present moment
exists, while the block universe (or eternalist) view is understood as
the view that all times are on a par, without there being something that
makes a point of time uniquely past, present or future. Presentism is
the common view among laypeople. A classic argument for presen-
tism, offered by Arthur Prior, is that there is a great difference between
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a headache we have now and a headache that is past or waiting. Presen-
tism is needed to make sense of the fact that we can say “Thank good-
ness that’s over” [1].
However, the majority of philosophers of time defend the block
universe view instead [2]. There is a famous argument against presen-
tism made by several philosophers but often referred to as the Rietdijk-
Putnam-Penrose argument, which argues from the relativity of simul-
taneity in the theory of relativity to a block universe [3]. Roger Penrose
describes this argument in the following way: Imagine a car driving
along the street in a direction which is also in the direction towards the
galaxy Andromeda. As the car passes a man standing on the street, the
man in the car and the man on the street will have different simultane-
ity lines with what happens at Andromeda. Simultaneous to the man
standing on the street, the Andromedans may consider whether to in-
vade earth, but simultaneous to the man in the car, the Andromedans
may already have chosen to invade us and be on theirway towards earth.
Penrose writes that if what is future to one person is past to another, the
event is an inevitability [4].
The argument is used bymany physicists to argue in favor of a block
universe, for example Brian Greene, Max Tegmark, and Sean Carroll [5].
Hilary Putnam says that the problem of the reality of future events has
been solved by physics, and not by philosophy [2], [6]. Craig Callender
calls the argument “utterly convincing” [3]. Arthur Prior discusses the
objection that the theory of relativity makes simultaneity relative and
responds that time in relativity theory “is just part of an artificial frame-
work which the scientists have constructed to link together observed
facts in the simplest way possible” [7]. In this article, I will be unpack-
ing and defending a response which is similar to this response by Prior.
2 Discussion
In order to consider the Rietdijk-Putnam-Penrose-argument carefully,
we shall first consider more closely what we do when we measure time.
Time can be measured by an individual in his or her reference frame,
and this is called coordinate time. Time can also be measured as wrist-
watch time by a clock travelling between two events, and this is called
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proper time, which is a quantity all observers can agree on. Since this
proper time is a commonmeasurement of time for all, and independent
of reference frame, it is a very useful way tomeasure time, which allows
the same laws to be used in all frames of reference, and which is there-
fore adopted by physics. In addition, it allows us to easily calculate real
phenomena like time dilation.
Suchmeasurements of time aremade by ideal clockswhich use light
to measure time. This is a sensible choice, since all measure the same
speed of light, and again, since it even matches with physical processes
like biological aging. Rocket Rocky could leave his twin brother Station-
ary Steve travelling at 0.8 c in one direction beforemoving and returning
to find Steve having aged ten years biologically and Rocky having aged
only six years biologically. It is worth saying explicitly that if travelling
twin brother Rocky had left Steve travelling at 0.8 c as in this example,
he would measure three years on his ideal clock while Steve measured
five years. But if Rocky were to have a regular clock on his arm, e.g.
bought at a gas station before leaving, this clock would show five years
just as the clock on Steve’s arm [8]. After all, Rocky would presumably
- like all of us - be moving his arm in all sorts of directions all the time,
and so this mechanical clock would not have been an idealized inertial
frame of reference.
This means that Rocky could easily have measured the same time
as Steve on his whole journey. For example, we could imagine clocks
along his journey hanging outside synchronized with Steve’s clock, so
that Rocky could always look outside his window to see what time it is
for Steve. Alternatively, he could have brought a watch which had been
corrected for the speed effects, such as the GPS watches [9].
Howwe choose tomeasure time is then a choicewemake, where dif-
ferent choices have different advantages. The ideal clocks and reference
frames are very useful coordinate systems for physics, but we need to
be very precise on exactly what they tell us about time, passage, simul-
taneity, future and past, and this is what we are now digging into. In
the twin paradox, ten years pass for Steve and six years for Rocky, and
this is natural to say because Steve has aged biologically four yearsmore
than Rocky. However, it would be wrong to say (even if many examples
do, as anyone can see by writing “twin paradox” and searching google
images) that if Rocky leaves in 2019, it will be 2025 for Rocky and 2029
for Steve when they meet.
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It will be 2029 since the earth will have orbited the sun ten times
since Rocky left, but if Rocky were to measure these orbits, he would
measure the earth as orbiting the sun faster compared to Steve. If he
were to look at it with his eyes (as opposed to measuring with his ideal
watch), he would see the earth going slower when he was moving away
from the light, and then faster when he was moving towards the light,
since the light would travel longer or shorter before reaching his eyes.
Asmeasured in Rocky’s frame of reference (if he travels at 0.8 c), there is
only 0.6 years between each Christmas. But Steve and Rocky will agree
on when it is Christmas, namely when the earth has a certain position
relative to the sun and the other planets - and there are Christmas trees
for sale. They will just disagree on how long the period is between each
Christmas if they use light to measure this time period, but they will
not disagree on how many months it is between each Christmas, if they
measure months not in seconds, but as 1/12 of the time earth takes to
orbit the sun, and roughly one period of the moon orbiting the earth.
If they measure time not by means of light but by means of the earth
orbiting the sun, they will of course agree that it is one year between
each Christmas.
It is useful then to distinguish between one the one hand events hap-
pening and the order in which they occur, and on the other hand how
we can use different coordinate systems and different means of measur-
ingwhen these events occur. There is an important distinction in SR and
GR between what happens within the past light cone of an event and
what happens outside of it. Your past light cone is the region of events
that could have influenced your present moment since they are within
light speed distance. You could have been influenced now by things
that were less than one light-year away one year ago, and less than two
light-years away two years ago, etc., since this could have reached you
now, and so this within your past light cone. But if something wasmore
than a light-year away a year ago, ormore than two light-years away two
years ago, etc., it could not have influenced you now, since it could not
in any way have reached you, and then it was outside your past light
cone.
Events that in your coordinate system is considered by you to be
past andwithin your past light cone, is called the absolute past, whereas
events outside of your past light cone is not. The reason is that different
observers will disagree on what is past and future outside of your past
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light cone, and even inwhich order they occurred. But all observerswill
agree on the order of events in your past light cone [10]. These events
follow a world line, and all observers can agree on the order of events
on a world line, although they will disagree on what happened first of
two disconnected events with a great spatial distance between them.
This has a very interesting consequence. Different observers will
measure different time orders of random events that are far from each
other, but in fact, there is a time order of events that are causally con-
nectible (within a light cone). All events in the universe can be placed
in the light cones of particles from the big bang, so in principle, all ob-
servers should be able to agree on the order of events in the universe, if
they could have communicated with each other. Relative to their own
frames, they would disagree on when the events happened and how
long they took, but they would agree on the order of events.
On the one hand then, we have the order of all the events in the
universe. On the other hand, we have different coordinate systems that
can be used to sort these events into past, present and future. This can be
done in many ways, and it is not the case that something becomes fixed
past by being designated as past by us in a coordinate systemwe choose
to use. Imagine a photon leaving the big bang. In a space-time diagram
it can be seen as travelling at 45 degrees to the right, with a simultaneity
line of 45 degrees, so that the big bang is always simultaneous with it.
After 13.8 billion years in the reference frame of the universe, for this
photon the big bang is still happening at the present moment, and the
13.8 billion years of universe history is future relative to the reference
frame of this photon. If the photon a second later (in the universe frame)
starts travelling in the opposite direction, then its simultaneity line gets
tilted 45 degrees upwards to the left, and now the 13.8 billion years that
the universe has lasted and the next 13.8 billion years of the future of
the universe, will all be 27.6 billion years of past relative to the reference
frame of this photon. In one second, 27.6 billion years of future becomes
27.6 billion years of past to this photon.
The good thing about using reference frames this way, is that we
learn something right about photons and how they do not seem to age
since they travel at the speed of light. On the other hand, it does not
make sense to say that a photon can gain 27.6 billion years of history
in one second. The reference frame of the photon is not useful for dis-
cussing the age of the universe. If we want to say something interesting
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about the age of the universe, we need a reference frame for the whole
universe, and this can be defined. Even if the geometry of space and time
does not prefer a special frame, the content of space and time makes
some reference frames special [2]. Not in the sense that different laws
apply to these reference frames, but in the sense that they stand out as
special. There is a frame of reference for the universe as a whole, where
the background radiation from the big bang is similar in all directions,
and this is the reference frame for the universe as a whole. It is used to
define the age of the universe, as being ca 13.8 billion years [3].
A notable attempt at defining global simultaneity has been offered
by William Lane Craig. Craig has both argued in favour of a Lorentz
interpretation of relativity with an absolute space, and that there is a
preferred foliation of space-time which gives us global simultaneity. It
is possible to define a reference frame for the universe as a whole where
the galaxies are fundamental observers at rest with one another, which
gives you a space-timemetric called Friedman-Lemaitre-Robertson-Wal-
ker [11], [9]. Craig Callender has criticized these attempts at a solution.
While the Lorentz interpretation of special relativity is equivalent to the
standard interpretation, this is not the case when it comes to general rel-
ativity. According to Callender, general relativity is overwhelmingly
better than Lorentz both theoretically and empirically when it comes to
interpreting gravity [3].
When it comes to the preferred foliation of the Friedman-Lemaitre-
Robertson-Walker space-timemetric, Callender offers four counterargu-
ments. 1) It depends on making average calculations for the universe
as a whole which are not accurate descriptions of what happens locally.
It is found by different global averaging techniques and cannot be used
to define a global now that all can agree on at specific local places. It
seems strange that metaphysical time should behave according to an
average and less accurate description of specific events. 2) We are not
fundamental observers, but rather inmotion relative to the galaxies, and
even galaxies collide. 3) The selection of this reference frame is still a
random selection since the theory of relativity does not support that it
is special. What is so special about the fundamental observers? 4) Why
should we believe that the time we experience is connected to this ar-
tificial definition of time? It is useful for several purposes, but not for
others [3].
Even if Callender makes these objections in 2017, Craig offers an
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answer to these critiques in an article from 2003. His response is that
the cosmic time of the universe coincides from its creation with meta-
physical time, but that there are local disturbances in our physical time
due to motion and gravity [12]. Against this response, Callender could
ask what accounts for this disturbance and argue that we should use
GR instead of Lorentz to account for it; and he could ask whether local
disturbance also implies that there must be different experiences of the
present moment existing at the same time.
I shall not enter the discussion between Craig and Callender, but
suggest another solution instead, which seems to be an easier way to
the same goal as Craig has. Even if it is true that the geometry of GR
does not give us a way to define a global simultaneity slice through the
whole universe, we can nevertheless make sense of the idea of a global
simultaneity slice. We can understand what it means by reflection even
if we cannot perform an experiment to measure it. How? Imagine the
reference frame of the universe as a lattice work of synchronized cam-
eras permeating the whole universe, and then taking a picture at one
point of time, as defined by this frame. The pictures could be combined
into one big snapshot of the universe, where one could see some ob-
jects being contracted. This cannot be done in practice, and black holes
would disturb parts of it, and it is a definition of universal simultaneity
which physics has no need for, but it is a definition of universal simul-
taneity that makes sense, contra those who say that no such concept can
make sense.
Why should we believe that a definition of time which gives global
simultaneity should be connected to our experience of time? It is com-
mon to believe that the physical state of the universe (which includes
the physical states of the brains in the universe) causes the conscious
experiences there are of the universe, and so this creates a link between
the actualized configuration of a universe at a point of time and how
the universe is consciously experienced. The brain causes us to experi-
ence the universe at it was about 80 milliseconds ago [13]. This means
that while the now of the conscious experience is simultaneouswith the
present moment of the universe, the content of the conscious experience
is the universe as it was about 80 milliseconds ago.
Some have also used quantummechanics to support the idea of glob-
al simultaneity, but Callender argues that the simultaneity of quantum
mechanics need not correspond to the simultaneity defined by meta-
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physics [3]. But it does suggest global simultaneity, and if the entangled
particle can be anywhere in the universe, and there is only one universe
existing at a time, and if the entanglement is due to laws governing the
whole universe, the most natural assumption to make is that they coin-
cide. Different lines of reasoning can thus support each other and the
belief in one global simultaneity.
Against my point that the configuration of the brains of the universe
causes the content of consciousness, Callender argues that all conscious
experiences of it being now in the past and the future exist at the same
time [3]. The problem with this view is that then all these configura-
tions of the universe at every moment must exist at different places. If
a door is closed one second and open the next second, you cannot have
an open and a closed door at the same place, so it must be two different
places, which gives you a very complicated ontology.
The big choice tomake iswhether to believewith the presentists that
what exists at such a universal slice of simultaneity is all that exists, or
whether to believewith the eternalists that all simultaneity slices exist at
the same time. The question is whether to believe that there is one three-
dimensional world that changes through time orwhether to believe that
there exists a four-dimensional block universe where every event exists
in the sameway, with no interesting ontological difference between past
and future.
We have seen some of the advantages that make physicists choose
no reference frame as special, but what is actually the ontology that is
being presupposed if you make this physics into an ontology of a block
universe? What does it mean to live in a block universe? To consider
this, imagine moving your hand slowly towards your face. At first, the
hand is 20 centimeters away, then 15 centimeters, then 10 centimeters,
etc. If these moments all exist in the same way, there must exist forever
a states of affairs where your hand is localized 20 centimeters from your
face, and a state of affairs where your hand is localized 10 centimeters
from your face, but this must then happen at two different places. There
is a you that sees the hand 20 centimeters away and a you that sees it
10 centimeters away, and these two events cannot be happening at the
same time and place, but if both exist in the sameway forever, theymust
be happening at two different places in order to be understandable as
something existing.
If the universe is a four-dimensional block universe, then “time” and
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“dimension” must be something unknown which exists and where
things can be located. And there must be an infinity of states of affairs
existing at the same time: a whole universe where my hand is 20 cen-
timeters from my face, a whole universe where my hand is 15 centime-
ters from my face, a whole universe where my hand is 10 centimeters
from my face, etc.
Or maybe one has another strange theory about objects as four-di-
mensional objects with time parts, but this will also be something
unknown and mystical. The point I am trying to make is that a four-
dimensional universe is a quite bizarre ontology which takes on board
a lot of problems in order to win a few advantages in how physics is
done. William Lane Craig makes the same point, that the block uni-
verse implies a bizarre ontology [9]. You can get rid of a preferred frame
of reference, but have to take on an infinite number of universes and a
strange spacetime substance with an unknown kind of dimension – in
addition to other problems: How did this massive block come into exis-
tence all at once, or how could it be like this forever? It makes so much
more sense with a three-dimensional universe that has changed and de-
veloped over time. We understand how evolution can select those who
are best fit to survive over time, but if everything has always existed in
a giant frozen now, how does evolution make sense? How should we
understand the advantages that have selected some species if all have
just existed forever anyway?
The defender of a four-dimensional universe could still argue that
physics have taught us that we live in a four-dimensional world, and
that we need the geometry of spacetime to explain why things move
as they do. Minkowski famously said that space and time must fade
away and spacetime take its place [14]. An important choice must here
be made: should we believe that spacetime and its geometry explains
motion in theworld, or shouldwe think instead thatmotion in theworld
happens according to certain rules, which are best described by a certain
geometry?
We already know that motion in the world happens according to
certain rules, so it would be a simpler theory if we could remove four-
dimensional spacetime as an additional entity with a certain structure
and a capacity for influencing objects. Harvey Brown argues this in his
book Physical relativity. It is not the geometry of space that makes ob-
jects contract or move slower, rather there are physical explanations for
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this, which are then well described by use of the Lorentz-factor and the
geometries of SR and GR [15].
Brown argues that we have no idea what a geometrical explanation
for contraction would be, and that we have no reason to believe that the
geometry of spacetime should explain anything. A common example
is that spacetime geometry explains inertia in the way that objects natu-
rally follow geodesics, but Brownpoints out that spinning objects do not
follow geodesics, and argues instead that it is the field equations that ex-
plain inertia. Clock and rods do not know what kind of spacetime they
are in. It is the laws of nature that explains why the geometry of GR is
useful to describe the universe, it is not the geometry that explains how
the universe works [15].
There are many possibilities within GR geometry that are obviously
not physically possible [3], [16]. This supports the view that GR geo-
metry should be understood as a theoretical frameworkwhich is helpful
in describing the world, but not that it is a description of an entity ex-
isting in the world. Instead of thinking that spacetime has a geometry
we can discover, I would say instead that we can discover the rules that
nature follows, and use geometry to describe systematic relations in the
motion that results.
3 Conclusion
In this article I have discussed the Rietdijk-Putnam-Penrose argument,
which argues from the relativity of simultaneity in the theory of relativ-
ity to a block universe. Arthur Prior responded to a similar argument by
saying that time in relativity was an artificial framework. In this article
I have tried to spell out in more detail the response offered by Prior, by
showing how different theoretical frameworks of time work, and how
they have different advantages and disadvantages. Because of their dif-
ference, lack of global simultaneity in general relativity does not show
that the future must already be fixed. Instead, we have many reasons to
prefer the theoretical framework of presentism.
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Abstract
My main purpose in this paper is to argue that eternalism in the block
universe conception is compatible with change, in a specific sense. After
introducing some restrictions and relinquishing some aspects of eternal-
istic models (such as, for instance, the Parmenidean character sometimes
associated with them), we will be able to preserve everything that is rel-
evant to that end. The chance to introduce such restrictions will occur in
the context of a possible answer to Niall Shanks (1994), who argues that
the classical block universe is incompatible with free will. After rejecting
the author’s arguments, we will introduce hybrid models, which, despite
being eternalistic, can accommodate the passage of time and what we
call “strong change”. The original contribution of this paper is, mostly, to
bring to light the conditions in which a strong change can be introduced
in an eternalistic model, and presenting what is gained and what is lost
with such a move.
Keywords: Eternalism, Parmenideanworld, change, free-will, hybridmod-
els.
1 Introduction
One of the most intriguing texts making a connection between eternal-
ism and determinism was written by Niall Shanks (1994). Here, we
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try to tackle the determinist challenges raised by that author. My main
purpose is to make an argument for the compatibility between eter-
nalism and change, in a specific sense, which I shall designate “strong
change”. Shanks’s argument depends on a certain interpretation of eter-
nalism, which is as a classical model of a fixed or static world. I shall
interpret what Shanks calls S-theory as the union of eternalism, Four-
Dimensionalism and B-series, thus resulting in the so-called Parmeni-
dean block universe.1
Shanks presents at least two requirements that are supposedly
incompatible with eternalism, and without which there is no free will,
because some sort of determinism cannot be avoided.2 These are: a) that
parts of theworld can bemodified by the intervention of free agents and
b) that there are many occurrence possibilities for each point in space-
time (cf. Oaklander, 1998, p. 196). Shanks also attempts to discern a
nomological criterion, which he stops short of endorsing. In what fol-
lows, I shall present a version of the argument that assumes the impos-
sibility of change, in a specific sense, as long as eternalism is concerned.
2 Is the change of parts possible in an eternalistic
world?
There is a clear sense in which eternalistic worlds allow for change: a
change in such a world would be just the difference of properties be-
tween stages in a B-series (cf. Rea, 2003; Russell, 1915). When we move
from one position to another in the series, we find different properties in
the different temporal stages of an object and, in that sense, properties
change. But will that “change” help us to solve the problem pointed out
by Shanks? Oaklander thinks that for there to be change it suffices that
there are different properties, instantiated at different times (cf. Oak-
lander, 1998). If Oaklander is right about this, the differences available
to the S-theorist put him in a position to adequately deal with contexts
in which there is change without generation or corruption.
1S-theory is a term used by Shanks to refer to a classical Parmenindean block uni-
verse. In this context, “S-theory” can be interpreted to mean something like “The Static
Theory of Time” or even “The Theory of a Static World”.
2Assuming a libertarian point of view.
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We can show how the S-theorist can explain the beginning and end
of a headache. The explanation will be satisfactory if it can indicate
when the headache occurs and when it does not, and which events (be-
ginning and end of a headache) can be indicated relative to other events,
i.e. in McTaggartian type-B relationships (McTaggart, 1908), as in the
examples “I have a headache now, while I’m watching the game (pre-
sent)”, or “my headache started before I saw the hill (past)”.
Part of the difficulty lies in thinking that only a temporal difference
could avoid some confusion between the beginning and the end of a
headache. But we can resort to an indexical strategy, which is very com-
mon among eternalist and non-temporalist theorists. In that strategy,
T1 is the time at which I become aware that I have a headache. The
non-temporalised treatment is given by indexation to that time in the
following manner: I have a headache now, in that “now” refers to my
realisation (my awareness) that I have a headache. For T2, the moment
in which I no longer have a headache, a similar process applies, in terms
of “my headache started before this […]” in that “this” refers to some
sense data. The important thing is that there is a translation of tempo-
ralised (tensed) sentences into non-temporalised (tenseless) sentences.
Naturally, the fact that T1 and T2 are ontologically on par (they both
exist) does not make them co-existent in any problematic sense; that is,
it does not make them simultaneous, as if present and past were the
same. What makes it seem so is merely a misunderstanding of non-
temporalism, when similarity with space is ascribed to it.
Meanwhile, for the sake of the argument, let us assume that there is
a more challenging version of the problem, in which it is required that
parts change in a different way. Let us call that state “strong change”.
Peter Geach considers that the sense in which things change, often sug-
gested by eternalists, does not consist of any change in the proper sense
of the term. The sense envisagedbyGeach is preciselywhat I call “strong
change”:
On this view, the variation of a poker’s temperature with
time would simply mean that there were different tempera-
tures at different positions along the poker’s time axis. But
this […] would no more be a change in temperature than
a variation in temperature along a poker’s length would be
[…] We thus have a view that really abolishes change, by
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reducing change to a mere variation of attributes between
different parts of a whole. (Geach, 1972, pp. 304-305)
Strong change is, theoretically, incompatible with S-theory. Zim-
merman (1998, p. 212), for instance, argues that doing justice to our
pre-theoretical intuition that the past “is over” and the future “is yet to
come” is a motivation to take the doctrine of presentism seriously. The
reason for this is related to the fact that, according to the doctrine of
eternalism, there is no “absolute becoming”, since that notion is incom-
patible with the idea that the future and the past are ontologically on
the same footing as the present. Let us assume that the kind of change
Shanks is after coincides with that second kind, and that such a concept
presupposes a non-staticworld, typically represented by presentism (al-
though it should be noted that there are non-presentist models that ap-
ply as well). So, in order to explore the author’s argument, we may ask:
is there free will, given that the world of the S-theorist has no change
in that sense? Let us consider a specific and simple version of Shanks’s
argument:
a) The world is an S-type world;
b) If the world is an S-type world, then there is no strong change;
c) Without strong change, there is no causally efficacious action;
d) In order for there to be free will, our actions must be causally
efficacious;
e) Therefore, there is no free will.
The main premise is based upon the idea that an action is causally
efficacious if it changes something in the world. The second is based
upon the impossibility of instancing strong change in a classic block
universe, i.e. an S-world. The conclusion is that there is no free will
in such a world. In response to this argument, I will mostly try to show
that: 1) free will is not threatened by the absence of change, as long as
there is contingency and 2) eternalism is compatible with hybrid mod-
els in which strong change can be instantiated. We will see that it is not
eternalism we lose after to introduce a strong change, but rather some
aspects that make up the block universe when conceived in the classical
manner.
Supposedly, the point is that if something is unchangeable, then it
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is, in some sense relevant to the consideration of some version of deter-
minism, necessary. But “being changeable” allows for a counterfactual
reading. In the end, even a block universe can have “changeable” parts,
i.e. a point in space-time that has the configuration XYZ could verywell
not have had it, at least if we think of the possibility of a different occur-
rence, prima facie. The correct understanding of fixidity in an S-world
is the following: an S-type world is a world where all facts exist and
all events occur, hence, it is “complete”. But such completeness, which
is configured in a certain way, could have been different. This view is
close to that held by Plantinga, whose aim is to illustrate a particular
solution to the problem of future contingents (cf. Plantinga, 1974). One
can interpret it as an answer to Shanks’s challenge. It suffices that things
that are a certain way could have been different, that is, to have contin-
gency is sufficient in order to avoid determinism. The question I pose to
Shanks is this: In order to avoid determinism, is it sufficient that there
is a counterfactual reading, which can be applied to at least a few facts
in the world?
If we answer “no” to the above question, thenwe can further inquire
whether, for the same reasons, non-eternalistic models evade determin-
ism. In a presentistic world, the objects that exist now could only exhibit
different properties in a counterfactual situation. But that is not contrary
to the fact that theworld is eternalistic. In the end, the spell turns against
the sorcerer. It would hardly be possible to refuse the counterfactual
answer without charging different theories, even presentism. The coun-
terfactual solution, inspired by Plantinga, can be successfully adopted
by anyonewho endorses the so-called S-theory andwishes to claim that
the existence of free will remains intact, without any underlying or im-
plied determinism.
3 Are there multiple possibilities of occurrence
for each point in space-time, in an eternalistic
world?
The kind of questions Shanks raises exhibits a pattern: the fixidity of
an S-world makes us think of the absence of free will. The fixidity of
the world means that each point of space-time has definite properties.
That fixidity, which we cannot call determinism in the classical sense
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(in the author’s vocabulary, classical determinism is referred to as “dy-
namic determinism”), can be designated as “ontological determinism”
(Shanks, 1994, p. 56). But does that entail that something must be nec-
essary, in a relevant sense to argue in favor of determinism? Shanks
thinks it does, since any change that was brought about by a free agent
would be just a particular case of “strong change” (Shanks, 1994, p. 57).
The author is not alone in this reasoning, as there are at least some schol-
ars who discuss it quite seriously. Torretti mentions, while speaking of
the consequences of relativity of simultaneity for ontology, an alleged
“chronogeometrical determinism” (Torretti, 1983, p. 29), while Savitt
prefers the term “chronogeometrical fatalism” (Savitt, 2017).3 Both are
considering the consequence of the world’s fixidity, which is suppos-
edly implied by relativity. But does the fixidity of the world have any
component that bears a commitment to any form of determinism?
There is at least one eternalist version that does not establish a re-
lation between fixidity and necessity. That version is ockhamist eter-
nalism, proposed by Rea and Finch (2008). It is an interpretation of
ockhamism as a solution to the problem of future contingents. In that
version, the “thin red line” is marked over the actual future. The “ac-
tual future” is understood in the non-temporalised manner, that is, as a
sequence of events in a B-series. As is usual in that kind of solution, the
thin red line ismarked over a future that, despite being actual, possesses
non-necessary events and objects. If that version is efficient in dispelling
fatalism for those who accept logical principles like bivalence, it is also
effective in avoiding the challenge set by Shanks.
One difficulty with ockhamist eternalism is the impossibility of dis-
tinguishing a tree of time from a more orthodox interpretation, accord-
ing to which the many futures are not parts of one and the same world
(or universe), but rather multiple possible worlds, of which one would
be real (or actual) and the others mere possibilities. In effect, if the fu-
ture marked out by a red line is actual, what can we say of those that are
not actual? The difference between both seems to be modal, giving rise
to the question: what criterion would we need if we wanted to know if
a model was a tree model or a multiple worlds model? It is a question
to which I have no answer. Meanwhile, I note that question could also
3In referring to those consequences, whether they are determinists or fatalists, the
authors are not necessarily declaring that they are convinced that our world functions
in this way.
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have the reverse meaning: we could ask the theorist who considers the
differences between the several futures to be differences between possi-
ble worlds why he thinks this is the case, rather than considering these
to be differences between possible futures in a temporal tree. If there is
not an objective criterion, there is no way to avoid that question. In an-
other example: someone who travelled in time into the past could pose
himself the question: how do I know I have not travelled to another
world, one which has the same past (or, at least, a past indistinguish-
able from my world of origin)? Again, one could also ask the reverse:
If someone who travelled between worlds came to a world whose past
was identical, how could he be sure whether, by some chance, he had
not made a journey into the past (of his world of origin)?
Perhaps the fact that we can raise the question in different ways con-
tributes to the view that there is no substantial difference between these
models. If that is the case, then there is no problem in adopting either in-
terpretation. Ockhamist eternalism can perhaps be interpreted as a tree
model — a structure of many worlds with a common past — or even as
an everettian multiverse (Everett, 1957).
4 Can an eternalistic world have nomological con-
tingency?
Nomological (or causal) determinism has not been abundantly men-
tioned in this argument thus far. Shanks, does not recognise it as di-
rectly implied by S-theory. But is it that obvious that there is no ver-
sion of nomological determinism possible for someone that accepts S-
theory? At least it is not difficult to imagine an argument to the con-
trary, which could likewise be assessed. Here is how we could conceive
a challenge involving the nomological notion of determinism:
a) If the world is a block universe, then there must be unity between
its spatio-temporal parts;
b) Unity between parts cannot have gaps, i.e. parts that are not com-
patible with others or not explainable from others, sequentially;
c) Nomological contingency demands gaps;
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d) Therefore, nothing in a block universe is nomologically contin-
gent.4
Which premise would we reject in order to avoid the above conclu-
sion? The argument rests on the idea that parts in an eternalistic world
are connected. Moreover, if that world is governed by laws, then having
nomological contingency means not being connected. To reject that ar-
gument is sufficient to present a case in which parts are connected and
governed by laws, and yet, determinism fails. Worlds with probabilis-
tic laws are an example. None of the parts in a world whose laws are
probabilistic is disconnected. The rejected premise is the third, the one
stating that contingency in phenomena requires gaps. In fact, if the laws
of nature plus the initial conditions do not lead to one single possible
future, it is not because there are gaps between parts, but because parts
of space-time are related in accordance with, for instance, probabilistic
laws.
5 Hybrid models and temporalised eternalisms
I can continue by exploring some solutions inspired byOaklander (1998).
Among his arguments, I wish to point out the confusion that results
from attributing a complete similarity to time and space, i.e. it is be-
cause time and space are the same that we do not have strong change.
Meanwhile, I shall advance the discussion of the separation of time and
space a little more so as to challenge S-theory itself and its supposed
entailment by special relativity.
In any case, I can deny that time and space are completely similar.
That seems to be an important premise of Shanks’s reasoning when he
argues that S-theory entails the fixidity of the world. The point here
arises from the understanding that there are differences between time
and space, which some philosophers have captured, e.g. Russell (1915),
Broad (1921), Clifford Williams (1994) and Oaklander (1998). The spa-
tialisation of time, in which the eternalist theorist would be incurring,
would make it seem that all events exist eternally, without change, gen-
eration or corruption. These aspects be not compatible with non-tempo-
4“Nomological contingency” means only that the laws of nature, or some other ele-
ment capable of describing the occurrence of phenomena in succession, do not have or
do not entail a single state of affairs in each point of space-time.
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ralised theories, because they would introduce an undeniably temporal
element to the McTaggartian B-series.
An eternalist theorist does not believe in ontological differences be-
tween events and objects that are in the past, present and future. How-
ever, he may believe in important differences, such as the phenomeno-
logical difference between “past, present and future” beyond the irre-
ducibility between the many different “times” in which temporal parts
of objects exist, i.e. no part being reducible to another. The associa-
tion between time and space is strongly suggestive of the Parmenidean
character of eternalism, often claimed for philosophers (cf. Rea, 2003;
Gödel, 1949). But is this, necessarily, the case? I would like to radicalise
the non-spatialisation of time, even if for that purpose I have to reject
S-theory. I think we can do it without losing eternalism, which will
remain set.5 But what do we lose, if anything, when introducing one
change (or two, or many) to an eternalistic model of the world? What
do we lose if such a model is subject to corruption (being destroyed);
what do we lose if we consider that this world was created by God (did
it come to existence at some point)? The answer does not present any
loss relative to its eternalistic aspect.
Eternalism can be understood as guaranteed, as long as there is onto-
logical equality between past, present and future. Naturally, that does
not mean that the properties “to be in the past, to be in the present and
to be in the future” exist. It means only that eternalism will be guaran-
teed if those things (objects and events) that I would call past, present
and future exist. However, if in an eternalistic model there is change in
a strong sense, that is, if there is generation, corruption or transforma-
tion, it may be difficult to establish a concrete difference between it and
non-eternalistic models. For instance, what difference would a change-
able eternalism (one inwhich the change involvedwould imply growth)
make for a growing block universe? As is known, a growing block uni-
verse has a past and a present without ontological distinction; however,
relative to the future, there is a distinction to be made (cf. Broad, 1923).
I should offer a criterion by which the eternalistic world, one allowing
5This model can be, for instance, a more A-series eternalistic type model, as in the
so-called theory of the moving light focus (cf. Skow, 2015, Deasy, 2015; Ross Cameron
2015). Furthermore, a different model could also be proposed — something that es-
chews the previously defined scheme, which divides models and theories into A-series
and B-series.
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for strong change, could be shown to be different from it. Unlike the
classical block universe, that eternalismwould not differ from the grow-
ing model on account of it being unmovable or unchangeable. How to
tell them apart, then? My proposal is: both models would differ by
the criterion relative to growth or de-growth. When a change is intro-
duced, in an eternalistic world, this should be such that there is no in-
crement in the existent whole — it may remain the same or decrease,
but never grow. As such, it will never be mistaken for Broad’s growing
block model.
That can be the case if I introduce some restrictions. For instance, to
such amodel of aworld one should not attributemore properties than it
had (before the introduction of a change), nor should it have more rela-
tions between the properties. A growing block universe necessarily has
new properties, more properties or relations between properties. This
model also necessarily preserves every property that comes to existence.
But is there any model that corresponds to such criteria? The answer is
yes. The McCall model (1994) is a competent one when it comes to
unifying things that seem to be in conflict, such as, for instance, strong
change and eternalism. In that model, the world is a time tree, time
passes and, at each interval of time, some branches, representing the
many possible futures, disappear. In the end, when only one branch
remains, one has something very close to what the ockhamist would
understand to be the “actual future”. The actual future is only one of
many, not being, indeed, necessary:
For it to be considered a model similar to McCall’s, the time tree
represented above must slowly lose its branches. One always prevails
while another one perishes. An interesting aspect of this model is that,
in it, the passage of time is a phenomenon with the following dynamics:
in one moment T0, the tree of time exists fully, as in a common eternal-
istic model. In T1, it does not have the same properties, for it lost objects
and, with them, relations and properties. That process continues until
the end, when one single state of affairs prevails, eternalistic as in the
beginning, but smaller. Furthermore, that tree of time is eternalistic be-
cause, in it, there are events that are non-present. Naturally, in saying
that certain points in that tree are the “past”, I are not attributing any
properties to those points . Furthermore, it is for that reason that such
a model can be accepted as eternalistic. The “past” and the “future”, in
the model above, can be understood in the following manner: there are
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Figure 1
6
at least some “nodes” (the green points in the picture) that represent
objects and events in a relationship of anteriority or posteriority. Any
node located to the left of any other represents its past. The same ap-
plies for the future relationship (any node located to the right of any
other represents its future).
But why do I say that such a model is an example of the above-
mentioned criteria? In effect, after a time interval, properties cease to
exist, altering the global state of the tree. However, since no new object
was introduced, and no relation or property was added to the whole, I
have precisely the result I want. Those were my criteria, perfectly per-
ceptible in McCall’s model.
In any case, there is still one other possibility. Consider eternal-
istic models of worlds that are very simple, whose only objects con-
sist of indiscernible, though numerically different, particles. Let us call
those particles “quarks”. Thanks to the property of “isomorphism”,7
7In mathematics, isomorphism is a bijective correspondence between all the ele-
ments of two structures. That correspondence preserves the operations of both. The
concept of “isomorphism” is used in more than one context. In linguistics, isomor-
phism is considered to exist between structures of two different orders of facts when
both present the same kind of combinatorial relations; thus, if the combinatorial laws
of morphemes are identical to the combinatorial laws of semes (syntax = semantics),
there is isomorphism between both. In our use of the concept, two structures with ob-
jects change through the replacement of the objects, or of the order those subjects have
in a series.
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those models can accommodate strong change without falling short of
the criteria that was mentioned. A quark can be replaced by another
quark without altering, globally, the number of objects and relations,
i.e. assuming isomorphism between relations and objects. The result of
change will always be a new model, which will be isomorphic, relative
to the first one. If those models fit my criteria, they show the intelligibil-
ity of eternalism with strong change.
There is yet another question that remains: What losses would re-
sult if, in a block universe, a change was introduced? I claim that eter-
nalism remains, despite the fact that, in such a case, we no longer have
a classical model. Indeed, the only loss is that eternalism is distanced
from the picture of a Parmenidean universe. But that loss is not diffi-
cult to incorporate. Today it is a common belief among theorists that
eternalism is compatible with A-series temporalism (Rea, 2003; Fischer,
2016). One loses, in that case, the S-theory as understood by the Shanks.
However, that is another point I wish to raise: Shanks seems to under-
stand that contemporary physics implies the so-called S-theory, which
I interpret as the union between eternalism, Four-Dimensionalism and
McTaggartian B-series, in a Parmenidean block universe. But contem-
porary physics, particularly special relativity, does not entail S-theory,
but only (theoretically) the non-existence of an ontologically privileged
present. As such, even those who accept that implication can avoid the
rigidity of S-theory.
6 Conclusion
Even assuming S-theory, it is not necessary that some version of deter-
minism is a consequence. There is a modal solution in which determin-
ism does not follow, where the world’s fixidity is compatible with non-
actualised states of affairs. Thus, the world could be different in some
point of space-time. If theworld could be different in some respect, does
not follow what Shanks says about the impossibility of a strong change
to occur, resulting from the act of some autonomous agent. To complete
that answer, I seek to show that the supposed problem, relative to the
fixidity of everything and its implications for free will, would apply to
any doctrine, presentism included. It would apply, at least, as long as
the answer in terms of contingency, inspired by Plantinga, was not ac-
cepted.
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Finally, I show where Shanks makes an error of assuming S-theory
and I explain the misleading reasoning involved. My latter response de-
nies that eternalism, allegedly entailed by contemporary physics accord-
ing to classic interpretations of special relativity, must be understood to
include all the elements making up S-theory. The illusion that a static
theory is the only possible eternalistic model occurs because, often, it is
thought that introducing some strong change in the world entails hav-
ing to ontologically distinguish between the past, present and future via
the introduction of a privileged present, compatible only with theories
such as presentism or the model of the growing universe (Broad, 1923).
I seek to show that it is not quite the case, and claim that eternalism can
be entailed bymodern physics without some of the associationsmaking
up S-theory. In the process of this argumentation, I show how to accom-
modate eternalism and strong change in models. My main point here
(which is also the most original contribution) clarifies the conditions
that allow us to have models with such properties.
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Abstract
We live in a world of possibilities, and there are many kinds of possibil-
ity. One popular way to conceive of possibilities is to view them asmodal
alternatives to actuality. Different kinds of possibility can then be dis-
tinguished in terms of their modal strength. However, not all kinds of
possibility fit into this general scheme. In this paper, I will introduce the
notion of real possibility into the vast landscape of possibilities and show
that it requires a fundamental shift in perspective with respect to how
actuality and possibility can be related: real possibilities constitute tempo-
ral alternatives for actuality rather than modal alternatives to actuality. I will
discuss how this distinction bears on the formal representation of possi-
bilities. The upshot is this: while possible worlds provide a perspicuous
framework for modeling possibilities as modal alternatives to actuality,
real possibilities—as temporal alternatives for actuality—are most ade-
quately represented in Prior’s theory of branching time.
Keywords: (Real) Possibility, Actuality, Open Future, Possible Worlds,
Branching Time.
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1 Introduction
Today is Sunday, March 31, 2019. It is half past two in the afternoon.
I am in Stockholm, sitting at my desk typing these sentences. Outside
the sun is shining. It is a mild spring day. At this very moment, in the
stadium Galgenwaard in Utrecht, the referee blows the whistle, signal-
ing the kick-off for the soccer match between FCUtrecht and Feyenoord
Rotterdam.
There is a sense in which it is possible that I am in Utrecht now,
standing in the stadium Galgenwaard cheering for FC Utrecht. In the
very same sense, it is also possible that I am right now enjoying a stroll
through the old town of Stockholm. And there are many more possibil-
ities. My desk could, for example, be black rather than white. It could
be cloudy rather than sunny. And staring out of the window, I won-
der whether there could be giant trees on Earth growing more than 200
meters into the sky or birds flying by faster than the speed of light.
Any of the above scenarios is possible in a certain respect. None of
them constitutes a real possibility, however. What is really possible, on
the other hand, is that I now take a break from writing and follow the
soccer match on the radio. It is likewise really possible that I skip the
match and continue writing for another few hours. In either case, I may
go for a walk in the old town later on, or I may just as well spend the
evening at home.
We live in a world of possibilities, and there are many kinds of pos-
sibility. One popular way to conceive of possibilities is to view them as
modal alternatives to actuality. Different kinds of possibility can then be
distinguished in terms of their modal strength. However, not all kinds
of possibility fit into this general scheme. In this paper, I will introduce
the notion of real possibility into the vast landscape of possibilities and
show that it requires a fundamental shift in perspective with respect to
how actuality and possibility can be related. In order to bring out the
relevant difference, I draw a distinction between modal alternatives to ac-
tuality and temporal alternatives for actuality. Real possibilities fall into
the second class. Whereas modal alternatives to actuality capture what
could be actual but is not, temporal alternatives for actuality represent
what can become actual as the future unfolds. I will discuss how this
distinction bears on the formal representation of possibilities. The up-
shot is this: while possible worlds provide a perspicuous framework
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for modeling possibilities as modal alternatives to actuality, real pos-
sibilities—as temporal alternatives for actuality—are most adequately
represented in Prior’s theory of branching time.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 is devoted to the con-
ception of possibilities as modal alternatives to actuality, and I briefly
review the most prominent kinds of possibility that are standardly dis-
cussed in the literature. Section 3 provides an explication of real possi-
bilities as temporal alternatives for actuality. In section 4, I turn to the
formal representation of possibilities. I will highlight crucial differences
between possible worlds and the theory of branching time and reveal
the prospects of Prior’s framework for modeling real possibilities.
2 Possibilities as Modal Alternatives to Actuality
The conception of possibilities asmodal alternatives to actuality is firmly
rooted in the idea that things could be different—in ever so many ways
—from what they actually are. Actuality is deemed to be but one of
many possibilities. At the moment, I am actually sitting here in Stock-
holm at my desk typing these sentences. But there are alternative pos-
sibilities: modal alternatives to this actuality.
Suppose you are ignorant about my weekend’s activities. Then, for
all you know, it is possible that I went to Utrecht this weekend and
am now standing in the stadium Galgenwaard cheering for FC Utrecht,
and your imperfect state of knowledge also renders it possible that I am
presently enjoying a stroll through the old town of Stockholm. On the
basis of your knowledge, you cannot rule out either of these possibili-
ties. Given what you know, any of them could be actual. The notion of
possibility at stake here is epistemic possibility. Epistemic possibilities re-
flect our epistemic uncertainty as to what actually is the case. They are
modal alternatives to actuality in virtue of an agent’s state of knowledge.
The less you know, the more epistemic possibilities there are.
However, epistemic possibilities by no means exhaust the space of
possibility. Alongside epistemic possibilities, there is a whole variety of
different kinds of possibility that constitute modal alternatives to actu-
ality in virtue of some ontic aspect of the world. In order to distinguish
them from epistemic possibilities, the latter are commonly referred to
as alethic possibilities. Alethic possibilities themselves are often divided
into logical, metaphysical, and physical possibilities, and the distinctions
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between these notions are explained as differences in modal strength:
when moving from logical to metaphysical to physical possibility, the
link with the world becomes stronger and stronger, or so the idea goes.
Hence, what is physically possible is also metaphysically possible, and
what is metaphysically possible is also logically possible, but not vice
versa.
The general scheme underlying the notions of logical, metaphysi-
cal, and physical possibility is fairly straightforward: in each case, some
ontic aspect of the world takes center stage, and in determining the rel-
evant range of possibilities, we keep this aspect fixed while we allow
others to vary. All configurations of things that can be consistently ob-
tained this way—that is, which are compatible with the given aspect of
the world—constitute salient modal alternatives in the relevant respect.
One rather common and intuitive way to fill in this general scheme is to
say that the ontic aspect that is at the core of the notion of logical possi-
bility is the logical form, whereasmetaphysical possibility is based on the
nature of things and physical possibility on the laws of nature. But let us
have a more detailed look at the traditional kinds of alethic possibility
and their intuitive classification.
Logical possibility is alethic possibility in the broadest possible
sense, and it is a rather abstract notion, if the link with the world only
comes in via the weak notion of logical form. We can think of the lat-
ter as the most general form of combination of things: the logical form
invokes a classification of things into objects and properties, and it de-
termines how objects and properties can be combined with each other
to form a state of affairs, and how different states of affairs can be com-
bined to form larger and larger configurations—abstracting away from
the very nature of things.1
This logical way of combining things is generous: not only is it log-
ically possible that I am in the stadium Galgenwaard in Utrecht right
now or that I am presently enjoying a walk through the old town of
Stockholm, but we may even say that it is logically possible that I am
both in Utrecht and in the old town of Stockholm at the very same time;
just as it is logically possible that my desk is simultaneously both black
all over and white all over. Note that the contradictions arising here are
1The account of logical possibility outlined here is, of course, very much in line with
the account of possibility that Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus (Wittgenstein
1922, [19]).
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not due to the logical form. By way of contrast, what is logically impos-
sible is me being in Utrecht and not being in Utrecht at the very same
time; just as it is logically impossible for my desk to be simultaneously
both white all over and not white all over. Nothing can have a property
and at the same time lack it.
Metaphysical possibility is far stronger than this: here the link with
theworld is establishednotmerely via the abstract notion of logical form
but also through the nature of things. By their very nature, objects have
some properties necessarily, others contingently. Some properties ex-
clude each other, others invariably co-occur—simply by virtue of being
the properties they are.
It is certainly not only logically but also metaphysically possible that
I am in the stadiumGalgenwaard in Utrecht at this very moment, and it
is likewise metaphysically possible that I am having a stroll through the
old town of Stockholm right now—while, actually, I am sitting here at
my desk typing these sentences. Neither of the alternative scenarios is
in conflict with the nature of things. Also, there is the metaphysical pos-
sibility of my desk being black rather than white; after all, being white
is not an essential property of my desk. However, many logical possi-
bilities are ruled out by the nature of things: for example, we said that
it is logically possible that I am both in Utrecht and in the old town of
Stockholm at the very same time, but this is arguably not a metaphys-
ical possibility. In the same vein, it is metaphysically impossible that
my desk is simultaneously both black all over and white all over. These
configurations are in conflict with the very nature of the objects and
properties involved.
Finally, physical possibility is where—in addition to the logical form
and the nature of things—the laws of nature enter the picture: what is
physically possible is what is in accordance with the laws of nature that
govern our world. Now, neither me attending today’s soccer match in
Utrecht nor me presently strolling through the old town of Stockholm
is incompatible with the prevailing laws of nature: the laws of nature
do not rule out a course of events in which I took a flight to the Nether-
lands yesterday and went to the stadium today, nor did they preclude
me from leaving the house this afternoon to go for a walk in the old
town. Both scenarios constitute physically possible alternatives to the
actual course of events. And the laws of nature do not impinge on the
color of my desk either: they allow it to be black or white. Yet, one
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may think that the laws of nature impose more constraints than the log-
ical form or the nature of things. It is definitely physically impossible
for there to be giant trees on Earth growing more than 200 meters into
the sky or birds flying faster than the speed of light. These scenarios
would violate our prevailing laws of nature. From a logical point of
view, on the other hand, these scenarios are perfectly possible. But are
they metaphysically possible as well? This depends on whether it is
metaphysically possible for the laws of nature to be different fromwhat
they actually are—and this again depends on our profound philosoph-
ical assumptions concerning the fundamental structure of the world.
While the intuitive ideas behind the notions of logical, metaphys-
ical, and physical possibility are very clear, the devil is in the details.
Metaphysical possibility is certainly one of the most employed modal
concepts in contemporary analytic philosophy, but it is a vague one, as
are logical and physical possibility. The point is simply this: even if
we agree on the general scheme sketched above, what we consider logi-
cally, metaphysically, or physically possible crucially depends on what
we consider the logical form, the nature of things, and the laws of nature
to be. Do things have a primitive modal nature? What exactly is their
nature? Do the laws of nature derive from the nature of things, or are
they mere systematizations of the regularities we find in the world?2
We here set aside these questions and focus on the big picture. En-
gaging in a discussion of the subtleties and intricacies of specific ac-
counts would lead us astray. The point I wish to make is a very fun-
damental one, which is brought out most distinctly on the abstract level
of the general scheme. Here we see that epistemic possibility as well as
the traditional kinds of alethic possibility hinge on the idea of modal al-
ternatives. Drawing on the idea of compatibilitywith the epistemic state
of an agent or some ontic aspect of the world, they capture in a rather
general way what could be the case in a certain respect even though it
actually is not. That is, epistemic, logical, metaphysical, and physical
possibilities are uniformly conceptualized as modal alternatives to actual-
2Just to give an impression of the variety of views we find here: while Fine (1994,
[3]) assumes that things have a primitivemodal nature and derivesmetaphysical possi-
bility from there, Lewis (1986, [7]) reduces the nature of things to a primitive totality of
metaphysically possible configurations. Bird (2007, [2]) grounds the laws in the nature
of dispositional properties, Lewis (1986, [7]) considers them to be mere systematiza-
tions of regularities, andMaudlin (2007, [8]) takes them to be primitive entities in their
own right.
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ity, and the differences between these notions are explicated solely in
terms of modal strength.
3 Real Possibilities as Temporal Alternatives for
Actuality
Let us now turn to the notion of real possibility and see how real possibil-
ities fit into the landscape of possibilities. What distinguishes real possi-
bility from the traditional kinds of possibility that we have discussed so
far—to wit, epistemic, logical, metaphysical, and physical possibility?
There clearly is a difference between the possibility of me standing in
the stadium Galgenwaard in Utrecht at this very moment and the real
possibility that I may now take a break from writing and follow the soc-
cer match on the radio. But what exactly is the difference? What are
real possibilities?3
To put it in a nutshell, real possibilities are alternative possibilities for
the future in an indeterministic world. That is, unlike the traditional
kinds of possibility, real possibilities bear an intimate relation not only
to theworld but to time aswell: they are future possibilities. In fact, here
the notion of time takes center stage, and the way in which time enters
the picture does not only make for a difference in modal strength, but,
as we shall see, it also affects the relation between actuality and possibil-
ity: real possibilities are temporal alternatives for a dynamic actuality to
evolve rather than modal alternatives to a given actuality.
In our discussion of the traditional kinds of possibility in the previ-
ous section, time did not really play a role. Of course, we may conceive
of actuality as being extended in time, and possibilities that represent
modal alternatives to actuality will then obviously be extended in time
as well. But, in the case of real possibilities, time plays a much more
fundamental role: by virtue of being future possibilities, real possibili-
ties are indexically anchored in time. For without a present, there is no
future; and once there is a present, there is of course also a past.
3Real possibility is a central theme in Prior’s work, and it has been further promoted
by, for example, Nuel Belnap (see e.g. Belnap et al. 2001, [1]) and Thomas Müller (e.g.
Müller 2012, [9]), though the notion is seldom explicitly defined. For a detailed discus-
sion of real possibility, see Rumberg (2016, [16]).
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At the very heart of the notion of real possibility lies the asymmetry
between the past and the future, which enters with the local standpoint
in time. While the past has happened and is fixed, the future is still to
come, and real possibilities depict the future as open: they represent
alternative possibilities for the future given the past course of events up
to now.
The relativization to the past makes real possibilities historical pos-
sibilities: what is really possible at one point in time may not be really
possible at a later time anymore. The passage of time constrains the
range of possibilities, so to say. Yesterday, it was still really possible that
I would be standing in the stadium Galgenwaard in Utrecht right now,
watching the soccer match: I could have taken a flight to the Nether-
lands yesterday and gone to the stadium today. And an hour ago, it
was still really possible that I would presently enjoy a stroll through
the old town of Stockholm: I could have escaped from writing and set
out for the old town instead. However, as it happens, I did not, and
now these possibilities have vanished. In contradistinction to the tra-
ditional kinds of possibility, which are first and foremost atemporal
notions, real possibilities—as historical possibilities—are essentially
time-dependent.
But there is a yet more fundamental difference that sets real possibil-
ity apart from the traditional landscape of possibilities: real possibilities
are temporal alternatives for actuality—rather than modal alternatives to
actuality. Capturing the openness of the future, they do not represent
what could be actual but is not. Instead, they represent what can be-
come actual as the future unfolds. The notion of actuality involved here
is a temporal one. It is rooted in the profound asymmetry between the
past and the future, which is at the core of the notion of real possibil-
ity. This asymmetry naturally induces a partition of the temporal realm
into actuality and possibility: actuality comprises what has happened
so far and thus is fixed, possibility spans what is open. Hence, on the
picture evoked here, only the present and the past are actual, whereas
the future is a pure realm of possibility: real possibilities for actuality
to evolve. None of these possibilities is actual yet, but any of them can
become actual as the future unfolds.
Building on the asymmetry between the past and the future, real
possibilities are thus open possibilities in a very genuine sense: they
can still be actualized. While there may be modal alternatives to what
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has happened so far, there is no real possibility for the present and the
past to be any different fromwhat they actually are. What has happened
has happened. Hence, there is no real possibility for me to be in the sta-
dium Galgenwaard in Utrecht right now, nor is it really possible that I
am currently taking a walk through the old town of Stockholm. How-
ever, there is a wealth of real possibilities for the future. For, unlike the
present and the past, the future is not actual. Rather, the future is still to
come, and in the presence of more than one real possibility, the future
is truly open. I can now take a break fromwriting and follow the soccer
match on the radio, and I can just as well skip the match and continue
writing for another few hours. Either way, I can go for a walk in the old
town later on, or I can simply spend the evening at home. Each of these
possibilities can be actualized, and, as time progresses, one of themwill
be actualized, ruling out the remainder. What will happen? You have
to wait and see.
Note that the indeterminacy at stake here is not just a matter of ig-
norance. Real possibilities are not mere epistemic possibilities that re-
flect our uncertainty as to what the future will bring. They are genuine
possibilities for the future in an indeterministic world. That is, like logi-
cal, metaphysical, and physical possibilities, real possibilities are alethic
possibilities: they are possibilities in an ontic rather than in an epistemic
sense. Unlike the traditional kinds of alethic possibility, however, real
possibilities do not solely capture which configurations of things are
compatible with one or another ontic aspect of the world and hence are
in principle possible. Rather, being future possibilities, real possibilities
capture which configurations of things can temporally evolve from the
concrete situation at hand, and, in accordance with the idea of indeter-
minism, there can be more than one possible future continuation.
Certainly, given a concrete situation in time, not just anything can
happen. Real possibility is based on a limited kind of indeterminism
rather than on sheer randomness. What is really possible in a concrete
situation is what can temporally evolve from that situation by virtue of
what the world is like—logically, metaphysically, and physically. Real
possibilities are thus far more strongly tied to the world than any of the
other kinds of alethic possibility that we have discussed so far: not only
must they conform to the logical form, the nature of things, and the
laws of nature, but they must also conform to the concrete momentary
circumstance at hand. Their indexical nature—their intrinsically histor-
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ical nature—is another determining factor that counts toward modal
strength.
In order to illustrate the modal strength of real possibilities, let us
consider a concrete example. As said, given that I am actually sitting in
Stockholm at my desk at this very moment, it is not really possible that
I am in the stadium Galgenwaard in Utrecht right now for the kick-off
of the soccer match. But while I will certainly have to miss out on the
opening of that match, we might wonder whether it is really possible
for me to make it to the stadium before the onset of the second half: this
starts only in one hour, and Utrecht is just about 1200 kilometers away.
Being in the stadium Galgenwaard in Utrecht a nanosecond from
now would require traveling faster than the speed of light and is hence
excluded by the prevailing laws of nature. While it is in principle phys-
ically possible to be there at that time, given my current location, it is
not a real possibility. If I traveled at the speed of light, I could reach
the stadium in less than a second, but that is not a real possibility either:
there is no available technological means that would allow me to accel-
erate that fast. With the fastest airplane in the world, I could make it to
Utrecht in less than 20minutes, but here another caveat comes into play:
as it happens, this plane is not parked next to my desk but at the NASA
headquarters inWashington. It would take at least one and a half hours
for the plane to pick me up, and thus by the time we reached Utrecht,
thematchwould already have finished. So this drops out as a real possi-
bility as well. Neither is a scheduled flight an option. Such a flight takes
approximately two hours, and hence I could at best make it to Utrecht at
dinnertime—and indeed, whether even this is really possible depends
on whether there is an appropriate flight scheduled for this afternoon,
whether the flight, if any, is not already fully booked, and so on. Natu-
rally, the options discussed here do not exhaust the entire range of pos-
sibilities for getting from Stockholm to Utrecht. However, they should
suffice to make clear how closely the notion of real possibility is bound
to the world. Since real possibilities are indexically anchored in time,
they crucially depend on the concrete situation, and thereby they sur-
pass all of the traditional kinds of alethic possibility in terms of modal
strength.
In conclusion: real possibilities are alternative possibilities for the
future in an indeterministic world, and, as such, they are alethic pos-
sibilities. Yet, they do not fit into the traditional hierarchy of the stan-
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dard kinds of alethic possibility discussed in the previous section. As fu-
ture possibilities, real possibilities are indexically anchored in time, and
while it is true that this results in a strengthening of the link with the
world, the difference between real possibility and the traditional kinds
of alethic possibility is not a mere difference in modal strength. Time is
not just a further dimension on a par with the logical form, the nature of
things, and the laws of nature. Rather, the indexical nature of real possi-
bilities also impacts howactuality and possibility are interrelated. In the
case of real possibility, this interrelation is not a purely modal one, but
derives from the asymmetry between the past and the future: instead
of being modal alternatives to actuality, real possibilities are temporal
alternatives for actuality to evolve. Real possibilities thus require us to
extend the traditional picture, revealing that the realm of possibility is
both modally and temporally structured.
4 Possible Worlds and Branching Time
In the previous two sections, we have mapped the vast landscape of
possibilities and have located the notion of real possibility within this
landscape. We have seen that the notion of real possibility introduces
a fundamental distinction into the realm of possibility: while the tradi-
tional kinds of possibility are commonly conceived of as representing
modal alternatives to actuality, real possibilities constitute temporal al-
ternatives for actuality. In this section, wewill discuss the consequences
of this distinction for the formal representation of possibilities, contrast-
ing the idea of possible worlds with the theory of branching time pio-
neered by Prior (1967, [14]).
The possible worlds framework enjoys great popularity—not only
in logic, but also in philosophy and in linguistics. It seems to have es-
tablished itself as the standard modal framework, one that is supposed
to capture all different kinds of possibility in a uniformway. Sometimes
one may even get the impression that the term ‘possible world’ is just a
synonym for ‘possibility’. While the idea of a possibleworld is at least as
old as Leibniz’s dictum that ours is the best of all possibleworlds, the sig-
nificant role that possible worlds nowadays play in our theoretical tool-
box is doubtlessly not least due toKripke andLewis. By turning the idea
of possible worlds into a rigorous formal framework, Kripke famously
laid the semantic foundation of modern modal logic (e.g. Kripke 1959,
353
[5]; 1963, [6]), and Lewis’s metaphysical account of possible worlds,
which he himself describes as “a philosophers’ paradise” (Lewis 1986,
[7]), constitutes a cornerstone of our theorizing about all kinds ofmodal
notions, in philosophy and beyond.
The basic idea underlying the possible worlds framework is fairly
simple: the space of possibilities is viewed as a huge pluriverse of dis-
tinct possible worlds. Each possible world stands in for some possibility.
One of the possibleworlds is the actual world, viz. theworldwe actually
live in. The remaining possible worlds represent ways our world could
be in a certain respect but actually is not. In other words, they represent
modal alternatives to the actual world.
In the actual world, I am now sitting in Stockholm at my desk, typ-
ing into my laptop. But, in another possible world, I am standing in
the stadium Galgenwaard in Utrecht right now, watching the soccer
match, and in yet another possibleworld, I am currently enjoying a stroll
through the old town of Stockholm, as illustrated in Figure 1. There is
also a possible world in which my desk is black rather than white, one
in which it is cloudy rather than sunny, one in which trees grow more
than 200 meters into the sky, and one in which birds fly faster than the
speed of light, and so forth. Whatever is possible is the case in some
possible world or another.
Figure 1: Actuality and possibility in the possible worlds framework.
The thick circle marks the actual world. The remaining possible worlds
represent modal alternatives to the actual world. Icons by Icons8: https:
//icons8.com.
As outlined above, on the traditional account of possibilities as
modal alternatives to actuality, different kinds of possibility are dis-
tinguished solely in terms of modal strength, and we can straightfor-
wardly accommodate this idea into the possible worlds pluriverse by
drawing on a central feature of Kripke semantics, viz. on the idea of an
accessibility relation between possibleworlds. We simply associate each
kind of possibility with an accessibility relation that reflects its modal
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strength, so that, in each case, the set of possible worlds that are accessi-
ble from the actual world comprises all and only those worlds that con-
stitute modal alternatives in the relevant respect. Differences in modal
strength then translate into properties of the underlying accessibility re-
lations. For instance, the traditional hierarchy of logical, metaphysical,
and physical possibility can be captured by the formal requirement that
what is physically accessible is also metaphysically accessible, and that
what is metaphysically accessible is also logically accessible, but not vice
versa.
As it treats actuality and possibility in parallel, the possible worlds
framework is perfectly tailored to the idea of possibilities as modal alter-
natives to actuality, and time plays only a secondary role. To be sure, we
can conceive of possible worlds as being extended in time—and, in fact,
this is what is commonly done. Possible worlds are often thought of
as spanning entire possible temporal developments of the world, from
the beginning till the end of time. In addition, possible worlds are often
viewed as being complete in yet another respect: they are considered
maximally specific in the very details they represent. It is important
to realize, however, that the relative degree of completeness does not
interfere with the general picture underlying the pluriverse: possible
worlds—whether complete or incomplete—representmodal alternatives
to a given actuality, viz. to the possible world that is singled out as the
actual one.
From a historical point of view, the modern tendency to think of
possibilities exclusively as modal alternatives to actuality is a surpris-
ing development. After all, the conception of possibilities as modal al-
ternatives only came up in the Middle Ages, where it is most vividly
articulated in the writings of Duns Scotus (cf. Knuuttila 1993, [4]). In
antiquity, on the other hand, the notion of possibility was naturally
interwoven with time. Indeed, in those days, possibilities received a
purely temporal interpretation: possibility was primarily understood in
terms of quantification over a linear series of times. Along those lines,
Diodorus Chronus, for example, defined the possible as what is or will
be the case.
And this brings us to Arthur Prior. He resurrected these ancient
ideas and developed them further, making room for human freedom
against the background of an open future. Intrigued by the famous
master argument of Diodorus Chronus, Prior set out to make formally
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precise the assumptions leading to the argument’s fatalistic conclusion.
His ideas not only formed the beginning of modern temporal logic, but
they also gave rise to a new formal framework for representing possibil-
ities, one that was suggested to him in a letter by Kripke; namely, the
theory of branching time.4
In the theory of branching time, possibility is no longer ‘outsourced’
to other possible worlds. Rather, possibility becomes a feature of our
world: it is incorporated into themodal-temporal structure of theworld,
which is depicted as a tree of moments that is linear toward the past and
branches toward the future. An example of a branching time structure,
illustrating the temporal dimension of the Stockholm-Utrecht scenario,
is provided in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Actuality and possibility in the theory of branching time. The
thick line marks actuality. Branches leading toward the future repre-
sent possibilities. The dashed lines depict counterfactualities. Icons by
Icons8: https://icons8.com.
Crucially, whereas in the possible worlds pluriverse, our standpoint
is that of the actual world, in the theory of branching time, our stand-
point is that of the present moment, and with the present, not only
past and future enter the stage, but actuality and possibility do so as
4See Ploug and Øhrstrøm (2012, [13]), for the Prior-Kripke letters of 1958, and
Øhrstrøm and Hasle (1995, [11]), for a broader overview of the historical development
of temporal logic.
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well. Due to the absence of backward branching, the present moment
uniquely determines the past, and together present and past provide a
notion of actuality. They capture what has actually happened so far
and hence is fixed. The branches leading toward the future, on the
other hand, represent possibilities: temporal alternatives for actuality
to evolve. While each of these branches can become actual as the future
unfolds, none of them is actual yet. There is no actual future. Rather,
actuality stands vis-à-vis a plurality of future possibilities, rendering the
future genuinely open.
Note that in this setting, where actuality and possibility are tempo-
rally opposed rather than modally aligned, it is less natural to think of
possibilities as complete possible courses of events, from the beginning
till the end of time. A more natural way to conceptualize possibilities
in the branching time framework is to view them as transitions, which
are local future possibilities that—like little arrows—each specify a pos-
sible direction at a branching point. Transitions highlight the dynamic
nature of actuality: as the future unfolds, actuality evolves, and at each
branching point, one of the local future possibilities is actualized, while
the remainder fade away.5
Branching time structures allow for a perspicuous representation
of real possibilities. Since the distinction of actuality and possibility is
drawn in the temporal realm, they are perfectly suited for capturing the
idea that real possibilities are temporal alternatives for actuality, and
they appropriately accommodate the historical, time-dependent nature
of real possibilities as well. To illustrate, in the picture provided in Fig-
ure 2, the moment in the middle corresponds to my present situation:
it represents me as sitting in Stockholm at my desk, typing into my lap-
top. This present moment and its linear past make up actuality. The
branches spreading out into the future, on the other hand, capture the
real possibilities available to me right now: follow the soccer match on
the radio or continue writing for a while, take an evening stroll through
the old town or, alternatively, spend the evening at home. Whereas each
of these future branches constitutes a genuine temporal alternative for
actuality to evolve, the branches splitting off in the past are mere coun-
terfactualities. Theywere once real possibilities but have gone unactual-
5For a detailed discussion of the interrelation of actuality and possibility in the the-
ory of branching time and the notion of a transition, see Rumberg (2019, [17]). The
formal details of the transition approach are worked out in Rumberg (2016, [15]).
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ized: I could have traveled to Utrecht for the soccer match, and I could
have escaped from writing this afternoon and enjoyed a walk in the old
town instead. But I actually did not, and these possibilities disappeared.
The picture that emerges is the following: building on a modal dis-
tinction between actuality and possibility, the possible worlds frame-
work is perfectly tailored to the idea of possibilities asmodal alternatives
to actuality. The theory of branching time, on the other hand, which
invokes a temporal distinction between actuality and possibility, is per-
fectly tailored to the idea of possibilities as temporal alternatives for ac-
tuality. But, of course, we would like a formal framework that allows
us to capture all kinds of possibility: epistemic, logical, metaphysical,
physical, and real.
We might try to squeeze modal alternatives to actuality into the the-
ory of branching time—but this seems pointless. After all, we have seen
that the traditional kinds of possibility are essentially atemporal notions
whereas the theory of branching time renders possibilities inevitably
time-dependent, and although the tree of moments allows for unactual-
ized alternatives, it would be absurd to assume that all possibilities are
historically connected. So the theory of branching time is ruled out as a
unifying account.
What about aligning real possibilities with the traditional kinds of
possibility? As already mentioned, it is common to conceive of possi-
ble worlds as linearly extended in time. We can then introduce a time-
dependent accessibility relation that relates two possible worlds at a
time if, and only if, they are physical alternatives that share the same
initial segment up to that time and diverge only later. On the formal
level, this amounts to moving to a so-called 𝑇 × 𝑊 frame (Thomason
1984, [18]).
But note: relativizing the accessibility relation to times does notmake
the actual world—with its actual future—disappear. That is, while this
maneuver allows us to straightforwardly capture the idea that real pos-
sibilities are time-dependent, historical possibilities, it does not allow
us to faithfully capture the idea that real possibilities are temporal al-
ternatives for actuality. To be sure, adding a temporal dimension intro-
duces a local standpoint in time. The local standpoint, however, merely
determines which of the possible worlds are historical alternatives at
that time. But the relevant worlds still constitute modal alternatives to
the actual world—with its actual future. Figure 3 illustrates the differ-
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ence with the theory of branching time: in the theory of branching time,
where actuality and possibility are temporally opposed, future possibil-
ities are open for actualization, whereas in the 𝑇 ×𝑊 framework, where
actuality and possibility are parallelly aligned, one of the future possi-
bilities is already actual. Once we have singled out one of the possible
worlds as the actual one, the only way to hold firm to the conviction that
it is indeterminate which of the historical possibilities will be actualized
in the end is by denying that it is settled which possible world we are
actually located in. But this amounts to giving the open future a merely
epistemic reading. The picture we end up with by moving to a 𝑇 × 𝑊
frame is tantamount to the theory of branching time with a Thin Red
Line added (cf. e.g. Øhrstrøm 2009, [12]); for in the presence of a Thin
Red Line, which captures the actual course of events, the interrelation
of actuality and possibility changes, and possibilities again boil down
to mere modal alternatives to the overarching actuality.
𝑤1 𝑤2 𝑤3
𝑡1
<
𝑡2
<
𝑡3
<
𝑡4
<
𝑡5
≈ ≈
≈ ≈
≈ ≈
≈
•
(a) 𝑇 ×𝑊 frame.
ℎ1 ℎ2 ℎ3
•
(b) Branching time structure.
Figure 3: Actuality and possibility in the 𝑇 ×𝑊 framework and the the-
ory of branching time, respectively. In each case, the thick line high-
lights actuality.
The upshot is this: there is no uniformity in the space of possibil-
ities, and there is no uniformity in their formal representation either.
Possible worlds and the theory of branching time constitute different
formal means, fit for different purposes. If we wish for a unifying ac-
count, we need to combine the merits of both frameworks into a single
picture. Oneway to do sowould be tomove from a single tree to a forest
of trees, allowing for a temporal distinction between actuality and pos-
sibility within each tree and a modal distinction between actuality and
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possibility in the forest. In such a framework, each tree corresponds to a
possible world that represents a way our world could be—epistemically,
logically, metaphysically, or physically. The branches within a tree, on
the other hand, represent real possibilities for the future. That is, while
the forest constitutes a unifying framework, it does not represent modal
and temporal alternatives uniformly, but instead makes use of different
formal resources in each case. This is as it should be, for modal alterna-
tives to actuality and temporal alternatives for actuality are two funda-
mentally different kinds of possibility.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the notion of real possibility into the
landscape of possibilities. Real possibilities are alternative possibilities
for the future in an indeterministic world. In contradistinction to epis-
temic, logical, metaphysical, and physical possibilities, real possibilities
are not only closely tied up with the world, but they are inextricably in-
terwoven with time as well, and their interrelation with time affects the
relation between actuality andpossibility: real possibilities are temporal
alternatives for a dynamic actuality to evolve rather than modal alterna-
tives to a given actuality. The notion of real possibility thus crucially
differs from the traditional kinds of possibility, which are uniformly
conceptualized as modal alternatives to actuality, distinguished solely
in terms of modal strength.
The distinction between modal alternatives to actuality and tempo-
ral alternatives for actuality established here marks a fundamental dis-
tinction in the realm of possibility, a distinction that needs to be reflected
in the formal representation of possibilities. While the possible worlds
framework allows for a straightforward representation ofmodal alterna-
tives to actuality, the tree-like structures emerging from Prior’s theory
of branching time afford a perspicuous treatment of real possibilities,
as temporal alternatives for actuality. Neither of the two frameworks is
suited to capture the entire variety of different kinds of possibility in a
uniform way.
However, the distinction between modal alternatives and temporal
alternatives does not only have consequences for our choice of formal
models. Indeed, the distinction seems so fundamental that one might
reasonably expect it to prove useful in many debates where possibilities
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are involved. The distinction may, for instance, be fruitfully applied in
the debate concerning determinism and indeterminism in the philoso-
phy of science, for temporal alternatives for actuality lend themselves
to a novel understanding of indeterminism, where indeterminism is de-
fined by the existence of more than one real possibility for the future.
Relatedly, the distinction may shed new light on the debate concerning
free agency and moral responsibility, where often a principle of alterna-
tive possibilities is invoked, demanding that the agent could have acted
otherwise. Does this principle refer to mere modal alternatives to ac-
tuality, or does it require that the agent had a real possibility of acting
differently?6 But the distinctionmay also be of interest in linguistics. Af-
ter all, is it not the case that the antecedents of the following two coun-
terfactual conditionals—“If trees on Earth grew more than 200 meters
into the sky ...” and “If I had traveled to Utrecht yesterday ...”—do not
only differ in their tenses but trade on fundamentally different kinds of
possibility?
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Abstract
In the first part of this paper, we analyze the concept of open future. Our
main thesis is that the indeterminateness of the future crucially depends
on the perspective from which the propositions containing the future op-
erator are evaluated. For this reason, we offer a perspectival temporal se-
mantics, in which propositions are evaluated with respect to two indexes:
the time of evaluation and the time of the perspective. This demonstrates
the compatibility of this semantics with both a tensed and a tenseless
metaphysics of time. In the secondpart, we apply the theoretical device of
perspectival semantics to the problem of divine foreknowledge, demon-
strating that this semantics proves to be promising in the solution of the
foreknowledge problem. Finally, we discuss this solution from the point
of view of both a tenseless and a tensed conception of the universe.
Keywords: open future, perspectival semantics, divine foreknowledge,
tensed/tenseless theories of time.
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1 The Future is Open
Think about the future. Think about your projects, your desires, your
fears. There is one very common intuition concerning the world that
will be; or better, it is a sort of feeling, a piece of pre-theoretical evidence:
the future is largely unknown. Certainly, there are future features of
the world about which we are very confident: we are ready to bet on
the fact that tomorrow the Sun will rise or that a pot of water heated
to 100 ∘C will start boiling. We are certain that we are going to get old
and that we will die. We have very good reasons to believe that within
a century there will still be life on Earth and that technological progress
will deeply transform our environment. Nevertheless, many other traits
of the future world are obfuscated by a sort of epistemic fog: we do not
know if next summer will be hot, if my daughter Emma will marry and
have children, if her children will have children of their own, and what
football team my great-grandchildren will be supporters of.
The epistemic openness of the future seemsundeniable: it is included
in our more general ignorance about many aspects of reality. According
to some, the openness of the future is just epistemic, whereas, from the
ontological point of view, the universe is deterministic. In Pierre de
Laplace’s famous words:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect
of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at
a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in
motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is com-
posed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these
data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those
of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be
uncertain and the future just like the past would be present
before its eyes. (see [12])
According to Laplace’s determinism, the epistemic openness of the
future is a mere byproduct of our ignorance. If we did not consider this
cognitive constraint (as in the case of Laplace’s demon), we would have
a perfect and complete knowledge of any event in the future (and in the
past).
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However, for many philosophers, the epistemic openness of the fu-
ture is actually a reflex of a deeper ontological openness: we don’t know
what football teammy great-grandchildrenwill be supporters of because
it is ontologically undeterminedwhat football team theywill be support-
ers of. The future reality is open because it has, so to speak, ontological
holes, that is, indeterminate regions in which there are no facts. Those
who advocates an ontological conception of the open future usually as-
sume the asymmetry between past and future: the future is open, but
the past is closed. There is no way to change or affect what was the case.
It is part of the standard terminology in the debate to say that the past
is historically (or accidentally) necessary: Titanic’s sinking is not a neces-
sary event tout court: it might not have happened. Unfortunately, it did
happen, and since then it is no longer possible that it did not happen. On
the other hand, the obtaining of a certain future state of affairs seems to
be – by virtue of the very openness of the future – contingent. Another
way to characterize the ontological asymmetry between past and future
exploits the notion of causality: whereas the past is beyond the reach of
our possible causal manipulation, it seems that we are able to determine
– partially –whatwill happen in the future. In otherwords, at least from
an intuitive standpoint, our free actions can bring about certain states
of affairs and can therefore exclude others.
So far, so good. There is another feature of the openness of the future
that it is worth analyzing.1 Let us consider the following sentence:
(1) Emma is going to drink a beer at the tonight’s party.
According the open future assumption, the truth value of (1) is gen-
uinely undetermined. Emma will be able to make up her mind and to
get a beer or a Coke or whatever. However, the future does not remain al-
ways open. At the party, Emmawill make a choice: either she will drink
a beer or she will not. Something must happen and therefore, what was
undetermined in the past becomes determined; of course, with respect
to the time of the party, there remain other future tense sentenceswhose
truth value is indeterminate. For instance, either Emma will catch a cab
to return home or not. And so on.
1Note that we did not provide any argument for the openness of the future; of course,
there many accounts of ontology of time according to which the future is closed and
determinate. In this paper, we simply assume that the future is ontologically open.
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But let us reflect on the just-described situation and add somedetails.
It is 6 p.m. and Emma is getting ready for the party. It is, by assump-
tion, ontologically indeterminatewhether Emmawill drink a beer at the
party. At 10 p.m., halfway through the party, Emma is thirsty and de-
cides to have a beer and therefore, the sentence whose truth value had
been undetermined now becomes (so to speak) true. Now, the ques-
tionwhether (1) is a sentencewith a determinate or indeterminate truth
value. Well, prima facie the answer might be that it depends on the in-
stant at which we evaluate it. (1) is indeterminate at 6 p.m., but it is
true at 10 p.m.. But this answer is troublesome. In fact, because Emma
decides to have a beer at 10 p.m., it is true at 10 p.m. that it was already
true at 6 p.m. that Emma would decide to have a beer. Therefore, its
truth value seems perfectly determinate.
In order to realize how much the intuition of the retrogradation of
truth is deeply-rooted, let us suppose that Paul and George make a bet
at 6 p.m.: Paul bets on the truth of (1), that is, on the fact that Emma
is going to have a beer at the party. George bets against (1). If Emma
drinks her beer, Paul can ask for the payment of the bet by saying that
hewas right and he stated the truth when he said that Emmawould have
a beer. If George replied that, after all, it was indeterminate at 6 p.m.
what Emma was going to do and that, therefore, what Paul said was
neither true nor false, so that he has no right to request the payment
of the bet, his argument would seem totally captious. Therefore, from
the 10 p.m. perspective, (1) is true at 6 p.m. But, on the other hand,
Emma is still undecided at 6 p.m., and it is plausible to regard, from the
6 p.m. perspective, the future tense sentence as indeterminate. Then,
the ascription of indeterminateness to a future tense sentence depends
not only on the instant at which it is evaluated but also on the perspec-
tive from which it is evaluated. This fact is deeply connected with the
question of the open future; the future is open when we put ourselves,
so to speak, in the present. But, retrospectively – when we look at the
future of a certain moment from the future of that moment – the future
appears to be determinate.
This intuitive description represents the conceptual core of our arti-
cle. According to us, once one has characterized in a rigorous way the
notion of temporal perspective, one is in possession of a powerful theoret-
ical device by means of which an answer to the well-known conundrum
of divine foreknowledge and human free will can be given. In a nut-
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shell, the conundrum is that if God already knew what Emma would
choose, Emma is not really free to do otherwise – and then, according
to a libertarian conception of freedom, Emma is not free. The structure
of the paper is then as follows. In the next section, we present the logi-
cal framework of a temporal perspectival semantics. Section 3 presents,
very briefly, the conundrum, and section 4 shows how to apply the per-
spectival analysis of the open future to the dilemma.
2 Perspectives on Branching Time Semantics
FUTURE IN BRANCHING TIME
In the previous section, we refer to the openness of the future as a deeply
rooted intuition. This can be logically characterized by a branching time
semantics.2
A branching time structure (BT) is a couple 𝔅 = ⟨𝑇 ,<⟩, where 𝑇 is
a nonempty set of instants and < is a relation defined on 𝑇 . Intuitively,
the instants are possible instantaneous states of the world, and < is the
relation of temporal precedence. This relation is therefore asymmetric
and transitive, and it satisfies (at least) the conditions of Backward Lin-
earity (BL) and Historical Connectedness (HC):
(BL) ∀𝑡,𝑡1, 𝑡2(𝑡1 < 𝑡∧𝑡2 < 𝑡) ⇒ (𝑡1 = 𝑡2 ∨𝑡1 < 𝑡2 ∨𝑡2 < 𝑡1)
In words, two instants of the past of 𝑡 are either identical or ordered
by <; this implies that for every instant 𝑡, there is one and only one past
history.
(HC) ∀𝑡1∀𝑡2∃𝑡(𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1 ∧𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2)
(HC) asserts that all the instants are connected in the past; the max-
imal subsets of instants linearly ordered in 𝑇 are referred to as histories
– the possible courses of events in the world. Ours is a propositional
language that includes a possible infinite set of propositional variables
(𝑉 𝑎𝑟) and two temporal operators P and F. We can define an evaluation
function 𝑉 ∶ 𝑉 𝑎𝑟 ⟼ ℘(𝑇 ) that maps every propositional letter 𝑝 onto a
set of instants at which 𝑝 is true. A model 𝐵𝑇 is, then, a couple ⟨𝔅,𝑉 ⟩.
2See, for instance, [3], [26], [20], [21], [1], and [11].
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According to the indeterminist intuition, there is only one past history,
but there are many possible future histories. This situation is illustrated
in figure 1:
Figure 1: A branching framework
The evaluation of the formulas are, then, with respect to an instant
(viz., the instant of evaluation):
𝑀,𝑡 ⊨ 𝑝 ⇔ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑉 (𝑝)
𝑀,𝑡 ⊨ ¬𝜑 ⇔ 𝑀,𝑡 ⊭ 𝜑
𝑀,𝑡 ⊨ 𝜑∧𝜓 ⇔ 𝑀,𝑡 ⊨ 𝜑 and 𝑀,𝑡 ⊨ 𝜓
𝑀,𝑡 ⊨ P𝜑 ⇔ ∃𝑡′(𝑡′ < 𝑡∧𝑀,𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑)
𝑀,𝑡 ⊨ H𝜑 ⇔ ∀𝑡′(𝑡′ < 𝑡∧𝑀,𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑)
Regarding the sentences with no future tense operators, our seman-
tics is straightforward. Things get more complicated when we must
evaluate future tense sentences. Of course, we cannot mirror the clause
about the past, because, given the branching, there can be two (ormore)
instants (𝑡1 and 𝑡2) which satisfy the condition of following 𝑡.
There are manyways to provide a semantics for the future.3 In what
follows, we will present just the so-called indeterminist or Aristotelian
3For an overview, see, for instance, [9] and [17]
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model.4 According to this interpretation, we have that
𝑀,𝑡 ⊨ F𝜑 ⇔ ∀ℎ∃𝑡′(𝑡′ > 𝑡∧𝑡′ ∈ ℎ∧𝑀,𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑)
𝑀,𝑡 ⊨ F¬𝜑 ⇔ ∀ℎ∃𝑡′(𝑡′ > 𝑡∧𝑡′ ∈ ℎ∧𝑀,𝑡′ ⊨ ¬𝜑)
Now, it is easy to understand that in the indeterminist model, we
can have semantically indeterminate future tense sentences (𝑀,𝑡 ⊭ F𝜑
and 𝑀,𝑡 ⊭ F¬𝜑). Onemight believe, then, that the branching semantics
with an Aristotelian conception of the future is a good formal account
of our intuitions about the open future. However, things are not so easy.
Let us hypothesize that we are in the following situation: 𝜑 is true
at 𝑡1 in history ℎ1, whereas it is false at 𝑡2 in history ℎ2. According to the
previous semantics, this means that at 𝑡0, F𝜑 is neither true nor false.
But let us hypothesize that time flows and that 𝜑 obtains (the world
“takes” the road ℎ1). We have that at 𝑡1 it is true that 𝜑. But then we
must claim that because at 𝑡1 it is true that 𝜑, then it has always been
the case that it would be true that 𝜑. In other words, since Emma, at
the end of the day, decided to have a beer, it has always been true that
Emma would have her beer. In formal terms, the conditional 𝜑 → HF𝜑
must hold. However, in the indeterminist framework we just presented,
that does not hold, and it is not difficult to see why:
Figure 2: 𝜑 → HF𝜑 does not hold at 𝑡1
4We are not committed to the view that this model reflects the actual theory held by
Aristotle; in this context Aristotelian refers to a quite common interpretation of Aristo-
tle’s solution to the riddle of future contingents in chapter IX of De Interpretatione. For
a detailed analysis, see, for instance, [6].
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Clearly, 𝜑 holds at 𝑡1. Now, let us determine whether HF𝜑 holds.
Accordingly, F𝜑 must always be true in the past of 𝑡1. So, the question
is whether 𝑀,𝑡0 ⊨ F𝜑 holds. However, as we have seen, the existence of
a history in which ¬𝜑 is true entails that F𝜑 is untrue at 𝑡0.
We arrived at a sort of stalemate. On one hand, the principle at is-
sue seems to be absolutely plausible. On the other hand, it is not valid
within the Aristotelian framework, which, in turn, is supposed to catch
our intuitions about the open future. There are, of course, many an-
swers to this problem5. One candecide to give up the principle𝜑 →HF𝜑
in the name of the open future; or, alternatively, one can modify the
branching semantics in order to preserve the principle (see [25], [17],
and [27]). In the following section, we present a framework for per-
spectival semantics. It allows us to pursue a twofold aim: on one side,
it accounts for the principle of retrogradation of the truth in an intuitive
way, and, on the other side, it provides a new interpretative setting for
the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom.
PERSPECTIVAL SEMANTICS
The basic idea of perspectival semantics is that formulas are evaluated
in a model, at a time 𝑡, from a certain perspective or context.6
Let us take into account the closed formula 𝜑. 𝜑 has a certain truth
value at 𝑡. As noted above, our semantic framework introduces another
ingredient: we evaluate 𝜑 at 𝑡 from the temporal perspective 𝑡′ (which,
of course, might coincide with 𝑡). Roughly, the idea is to consider the
perspective 𝑡′ as the point at which the world has arrived, that is, the
present moment. As we will see shortly, the advocates of a dynamic
and realist metaphysics of time could construe the idea of perspective
we are presenting in a strong sense. However, our semantic also allows
5[22] raises this question for the Local Thin Red Linemodels ([21]). In [9], we show
that this criticism applies to nondeterministic systems as well
6The idea of a perspective or context of evaluation circulates in the branching time
semantics in very different forms. The model of Belnap, Perloff, Xu ([1]) uses the pa-
rameter of the context, and that of Waver ([17]) employs the parameter of the context
of use. Here we adopt a notion of perspective close to that of MacFarlane ([14], [15]).
According to MacFarlane, every proposition must be evaluated at two different times,
which he calls the context of assessment and the context of evaluation. In our proposal
as well, the evaluation occurs at two different times. In ([9]), we consider the differ-
ences between these approaches and ours.
372
for an indexical reading according towhich the perspective indicates the
instant we consider as our “now”, without any metaphysical privilege.
Let 𝐻𝑡 = {ℎ|𝑡 ∈ ℎ} be the bundle of histories at 𝑡, that is, the set
of histories which pass through 𝑡. Our model is, then, constituted by
the structure BT, the evaluation function 𝑉 , and two temporal indexes:
the instant of evaluation and the perspective from which one evaluates.
We sharply distinguish two kinds of propositions: factual propositions,
which concern things that happen at the present, in the past, and in
the future of a given perspective, and counterfactual propositions, which
concern not what is happening, what happened, or what will happen
from the given perspective, but what could or could have happen from
another perspective.7
The evaluations of factual propositions in ourmodel are always rela-
tivized to the intersection of the (bundle of) historieswhich pass through
themoment of evaluation 𝑡 and the historieswhich pass through the per-
spective 𝑡′. As we are evaluating factual propositions, we suppose that
this intersection is never empty, that is that the moment of evaluation
is connected with the temporal perspective. This seems a reasonable
condition, because factual propositions concern what happens at a cer-
tain time or in the past or in the possible futures of that time. Because
the histories on which we evaluate must pass through the perspective,
certain branches are pruned. Let us consider an example:
Figure 3: Evaluation of 𝜑 at 𝑡 from the perspective 𝑡′
7Developing this interpretation of counterfactual propositions seems to be a very
fecund path of inquiry. However, in this paper, we do not take that into account. See
([9]) for a proposal for the treatment of counterfactual propositions.
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In this schema we have four histories; let us suppose we evaluate
the formula 𝜑 at 𝑡, from the perspective 𝑡′: 𝑀,𝑡,𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑. We consequently
have the following truth conditions:
𝑀,𝑡,𝑡′ ⊨ 𝑝 ⇔ ∀ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑡 ∩𝐻𝑡′ , 𝑡 ∈ 𝑉 (𝑝)
𝑀,𝑡, 𝑡′ ⊨ ¬𝜑 ⇔ ∃ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑡 ∩𝐻𝑡′ ,𝑀,𝑡, 𝑡′ ⊭ 𝜑
𝑀,𝑡, 𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑∧𝜓 ⇔ ∀ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑡 ∩𝐻𝑡′ ,𝑀, 𝑡, 𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑 and 𝑀,𝑡,𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜓
𝑀,𝑡, 𝑡′ ⊨ P𝜑 ⇔ ∀ h ∈ 𝐻𝑡 ∩𝐻𝑡′ , ∃ 𝑡″ < 𝑡,𝑀,𝑡″, 𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑
𝑀,𝑡, 𝑡′ ⊨ H𝜑 ⇔ ∀ ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑡 ∩𝐻𝑡′ ,∀ 𝑡″ < 𝑡,𝑀,𝑡″, 𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑
Notice that our evaluation at times and perspectives is analogous to
a standard evaluation as far as evaluations not regarding the future are
concerned. Things change when we consider the evaluation of future
tense. The idea is, in a nutshell, the following:
Figure 4: Evaluation of F𝜑 at 𝑡 from the perspective 𝑡
Here, we have a branching structure inwhich there are four histories:
in the first two, it is true that 𝜑; in the second pair, it is true that ¬𝜑. Now,
let us hypothesize that we want to evaluate F𝜑 at 𝑡 from the perspective
𝑡. We then have
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𝑀,𝑡,𝑡 ⊨ F𝜑 ⇔ ∀ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑡 ∩𝐻𝑡∃𝑡′ > 𝑡,𝑀,𝑡′, 𝑡 ⊨ 𝜑
Obviously, this does not hold, because there exist two histories in
the intersection in which ¬𝜑 is true. But let us now suppose that the
perspective changes (i.e., that time flows); the schema becomes:
Figure 5: Evaluation of F𝜑 at 𝑡 from the perspective 𝑡′
This schema is identical to the previous one, except for the perspec-
tive of the evaluation, which is now 𝑡′.
𝑀,𝑡,𝑡′ ⊨ F𝜑 ⇔ ∀ ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑡′ ∩𝐻𝑡∃𝑡″ > 𝑡,𝑀,𝑡″, 𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑
Time flowed – so to speak – and the histories into the intersection
decreased. From the perspective of 𝑡′, therefore, 𝜑 will happen in the
future of 𝑡. So, for example, whereas from the perspective of 6 p.m., it is
not true that Emmawill drink a beer at the party, from the perspective of
10 p.m., when Emma has already decided to drink a beer, it was true at
6 p.m. that Emma would drink a beer. So, our framework incorporates
MacFarlane’s intuition that the evaluation at a certain time of a formula
containing a future operator changes depending on the perspective that
is assumed.
Let nowobservewhat happens to the crucial principle 𝜑 →HF𝜑. Let
us assume to evaluate at 𝑡′ from the perspective of 𝑡′; we have, then, that
𝑀,𝑡′, 𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑 → HF𝜑
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So, let us assume 𝑀,𝑡′, 𝑡′ ⊨ 𝜑; hence, it must always have been true
in the past that F𝜑. Let us consider the instant 𝑡 previous to 𝑡′:
𝑀,𝑡,𝑡′ ⊨ F𝜑 ⇒ ∀ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑡′ ∩𝐻𝑡∃t”>t,𝑀 ,t”,t’⊨ 𝜑
Of course, this holds because 𝜑 holds in every history that passes
through 𝑡′ at a moment subsequent to 𝑡. In particular, it holds at 𝑡′ itself.
Because the evaluation is always restricted to the histories in the inter-
section 𝐻𝑡′ ∩ 𝐻𝑡, if 𝜑 holds at 𝑡′, then it is true at every moment in the
past of 𝑡′ that 𝜑 will hold in the future. Thus, the principle 𝜑 → HF𝜑 is
vindicated in our perspectival semantics.
3 Divine Foreknowledge, and the Openness of the
Future
In the previous section, we provided a sketch of perspectival semantics.
As noted, this system is interesting for several reasons, but, here, we ex-
plore a possible application to a classical topic in philosophy of religion,
that is, the problem of compatibility between divine foreknowledge and
human free will. We present the argument against the compatibility be-
tween foreknowledge and freedom in Linda Zagzebski’s clear version
([28] cap. I; [29]: 46–47). Let 𝐵 be a free action the agent is going to
perform tomorrow:
1. Yesterday God believed that 𝐵 (divine foreknowledge)
2. If an event 𝑒 occurred in the past, then it is accidentally necessary
that 𝑒 occurred then (necessity of the past)
3. It is now necessary that yesterday God believed 𝐵 (1,2, modus po-
nens)
4. Necessarily, if yesterday God believed 𝐵, then 𝐵 (infallibility of
divine foreknowledge)
5. If 𝑠 is accidentally necessary and if(𝑠 → 𝑝), then it is accidentally
necessary that 𝑝 (principle of transfer of necessity)
6. So it is now necessary that 𝐵 (3, 4, 5)
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7. If it is now necessary that 𝐵, then you cannot do otherwise than
𝐵 (definition of necessary)
8. Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than 𝐵 (6,7, modus ponens)
9. If you cannot do otherwise when you perform an act, you do not
perform it freely (principle of alternate possibilities)
10. Therefore, when youperform𝐵, youwill not perform it freely (8,9,
modus ponens)
The crucial premises onwhich the argument hinges are (1), (2), and
(9), that is, the definition of divine foreknowledge, the necessity of the
past, and the libertarian definition of free will. The timeless solution to
this dilemma denies premise (1): since God is out of time, it is meaning-
less to say that God yesterday knew that Emma will drink a beer. God
timelessly knows that Emma drinks a beer at a certain time. So, premise
(1) is false and the argument does not conclude. In this paper, we will
take into account the prospects of the timeless solution in light of the
need to postulate a temporal perspective in order to account for our in-
tuitions on truth values of future sentences.
Let us consider the proposition that describes Emma’s free act of
drinking a beer (let us call it, as usual, 𝜑). This proposition, from a
logical point of view, must satisfy two opposed semantic constraints:
i. On one hand, its truth value has to be determinate;
ii. On the other hand, its truth value has to be indeterminate.
Let us see why. (i) has to be satisfied because 𝜑 is the object of di-
vine knowledge and it is not possible to know something that is neither
true nor false. But, at the same time, (ii) has to be satisfied as well be-
cause if 𝜑 is true tout court, then it is true also before Emma’s choice and
this blocks her effective freedom of choice. In order to preserve Emma’s
freedom, the truth value of 𝜑 must be indeterminate.
Actually, this happens also in the (much less troublesome) case of
the human knowledge of free actions; we can safely say that yesterday
Emma was free to drink a beer at the party and that she then decided
to drink it. It is therefore true both that it was indeterminate whether
Emma would drink a beer and that she drank it. So, the natural way to
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keep both requirements together is that of relativizing them to an instant:
the day before yesterday, it was indeterminate whether Emma would
drink a beer, but today it is no longer indeterminate. The problem with
divine knowledge is that given God’s omniscience, the possibility of rel-
ativization to instants is blocked: God must be able to know in the past
what will happen in the future. But this entails that future contingents
must have a determinate truth value, and again, we end in the negation
of free will.
Our perspectival framework can help. By means of it, we have un-
derstood how to talk coherently about the truth value of future tense
propositions with respect to the assumed perspective; recall that F𝜑 is
true at 𝑡1 from the perspective of the future. And it is indeterminate
from the perspective of the present. In fact, one could say that it is by
virtue of the fact that the future has been in this way that retrospectively
the truth value of future tense sentences is determinate. And this is per-
fectly analogous to what happens with the human knowledge, directed
to the past: because Emma decided to drink a beer at the party, it is
now true that it was true that Emma would drink a beer at the party.
However, when we evaluate on instants that are contemporary with or
subsequent to the perspective, then the future is really indeterminate
and open.
Our proposal is the following: God is omniscient not only because
He timelessly knows the truth value8 of each proposition at each time
but, crucially, because He also timelessly knows the truth value of each
proposition at each time from each perspective. Omniscience is, then,
omni-perspectival knowledge. Looking back at our example, we have
that God knows that at 𝑡0 from the perspective 𝑡0, it is indeterminate
whether Emma will drink a beer at the party – thus, Emma is free in a
genuine sense to drink a beer or not. However, God also knows that at
𝑡0 but from the perspective 𝑡1, it is true that Emma will drink a beer at
the party. All these sentences are formally coherent, and one could say
that both God’s omniscience and Emma’s free will are preserved.
Now, this solution has some theoretical costs. First, we have to take
a stand on the nature of perspectives. So far, we have reasoned from
model-theoretic considerations, but what is the ontological import of
this framework? In other words, are perspectives actual? And what
8Obviously, one can know only what is true. So, if 𝜓 is false, then God knows that it
is true that 𝜓 is false.
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are they? Second, even if one accepts the idea that God’s knowledge
is omni-perspectival, does it make sense to ask the following question
at face value: is Emma actually free? That is, is there a description of
reality which is absolute and therefore not perspectival? In that case, it
is plausible to think that there is a true description of reality and the
perspectives are a mere reflex of this absolute vision. To provide some
tentative answers, we have to make some conjectures about the nature
of temporal perspectives and about how they play an essential role in
characterizing the epistemic relation between God and the world.
4 Metaphysics of Time and God’s Knowledge
Since the publication of McTaggart’s seminal paper ([16]), it has been
de rigueur in the philosophy of time to distinguish the most important
metaphysical views in terms of A-theories and B-theories. In a nutshell,
the A-views claim that the dynamic dimension of time is actual; this en-
tails that becoming is an objective feature of the world. There exists, in
other words, a privileged time (the present), and this changes. What
has been future yesterday will be present today and what is present to-
day will be past tomorrow. The A-views are realist about tense: there
are irreducible tensed features that entities possess. More soberly, B-
views state that the only temporal relations are the B-relations, that is,
the relations of order among instants. There is no privileged instant;
by consequence, “now” behaves as a spatial indexical term (an argu-
ment cited very often by the B-theorists is the structural analogy be-
tween space and time): just as there is no privileged “here”, so there
is no special “now”. Temporal becoming is a cognitive illusion; prop-
erly speaking, time does not flow.
A classical A-theoretic metaphysics is Presentism: there exist only
present entities and the content of presentness changes over time. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, a metaphysical view often advocated
by B-theorists is Eternalism: all the temporal entities exist on a par with
one another, exactly as do all the points of a space.9
Theprevious section showed thatGodhas an omni-perspectival form
of knowledge. The point is to provide an explanatory account of it.10
9For an overview, see [19].
10See, for a more detailed view, [7] and [9]
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There are essentially two general options about the metaphysics of the
perspectival knowledge: according to the first, which we call tenseless,
the perspectives are points of view on the temporal series; the second,
the tensed view, regards the perspectives as actual. Let us investigate
both of them in turn.
The tenseless approach is usually matched with a general eternalist
metaphysics.11 According to this view, the perspectives are mere stand-
points on the temporal series; their nature is, thus, purely indexical.
God, as omniscient, has every perspective atHis cognitive disposal. The
analogywith the spatial case could be illuminating; “here” is, clearly, an
indexical to which no privileged place corresponds. At the same time,
however, we cannot be in every possible “here”; this limitation does not
affect God, who is, so to speak, as we are when we look at a map and
are able – at least in the representation – to locate ourselves in whatever
position.
Metaphors aside, God knows that Emma is free at 𝑡1 from the per-
spective of 𝑡1, because two possible histories stem from 𝑡1, one in which
Emma drinks a beer at the party and the other in which she does not.
At the same time, God sees that at 𝑡2 Emma drinks a beer because she
made up her mind (and thus she is responsible for her action). So,
from the perspective 𝑡2, it is true at 𝑡1 that Emma would have a beer
at the party. It is important to underline two points. First, the cause of
the fact that God knows that at 𝑡2 Emma is at the party, is Emma’s free
decision. This entails that there is a sort of interaction between what
happens in time and God’s knowledge. Second, the eternalist ontology
of the universe does not undermine free will because this has to dowith
branching time, namely with the openness of the future. Even though
thewhole series of Emma’s choices exists eternally, it is nonetheless true
that Emma could have made choices different from the ones she made.
It is clear how the concept of omni-perspectival knowledge plays a cen-
tral role: human knowledge of the temporal aspects is given through a
particular perspective, whereas the divine standpoint includes any pos-
sible point of view. What we usually say about the past – i.e., that it was
indeterminate whether Emmawould drink a beer but it is now determi-
nate, because Emma made up her mind – is true for God with respect
11But it would be interesting to investigate the entanglements between the perspecti-
val tenselessness and nonstandard eternalist theories of time such as the moving spot-
light theory.
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to the whole temporal series. After all, metaphysical eternalism agrees
with the idea of a tenseless God: the only temporal features of reality,
for the eternalist, are the B-relations, and God is able to observe the en-
tire temporal sequence from every possible perspective in a single act
of knowledge.12
We believe that the main cost of this solution lies in the acceptance
of a B-theory of time.13 If we are persuaded by the criticisms moved
against the B-theories of time and if we decide to embrace an A-view of
time, the ontological weight of the perspectives becomes crucial. A pos-
sibility explored in [8] – although using different formal frameworks
– is to connect the perspective with the ontologically privileged now.14
The perspectival index of the semantic framework is interpreted as the
metaphysical now: it is the instant of time at which the world has ar-
rived. Obviously, nothing prevents us from changing perspective, that
is, from imagining how thing would be if the world had arrived at an-
other time 𝑡.
If the various perspectives are the “nows”, we have a problem: the
perspectives are incompatible. And this is plausible: if 𝑡1 is today, to-
morrow 𝑡2 will be today. But two different times 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 cannot both
be today simultaneously. Therefore, the two perspectives on reality are
clearly incompatible: the property of being present cannot apply to two
different instants at the same time. But, plausibly, this is not a prob-
lem for us: in a tensed theory of time, the perspectives follow one an-
other in time and they are never in conflict.15 The problem is more
pressing if we postulate the existence of an agent whose knowledge is
omni-perspectival: God timelessly knows that at now(𝑡1) Emma is free,
that is, that F𝜑 is indeterminate at 𝑡1, but He also timelessly knows that
12A very similar position is advocated by Katherine Rogers. See [23], and [24].
13This is not the place to discuss the arguments against this view of time. See, for
instance, [2], and [5]. Note that there might also be derived costs, such as the problem
of conciliating a tenseless metaphysics with the features of classical theism. See [18].
14As is well-known, the A-theories of time ascribe to the present an ontological pri-
ority. Presentism construes this priority as the very existence: the present is privileged
because it is the only “thing” that exists. But other A-theories as well ascribe to the
present a special status: according to the advocates of the growing block theory, the
now is the edge of the block, where we are. Analogously, the moving spotlight theory
characterizes the now through the metaphor of a light that progressively illuminates
the various instants of the temporal series.
15Of course, McTaggart did not agree; based on a similar train of thought, he argued
that the A-series is incoherent.
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at now(𝑡2) it is determinate at 𝑡1 that F𝜑. But the two states of knowl-
edge are not compatible, because now(𝑡1) and now(𝑡2) are incompatible
perspectives. If now(𝑡1) and now(𝑡2) are two robust stages of the world
following one another (and not mere indexicals), it does not seem that
God can know at the same time the truth value of the propositions both
from the point of view of now(𝑡1) and from the point of view of now(𝑡2),
because these stages are not compatible.
A possible way out is to adopt a form of Fine’s fragmentalist A-view
of time.16 In Fine’s view, Fragmentalism is the only possible realism in
relation to tensed facts. The argument of [16] against the reality of time
has four premises: (1) there are tensed facts; (2) no time is privileged
over the other times; (3) the constitution of reality is absolute and not
relative to time or temporal perspectives; (4) reality is coherent. These
four premises lead to a contradiction. The standard answer of the realist
regarding tensed facts is to reject premise (2) and claim that the present
is a privileged time over the others. The problem of this response is that
every time becomes present sooner or later, and from this point of view,
none is privileged. If one retorts that the instants are not privileged at
the same time, but one by one, then McTaggart would respond that this
rebuttal presupposes the existence of a hypertime, for which the same
problem arises again. Fine, therefore, prefers to accept a nonstandard
form of realism of tense and rejects premise (4). Every fragment has
a present time and contains tensed facts, but the fragments contain dif-
ferent tensed facts, and the present is not the same in every fragment
but changes from fragment to fragment. The present is a privileged
time over the others in any fragment, but there is no absolute present
in reality: one instant is privileged only with respect to a fragment, be-
cause, if an instant is present in a fragment, it is not present in the other
fragments. In addition, the fragments are all on par, and there is no
fragment that is privileged over the others.
We believe that Fragmentalism is a viable metaphysics with which
to understand perspectival semantics. Any fragment is constituted by a
present and by a bunch of tensional facts which “refer” to that present.
Obviously, the fragments are intrinsically coherent but they are incom-
patible; therefore, reality is made of fragments which cannot be “com-
bined”. It is natural enough to understand a perspective as the present
16See [10], [4], and [13].
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of a fragment and all the true propositions from that perspective as
descriptions of the tensional facts of that fragment. Given this seman-
tic framework and this metaphysics, a timeless God can be omniscient,
since He can retain a constant epistemic relationship with all the frag-
ments, thus knowing all the propositions that are true in them. Even
God’s knowledge is fragmented, but it cannot be otherwise, because the
reality He knows is fragmented too.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a perspectival semantics which ac-
counts for the variation over time of the truth value of future tensed
sentence. We have then applied this framework to the problem of divine
foreknowledge and human free will. This framework can, in principle,
provide a solution to the problem, but it has been shown that the un-
derlying ontology is crucial. If the assumed metaphysics is a B-theory
of time (and if the perspectives are just indexicals), God’s knowledge
and human free will are compatible. However, if the assumed meta-
physics is tensed and if the perspective coincides with the “now”, then
the solution works only if we are ready to adopt nonstandard A-views
such as Fragmentalism.
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Abstract
Since the early days of Ockhamist semantics, it has been recognized that
the history-relative notion of truth which the theory postulates is prob-
lematic: it is unclear what it means that a sentence is true relative to a
possible course of events; it is also unclear how such a notion of relative
truth relates to the everyday notion of truth simpliciter. To rationalize the
Ockhamist notion of truth I compare two relativistic theories: the assess-
ment relativism of John MacFarlane and the history relativism of Belnap
et al. In the end, I suggest that wemay understand the history-relative no-
tion of truth as the truth assessed relative to an end of time. On the formal
level, I introduce a doomsday extension of a branching model and prove
that history-relative truth in any given model is equivalent to doomsday-
relative truth in the extended model. It turns out that this equivalence
holds in general only if the end of time is also, in a sense, beyond time.
Keywords: Ockhamism, assessment relativism, branching time.
1 Introduction
With the publication of “Past, Present and Future” the branching-time
model was incorporated into the mainstream of temporal logic. The
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model introduced an important modal dimension to the discussion of
time as it is based on the insight that the future, as opposed to the past, is
open to multiple realizations. Nonetheless, Prior himself did not dwell
on the metaphysical significance of the model because his main objec-
tivewas to understand (and undermine) themain arguments for logical
determinism. Thus, he immediately put the branching model to seman-
tic work to show that some assumptiomps postulated by determinists
are questionable and can be falsified in certain semantic theories. One
of these theories is Ockhamism (this model helped Prior to show that
not every sentence in the past tense truly concerns the settled past).
Ockhamist semantics is a simple and formally appealing theory that
smoothly blends past, present, and future tenseswith temporal possibil-
ity. However, there is certain controversy surrounding this semantics,
as the basic Ockhamist notion of truth eludes clear comprehension [this
concern was first clearly articulated in 11, pp. 270–1]. A few definitions
are required to understand this problematic issue.
Definition 1 (Branching Structure). Branching structure𝔅 is an ordered
pair ⟨𝑀,<⟩, where 𝑀 ≠ ∅ and ≤ is a partial order on 𝑀 that satisfies
the following conditions:
Backward linearity
∀𝑚1,𝑚2,𝑚3((𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚3 &𝑚2 ≤ 𝑚3) ⇒ (𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚2 or 𝑚2 ≤ 𝑚1));
Connectedness ∀𝑚1,𝑚2∃𝑚3 (𝑚3 ≤ 𝑚1 &𝑚3 ≤ 𝑚2).
The structure represents all the possible ways the system (e.g. our
world) might develop. Any one of the possible paths is called a history
(it is a maximal, linearly ordered subset of 𝑀 , sometimes also described
as a “chronicle” or a “branch”).
To define an Ockhamist model based on a branching strucute we
use a very simple, sentential language containing operators of classical
logic, two temporal operators, (‘it will be the case that’—𝐹—and ‘it was
the case that’—𝑃 ), and an operator of historical modality (‘It is settled
that’—2)1 .
Branching model 𝔐, based on a structure 𝔅, is a pair 𝔐 ≔ ⟨𝔅,𝑉 ⟩,
where 𝑉 is a valuation function which assigns a set of moments to ev-
ery sentential constant, 𝑉 ∶ 𝐴𝑡𝑜𝑚 ↦ ℘(𝑀). In Ockhamism, sentences
1The necessity operator is sometimes read as “it is inevitable that,” or “it is unpre-
ventable that.”
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are evaluated in a branching model at an index which contains two pa-
rameters: a moment parameter (shifted by temporal operators) and a
history parameter (shifted by the modal operator). Consequently, sen-
tences are evaluated at triples ⟨𝔐,𝑚/ℎ⟩. The Ockhamist truth (⊧) of a
sentence in a model at an index is inductively defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Sentence 𝜙 is true in model 𝔐, at index 𝑚/ℎ).
1. For 𝑝 ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑜𝑚, 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝑝 iff 𝑚 ∈ 𝑉 (𝑝);
2. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ ¬𝜙 iff it is not the case that 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙;
3. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 ∧𝜓 iff 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 &𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜓;
4. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝑃𝜙 iff ∃𝑚′(𝑚′ < 𝑚&𝔐,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙);
5. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff ∃𝑚′(𝑚 < 𝑚′ &𝑚′ ∈ ℎ&𝔐,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙);
6. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 2𝜙 iff ∀ℎ′(𝑚 ∈ ℎ′ ⇒ 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ′ ⊧ 𝜙).
Importantly, in Ockhamist semantics the truth value of a sentence
is relative to a modal parameter—a history. There is formally nothing
wrong with such a relativization, but it creates an obstacle to the ap-
plication of Ockhamism to its original purpose—analysis of future con-
tingents. Let us take the sentence (S), “There will be a space battle in
the 21st century,” (𝐹𝑝) as used during the NATO 2018 Summit in Brus-
sels. HowshouldweuseOckhamist semantics to evaluate this sentence?
Well, we need to check if it is true at a moment/history pair. So far so
good, but which exact moment and, more importantly, which history
to use? After all, the Brussels Summit has many possible continuations.
And so the trouble begins.
Our Ockhamist semantics gives us a definition of truth at a
context and index (world/time pair) for arbitrary sentences
in our language. But how canwemove from this to the prag-
matically relevant notion of truth at a context?
[6, pp. 207–208]
Thus, to apply Ockhamism, we need to somehow relate the prag-
matically relevant notion of the truth of a sentence used at a particular
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context to the technically relevant notion of the truth of a sentence eval-
uated at a semantic index. I use the symbol ||− to stand for the former
notion of truth, and I use ⊧ to stand for the latter. MacFarlane coined
the term postsemantics to designate the theory whose job is to link the
two notions of truth.
The easiest postsemantics simply identifies the truth at the context
with the truth at the unique semantic index initialized by the context
(we advocated this solution in Wawer and Malpass [12]; it is indepen-
dently defended by Gallina [4]). Nonetheless, many branching theo-
rists reject the easy solution. They argue that the context does designate
a moment, but it does not designate a history [see especially 2, pp. 151–2,
231–3]. In their view, since the act of utterance is a part of many distinct
histories, we cannot distinguish the history in which the utterance takes
place and they conclude that the history parameter is not initialized by
the context of use (see e.g. Belnap et al. [2, pp. 151–152, 163–164, 232–
233]; John MacFarlane [5, p. 232]; [6, p. 208]; Tomasz Placek [9, p. 756];
or Thomas Müller [8, p. 350]). Therefore, they face what I call an ini-
tialization failure. Ockhamist semantics requires that the process of se-
mantic evaluation begins at some specific index, but the context does
not initialize the relevant index.2
Hence, the simple procedure does not work. According tomany the-
orists the context of a sentence is not sufficient to designate the appro-
priate circumstance for the evaluation of the sentence. The content of
the sentence does not seem to do the job either. The meaning of, “There
will be a space battle in the 21st century,” does not indicate which his-
tory is being referred to. However, if neither the context nor the content
initializes a history, then how shall one apply Ockhamist semantics?
Since the immediate route from the truth at a context to the truth at
a semantic index is blocked, the authors need to find another, less direct
way to relate the two notions of truth. Several postsemantic strategies
have been proposed and I shall focus on two of them, both of whose
distinctive feature is that they embrace a relative notion of truth. That
is, I focus on the theories in which the meaning of the sentence supple-
mented by information provided by the context of use is not sufficient
to assess the truth status of a sentence used at the context. According
2I believe that the refusal to accept the history of the context partly results from spe-
cific metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of the branching structure, but I
set this issue aside (the issue is discussed in 12).
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to these theories, the truth value of the sentence is relative to some extra
factor.
2 Assessment relativism
MacFarlane thinks that the relevant additional factor is the context of
assessment. He argues that the truth value of a sentence used at a given
context can be determined only if we also take into account the context
from which the truth value of the sentence is being assessed. A premo-
nition of such an idea can be traced back to [11], in which it is suggested
that:
[R]ather than making formulas true or false with respect
only to the times at which they are true or false, we make
their being true or false relative to subsequent times as well.
[11, p. 268]
The idea was later revived by Nuel Belnap [1] under the name of
“double-time reference.” (However, Belnap used the technique not to
assess the truth value of a sentence, but to provide satisfaction condi-
tions for assertions and other speech acts.) Finally, John MacFarlane
used Belnap’s technical apparatus to formalize the double-relativized
notion of truth in the form of “double-time reference postsemantics” [5,
p. 331]. This postsemantics was later incorporated into a more general
theory of assessment relativism [6].
The formal idea of assessment relativism, as applied to branching,
is that when we assess the truth value of a sentence used at one context
from the perspective of another context, we should check if the sentence
assessed is true at the context of use with respect to the histories passing
through the context of assessment. To state relativist postsemantics, we
need an auxiliary notion of the set of histories passing through a mo-
ment:
Definition 3. 𝐻𝑚 = {ℎ|𝑚 ∈ ℎ}
and the set of histories passing through a pair of moments:
Definition 4. 𝐻𝑚1|𝑚2 =
⎧{
⎨{⎩
𝐻𝑚1 ∩𝐻𝑚2 , if 𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚2,
𝐻𝑚1 , otherwise.
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We can now define assessment relativism as follows
Definition 5. 𝑚𝑢,𝑚𝑎||−𝑅𝜙 iff 𝔐,𝑚𝑢/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 for every history ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑚𝑢|𝑚𝑎 .
A sentence is true at a pair of contexts 𝑚𝑢,𝑚𝑎 iff it is true at mo-
ment 𝑚𝑢 in all histories passing through 𝑚𝑎 (or all histories passing
through𝑚𝑢 if𝑚𝑢 ≰ 𝑚𝑎). Assessment relativism truly deserves its name,
since the very same sentence used in a single context can be true when
assessed from one perspective, false when assessed from another per-
spective, and neither true nor false when assessed from still another
perspective.
Let us study relativist postsemantics with a particular example:
𝑚0
𝑚2:!
ℎ2
𝑚1:
ℎ1
It will be sunny tomorrow.
In such a model:
• 𝑚0,𝑚0||−/𝑅𝐹1(sunny)
• 𝑚0,𝑚0||−/𝑅¬𝐹1(sunny)
• 𝑚0,𝑚1||−𝑅𝐹1(sunny)
• 𝑚0,𝑚2||−𝑅¬𝐹1(sunny)
So, at the pair of contexts 𝑚0 and 𝑚0, the sentence “It will be sunny
tomorrow” is neither true nor false: at 𝑚0,𝑚1 it is true, and at 𝑚0,𝑚2
it is false. MacFarlane is happy with these results as he believes that
the relative truth fits well with our intuitive ascriptions of accuracy to
assertions. He claims that each assertion of a future contingent should
be judged to be inaccurate when assessed from the perspective of the
context of use. Nonetheless, when the flow of time resolves the matter
and confirms the previous prediction (i.e. the context of assessment
changes), then the initial assertion should be judged accurate. Thus,
MacFarlane finds intuitive support for his relative notion of truth.3
3I havemy doubts with regard toMacFarlane’s postsemantic solution, but I set them
aside as I am currently working on a paper focused uniquely on criticism of relativism.
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3 History relativism
History relativism agrees with assessment relativism that the truth sta-
tus of a sentence used in a context cannot be determined based solely on
themeaning of the sentence and the features of the context of use. How-
ever, in history relativism we need to assume the point of view of the
entire history to assess the truth status of a sentence used at a context.
In Richmond Thomason’s words, we are “adopting a whole possible fu-
ture for 𝛼 as our perspective, rather than a single time in the future of
𝛼” [11, p. 269].
Such an attitude is characteristic of Belnap et al. [2]. In their view,
unless a specific possible history is specified, a future contingent cannot
be evaluated at a given context.4 The authors express their attitude in
the following words:
Then the truth of that sentence (given indeterminism) de-
pends not only on the moment at which the sentence is
uttered. It depends in addition on which future course of
events—which history—is being considered. [2, p. 225]
Nonetheless, we noticed that the authors ferociously argue against
the idea that the context indicates which history should be considered
(after all, an utterance is a part of many different courses of events). As
a result, it is simply meaningless to call a future contingent true or false
at the context of its use 𝑚𝑐. As the authors put it:
“𝔐,𝑚𝑐 ⊧ 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑙 ∶ the coin lands heads” does not make sense.
[2, p. 155]
Only when a continuation of the moment of utterance is indepen-
dently specified can one ask about the truth value of the uttered sen-
tence. Therefore, the history relativists’ answer to the question whether
the sentence “there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow” is true is some-
what evasive. They claim that the sentence is true relative to the contin-
uation in which the sea battle takes place, but it is false relative to the
alternative continuation. This is as much as can be said regarding the
truth value of a sentence at a context.
4Their terminology differs from mine. When I write about a sentence being true at
a context, Belnap et al. [2] write about a stand-alone sentence being true at a context-
initialized point of evaluation.
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We may say that history relativists simply capitulate in face of the
initialization failure. Given the evident indispensability of the history
parameter in Ockhamist semantics, they simply duplicate the history
parameter on the level of postsemantics. We end up with a theory ac-
cording towhich the truth value not only of a sentence-at-index but also
of a sentence-at-context is relative to a history.
Definition 6 (History relativism postsemantics). 𝑚/ℎ||−𝐻𝜙 iff 𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙.
When we apply history relativism to future contingents it becomes
clear that their truth value (at context) is highly arbitrary—it depends
on something as whimsical as an entirely unmotivated choice of a his-
tory parameter. This is a rather controversial consequence. One could
argue that the truth value of a sentence used in a context should be
grounded in something more solid than an ad hoc decision of a seman-
ticist who needs one history or another to do her job.
It is also not entirely clear ofwhat this decision should consist. When
relativists talk in terms of abstract Ockhamist semantics, they say that
a possible future needs to be “posited” [11, p. 271] or “supplied” [2, p.
156]. However, when they try to give a more down-to-earth descrip-
tion of the procedure, they often help themselves with intentional vo-
cabulary. For example, Burgess writes that “The truth value of a future
tense statement depends on which branch we think of as representing
the course of events which is actually going to turn out to happen” [3,
p. 575, emphasis mine] and Müller [8] echoes that “we normally need
to specify which of the equally possible futures we mean to refer to” [8,
p. 354, emphasis mine]. However, if all that is required to specify a pos-
sible history is an intention of a speaker (this procedure is called “inner
baptism in [7]), then making predictions true or false would be all too
easy. Such a procedure has very little in common with everyday usage.
When Themistocles said to Eurybiadeds, “There will be a sea battle to-
morrow,” no one could make this sentence true or false just by thinking
of a specific possible future.5
5Let me note that Belnap et al. [2] have their own ways of domesticating their pro-
posal. Specifically, they argue that the “bare” truth value of a sentence at a context is
irrelevant to the linguistic practice. What really matters in their view is the settled truth
value. They notice that it is often settled that future contingents will have had a settled
truth value and explain how this feature is sufficient to explain linguistic practice. A
sketch of their proposal can be found in [2, sec. 6E]; the view is developed in [1].
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In what follows, I will argue that there is another way to rationalize
history relativism. In my proposal, the truth value of a sentence used
at a context is still relative, but the choice of a specific history is neither
arbitrary nor does it depend on a subject’s intentions. I claim that the
choice of the history becomes well motivated when we understand a
history as a special context of assessment.
4 History relativism as extreme assessment rela-
tivism
In this section, I argue that history relativism can be understood as an ex-
treme version of MacFarlane’s assessment relativism; some inspiration
for this approach can be found in a short passage by Prior:
[T]he Ockhamist seems to treat what is still future in a way
in which it would only be proper to treat what has been
future—he views it as it would be proper to view it from
the end of time. [10, pp. 130–131]
This line of thinking aboutOckhamism seems to have beendiscarded
in the later development of the theory, but it might be used to establish
a new understanding of the history-relative notion of truth. I intend to
develop the idea that when history relativists relativize the truth value
of a sentence at context to a history, they metaphorically situate them-
selves at the transcendent end of the history. Then, they indeed view a
course of events “as it would be proper to view it from the end of time.”
In the spirit of Prior’s philosophy, let me elucidate the insight above
by giving it a formal reconstruction. I intend to apply MacFarlane’s as-
sessment relativism to demonstrate that the notion of truth at a context
relative to a history can be understood as truth at a pair of contexts. We
shall see that—in accordance with Prior’s insight—the context of assess-
ment needs to be situated at the end of time.
Let me begin the investigations with a simple example. Consider
a branching model 𝔐 in which there is a maximal element in every
history—“the end of time”—in this history (there is at most one such
element, given that histories are linearly ordered). If we symbolize the
maximal moment in history ℎ as 𝑚ℎ, it is easy to observe that:
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Lemma 1. If 𝔐 is a model in which there is a maximal element 𝑚ℎ in
every history ℎ, then ∀ℎ(𝐻𝑚ℎ = {ℎ})
Proof. Take an arbitrary history ℎ ∈ 𝔐, 𝑚ℎ ∈ ℎ, so ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑚ℎ , therefore,
{ℎ} ⊆ 𝐻𝑚ℎ . To prove that 𝐻𝑚ℎ ⊆ {ℎ}, assume for reduction that ∃ℎ′ℎ′ ≠
ℎ&𝑚ℎ ∈ ℎ′. Since ℎ ≠ ℎ′, ∃𝑚′∈ℎ′𝑚′ ∈ ℎ′ &𝑚′ ∉ ℎ. As 𝑚ℎ,𝑚′ ∈ ℎ′ and ℎ′
is linearly ordered, there are two options:
1. If 𝑚′ < 𝑚ℎ, then (by no-backward-branching and maximality of
ℎ) 𝑚′ ∈ ℎ, which contradicts our assumption.
2. If 𝑚ℎ ≤ 𝑚′, then (since 𝑚ℎ is the maximal element of ℎ and ℎ is a
maximal, linearly ordered subset of 𝑀) 𝑚ℎ ≮ 𝑚′. Thus, 𝑚′ = 𝑚ℎ,
but then 𝑚′ ∈ ℎ, which contradicts our assumption.
A simple proof is sufficient to establish that for any 𝑚 in model 𝔐
described above, a sentence is true relative to a history ℎ iff it is assessed
as true from the perspective of moment 𝑚ℎ, i.e. from the end of time in
history ℎ:
Fact 1. 𝑚/ℎ ||−𝐻𝜙 iff 𝑚,𝑚ℎ||−𝑅𝜙
Proof. Since 𝑚,𝑚ℎ ∈ ℎ and 𝑚ℎ is themaximal element of ℎ, then 𝑚 ≤ 𝑚ℎ.
From this we can conclude that 𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ = (𝐻𝑚 ∩ 𝐻𝑚ℎ) = 𝐻𝑚ℎ . Hence,
𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ = 𝐻𝑚ℎ . By lemma 1, 𝐻𝑚ℎ = {ℎ}. Therefore, 𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ = {ℎ}.
1. 𝑚,𝑚ℎ||−𝑅𝜙 iff
2. 𝑚/ℎ′ ⊧ 𝜙, for every ℎ′ ∈ 𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ iff (since 𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ = {ℎ})
3. 𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (by def. 6)
4. 𝑚/ℎ||−𝐻𝜙.
Thus, in the “upper-bounded”model it is easy to substantiate Prior’s
claim; however, application ofOckhamism is not limited to suchmodels.
It might well be that some (or even all) of the histories in a model have
no end. In such a case, what would it mean for an Ockhamist to view
the future “as it would be proper to view it from the end of time?” I
propose to read it along the following lines: an Ockhamist views the
future as it would be proper to view it from a transcendent end of time.
396
To give formalmeaning to themaxim, I construct what I call a dooms-
day extension of a branching model. Let 𝔐 ≔ ⟨𝑀,<⟩ be a branching
model. We extend the model 𝔐 with a set 𝑀𝐷 such that:
(i) ∀ℎ∃!𝑚ℎ∈𝑀𝐷∀𝑚∈ℎ𝑚 < 𝑚ℎ
(ii) ∀𝑚ℎ∈𝑀𝐷∃!ℎ∀𝑚∈ℎ(𝑚 < 𝑚ℎ ⇔ 𝑚 ∈ ℎ)
This means that we attach a single extra moment on top of every
history in the original model 𝔐. I will call such an extended structure
𝔐𝔇, and 𝑚ℎ is the moment which is attached on top of history ℎ. Let
me pause to show that model 𝔐𝔇 is still a model of branching. Its or-
dering relation is evidently a partial order, so let me just check if it is a
connected order without backward branching.
Fact 2 (𝔐𝐷 is a 𝐵𝑇 model).
Connectedness ∀𝑚,𝑛∈𝑀∃𝑜∈𝑀𝑜 ≤ 𝑚&𝑜 ≤ 𝑛
Proof. The only interesting case is when we pick 𝑚ℎ1 ,𝑚ℎ2 ∈ 𝑀𝐷.
In this case, we just need to choose anymoment 𝑚 ∈ ℎ1 and 𝑛 ∈ ℎ2.
By definition of 𝔐𝔇, 𝑚 < 𝑚ℎ1 and 𝑛 < 𝑚ℎ2 , and since 𝑚 and 𝑛 are
connected and ≤ is transitive, 𝑚ℎ1 and 𝑚ℎ2 are also connected.
No-Backward-Branching
∀𝑚1,𝑚2,𝑚3(𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚3 &𝑚2 ≤ 𝑚3) ⇒ (𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚2 ∨𝑚2 ≤ 𝑚1)
Proof. We just need to check if it is satisfied for every 𝑚3 = 𝑚ℎ ∈
𝑀𝐷. Take an arbitrary 𝑚ℎ ∈ 𝑀𝐷, then by condition (ii) we have
that all the moments below 𝑚ℎ are in a single history. And since
every history is linearly ordered, there is no danger of backward
branching.
Before I proceed, let me observe that the construction of 𝔐𝔇 guaran-
tees that there is a maximal element in every history. Therefore, lemma
1 applies, and we have that in 𝔐𝔇, ∀ℎ𝐻𝑚ℎ = {ℎ}.
Let us investigate the relations between history relativism and as-
sessment relativism in the doomsday model.
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Observe first that there is 𝔐 and 𝜙 such that:
𝔐,𝑚/ℎ||−𝐻𝜙 & 𝔐𝔇,𝑚,𝑚ℎ||−/𝑅𝜙
There are two kinds of reasons for the failure.
“Material” There may be 𝜙 which is false everywhere in ℎ, but true at
𝑚ℎ. (“Four horsemen of the Apocalypse are riding their horses”
is a good candidate for 𝜙). Then 𝐺¬𝑝 is true at anymoment in ℎ in
the base model, but false in the doomsday extension of the model.
“Structural” The addition of doomsday significantlymodifies the struc-
ture of the histories. Most evidently, seriality no longer holds and
thus 𝐺𝜙 → 𝐹𝜙 is not valid in the extended model.
It is then a valid questionwhetherwe can give formal credit to Prior’s
insight in the general case. I propose a relatively easy solution: limit the
range of the future operator such that it does not reach all the way to
doomsday. In this sense, doomsday is truly a transcendent end of time
as it cannot be reached by the “mundane” future operator. The new
definition of 𝐹 in the doomsday model should be modified as follows:
Definition 7.
𝔐𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff ∃𝑚′(𝑚′ ∈ ℎ&𝑚′ > 𝑚&𝑚′ ≠ 𝑚ℎ &𝔐𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙).
By the duality of 𝐹 and 𝐺, we obtain that
𝔐𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐺𝜙 iff ∀𝑚′(𝑚′ ∈ ℎ&𝑚′ > 𝑚&𝑚′ ≠ 𝑚ℎ) ⇒ 𝔐𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙.
Therefore, we end up with a model which has an extra element on
top of every history, but the element is not attainable by the connective
“it will be the case that.” So, doomsday is in one sense at the end of
time, but in another it is outside of time. I am not sufficiently versed
in theology to give a convincing account of this idea, but I am quite
confident that it has been entertained at some point in the history of
human thought. Importantly for us, this modification makes it possible
to prove an analogue of fact 1 in full generality:
Fact 3. Let 𝔐 be an arbitrary branching model and 𝔐𝔇 its doomsday
extension, and let 𝑚 ∈ 𝔐, then:
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𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ||−𝐻𝜙 iff 𝔐𝔇,𝑚,𝑚ℎ ||−𝑅𝜙
Proof. By induction on complexity of 𝜙, in particular:
1. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ||−𝐻𝐹𝜙 if (by def. 6)
2. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff (by def. of 𝐹)
3. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚𝔐,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (by def. 6)
4. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚𝔐,𝑚′/ℎ ||−𝐻𝜙 iff (by inductive assumption)
5. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚𝔐𝔇,𝑚′,𝑚ℎ||−𝑅𝜙 iff (by def. 5)
6. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚∀ℎ′∈𝐻𝑚′|𝑚ℎ 𝔐
𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ′ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (since 𝑚′ < 𝑚ℎ, by
def. 4)
7. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚∀ℎ′∈𝐻𝑚ℎ 𝔐
𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ′ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (by Lemma 1)
8. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚𝔐𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (𝑚′ ∈ ℎ, so 𝑚′ ≠ 𝑚ℎ)
9. ∃𝑚′(𝑚′ ∈ ℎ&𝑚′ > 𝑚&𝑚′ ≠ 𝑚ℎ &𝔐𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙) iff (by def. 7)
10. 𝔐𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff (by Lemma 1)
11. ∀ℎ∈𝐻𝑚ℎ 𝔐
𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff (since 𝑚 < 𝑚ℎ, by def. 4)
12. ∀ℎ∈𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ 𝔐
𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff (be def. 5)
13. 𝔐𝔇,𝑚,𝑚ℎ||−𝑅𝐹𝜙
Thanks to the modification of the truth clause of 𝐹 in the doomsday
model, we can give full credit to Prior’s insight. The Ockhamist looks
at the future as if it has been future, that is, from the perspective of the
end of time. A necessary addition to vindicate this insight is that in the
models in which time has no end, the end of time is “beyond time.”
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Abstract
Arthur Prior inventedhybrid logic, and sometimes definednominalswith
his 𝑄 operator, which he in turn defined using propositional quantifiers.
Nowadays there are two well-known approaches to propositional quan-
tification: the standard (or set-theoretical) approach and the general
(or Henkin) approach. As we shall see, these give rise to two different
‘species’ of nominals. Working in a version of hybrid logic which con-
tains both standard nominals and propositional quantifiers we shall see
that these two ‘species’ behave differently with respect to the rule of uni-
versal instantiation. We then suggest that this formally-defined ‘species
division’ corresponds rather well with two intuitions about nominals that
can be detected in Prior’s writing: the ‘index’ view and the ‘content’ view.
Keywords: Arthur Prior, hybrid logic, nominals, propositional quanti-
fiers, general models, tableau systems.
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1 Introduction
In the familiar Kripke semantics for modal logic, the truth-value of a
formula is defined relative to the points in a set; that is, a formula is
evaluated ‘locally’, at a point, where points are usually taken to repre-
sent possible worlds, times, locations, persons, or computational states.
Contemporary hybrid logics are extended modal logics in which it is
possible to directly refer to such points in the logical object-language
using nominals, propositional symbols of a new sort; nominals are typi-
cally written as 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑘 to distinguish them from the ordinary propo-
sitional symbols, which are usually written as 𝑝, 𝑞, and 𝑟. Nominals are
interpreted in a restricted way: they are guaranteed to be true at exactly
one point in any model. Thus, in contemporary hybrid logic, a nomi-
nal can be considered to be an atomic ‘propositional term’ that names
a world or a time, and in what follows we shall often call such symbols
standard nominals. The history of what is now known as hybrid logic
traces back to Arthur Prior’s pioneering work on modal and tense logic
from the 1950s and 60s; see [6] for background.
Sometimes, however, Arthur Prior introduced nominals not as a sec-
ond sort of propositional symbol, but as an ordinary propositional sym-
bol (𝑝 say) preceded by the 𝑄 operator, and he spelt out what 𝑄𝑝 meant
using propositional quantifiers. For example in [10], page 237 he says:
For ‘𝑝 is an individual’ (or an instant, or a possible total
world-state) we write 𝑄𝑝. If we have propositional quan-
tifiers, we can define 𝑄𝑝 thus:
𝑄𝑝 = 3𝑝 ∧∀𝑞(2(𝑝 → 𝑞)∨2(𝑝 → ¬𝑞))
Prior defines 𝑄𝑝 in this way in other places as well (see, for example,
[10], page 129). For a discussion of the origin of the 𝑄 operator, see [9].
In this definition, Prior uses the 2 and 3 operators to mean true at
all worlds and true at some world respectively — that is, they are the Box
and Diamond forms of an S5 modality that nowadays is often called the
universal modality.1 With this noted, it is clear that 𝑄𝑝 says that 𝑝 is both
1The modal logic 𝑆5 is one of simplest and most important modal logics. In terms
of Kripke semantics, S5 can be thought of as the modal logic of models in which every
world is related to every world (that is: models bearing the universal relation).
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possible and maximal: 𝑝 is true somewhere (the 3𝑝 conjunct secures this)
and in addition 𝑝 strictly implies every proposition 𝑞 or its negation;2 this
is secured by the conjunct:
∀𝑞(2(𝑝 → 𝑞)∨2(𝑝 → ¬𝑞)).
Note the crucial role played by the propositional quantifier ∀𝑞.
In the present paper we shall take a closer look at the nominals de-
fined using propositional quantifiers. We shall do so by working with a
basic hybrid language enriched with propositional quantifiers. To spell
this out a little: the language that we definewill contain ordinary propo-
sitional symbols, a single modality 2 (and its dual 3), which we will
interpret universally, plus standard nominals 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 and so on, together
with a satisfaction operator@𝑖, @𝑗, @𝑖 for each nominal;3 these are the syn-
tactic elements of what nowadays is called the basic hybrid language. To
this we shall add propositional quantifiers: for each ordinary proposi-
tional symbol 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟 we shall allow ourselves to form expressions of the
form ∀𝑝𝜑, ∀𝑞𝜑, ∀𝑟𝜑 and so on. Thus in the enriched language we will
have both standard nominals (like 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) and—becausewe have propo-
sitional quantifiers and a universally interpretedmodality—wewill be
able to define Prior’s 𝑄 operator and use it to define a second species of
nominals. Having both in the same object language will make it easier
to explore their similarities and differences.
Now, it is straightforward to extend basic hybrid logical syntax to
cover propositional quantifiers, but the formal semantics brings us face-
to-face with a much-studied choice point: should we simply say that
propositional quantifiers range over all subsets of worlds — that is, all
propositions — in which case we are working with what is called the
standard, or full, or set-theoretic semantics? Or shouldwe view the propo-
sitional quantifiers as ranging over a pre-selected set of subsets of worlds
(usually called the admissible subsets or the admissible propositions)? This
second choice traces back to Leon Henkin’s pioneering work on higher-
order logic in the 1950s, and is often called the general semantics; note
that the standard semantics is the special case of the general semantics
2We say 𝑝 strictly implies 𝑞 iff at every world where 𝑝 is true, 𝑞 is true too; 2(𝑝 → 𝑞)
says precisely this (given that 2 is the universal modality).
3A formula of the form @𝑖𝜑 says that 𝜑 is true at one particular point, namely the
point the standard nominal 𝑖 refers to, and similarly for 𝑗, 𝑘 and so on.
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in which the admissible subsets are all subsets of worlds.
The distinction between the standard and the general semantics is
of direct relevance to Prior’s definition of the 𝑄 operator. As we will
see, under the standard semantics for propositional quantification, 𝑄𝜑
says that the denotation of the formula 𝜑 is a singleton, thus the stan-
dard semantics yields standard nominals.4 However, as we will also
see, under the general semantics for propositional quantification, 𝑄𝜑
says something rather different. As before, 𝑄𝑝 says that 𝑝 is both pos-
sible and maximal, but the sense of maximality has shifted subtly: the
conjunct ∀𝑞(2(𝑝 → 𝑞) ∨ 2(𝑝 → ¬𝑞)) now tells us that 𝑝 strictly implies
every admissible proposition 𝑞 or its negation. Under the general inter-
pretation∀𝑞 only ranges over all admissible propositions, and aswewill
see, this has logical consequences. We will soon dig deeper into these,
but for now let’s highlight the key points we wish to make:
Viewed formally, Prior’s definition of a nominal as 𝑄𝑝 gives rise to
two distinct species of nominals: if we adopt standard semantics,
the nominals obtained are identical to those used today; if we use
the general semantics we obtain something interestingly different.
Moreover, we shall also see that this formally-defined species divi-
sion corresponds rather well with two intuitions about nominals
that can be detected in Prior’s writing: his ‘index’ view and his
‘content’ view.
We shall make these points via a series of four observations — three
technical, one historical. The first is this: the unrestricted universal
instantiation rule (the familiar inference rule that allows us to replace
universal quantifiers by specific instances) says that a universally quan-
tified propositional symbol can be replaced by any formula. As we shall
see, however, the soundness of this rule depends onwhich species of for-
mulawe are allowed to substitute. If we allow a propositional symbol to
be replaced by any formula at all, including standard nominals, then the
rule is not sound with respect to the general semantics. However, the
(unrestricted) universal instantiation rule is sound with respect to the
standard semantics where quantifiers range over all subsets of worlds.
4That is, under the standard semantics, if 𝑄𝜑 is true, then 𝜑 is true at a uniqueworld
(say 𝑤). Here’s another way of saying the same thing: under the standard semantics, if
𝑄𝜑 is true, then the proposition that 𝜑 expresses is {𝑤}, the set of worlds consisting of
only the single world 𝑤 where 𝜑 is true. Either way, this is the semantics for nominals
standardly used in contemporary hybrid logic.
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The second observation is this: if we add a side-condition to the uni-
versal instantiation rule stating that the only formulas which can be sub-
stituted for propositional symbols are those not containing nominals as
atomic formulas, then the rule becomes sound with respect to the gen-
eral semantics.
The third observation is this: if we do not want to restrict which for-
mulas are substitutable when using this rule, but we do want to work
with the general semantics, then, to ensure soundness, we should work
with general models satisfying the discreteness property: the domain of
the propositional quantifiers (that is, the collection of admissible propo-
sitions) should contain every singleton set of worlds. That is, if 𝑤 is a
world, then {𝑤} should be an admissible proposition.
These technical observations lead naturally to our fourth — histori-
cal — observation. Prior seems to have thought about nominals in (at
least) two distinct ways, and his two conceptions align neatly with the
species distinction we have drawn. In particular, what we might call
Prior’s ‘index’ view of nominals matches the 𝑄𝑝 definition under the
standard interpretation of propositional quantifiers, but Prior also had
a ‘content’ view, and this fits rather well with the 𝑄𝑝 definition when
viewed via the general interpretation. We note some of the issues in-
volved, and point towards future work, in the paper’s conclusion.
2 Syntax
We first present the syntax of 𝐿BHPQ, the language we shall use in this
paper. As we said above, syntactically 𝐿BHPQ is just the basic hybrid lan-
guage augmented with propositional quantifiers. Let SYM = {𝑝,𝑞,𝑟,…}
be a countably infinite set of propositional symbols andNOM= {𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,…}
be a set of (standard, contemporary) nominals; SYM andNOM are cho-
sen to be disjoint. Then the formulas of 𝐿BHPQ are:
𝜑 ∶∶= 𝑝 | 𝑖 | ¬𝜑 | 𝜑∧𝜑 | 𝜑 | @𝑖𝜑 | ∀𝑝𝜑
where 𝑝 ∈ SYM and 𝑖 ∈ NOM. Other Boolean connectives are defined
in the standard way, and 3𝜑 and ∃𝑝𝜑 are defined as ¬¬𝜑 and ¬∀𝑝¬𝜑
respectively. Note that standard nominals can appear in two syntacti-
cally distinct ways: if 𝑖 appears as a subscript to @, then we say it occurs
in operator position and if it occurs as an atomic symbol, then we say it
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occurs in formula position.
This is simple syntax, but we need to be careful. The propositional
quantifiers bind the propositional symbols, and the symbols they bind
mark positions that are available for substitution by other formulas. As
the distinctions we wish to draw will be reflected by restrictions on
which symbols can and cannot legitimately be substituted into these po-
sitions, we need to be precise here. As a first step, we draw the usual
distinction between free and bound symbols. For example, in
∀𝑝∀𝑞(𝑞 → 2(3𝑞 ∨𝑝))
there are two propositional symbols (𝑝 and 𝑞) but all occurrences of
either symbol are bound (either by ∀𝑝 or by ∀𝑞). On the other hand, in
∀𝑝∀𝑞(𝑞 → 2(3𝑟 ∨𝑝))
wealso have a freepropositional symbol (namely 𝑟), a symbol not bound
by any quantifier. We shall write FS(𝜑) to denote the free propositional
symbols that a formula 𝜑 contains— thus to return to our two examples,
we have that
FS(∀𝑝∀𝑞(𝑞 → 2(3𝑞 ∨𝑝))) = {} and FS(∀𝑝∀𝑞(𝑞 → 2(3𝑟 ∨𝑝))) = {𝑟}.
The idea should now be clear; we inductively define FS(𝜑) as follows:
Definition 1. The set of free propositional symbols in a formula 𝜑 is de-
noted FS(𝜑) and is defined by:
• for any 𝑝 ∈ SYM, FS(𝑝) = {𝑝}
• for any 𝑖 ∈ NOM, FS(𝑖) = {}
• FS(¬𝜑) = FS(𝜑)
• FS(𝜑∧𝜓) = FS(𝜑)∪FS(𝜓)
• FS(𝜑) = FS(𝜑)
• FS(@𝑖𝜑) = FS(𝜑)
• FS(∀𝑝𝜑) = FS(𝜑)−{𝑝}
There is another (slightly trickier) syntactic definition we shall need
in what follows: the result of substituting a formula 𝜓 for free occur-
rences of a propositional symbol 𝑞 in a formula 𝜑, which we shall write
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as 𝜑[𝜓/𝑞]. First, why do we need this concept? Because it is a funda-
mental deductive operation for the propositional quantifiers. Here is
the intuition. A formula of the form ∀𝑞𝜑 is a claim that for any proposi-
tion 𝑞, 𝜑 holds. Thus, given any formula 𝜓 —after all, formulas express
propositions! — we should be able to discard the ∀𝑞 in front of the 𝜑,
substitute 𝜓 for the newly-freed occurrences of 𝑞 in 𝜑, thereby deducing
𝜑[𝜓/𝑞]. Here’s a simple example: given
∀𝑞∀𝑝(𝑞 ∧¬𝑝)
then we should be able to throw away the ∀𝑞 and substitute 𝜓 for the
newly-freed occurrence of 𝑞 resulting in
∀𝑝(𝜓 ∧¬𝑝).
In essence, all we are saying is that the rule of universal instantiation is
a legitimate deductive rule for propositional quantifiers.
Well — the basic intuition is certainly correct, but much of this pa-
per is about exploring its nuances. For a start, just as in classical logic
we need to beware of accidental binding ruining the process. Consider
another example. Once again, suppose we are given
∀𝑞∀𝑝(𝑞 ∧¬𝑝)
but that this time we substitute 𝑝 for the newly-freed 𝑞 resulting in
∀𝑝(𝑝 ∧¬𝑝).
This cannot be right — the substituted symbol 𝑝 has been ‘accidentally
captured’ by ∀𝑝. We have changed the meaning — a free slot in the
formula has become a bound slot—and (evenworse)we havemanaged
to convert the formula to one that is guaranteed to be false!
But there is a standard remedy: the following inductive definition
pins down the safe substitutions that we will use when we define the
rule of universal instantiation in Section 5:
Definition 2. The formula 𝜓 is free for 𝑞 in 𝜑 if and only if
• 𝜑 = 𝑝 for some 𝑝 ∈ SYM
• 𝜑 = 𝑖 for some 𝑖 ∈ NOM
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• 𝜑 = 𝜒∧𝜎 and 𝜓 is free for 𝑞 in 𝜒 and in 𝜎
• 𝜑 = 𝜒 and 𝜓 is free for 𝑞 in 𝜒
• 𝜑 = @𝑖𝜒 and 𝜓 is free for 𝑞 in 𝜒
• 𝜑 = ∀𝑟𝜒, 𝜓 is free for 𝑞 in 𝜒 and if 𝑞 ∈ FS(𝜒), then 𝑟 ∉ FS(𝜓)
Note the crucial role played by the last clause in ruling out accidental
binding. Spelling it out, this says that if wewant to substitute 𝜓 for 𝑞 in 𝜒
then (i)𝜓 has to be free for 𝑞 in𝜒 as in the previous clauses, and (ii) if the
substitution really can be carried out (that is, if 𝑞 ∈ FS(𝜒), so there really
is an open 𝑞-slot to substitute into) then 𝑟 must not be free in 𝜓, since
it will be grabbed and bound by ∀𝑟. As usual, however, by changing
bound variables appropriately we can always bypass such problems. To
return to our example: if instead of (foolishly) insisting on substituting
𝑝 for the newly-freed 𝑞 in ∀𝑝(𝑞∧¬𝑝) wehad first changed this formula to
(say) the formula ∀𝑠(𝑞∧¬𝑠), which says exactly the same thing, thenwe
would obtain a correct result: ∀𝑠(𝑝 ∧ ¬𝑠). In short, the basic syntactical
properties of 𝐿BHPQ are much like those familiar from first-order logic.
3 Semantics
Now for the semantics — and this brings us face-to-face with a funda-
mental divide: the chasm separating first- and second-order logic. As
propositional quantification is a form of second-order quantification,
this chasm is directly relevant to our discussion, so let’s begin with a
little background.
At first glance, the first-order/second-order divide isn’t obviously
dangerous. Compare the following two arguments:
All logicians are mortal All logicians are humble
Arthur is a logician Arthur is all a logician is
Therefore Arthur is mortal Therefore Arthur is humble
Here they are in first-order and second-order notation:
∀𝑥(𝐿𝑥 → 𝑀𝑥) ∀𝑥(𝐿𝑥 → 𝐻𝑥)
𝐿𝑎 ∀𝑃 (∀𝑥(𝐿𝑥 → 𝑃𝑥) → 𝑃𝑎)
∴ 𝑀𝑎 ∴ 𝐻𝑎
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The left is first-order notation: quantifiers only bind symbols in term
position: ∀𝑥(𝐿𝑥 → 𝑀𝑥). The right is second-order notation: quantifiers
can bind predicate positions: ∀𝑃 (∀𝑥(𝐿𝑥 → 𝑃 𝑥) → 𝑃 𝑎). This distinction
looks rather trivial syntactically — but semantically it leads to a vast
increase in expressive power and a vast decrease in logical tractability. For
example, second-order logic is not axiomatisable and lacks many other
properties (such as compactness) that make first-order logic technically
attractive; see Chapter 4 of [7] for a short and clear exposition.
But there is an elegant cure: in 1950 Leon Henkin showed us how to
‘tame’ second-order (and, more generally, higher-order) logic; see [11].
His basic insight was simple: instead of interpreting second-order (or
higher-order) quantifiers as ranging across all subsets of the domain of
quantification, view them as ranging across a pre-selected set of admis-
sible subsets. As he showed, if these subsets satisfied certain intuitive
constraints, natural completeness results could be proved.5
Now, propositional quantification is a form of second-order quan-
tification: after all, in Kripke semantics, propositions are interpreted as
sets of possibleworlds or times— thus, viewed standardly, our innocent
looking formulas ∀𝑝𝜑 are attempting something potentially dangerous,
namely to quantify across all subsets of these entities! And indeed, in
1972, S. K. Thomason showed that the danger was not merely potential
but actual: he proved a frame incompleteness result for Priorean tense
logic; see [12].6 Fortunately, Thomason simultaneously showed that a
Henkin-style second-order logic-taming approach could be applied to
modal logic, and this gave rise to what is now called the general frame
semantics for modal logic, which we shall use here.7
5One way of looking at Henkin’s ideas and results is to say that he showed how to
reduce higher-order logic to (sorted) first-order logic by working with deliberately pre-
structured models rather than with the menu of pre-packaged models automatically
provided by set theory.
6Thomason’s results were stated in terms of frame validity (that is: via universal
propositional quantification in the meta-language) rather than for an object-language
containing propositional quantifiers, but the danger is the same, as is the cure.
7General frame approaches to modal semantics are nowadays a fundamental item
in the toolbox of modal logic; see pages 28–31 and pages 303–318 of [3] for a detailed in-
troduction; general semantics is intimately linked to the algebraic semantics for modal
logic. Moreover, the fact that simple propositional modal and tense logics offer a vast
amount of second-order expressive power when it comes to pinning down frame struc-
ture has been a central topic in modal logic since 1972; much of Chapter 3 of [3] is
devoted to this second-order perspective, which was first systematically explored by
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Definition 3. A general frame is a triple ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π⟩ where 𝑊 is a non-
empty set (worlds), 𝑅 is a binary relation on 𝑊 (the accessibility re-
lation) and Π is a non-empty collection of subsets of 𝑊 (the admissible
subsets) closed under the following operations:
• relative complement: if 𝑋 ∈ Π, then 𝑊 −𝑋 ∈ Π
• intersection: if 𝑋,𝑌 ∈ Π, then 𝑋 ∩𝑌 ∈ Π
• modal projection: if 𝑋 ∈ Π, then {𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ∶ ∀𝑣(𝑤𝑅𝑣 → 𝑣 ∈ 𝑋)} ∈ Π
The intuition here is that propositions are sets of possible worlds. In
the special case of a general frame with Π = 𝒫(𝑊) — that is, when all
possible subsets of the set of possible worlds are propositions — then
we say we have a standard general frame (or more simply: a standard
frame).8 However (and this is the key Henkin insight that Thomason
put to work) we do not need to work with all possible subsets, just
with collections of subsets of worlds with ‘enough logical structure’.
This is what the three conditions achieve: relative complement gives
us the structure needed to cope with negated propositions, intersection
gives us the structure needed to copewith conjunctive propositions, and
modal projection gives us what is required to cope with modalities (for
further motivation and discussion, we refer the reader to [3], particu-
larly pages 28–31).
Now for the definition of a general model: the interpretation of the
standard nominals will be taken care of by a naming function 𝑁 assign-
ing a world to each standard nominal, while the interpretation of the
propositional symbols will be given by a valuation function 𝑉 :
Definition 4. A general model 𝔐 based on a general frame ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π⟩
is a tuple ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π,𝑁,𝑉 ⟩ where 𝑁 ∶ NOM → 𝑊 and 𝑉 ∶ SYM → Π. The
Johan van Benthem in his PhD thesis, later published as [1].
8Standard frames are often called full frames to emphasize that Π contains all ele-
ments of 𝒫(𝑊). Incidentally, later in the paper we will discuss discrete general frames
and atomic general frames; we will usually keep it simple and just call them discrete
frames and atomic frames.
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truth conditions are as follows:
𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ 𝑝 iff 𝑤 ∈ 𝑉 (𝑝) where 𝑝 ∈ SYM
𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ 𝑖 iff 𝑤 = 𝑁(𝑖)
𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ ¬𝜑 iff it is not the case that 𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑
𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑∧𝜓 iff 𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑 and 𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜓
𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑 iff for all 𝑣 ∈ 𝑊 such that 𝑤𝑅𝑣,we have 𝔐,𝑣 ⊧ 𝜑
𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ @𝑖𝜑 iff 𝔐,𝑁(𝑖) ⊧ 𝜑
𝔐,𝑤 ⊧ ∀𝑝𝜑 iff for all 𝔐′ = ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π,𝑁,𝑉 ′⟩such that 𝑉 ′(𝑞) = 𝑉 (𝑞)
whenever 𝑞 ≠ 𝑝, we have 𝔐′,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑
Note how the last clause works: 𝑉 ′ is essentially a way of ‘trying out’
the effect of every admissible proposition in the newly-freed 𝑝-slot (and
note that it only changes what is assigned to the 𝑝-slot; that is what the
restriction 𝑉 ′(𝑞) = 𝑉 (𝑞) whenever 𝑞 ≠ 𝑝 secures). That is: we are able to
‘try out’ every admissible choice for 𝑝 from Π, and only if they all lead
to truth do we conclude that ∀𝑝𝜑 itself is true.
Apart from occasional side remarks, in what follows we shall con-
fine our attention to universally related general frames, that is, to gen-
eral frames ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π⟩ where 𝑅 = 𝑊 × 𝑊 . Thus we are assuming that
every world is related to every other world (and itself). This is because,
as mentioned earlier, Prior interprets 2 and 3 universally in his defini-
tion of 𝑄. We will say that a formula 𝜑 is a general validity on a general
(universally related) frame ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π⟩ iff for any model ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π,𝑁,𝑉 ⟩
and any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 we have that ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π,𝑁,𝑉 ⟩,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑, and we will say it is
a general validity iff it is valid on all such frames. Similarly, we will say
that a formula 𝜑 is a standard validity on a standard (universally related)
frame ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π⟩ iff for any model ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π,𝑁,𝑉 ⟩ and any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 we
have that ⟨𝑊,𝑅,Π,𝑁,𝑉 ⟩,𝑤 ⊧ 𝜑, and we will say it is a standard validity
iff it is valid on all such frames.
4 Fine's formula
In a pioneering paper onmodal logic with propositional quantifiers [8],
Kit Fine drew attention to the following formula:
(∗) ∃𝑝(𝑝 ∧∀𝑞(𝑞 → (𝑝 → 𝑞))).
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Why is it interesting here? Well — because (1) it is a standard validity,
(2) it is not a general validity, (3) it is a general validity on any general
frame satisfying the discreteness property mentioned earlier, (4) is also
generally valid on any general frame satisfying an atomicity property
and (5) it is closely related to the formula Prior used to define 𝑄. Let’s
look a little closer at all five claims.
First, it is easy to check that Fine’s formula (*) is true at any world
in any standard model at all (whether universally related or not). To
see this, let 𝑤 be the world of evaluation. Let the outermost existential
quantifier pick out the singleton set {𝑤}; the truth of the formula follows
immediately. As 𝑤 was an arbitrary evaluation point, it follows we can
never falsify this formula on (any) standard model.
Second, Fine’s formula can be falsified on some general models (so it
is not a general validity). Wewon’t prove this, but point the reader to the
second general frame in Example 5.67, page 307 in [3], which falsifies
(*) on a general frame when we interpret 2 and 3 using 𝑊 ×𝑊 .
Third, Fine’s formula is valid on any discrete general frame, that is,
on any general frame where all singleton sets of worlds are admissible
propositions (that is, where for any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 , we have {𝑤} ∈ Π).9 This is
easy to see — just use the argument used in our first observation above.
Fourth — and more interestingly — as Fine points out in his paper,
(*) says that the set of propositionsmust be atomic over the set of worlds;
wewon’t prove this here, butwewill explain the terminology. A general
frame is atomicwhen every 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 belongs to some minimal non-empty
element of Π. Clearly standard frames and discrete frames are atomic—
trivially {𝑤} is the required minimal non-empty element of Π in both!
The more interesting point is that in some atomic frames atoms may con-
tain multiple worlds, and such atomic frames are not discrete.10
9 Obviously any standard frame is discrete — but there are also plenty of discrete
frames that are not standard. This is not so obvious— any discrete non-standard frame
must be infinite. This is because, if we have all singleton sets of a finite set, then we
can generate all of its subsets simply by taking intersections and complements, which
means that finite discrete frames are standard. However if we try to generate all subsets
of an infinite set in this way, we end up with a general frame in which Π contains just
the finite and co-finite sets, rather than all elements of 𝒫(𝑊); see page 30 of [3] for the
relevant definitions.
10So to sum up: STANDARD ⊂ DISCRETE ⊂ ATOMIC. The class of standard frames
is included in the class of discrete frames, which in turn is included in the class of atomic
frames. Both inclusions are proper: there are discrete frames which are not standard
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Lastly, Fine’s formula is reminiscent of the formula Prior used to de-
fine 𝑄𝑝:
(∗∗) 3𝑝 ∧∀𝑞(2(𝑝 → 𝑞)∨2(𝑝 → ¬𝑞))
butwhereas Fine’s formula (*) says that theworld of evaluation belongs
to an atom in Π, Prior’s formula (∗∗) says that the denotation of 𝑝 is
an atom in Π. If we are working with a standard model (or a discrete
model) then condition (∗∗) obviously boils down to the denotation of 𝑝
being a singleton set, which seems to be what Prior often intended 𝑄𝑝
to mean (recall the quotation in the introduction). And in fact, Kit Fine
on pages 339–340 of [8], considers the 𝑄 operator in connection with
the formula
(∗∗∗) ∃𝑝(𝑝 ∧𝑄𝑝).
It is straightforward to show that the formulas (∗∗∗) and (∗) are equiv-
alent in any (universally related) general frame. That is: Fine’s formula
can be defined using Prior’s 𝑄; both say something about atomicity.
5 A tableau system
To make the differences between our two species of nominals concrete,
it will help to have a proof system. There are several we could have used
for this purpose (see [5] for a general introduction to the proof-theory
of hybrid logic) but here we will use a tableau system, as it is easy to
use and the reader can easily find illustrative examples in the literature
(see the Appendix for references).
The basic idea driving the system is this: given a 𝐿BHPQ formula 𝜑
whose validity youwant to establish, choose a nominal 𝑖 that does not oc-
cur in 𝜑 and attempt to build a tableau for ¬@𝑖𝜑. Tableau systems are es-
sentially model building systems, so by starting with the formula ¬@𝑖𝜑
we are asking: is it possible that there is somemodel containing aworld,
which we have arbitrarily called 𝑖, at which 𝜑 is false? We then attempt
to build a tableau for ¬@𝑖𝜑; this is a step-by-step process that uses rules
that directly mimic the semantics of 𝐿BHPQ. During this process, more
andmore information about potential models for ¬@𝑖𝜑 is obtained, and
at some stage it may become clear that no model for ¬@𝑖𝜑 exists (this
(see Footnote 9) and there are also atomic frames which are not discrete (we will see a
simple example in Section 6).
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happens when all the branches on the tableau close, that is, contain con-
tradictory information). When (and if) this happens, we have proved
that the formula 𝜑 was valid after all. In short: the tableau method al-
lows us to prove the validity of 𝐿BHPQ formulas by trying — and failing
— to falsify them at an arbitrary world. This works because the tableau
system is systematic in its search for models. Tableau systems for hy-
brid logic were first introduced in [13] and [2], and the systemwe shall
use here is the second of these systems augmented with rules for the
propositional quantifiers.
The rules for our system are given in the Appendix, and we discuss
some of them there. Here in the main text, however, we shall confine
our discussion to how the new propositional quantifier rules work. The
∀ and ¬∀ rules are shown in Figure 1; let’s discuss each of these in turn.
@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑
@𝑖𝜑[𝜓/𝑝]†
¬@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑
¬@𝑖𝜑[𝑞/𝑝]∗
† : where 𝜓 is free for 𝑝 in 𝜑 and 𝜓 does not contain any standard
nominal in formula position.
∗ : where 𝑞 is a new propositional symbol.
Figure 1: The ∀ and ¬∀ rules
The ¬∀ rule is easily dealt with. Suppose we have the following
piece of information: ¬@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑. This says that it is false at the world
named 𝑖 that ∀𝑝𝜑. But if this is false, then there is some proposition
— let’s call it 𝑞 — which witnesses this falsehood. Thus, throwing away
the quantifier, and substituting the new symbol 𝑞 for the newly-freed oc-
currence of 𝑝, we deduce that it is false at the world named 𝑖 that 𝜑[𝑞/𝑝],
or to put it another way, we deduce ¬@𝑖𝜑[𝑞/𝑝]. The ∗ side-condition on
this rule — which insists that 𝑞 be new — is what ensures that 𝑞 acts as
the desired falsifying witness.
And now for the crucial ∀ rule, the universal instantiation rule. The
basic idea is straightforward: suppose we are given the information
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@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑. This is a universal claim: it says that at the world named 𝑖, ∀𝑝𝜑
is true. Hence we should be able to pick any formula 𝜓, throw away the
∀𝑝, and substitute 𝜓 inside 𝜑. Now, the first part of the † side-condition
deals with an issue we have already discussed: “where 𝜓 is free for 𝑝
in 𝜑” simply prevents accidental symbol binding. But what about the
second part of the restriction † side-condition? This is where the distinc-
tion between the two species of nominals kicks in, and we will discuss
this in the following section.
Before doing so, however, let’s look at a couple of proofs to see how
the tableau systemworks in practice. Wewill prove the propositional Bar-
can formula, that is, ∀𝑝𝜑 → ∀𝑝𝜑, and the converse propositional Barcan
formula, that is, ∀𝑝𝜑 → ∀𝑝𝜑.11 The proofs can be found in Figure 2.
We have placed numbers next to each formula, and markings next to
the arrows for guidance: the markings by the arrows say which rule
was applied to which numbered formula. As you can see, both the ∀
rule and the ¬∀ rule are used in each proof; the other rules used are
all listed in the Appendix. The × : 6,8 at the end of both proofs signals
that each tableau closed because two conflicting formulas were found
(coincidentally, in both proofs these were formulas number 6 and 8).
6 Two observations about universal instantiation
It is time to examine the second part of the side-condition on the univer-
sal instantiation rule, namely the part of † that forbids the substitution of
formulas 𝜓 containing nominals in formula position. Why is this there?
This brings us to the first observation listed at the start of the paper:
Observation 1: If the universal instantiation rule is not restricted
in this way — that is, if we allow a bound propositional symbol
to be replaced by any formula at all, and in particular, by those
containing standard nominals in formula position— then the rule
11These formulas mirror the first-order modal Barcan formula ∀𝑥𝜑 → ∀𝑥𝜑, and
the first-order converse modal Barcan formula ∀𝑥𝜑 → ∀𝑥𝜑. In first-order modal
logic, the Barcan formula says that the domain of quantification cannot get bigger as
one moves from world to world, while the converse Barcan formula says that domains
of quantification cannot shrink. Thus, taken together, they force constant domains of
quantification in first-order modal logic. Thus it should be be no surprise that both
forms are provable for the propositional quantifiers. After all, our propositional quan-
tifiers range over a constant domain in any model, namely the elements of Π.
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¬@𝑖(∀𝑝𝜑 → ∀𝑝𝜑) : 1
@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑 : 2¬@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑 : 3
@𝑖3𝑗 : 4¬@𝑗∀𝑝𝜑 : 5
¬@𝑗𝜑[𝑞/𝑝] : 6
@𝑖𝜑[𝑞/𝑝] : 7
@𝑗𝜑[𝑞/𝑝] : 8
× : 6,8
¬ →: 1
¬: 3
¬∀,[𝑞/𝑝]: 5
∀,[𝑞/𝑝]: 2
: 4,7
¬@𝑖(∀𝑝𝜑 → ∀𝑝𝜑) : 1
@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑: 2¬@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑 : 3
¬@𝑖𝜑[𝑞/𝑝] : 4
@𝑖3𝑗 : 5¬@𝑗𝜑[𝑞/𝑝] : 6
@𝑗∀𝑝𝜑 : 7
@𝑗𝜑[𝑞/𝑝] : 8
× : 6,8
¬ →: 1
¬∀,[𝑞/𝑝]: 3
¬: 4
: 2,5
∀,[𝑞/𝑝]: 7
Figure 2: Two propositional Barcan formulas
is not sound with respect to the general semantics. However, the
(unrestricted) universal instantiation rule is sound with respect to
the standard semantics in which quantifiers range over all subsets
of worlds.
The second part of this observation — that (unrestricted) universal
instantiation is sound with respect to the standard semantics — is both
unsurprising, and easy to check, and we leave this to the reader.12 On
the other hand, that (unrestricted) universal instantiation is not sound
with respect to the general semantics is less clear. But we can see this as
follows. Consider the general frame where 𝑊 = {𝑎,𝑏}, 𝑅 = 𝑊 ×𝑊 and
Π = {∅,𝑊}. It is straightforward to check that Π satisfies the closure
properties: the relative complement and intersection properties are im-
mediate, and as for the modal projection condition, we have that:
{𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ∶ ∀𝑣(𝑤𝑅𝑣 → 𝑣 ∈ 𝑊)} = 𝑊
{𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ∶ ∀𝑣(𝑤𝑅𝑣 → 𝑣 ∈ ∅)} = {𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 ∶ ¬∃𝑣(𝑤𝑅𝑣)} = ∅
12Needless to say, although we say unrestricted universal instantiation, substitutions
that lead to accidental binding are not allowed. We’re really talking about universal
instantiation that is unrestricted — up to obvious syntactic stupidity!
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So: Π has propositional structure and thus we have a genuine general
frame. Now, extend the general frame to a general model by choosing
some valuation 𝑉 , letting 𝑁(𝑖) = 𝑎. Then the formula @𝑖∀𝑞(𝑞 → 2𝑞) is
true: if 𝑉 ′(𝑞) = ∅, then the implication 𝑞 → 2𝑞 is trivially true at 𝑎, and
if 𝑉 ′(𝑞) = 𝑊 , then the implication is true at 𝑎 since 𝑞 is true at both 𝑎
and 𝑏. On the other hand, if the rule ∀ is applied to @𝑖∀𝑞(𝑞 → 2𝑞) with
the substitution [𝑖/𝑞], then the resulting formula @𝑖(𝑖 → 2𝑖) is false at 𝑎
since 𝑖 is not true at 𝑏. So we have falsified an instance of unrestricted
universal instantiation on a general model, and shown that the (unre-
stricted) rule is not sound for the general semantics. Indeed, we have
done something a little stronger. The model just defined is atomic —
note that 𝑊 is a minimal non-empty set for both worlds 𝑎 and 𝑏, thus
𝑊 itself is a (rather unusual!) atom. Thus we have also shown that the
(unrestricted) rule is unsound on the class of atomic general frames.13
We return to this example — it’s a useful one — near the end of the
paper.
But for now, let’s turn to our second observation:
Observation 2: If we add an extra side-condition to the univer-
sal instantiation rule stating that only formulas without standard
nominals in formula position can be substituted for propositional
symbols, then the rule becomes sound with respect to the general
semantics, and gives rise to a sound tableau system for the general
semantics.
This is precisely what the second part of the † side-condition does.
It is straightforward to check that the side-condition yields soundness:
if there are no nominals in formula position, then all formulas are either
propositional symbols or of the form ¬𝜑, 𝜑 ∧ 𝜓, 2𝜑, ∀𝑝𝜑 or @𝑖𝜑. The
denotation of all such formulas (with the exception of those of the form
@𝑖𝜑) are guaranteed to be in Π because of the way valuations are de-
fined and the three properties imposed on Π. What about formulas of
the form @𝑖𝜑? Well — first note that all such formulas are either true
everywhere (that is, have denotation 𝑊), or false everywhere (that is,
have denotation ∅). But both ∅ and 𝑊 are admissible sets in any general
13Incidentally, it’s worth explicitly noting that while this frame is atomic, it is not
discrete, as neither {𝑎} nor {𝑏} is a proposition. Thus this example also shows that the
class inclusion DISCRETE ⊂ ATOMIC is proper, as claimed in Footnote 10.
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model,14 so these are fine too. It is easy to check that the rules listed in
the Appendix are sound, so helped by the † side-condition, we indeed
have a sound proof system for the general semantics.
7 Soundness on discrete general frames
Now, we have just pointed out that the rule for universal instantiation is
not sound on general models without the extra † side-condition. But we
might be tempted to say something like this “Look, standard nominals
just are propositions! We should be able to use them with the universal
instantiation rule — even when working with general models! If their
use is ruled out, we must be missing something interesting!”
Here’s an analogy. We can’t prove 𝐹𝐹𝑝 → 𝐹𝑝 in the minimal Pri-
orean tense logic 𝐾𝑡. This is because 𝐹𝐹𝑝 → 𝐹𝑝 reflects an important
fact about time, namely the transitive nature of its flow. The minimal
tense logic 𝐾𝑡, on the other hand, consists of just the formulas that are
valid when we make no assumptions whatsover about time’s structure.
Kripke semantics is useful precisely because it is good at drawing our
attention to the different ways in which validities arise. The validity of
𝐹𝐹𝑝 → 𝐹𝑝 rests on an intuition about temporal structure; its validity does
not rest on the same kinds of assumption that the validity 𝑝 ∨ ¬𝑝 does,
or the validity of 𝑝 → 𝐺𝑃𝑝 for that matter.
Perhaps we face a similar situation with the (unrestricted) universal
instantiation rule? Perhaps the loss of its soundness on arbitrary gen-
eral frames means we have thrown away too much structure? Standard
models may be overly precise — too much dictated by set theory — but
perhaps arbitrary general frames take us too far in the other direction?
Maybe (unrestricted) universal instantiation is sound on an interesting
class of general frames (not just the standard ones) in much the same
way that 𝐹𝐹𝑝 → 𝐹𝑝 is valid on an interesting class of Kripke models
(the transitive ones) though not on all of them? This brings us to our
third observation:
Observation 3: If we do not want to restrict which formulas are
14Why? Because of the relative complement and intersection closure conditions. For
any 𝑋 ∈ Π, these guarantee that 𝑋 ∩(𝑊 −𝑋) = ∅ is in Π, and thus its complement 𝑊
must be in Π as well.
418
substitutable in the universal instantiation rule, but we do want
to work with the general semantics, then, to ensure soundness, we
should work with discrete general frames.
So: discreteness guarantees the soundness of (unrestricted) univer-
sal instantiation. This is easy to check, and we leave it to the reader.
8 Index versus content
So far, the paper has focussed on observations about propositional quan-
tifiers and universal instantiation. Our fourth and final observation has
a different flavour:
Observation 4: Prior thought about nominals in (at least) two
distinct ways. His two conceptions align rather well with the two
technically defined species of nominals we have been discussing in
this paper. In particular, what we might call Prior’s ‘index’ view of
nominals matches the 𝑄𝑝 definition under the standard interpreta-
tion of propositional quantifiers, whereas his ‘content’ view seems
to fit well with the 𝑄𝑝 definition under the general interpretation.
This quotation from “Tense Logic and the Logic of Earlier and Later”
(see [10], page 124) expresses both conceptions in a single sentence:
We might … equate the instant 𝑎 with a conjunction of all
those propositionswhichwould ordinarily be said to be true
at that instant, or we might equate it with some proposition
whichwould ordinarily be said to be true at that instant only,
and so could serve as an index of it.
The second option here is strikingly close— identical? —to the standard
contemporary interpretation: nominals are labels, uniquely true at one
world or time andhence able to “serve as an index of it”. It seems close in
spirit to the quotation given at the start of the paper; recall in particular
the words “For ‘𝑝 is an individual’ (or an instant, or a possible total
world-state) we write 𝑄𝑝”, which emphasizes individuating something
— whether it be a person, aworld, or a time—using a single proposition.
This is the essence of what the standard interpretation gives us.
The first part of the sentence, on the other hand, takes us in another
direction: it identifies nominals as the conjunction of all the propositions
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that would (ordinarily) be taken to be true at an instant. That is: instead
of individuating entities of interest using a single labelling proposition,
it attempts to identify them via their content — it holds together “all
those propositions which would ordinarily be said to be true” at that
world, time or individual. In the quotation just given, Prior suggests
conjunction as the way of holding all this information together, but it
is clear that often infinite conjunctions will be needed, thus it is natu-
ral to think of content in terms of sets of relevant propositions instead.
But this, of course, is precisely what we do when we work with general
frames. We select those subsets of worlds — those propositions — that
we think are of interest. So the general semantics framework gives us a
natural way of thinking about Prior’s content view of nominals: under
this conception they seem to be sets of “all those propositions which
would ordinarily be said to be true”, and thus 𝑄𝑝 read in this way can
be thought of identifyingworlds, times and individuals via descriptions,
via content.
We have seen in this paper that the distinction that Prior appears
to be drawing points towards an issue that is interesting both techni-
cally and conceptually: Should we view propositional quantifiers as ranging
over ‘what is normally said to be true’ or should we view them as ranging
over ‘indexes’ as well? As we have seen, there is a genuine choice here.
On the one hand, we might want to dissolve this distinction. As we re-
marked above, we might be tempted to say “Look, standard nominals
just are propositions! We should be able to use them with the univer-
sal instantiation rule — even when working with general models!”. On
the other hand, we might want to insist that propositional quantifiers
should not range over indexes (that is, standard nominals) only over
ordinary propositions. We might say: indexes enable us to draw dis-
tinctions arbitrarily. Labelling is useful, but the symbols (standard nom-
inals) that express them are not something normally said to be true and
so should not count as propositions. They add something extra, some-
thing more abstract.
To make this more concrete, let us return once again to the general
frame 𝑊 = {𝑎,𝑏}, 𝑅 = 𝑊 × 𝑊 and Π = {∅,𝑊}. Recall that we used
this to show that the (unrestricted) rule was not sound for the general
semantics — but we also remarked that although it is not discrete, it is
atomic, as 𝑊 = {𝑎,𝑏} is a minimal proposition containing both 𝑎 and 𝑏.
So 𝑊 is a (pretty weird!) atom. Now, choose some propositional sym-
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bol, say 𝑝. In this general frame, there are only two ways to interpret
it: as 𝑊 or as ∅. Suppose we interpret it as 𝑊 . Then is is easy to check
that at both worlds 𝑎 and 𝑏, 𝑄𝑝 is true. So we have created a ‘nominal’,
namely 𝑝, that ‘names two worlds’! This makes absolutely no sense un-
der the ‘index’ interpretation, but it makes perfect sense under the ‘con-
tent’ interpretation. It is clear that we simply can’t distinguish the two
worlds on the basis of admissible propositions, that is, on the basis of
‘what is normally said to be true’. On the other hand, we certainly can
distinguish them if we have access to standard nominals — we can slice
𝑊 apart with their help! — but is this stepping outside the bounds of
‘normal truth’?
We will make no attempt to decide this issue here — in this paper
we merely wished to note some interesting technical, conceptual and
historical issues that deserve further exploration. On the technical side,
we havemany questions concerning completeness and expressivity, and
we hope to soon provide proof systems that can be adapted to the var-
ious classes of general frames of interest (not just universally related
frames). On the conceptual side, we would like to have a clearer pic-
ture of the interplay of the ‘index’ and ‘content’ views of nominals in
the work of Prior. It is not clear to us how firmly he drew this distinc-
tion, or exactly what role it played for him at various stages of his work;
but there are interesting philosophical issues at play here. It would also
be interesting to know what Arthur Prior knew about Henkin’s work
on higher-order logic. The Henkin approach to second-order logic pro-
vides a natural setting for exploring Priorean themes related to propo-
sitional quantification, and it would be nice to know how much impact
such ideas had on his own work.
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Appendix: A tableau system for ℒBHPQ
This Appendix lists the tableau rules for ℒBHPQ. Figure 3 shows the
rules for each primitive connective, operator and quantifier: for eachwe
have a pair of rules, one governing the primitive symbol itself, the other
governing its negation. We refer to these rules in the obvious way: for
example, the two rules for conjunction are the ∧ and the ¬∧ rules. Note
that each rule specifies an inference that can be drawn with respect to a
named world: the main premiss in each rule is labelled with either @𝑖
or ¬@𝑖. The crucial † side-condition on the ∀𝑝-rule is discussed in detail
in the main text.
The rules Ref, Sym and Nom are shown in Figure 4. These rules gov-
ern world equality. The Ref rule tells us that if we have already encoun-
tered a nominal 𝑖 somewhere in the proof so far, thenwe are free to infer
that @𝑖𝑖 (that is: the nominal 𝑖 is true at the world named 𝑖). The Sym
rule expresses an informational symmetry: given the information that
@𝑖𝑗 (that is: at the world named 𝑖, the nominal 𝑗 is true), we are free
to flip the nominals in operator and formula position and infer that @𝑗𝑖
(that is: at the world named 𝑗, the nominal 𝑗 is true). Finally, the Nom
rules tells us that if we know that at the world named 𝑖 the nominal 𝑗
is true, and we also know that at the world named 𝑗 the proposition 𝜑
is true, then we can infer that at the world named 𝑖 the proposition 𝜑 is
true too.
The Bridge rule in Figure 4 relates worlds. Note its form: it mirrors
the Nom inference, but for accessible worlds. This time, from the infor-
mation that nominal 𝑗 is true at some world accessible from the world
named 𝑖, together with the information that at the world named 𝑗 the
proposition 𝜑 is true, then we can infer that at the world named 𝑖 the
proposition 3𝜑 is true.
To complete the picture, Figure 6 contains the rules for four com-
monly use defined operators/connectives: ∨, →, 3 and ∃.
It only remains to add one more rule, namely the rule required to
deal with the universality of 2 and 3. The required rule is simple:
At any stage of the tableau construction process, if 𝑖 and 𝑗 are any
two nominals on a branch, then we are free to add @𝑖¬2¬𝑗 or
@𝑖3𝑗 to the same branch.
This rule simply reflects the fact that, because 𝑅 is universal, then no
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@𝑖¬𝜑
¬@𝑖𝜑
¬@𝑖¬𝜑
@𝑖𝜑
@𝑖(𝜑∧𝜓)
@𝑖𝜑@𝑖𝜓
¬@𝑖(𝜑∧𝜓)
¬@𝑖𝜑 ¬@𝑖𝜓
@𝑖𝜑
@𝑖3𝑘
@𝑘𝜑
¬@𝑖𝜑
@𝑖3𝑗∗¬@𝑗𝜑
@𝑖@𝑗𝜑
@𝑗𝜑
¬@𝑖@𝑗𝜑
¬@𝑗𝜑
@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑
@𝑖𝜑[𝜓/𝑝]†
¬@𝑖∀𝑝𝜑
¬@𝑖𝜑[𝑞/𝑝]∗
∗ where 𝑗 is a new standard nominal
† where 𝜓 is free for 𝑝 in 𝜑 and 𝜓 does not contain any standard nominal
in formula position
∗ where 𝑞 is a new propositional symbol
Figure 3: Rules for primitive operators and connectives
matter what worlds 𝑖 and 𝑗 name, the 𝑖-world will be related to the 𝑗-
world. For numerous examples of tableau proofs using essentially the
above system (minus the propositional quantifier rules) the reader can
consult [4]. For a deeper look, consult [2].
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Ref
𝑖 occurs on the branch
@𝑖𝑖
Sym
@𝑖𝑗
@𝑗𝑖
Nom
@𝑖𝑗
@𝑗𝜑
@𝑖𝜑
Figure 4: Equating worlds
Bridge
@𝑖3𝑗
@𝑗𝜑
@𝑖3𝜑
Figure 5: Relating worlds
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@𝑖(𝜑∨𝜓)
@𝑖𝜑 @𝑖𝜓
¬@𝑖(𝜑∨𝜓)
¬@𝑖𝜑¬@𝑖𝜓
@𝑖(𝜑 → 𝜓)
¬@𝑖𝜑 @𝑖𝜓
¬@𝑖(𝜑 → 𝜓)
@𝑖𝜑¬@𝑖𝜓
@𝑖3𝜑
@𝑖3𝑗∗@𝑗𝜑
¬@𝑖3𝜑
@𝑖3𝑘
¬@𝑘𝜑
@𝑖∃𝑝
@𝑖𝜑[𝑞/𝑝] ∗∗
¬@𝑖∃𝑝
¬@𝑖𝜑[𝜓/𝑝]†
∗ where 𝑗 is a new standard nominal.
† where 𝜓 is free for 𝑝 in 𝜑 and 𝜓 does not contain any standard nominal
in formula position.
∗∗ where 𝑞 is a new propositional symbol
Figure 6: Rules for defined operators and connectives
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Abstract
In this paper we study the temporal aspect of the decision between two
mutually exclusive alternatives 𝐶 and 𝑁 , where 𝑁 is the default state
and 𝐶 is an offer that is available for an unknown period of time. The
primary example we have in mind, due to Blaise Pascal [1], is when 𝐶
corresponds to the option of becoming a Christian, whereas 𝑁 is short
for not taking this step. It is assumed that the decision maker or agent
bases his decision on his rational belief in whether 𝐶 is true, and his will-
ingness to accept the offer. To this end we take a Bayesian approach [2]
and quantify degrees of belief as posterior probabilities based on prior
beliefs and evidence. [3] Two temporal aspects of the decision are high-
lighted. First, we use Bayesian sequential decision theory in order to give
conditions under which it is preferable to postpone the decision or not.
Second, we specify the way in which the agent is able to influence his de-
cision. To this end, we divide rewards and degrees of belief into the fol-
lowing three components: 1) a foundational part, 2) circumstances, and
3) subjective preferences. Component 1 is identical for all humans, 2 is
individual-specific and only caused by external influences, whereas 3 is
also individual, and caused by internal influences from the agent himself.
We conclude by discussing whether 1-3 have a deeper spiritual meaning
and the connection between component 3 and free will. [4]
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1 Introduction
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662)was a French scientist, inventor, writer, philoso-
pher, and theologian whomade important contributions to a number of
disciplines. Many of Pascal’s theological ideas can be found in Pensées,
a book that appeared in 1669, after his death, based on the scraps of
paper he left behind [1,5-6]. The most well known part of Pensées is
the Wager model [7-8], where Pascal describes the decision to become
a Christian or not as wagering against the truth. The objective of the
decision-maker or agent of the Wager is to choose between Christianity
𝐶 and Non-Christianity 𝑁 . In order to formalize this decision Pascal
uses probabilities to define degrees of beliefs, rewards to quantify pri-
orities, and expected values to combine the rewards when Christianity
and Non-Christianity is true, for each possible choice [1-2,7,9-12].
TheWager model is in fact an early application of statistical decision
theory. A modern version of this theory was developed by Abraham
Wald [13], see also [14]. As pointed out in [3,12], it is preferable to
use the Bayesian version [2] of statistical decision theory for the Wager,
since subjective probabilities are employed in order to assess degrees of
beliefs, and these are gradually updated as more evidence is acquired,
in accordance with Bayes’ Theorem.
In this paper we look at theWagermore broadly as a choice between
two mutually exclusive alternatives; the default state 𝑁 and an offer
𝐶 which is available for an unknown period of time. The task of the
decision maker is to decide if and when to accept 𝐶, using evidence
up to the time point of the decision.[15] We will focus on the temporal
aspect of this decision and frame it as a problem of sequential decision
theory [16-18], in particular the Bayesian version [2,19] of sequential
decision theory.
First, we discuss when the agent should make the decision. This is
a problem of optimal stopping, where the cost of waiting (i.e. the risk
that the offer disappears) is balanced against the benefits of postpon-
ing the decision in order to collect new evidence, and thereby hopefully
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make the decision more informed. In this context we introduce two
decision rules; one look-ahead procedure that makes predictions about
the way in which degrees of beliefs and rewards might change in the
future, and another one which focuses on the present degrees of beliefs
and rewards. In particular, we give conditions, for both procedures, un-
der which the agent delays his or her decision. In this context we also
introduce another kind of evidence, which is only available if the agent
receives 𝐶, and the claimed benefits associated with this offer turn out
to be true. For the decision to become a Christian, this is the kind of
evidence one obtains when God responds to the decision to become a
Christian in terms of a revelation. It gives the agent not only rational
belief, but also belief by heart. We show that the decision to become a
Christian might occur earlier, if the agent predicts that belief by heart
will increase his degree of belief in 𝐶.
Second, we look at the time-dynamics of the decision and decom-
pose degrees of beliefs and rewards into three parts; a foundational com-
ponent implanted from birth, a second component of circumstances,
which is individual and caused by external influences, outside the agent,
and finally a third component of individual preferences, corresponding
to the agent’s free will. In this context we discuss whether the subjec-
tive preferences component is compatible or not with God having fore-
knowledge of our decisions. [4]
Thepaper is organized as follows: In Section 2wedefine the Bayesian
and sequential extension of Pascal’sWager, then in Section 3we address
the problem of when to make the decision, in Section 4 we decompose
the decision process into the abovementioned three components, and
finally, in Section 5 we conclude with a discussion.
2 A Bayesian and Time-Dynamic Extension of Pas-
cal's Wager
DEFINING THE DECISION PROBLEM AND STOPPING TIMES
Consider an agent who chooses between two alternatives 𝑁 and 𝐶. It is
assumed that𝑁 is the default state, whereas𝐶 is an offer that is available
for a limited and unknown period of time 𝑡 = 0,1,…𝐷, where 𝐷 ≤ 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥
is the time point after which the offer disappears, and 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the finite
time horizon. There are some claimed benefits associated with the offer.
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These claimed benefits are either true or false, and the only way for the
agent to find out which, is to receive the offer. That is, in order to receive
the promised benefits the agent must first of all receive the offer, and
secondly the claims associated with the offer have to be true. The task
of the agent is to make a decision 𝑑 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁} based on his prior beliefs
in whether the claimed benefits of the offer are valid (truth=𝐶) or not
(truth=𝑁), and all evidence of relevance for the decision. The problem
can formulated in terms of a stopping time 𝑇 such that the agent either
stops collecting more evidence at time 𝑇 ≤ 𝐷, and then chooses 𝐶 (i.e.
𝑑 = 𝐶), or he does not receive the offer as long as it is available (i.e.
𝑑 = 𝑁), which corresponds to stopping the process at time 𝑇 = 𝐷 + 1.
Since the stopping rule 𝑇 uniquely defines the decision rule, wewill use
these two words interchangeably.
A TIME-DYNAMIC EXTENSION OF PASCAL'S WAGER
As mentioned in Section 1, the main application we have in mind is the
Wager model of Blaise Pascal, where 𝐶 and 𝑁 correspond to Christian-
ity and Non-Christianity respectively, 𝑡 = 0 is the time when the agent
first becomes responsible tomake a decision (the time of moral account-
ability), 𝐷 is the time when the agent dies, 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 is his maximal possible
life length after acquiring moral accountability, whereas 𝑇 is the mo-
ment when the agent either becomes a Christian (𝑇 ≤ 𝐷) or has died
without becoming a Christian (𝑇 = 𝐷 + 1). In particular, a person who
becomes a Christian does not necessarily have a large degree of belief
in Christianity at the time of the decision, although this is typically the
case. It is rather an active step to ask God for forgiveness because of
wrongdoings, acknowledging that Jesus died on Calvary, as a payment
for the sins of humanity, and then resurrected from death. The deci-
sion to become a Christian also includes a commitment to follow Jesus
for the rest of one’s life. The claimed benefits of 𝐶, which are valid if
Christianity is true, is a personal relationship with Jesus and a promise
to spend eternity in heaven with God. On the other hand, becoming a
Christian means living on a myth if 𝐶 is not true, since then the agent
gets no relation with Jesus, neither in this life nor in afterlife (when 𝑁
includes the possibility of afterlife).
Our stopping time approach for the decision to become a Christian
follows [15]. That is, we assume that the decision is a commitment for
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life, whereby the agent stops collectingmore evidence after the decision
for the purpose of altering his own decision. However, the agent may
still collect more evidence after the decision to become a Christian for
other purposes, like doing apologetics or understandingmore about his
own beliefs.
BAYESIAN APPROACH, DEGREES OF BELIEFS AND REWARDS
Denote evidence at time point 𝑡 as 𝑒𝑡, and let 𝐸𝑡 = {𝑒0,…,𝑒𝑡} refer to
all evidence up to time 𝑡. We will use a Bayesian approach to quantify
degrees of beliefs in 𝐶 and 𝑁 at time 𝑡, that is, beliefs in whether the
claimed benefits of the offer are true or not, based on evidence up to
time 𝑡. These degrees of belief are expressed in terms of the conditional
probabilities 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) and 𝑃(𝑁|𝐸𝑡) = 1−𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) of each alternative 𝐶
and 𝑁 , given evidence, also referred to as the posterior probabilities of
𝐶 and 𝑁 . Let 𝑃(𝐶) and 𝑃(𝑁) = 1−𝑃(𝐶) denote the prior probabilities
of 𝐶 and 𝑁 . They reflect the agent’s belief in each alternative before any
evidence has been collected. According to Bayes’ Theorem, we have that
𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) = 𝑃 (𝐶)𝑃(𝐸𝑡|𝐶)/𝑃 (𝐸𝑡) and 𝑃(𝑁|𝐸𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑁)𝑃(𝐸𝑡|𝑁)/𝑃(𝐸𝑡)
respectively. From this it follows that the agent’s degrees of belief at time
𝑡, expressed as his posterior probabilities of 𝐶 and 𝑁 , involves not only
the prior probabilities of 𝐶 and 𝑁 , but also 𝑃(𝐸𝑡|𝑥), his interpretation
of evidence up to time 𝑡, under both alternatives 𝑥 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}.
Consider a time point 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 when the decision has not yet been
made. In order to decide whether or not to accept the offer at time 𝑡
(that is, whether 𝑇 = 𝑡 or 𝑇 > 𝑡), the agent defines the reward table
𝑅𝑡 = {𝑅𝑥𝑦𝑡;𝑥,𝑦 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}} at time 𝑡, where 𝑅𝑥𝑦𝑡 is the reward of choos-
ing 𝑦 at time 𝑡 when 𝑥 is true, for all four combinations 𝑥,𝑦 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}.
The larger 𝑅𝑥𝑦𝑡 is, the more inclined the agent is to act and choose 𝑦
when 𝑥 is true. For the decision to become a Christian, these rewards
quantify whether we want to become Christians or not, and hence they
reflect our goals in life.
Recall that if the agent chooses 𝐶 at time 𝑡, the process stops (𝑑 =
𝐶, 𝑇 = 𝑡), whereas if the agent chooses to hold on to 𝑁 at time 𝑡, it
is still possible for him (if 𝑡 < 𝐷) to choose 𝐶 later on. That is, if the
agent chooses 𝑁 at time 𝑡 and if 𝑡 < 𝐷, the decision is postponed (𝑇 >
𝑡), making it possible for him to continue and look for more evidence.
We will assume that the decision rule is a function of the rewards and
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all known evidence at the time point of the decision. That is, we will
assume that 𝑑 = 𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 ) is a function of evidence up to time 𝑇 and
rewards at time 𝑇 . Equivalently, if 𝑇 = 𝑡, the decision to stop at this time
point makes use of 𝐸𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡.
EXPECTED REWARDS AND VALUE FUNCTIONS
In order to quantify howwell a stopping time𝑇 performsweuse a value-
function. It is defined as the expected reward
𝑉 (𝑇 ) = 𝜀[𝑅𝑋𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 )𝑇 ]
= 𝑃(𝑁)𝜀[𝑅𝑁𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 )𝑇 |𝑁]+𝑃(𝐶)𝜀[𝑅𝐶𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 )𝑇 |𝐶]
(1a)
at the time point 𝑇 of the decision. In equation (1a) we introduced
the random variable 𝑋 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}. This is a random quantity reflect-
ing an agent’s prior belief in which alternative is true, so that 𝑋 equals
𝐶 with probability 𝑃(𝐶) and 𝑁 with probability 𝑃(𝑁). We also intro-
duced 𝜀[⋅] = 𝜀𝑇 [⋅], the expected value of the random quantity within the
squared brackets, when this quantity is evaluated at time 𝑇 . In equation
(1a), this random quantity 𝑅𝑋𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 )𝑇 is the reward at time 𝑇 when 𝑋
is true, based on the agent’s decision 𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 ). In this paper we will
omit time index 𝑇 of an expected value when all known evidence 𝐸𝑇
up to this time point is used for calculating the expected value.
As a preparation for the next section we will rewrite the value func-
tion in (1a). To this end, we introduce the expected rewards of choosing
𝐶 and 𝑁 respectively, conditional on evidence 𝐸𝑡 up to time 𝑡 and the
rewards 𝑅𝑡 at time 𝑡. These expected rewards are defined as
𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝐶) = 𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡 +𝑃 (𝑁|𝐸𝑡)𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑡
and
𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁) = 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡)𝑅𝐶𝑁𝑡 +𝑃 (𝑁|𝐸𝑡)𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑡
respectively. Then we condition on 𝑇 , 𝐸𝑇 , and 𝑅𝑇 in (1a), and rewrite
the value function as an expectation
𝑉 (𝑇 ) = 𝜀[𝐸𝑅𝑇 (𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 ))], (1b)
of the expected reward 𝐸𝑅𝑇 (𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 )) at the time of the decision.
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SUBJECTIVE DEGREES OF BELIEFS AND INTERPRETATION OF
EVIDENCE
We will assume that interpretation of evidence is subjective, so that in-
terpretation 𝑃(𝐸𝑡|𝑥) of evidence up to time 𝑡 varies between individu-
als. It may also happen that the agent modifies his own interpretation
of evidence over time. Suppose for instance that 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1 < 𝑡2. It is possi-
ble then that the agent interprets evidence 𝐸𝑡 up to time 𝑡 differently at
time points 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, so that 𝑃𝑡1(𝐸𝑡|𝑥) ≠ 𝑃𝑡2(𝐸𝑡|𝑥), where 𝑃𝑡1 and 𝑃𝑡2
refer probabilities evaluated at time 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. Due to Bayes’ Theorem,
the agent’s degrees of beliefs will therefore typically change between 𝑡1
and 𝑡2 as well, so that 𝑃𝑡1(𝑥|𝐸𝑡) ≠ 𝑃𝑡2(𝑥|𝐸𝑡). In these formulas, the time
index of a probability iswritten out. Whenever the time index of a condi-
tional probability 𝑃(𝑥|𝐸𝑡) = 𝑃𝑡(𝑥|𝐸𝑡) is omitted, it is tacitly understood
that the probability is evaluated at the time point 𝑡 up towhich evidence
𝐸𝑡 has been registered. Whenever the so called martingale property
𝜀𝑡2 [𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡2)|𝐸𝑡1] = 𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡1) (2)
holds holds for degrees of beliefs 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡), we say that these degrees
of beliefs evolve neutrally (as a martingale) between time points 𝑡1 and
𝑡2. Notice though that (2) fails in general, either because the agent a)
actively gathers new evidence, b) reevaluates old evidence, or c) is ex-
posed to evidence, in a way that either favors 𝐶 or 𝑁 .
3 When to Stop and Make the Decision
OPTIMAL STOPPING
The task of Bayesian sequential decision theory is to find a stopping time
𝑇 that maximizes the value function, defined in equations (1a)-(1b).
Such a stopping time 𝑇 is referred to as an optimal sequential decision
rule [2]. In order to find an optimal sequential decision rule, we have to
find expressions for the value function. This requires a model for how
evidence is interpreted under each alternative 𝐶 and 𝑁 , and how the
rewards change over time. If the reward function is time-invariant
𝑅𝑥𝑦𝑡 = 𝑅𝑥𝑦, 𝑥,𝑦 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}, (3)
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and if interpretation of evidence evolves over time as aMarkov (ormem-
oryless) process, it is possible to maximize (1b) and find the optimal
𝑇 through backward recursion [2,17,20-21]. This is an instance of dy-
namic programming or Bellman recursions, where the optimal deci-
sion, whether to accept the offer or continue looking for more evidence,
is found recursively over time horizons {𝑡,…,𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥}, starting with 𝑡 =
𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 and then working backwards until 𝑡 = 0 and the final solution
for time horizon {0,…,𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥} is reached. Although it might be compli-
cated to solve this backward recursion, it is still a general procedure
for deriving the optimal stopping time 𝑇 . On the other hand, when
(3) is violated and the rewards are time-varying, we get a challenging
time-inconsistent optimal stopping problem ([22,23]), which requires
a model for how rewards evolve over time.
In this paper we will only consider optimal stopping for an ideal-
ized scenario where the agent knows the time point 𝐷 when the offer
𝐶 last appears (Model 1). For the more realistic scenario where 𝐷 is
unknown (Models 2 and 3), we will not look at optimal stopping, but
rather consider two simplified stopping rules.
MODEL 1: OFFER DISAPPEARS AT A KNOWN TIME POINT
The first model is ideal, since it requires knowledge of the time point
𝐷 after which the offer to choose 𝐶 disappears. In order to make use
of this knowledge, we define a stopping rule 𝑇1 which incorporates all
evidence 𝐸𝐷 up to time 𝐷. Equation (1b) suggests that in order tomaxi-
mize the value function we should choose 𝐶 (that is, 𝑇1 = 𝐷) or 𝑁 (that
is, 𝑇1 = 𝐷+1) depending on which of the two expected rewards at time
𝐷 is the largest. This so called expectation rule ([7,15]) can be phrased
as
𝐸𝑅𝐷(𝐶) > 𝐸𝑅𝐷(𝑁) ⟹ 𝑇1 = 𝐷, (4a)
and
𝐸𝑅𝐷(𝐶) ≤ 𝐸𝑅𝐷(𝑁) ⟹ 𝑇1 = 𝐷 +1. (4b)
In order to simplify the analysis of this stopping rule, wewill assume
that no new evidence after time 𝐷 is used when calculating expected
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rewards and moreover that the that the rewards of turning down the
offer remain unchanged after the offer disappears,
𝑅𝑥𝑁𝐷 = 𝑅𝑥𝑁,𝐷+1, (5)
regardless of whether the claimed benefits of the offer are true or not
(𝑥 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}). It then follows from (4) and (5) that the quantity inside
the brackets of (1b), for the stopping rule 𝑇1, equals the maximal ex-
pected reward (MER) at time 𝐷, i.e.
𝐸𝑅𝑇1´(𝑑(𝐸𝑇1 ,𝑅𝑇1)) = 𝑀𝐸𝑅𝐷 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐸𝑅𝐷(𝐶),𝐸𝑅𝐷(𝑁)) . (6)
Wemay also express (4) in terms of the reward advantages Δ𝑅𝐶𝐷 =
𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐷 −𝑅𝐶𝑁𝐷 and Δ𝑅𝑁𝐷 = 𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐷 −𝑅𝑁𝐶𝐷 of choosing a true alterna-
tive compared to choosing a false one, at time 𝐷, when 𝐶 and 𝑁 is true
respectively. A little algebra reveals that (4) is equivalent to
𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝐷)Δ𝑅𝐶𝐷 > 𝑃(𝑁|𝐸𝐷)Δ𝑅𝑁𝐷, (7)
so that the agent chooses𝐶 whenever the reward advantage of𝐶, weight-
ed by the degree of belief 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝐷) in 𝐶, exceeds the reward advantage
of 𝑁 , weighted by the degree of belief 𝑃(𝑁|𝐸𝐷) in 𝑁 .
As noted in [3,12], there are three qualitatively different scenarios
for the reward table 𝑅𝐷 at time 𝐷. They correspond to the following
values of the two reward gains:
(i) Δ𝑅𝐶𝐷 > 0, Δ𝑅𝑁𝐷 ≤ 0: The agent is better off with 𝐶 regardless
of whether 𝐶 or 𝑁 is true.
(ii) Δ𝑅𝐶𝐷 > 0, Δ𝑅𝑁𝐷 > 0: The agent prefers a true alternative over a
false one.
(iii) Δ𝑅𝐶𝐷 ≤ 0, Δ𝑅𝑁𝐷 > 0: The agent advocates 𝑁 regardless of
whether 𝐶 or 𝑁 is true.
For the decision to become a Christian, scenario i) favors 𝐶. It may
reflect an attitude of having nothing to lose by becoming a Christian, or
desiring meaning with life. Scenario iii), on the other hand, favors 𝑁 . It
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could be caused by a desire to keep control of life, being afraid of others’
opinions or being self-sufficient, regarding God as a crutch for weak
people to use. Scenario ii) is a somewhatmore neutral attitude of letting
one’s belief in what is true to a larger extent influence the decision.
It follows from (7) that evidence does not influence the decision for
scenarios i) and iii). Indeed, the agent will always choose 𝐶 for scenario
i) and 𝑁 for scenario iii), regardless of evidence. On the other hand,
when both reward differences are positive (scenario ii), evidence does
have an impact. In this case it is possible to rewrite (7) as
𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝐷) > ∆𝑅𝑁𝐷∆𝑅𝐶𝐷+∆𝑅𝑁𝐷 , (8)
so that the agent chooses 𝐶 whenever his degree of belief in 𝐶 exceeds
the right hand side of (8). A special case of scenario ii) is a neutral re-
ward table 𝑅𝐷, whose reward gains Δ𝑅𝐶𝐷 and Δ𝑅𝑁𝐷 are equal and
positive, so that neither 𝐶 nor 𝑁 is favored at time 𝐷. The threshold on
the right of (8) then equals 0.5, and consequently the agent will choose
𝐶 at time 𝐷 whenever he believes that 𝐶 is more likely than 𝑁 , i.e. when
𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝐷) > 0.5. The three reward scenarios i)-iii) are illustrated in Fig-
ure 1 as three quadrants of a coordinate system, where Δ𝑅𝐶𝐷 is plotted
against Δ𝑅𝑁𝐷.
The stopping rule 𝑇1 is such that the decision is postponed as long as
possible, since the agent either chooses 𝑑 = 𝐶 at time 𝐷 or 𝑑 = 𝑁 at time
𝐷+1, making use of all evidence 𝐸𝐷 up to time 𝐷. It is straightforward
to see that 𝑇1 is optimal among all stopping rules that delay the decision
as long as possible, since it maximizes, among such stopping rules, the
expression inside the expectation of the value function (1b). If there is
no cost involved in postponing the decision, one would expect that it is
beneficial to collect as much evidence 𝐸𝐷 as possible before making the
decision, cf. [24]. This wouldmake 𝑇1 optimal among all decision rules.
Proposition 1 gives conditions under which this is indeed true (see Sec-
tion A.1). These conditions include a) that evidence is important for the
decision, corresponding to scenario ii) above, b) that the agent’s inter-
est in making decision increases over time, and finally c) that degrees
of beliefs evolve neutrally (2) over time.
However, if some of the conditions of Proposition 1 fail, it might not
be preferable to delay the decision of choosing 𝑑 = 𝐶, until the time
point 𝐷 when the offer disappears. For instance, condition b) fails if
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Figure 1: The agent’s reward gain ∆𝑅𝐶𝐷 of 𝐶 at time 𝐷 is depicted as a cir-
cle along the vertical axis, whereas his reward gain ∆𝑅𝑁𝐷 of 𝑁 at time 𝐷 is
drawn as a circle along the horizontal axis. The agent will accept the offer
𝐶 if the point (𝑃(𝑁|𝐸𝐷)∆𝑅𝑁𝐷,𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝐷)∆𝑅𝐶𝐷), marked as a filled circle, is
located above the dotted diagonal line of conversion (∆𝑅𝐶𝐷 = ∆𝑅𝑁𝐷). This
filled circle is located somewhere along the line between the two unfilled cir-
cles, depending on the agent’s degree of belief 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝐷) in 𝐶. Evidence will
only impact the decision when both reward gains are positive, corresponding
to scenario ii), since it is only then that the line between the two unfilled cir-
cles will cross the line of conversion. For scenario i), the agent will choose to
receive 𝐶 regardless of evidence, since all parts of the line between the two
unfilled circles are located above the line of conversion, whereas for scenario
iii), the agent will never choose 𝐶, regardless of evidence, since all parts of the
line between the two unfilled circles are located below the line of conversion.
the agent is particularly interested in making the decision early in life.
It might then be better not to postpone the decision, even if 𝐷 is known.
Likewise, condition c) fails if the agent is inclined to choose 𝑑 = 𝐶 early
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in life, but then the strong childhood evidence in favor of 𝐶 diminishes.
It might then be suboptimal to postpone the decision, if the agent’s de-
gree of belief in 𝐶 gets smaller over time and thereby causes the overall
expected reward, at the time of the decision, to decrease.
MODEL 2: OFFER DISAPPEARS AT AN UNKNOWN TIME POINT
Let us turn to the more realistic model where 𝐷 is not known, and give
sufficient conditions for when it is preferable or not to postpone the de-
cision to choose 𝐶. To this end, we will consider two stopping rules 𝑇2
and 𝑇3, where an agent who uses 𝑇2 makes no predictions about the
future, whereas the one who employs 𝑇3 also guesses what might hap-
pen one time point ahead. We will refer to these two stopping times as
decision rules 2 and 3.
Starting with 𝑇2, it is defined as the first time point when the ex-
pected reward of 𝐶 exceeds that of 𝑁 , i.e.
𝑇2 = min(min{𝑡;𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝐶) > 𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁)},𝐷 +1), (9)
interpreting theminimum of an empty set as ∞. Because of (8), wemay
rewrite (9) as
𝑇2 = min(min{𝑡;𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡) > ∆𝑅𝑁𝑡∆𝑅𝐶𝑡+∆𝑅𝑁𝑡 },𝐷 +1), (10)
whenever scenario ii) of Section 3.2 holds. An agent who employs
rule 2 in (9)-(10) makes no predictions about the way in which future
evidence might change his degrees of beliefs. For this reason, 𝑇2 has
a simple form, the first time point when the agent’s degrees of beliefs
𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) in 𝐶 exceeds the threshold Δ𝑅𝑁𝑡/(Δ𝑅𝐶𝑡 +Δ𝑅𝑁𝑡). In particu-
lar, this threshold does not change over time for time-invariant rewards.
The other stopping rule 𝑇3 is such that the agent at each time point
𝑡 ≤ 𝑇3 compares the expected reward 𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝐶) of 𝐶 at time 𝑡 with a pre-
diction 𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1 of the maximal expected reward 𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1 in (6), one
time point ahead. The decision is postponed (𝑇3 > 𝑡) if the predicted
maximal reward exceeds the expected reward of 𝐶 at time 𝑡. Since 𝐷 is
unknown there is a cost involved in postponing the decision; the possi-
bility that the offer is removed between time points 𝑡 and 𝑡+1. We will
assume that the agent knows the probability 𝜇𝑡 = 𝑃(𝐷 = 𝑡|𝐷 ≥ 𝑡) for
this to happen. The predicted maximal reward takes the form
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𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝜇𝑡𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁)+(1−𝜇𝑡)𝜀𝑡(𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1|𝐸𝑡), (11)
where 𝜀𝑡(⋅|𝐸𝑡) is a conditional expectation, given evidence 𝐸𝑡 up to time
𝑡 and rewards 𝑅𝑡 at time 𝑡. It is evaluated based on how the agent pre-
dicts that his degrees of beliefs will change until the next time point.
When the agent looks one time point ahead, from 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1, and evalu-
ates 𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1, he takes into account that with probability 𝜇𝑡 he is forced
to accept 𝑁 , whereas with probability 1 − 𝜇𝑡 it is still possible for him
to choose between 𝑁 and 𝐶. The one-step look ahead rule 𝑇3 can more
compactly be expressed as
𝑇3 = min(min{𝑡;𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝐶) > 𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1},𝐷 +1). (12)
Equation (12) can be generalized to a 𝑘-step look ahead procedure
for any positive integer 𝑘 (see Section 7.4.6 of [2]). For time-consistent
stopping problems, the larger 𝑘 is, the better the 𝑘-step stopping rule
approximates the optimal solution discussed in the previous subsection.
Theorem 1 of Section A.2 deals with a model whose rewards are
time-invariant (3). It gives sufficient conditions underwhich rule 3 post-
pones the decision from time point 𝑡 to 𝑡+1 for a reward function such
that evidence is important (scenario ii). This condition involves the re-
wards, the probability 𝜇𝑡 that the offer to receive 𝐶 is removed between
𝑡 and 𝑡+1, the agent’s degree of belief 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) in 𝐶 at time 𝑡, and finally,
his predicted degree of belief
̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1) = 𝜀𝑡[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1)|𝐸𝑡] (13)
in 𝐶 at time 𝑡 + 1. If the mortality rate 𝜇𝑡 is small, it is more likely that
an agent who uses rule 3 will postpone the decision. This will happen
when ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1) is sufficiently close to 0 or 1, that is, if the agent believes
the decision at time point 𝑡+1 will be more informed. For instance, for
the decision to become a Christian or not, if the agent plans to read the
Bible and/or Richard Dawkin’s “The God Delusion”, if he expects this
will increase his certainty as to whether 𝐶 or 𝑁 is true, and if the risk of
dying before finishing these books is small, he might want to postpone
the decision. But rule 3 may also imply that the agent never postpones
the decision, regardless of the value of ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1). This is the case, for
instance, if the agent would choose 𝐶 at time 𝑡 with rule 2, and if the risk
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𝜇𝑡 of loosing the offer is sufficiently large. The predicted future degree
of belief in 𝐶 is then less relevant, since the risk of loosing the offer is
too high.
The mortality rate 𝜇𝑡 represents a cost of postponing the decision
from time 𝑡 to 𝑡 +1. This cost is accounted for by rule 3, but not by rule
2. When there is no such cost involved (𝜇𝑡 = 0), and rule 2 leads to a
decision for 𝐶 at time 𝑡, the agent will still postpone the decision accord-
ing to rule 3 whenever he believes his certainty about 𝐶 will increase, i.e.
when ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1) ≥ 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡), and possibly also if ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1) is very close
to 0. Notice however that the rewards of Theorem 1 are time-invariant.
If, on the contrary, the agent predicts that his rewards will change in
such a way that his interest in making the decision will decrease in the
future, it might be better not to postpone the decision, even if 𝜇𝑡 = 0 and
even if the agent predicts that his certainty about 𝐶 will increase.
MODEL 3: OFFER DISAPPEARS AT AN UNKNOWN TIME POINT,
AND BELIEF BY HEART IS ACCOUNTED FOR
In this section we will add a twist to the decision problem of Section 2.
Recall that 𝑁 is the default choice, whereas 𝐶 is an offer available at time
𝑡 = 0,…,𝐷, an offer that is associated with some claimed benefits. The
only way for the agent to know for sure whether these claimed benefits
are true or false, is to receive the offer.
Suppose that if the benefits associated with 𝐶 are true and the agent
receives the offer at some time 𝑇 , he will still not get full assurance about
the truthfulness of 𝐶 until after time 𝐷, the last time point at which
the offer to receive 𝐶 is still available. The agent will still, however, get
some partial assurance that the claimed benefits of 𝐶 are true (if they
are indeed true) during the time period 𝑡 ∈ {𝑇 + 1,…,𝐷}. This partial
assurance typically increases over time, although it does not increase to
full assurance until 𝑡 = 𝐷+1. We may picture this as a waiting room, in
which the agent is placed if he accepts 𝐶. Then, if the claimed benefits
of 𝐶 are true, more evidence is available in the waiting room, evidence
that increases his belief in these benefits being true.
For the decision to become a Christian we will interpret this partial
assurance about the truthfulness of 𝐶 as belief by heart. This belief by
heart grows out from a relationship with Jesus, as revealed from God
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through his Holy Spirit, whereas full assurance occurs after deathwhen
the agent meets Jesus face to face (if 𝐶 is true).
We will assume, as in the previous subsection, that 𝐷 is unknown,
but add belief by heart to the model. The resulting framework is re-
ferred to as Model 3. In order to formalize belief by heart, assume that
the agent has chosen to receive 𝐶 at time 𝑇 , and consider a later time
point 𝑡 ∈ {𝑇 + 1,…,𝐷}. We let 𝐸∗𝑇 𝑡 = {𝑒0,…,𝑒𝑇 ,𝑒∗𝑇 +1,…,𝑒∗𝑡} refer to
the evidence at time 𝑡 that is relevant for the decision. The first part
𝑒0,…,𝑒𝑇 of 𝐸∗𝑇 𝑡 represents ordinary evidence up to time 𝑇 . The second
part 𝑒∗𝑇 +1,…,𝑒∗𝑡 of 𝐸∗𝑇 𝑡 corresponds to revealed evidence about the truth-
fulness of 𝐶, if 𝐶 is true, whereas 𝑒∗𝑇 +1,…,𝑒∗𝑡 is empty if 𝐶 is false. Ordi-
nary evidence 𝑒𝑇 +1,…,𝑒𝑡, that arrived after the agent’s decision, is still
available to him, but it is not used in order to influence the decision. It is
rather used in order to strengthen his beliefs in the decision he already
made. In contrast, 𝑒∗𝑇 +1,…,𝑒∗𝑡 is part of the decision that was made at
time 𝑇 , although it arrives later. Therefore, the agent stops seeking new
evidence as part of the decision, after he has chosen 𝐶, although hemay
still have such new evidence revealed to him after the decision.
We will incorporate revealed evidence and belief by heart into deci-
sion rules 2 and 3. Let 𝑇 ∗2 and 𝑇 ∗3 refer to the versions of 𝑇2 and 𝑇3 that
are modified in this way. To this end, we introduce
̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1) = 𝜀𝑡[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1)], (14)
the agent’s prediction at time 𝑡 of his degree of belief in 𝐶 at time 𝑡 + 1,
which adds revealed (but not natural) evidence to the degree of belief
𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) in 𝐶 he has at time 𝑡. The corresponding forecast
𝐸𝑅
∗
𝑡+1(𝐶) = ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1)𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡 +(1− ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1))𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑡 (15)
of the expected reward of 𝐶 at time 𝑡 + 1, incorporates a prediction of
future revealed evidence one time step ahead from 𝑡. Then we modify
decision rule 2 in (9), as
𝑇 ∗2 = min(min{𝑡;𝐸𝑅
∗
𝑡+1(𝐶) > 𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁)},𝐷 +1). (16)
After some calculations, it can be seen that this is equivalent to choosing
𝐶 the first time point when a weighted average of the agent’s degree of
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belief in 𝐶, and his predicted degree of belief in 𝐶 based on revealed
evidence, exceeds a threshold. This threshold is the same as the one
that was used for stopping rule 𝑇2 in (10). In more detail, we rewrite
(16) as
𝑇 ∗2 =min(min{𝑡;𝑤1 ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1)+𝑤2𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) > ∆𝑅𝑁𝑡∆𝑅𝐶𝑡+∆𝑅𝑁𝑡 },𝐷 +1),
with weights 𝑤1 = (𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡 − 𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑡)/(Δ𝑅𝐶𝑡 + Δ𝑅𝑁𝑡) and 𝑤2 = 1 − 𝑤1 re-
spectively. It is reasonable to assume that the agent expects his degree of
belief in 𝐶 to increase because of revealed evidence, i.e. ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1) ≥
𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡). From this it follows that the agent decides for 𝐶 at least as
quickly, according to rule 2, when future revealed evidence is incorpo-
rated in the model, i.e. 𝑇 ∗2 ≤ 𝑇2. Prediction of revealed evidence will
therefore never delay his decision, but sometimes speed it up.
As a next step, we will generalize decision rule 3 in order to incor-
porate a prediction of future revealed evidence. That is, we replace the
stopping rule 𝑇3 in (12) by
𝑇 ∗3 = min(min{𝑡;𝐸𝑅
∗
𝑡+1(𝐶) > 𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1},𝐷 +1). (17)
Theorem 2 of Section A.3 gives sufficient conditions under which
the agent postpones the decision according to rule 3 when revealed ev-
idence is taken into account. Recall that Theorem 1 of Section A.2 an-
alyzes decision rule 3 without revealed evidence. When these two the-
orems are compared, the same patterns as for rule 2 emerges: When
̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1) ≥ 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡), the agent will decide for 𝐶 at least as quickly
according to rule 3, when future revealed evidence is part of the model,
i.e. 𝑇 ∗3 ≤ 𝑇3.
There is some ambiguity though whether predicted revealed evi-
dence should be used in order to modify degrees of belief or whether
it should be part of the reward function. In the latter case, the agent
will regard the prospect of having new revealed evidence as part of the
reward 𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡 of 𝐶 when it is true. For time-invariant rewards (3), it can
easily be seen that instead of replacing 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) by ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1), in the
definitions (16) and (17) of the two decision rules 𝑇 ∗2 and 𝑇 ∗3 , one may
proceed as follows: First, keep a degree of belief 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) in 𝐶 instead
of introducing predicted revealed evidence. Second, change the reward
of choosing 𝐶, when 𝐶 is true, from 𝑅𝐶𝐶 to
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𝑅∗𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝑅𝑁𝐶 +
?̂? (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1)
𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) (𝑅𝐶𝐶 −𝑅𝑁𝐶),
whereas the other three rewards 𝑅𝑁𝑁 , 𝑅𝑁𝐶 , and 𝑅𝐶𝑁 are the same as
for stopping rules 𝑇2 and 𝑇3 in (9) and (12).
4 External and Internal Influences of the Decision
In this section we will focus on the decision to become a Christian, as
outlined in in Section 2, when the time-dynamic extension of Pascal’s
Wager was introduced. We will look more closely into the time dynam-
ics of the decision process, and divide degrees of beliefs and rewards
into three components. The first foundational component of the de-
cision process is implanted from birth, and it is possibly the same for
all humans. The second component of circumstances is individual and
caused by external influences during life. The third component of sub-
jective preferences is also individual, but caused by internal influences,
from the agent himself.
For simplicity, we will only consider the simplest don’t look ahead
rule 𝑇2, as defined in equation (9) of Section 3. Since this decision rule
is formulated solely in terms of 𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝐶) and 𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁), the expected re-
wards of 𝐶 and 𝑁 , it suffices to analyze the time dynamics of these two
quantities. We therefore split the two-dimensional vector
𝐸𝑅𝑡 = (𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁),𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝐶)) = 𝐸𝑅1 +𝐸𝑅2𝑡 +𝐸𝑅3𝑡 (18)
of expected rewards into a foundational component (𝐸𝑅1), which is
constant, independent of time, a time-varying circumstances compo-
nent (𝐸𝑅2𝑡 ), and a time-varying individual preferences component (𝐸𝑅3𝑡 ).
Since 𝑡 = 0 is the time point of the agent’s moral accountability it may
happen that 𝐸𝑅20 and 𝐸𝑅30 differ from (0,0). Indeed, since the founda-
tional component corresponds to the time of birth, 𝐸𝑅20 and 𝐸𝑅30 will
include circumstances faced by the agent and individual preferences
made by the agent up to the time point of moral accountability.
It is not obvious whether the subjective preferences component 𝐸𝑅3𝑡
exists at all. Assuming that God has foreknowledge, the existence of
𝐸𝑅3𝑡 hinges on whether free will is compatible with this assumption or
not [4]. According to the fatalistic view, there is no free will if God has
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foreknowledge. The individual preferences component must then van-
ish (𝐸𝑅3𝑡 = (0,0)) at all time points 𝑡. With some conceptual model of
foreknowledge, on the other hand, it is possible for 𝐸𝑅3𝑡 to be nonzero,
since it is possible then to combine freewill of the agentwith divine fore-
knowledge. The perhaps most well-known model of this kind is Molin-
ism ([4,25]), whereby God first has knowledge of all necessary truths,
such as the laws of logic, then God has middle knowledge of what ev-
ery possible individual would do under any set of circumstances, and fi-
nallyGodhas knowledge (including foreknowledge) of the actualworld
that He creates. In order to illustrate the foundational, circumstances
and subjective preferences components of the decision to become aChris-
tian, we depict in Figure 2 the time dynamics of these three components
for a monozygotic twin pair, Ben and Jerry, of which Ben becomes a
Christian whereas Jerry does not. At some time point 𝑡 = 𝑡1, the twins’
expected rewards of 𝐶 and 𝑁 start to differ. It is assumed in this fig-
ure that this split is due to Ben and Jerry’s different free choices. With
a fatalistic approach, on the other hand, there is no free will. The dif-
ferent trajectories of Ben and Jerry, after the time of split, must then be
explained solely in terms differing circumstances.
In the special case (3) of time-invariant rewards, the two-dimensional
expected reward-vector
𝐸𝑅𝑡 = (𝑅𝑁𝑁 ,𝑅𝑁𝐶)+𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡)(𝑅𝐶𝑁 −𝑅𝑁𝑁 ,𝑅𝐶𝐶 −𝑅𝑁𝐶) (19)
must be located along a one-dimensional line, as illustratedwith a dashed
line in Figure 2 when 𝑅𝑁𝐶 = 𝑅𝐶𝑁 = 0. In particular, if degrees of beliefs
evolve neutrally according to (2), it follows from (19) that
𝜀𝑡2(𝐸𝑅𝑡2 |𝐸𝑡1) = 𝐸𝑅𝑡1 , (20)
for any pair of time points 𝑡1 < 𝑡2. This implies that 𝐸𝑅𝑡 will vary over
time, without any systematic drift. However, as mentioned in Section
2, (20) may fail if the agent a) decides to gather new evidence in a way
that favors 𝐶 or 𝑁 , because of his subjective preferences (free will), b)
reinterprets old evidence in way that favors 𝐶 or 𝑁 because of his sub-
jective preferences (free will), c) is exposed to external circumstances
that favor 𝐶 or 𝑁 (in the former case due to a revelation from God, for
instance).
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Figure 2: Time dynamics of the expected rewards vector 𝐸𝑅𝑡 for the monozy-
gotic twin pair Ben and Jerry, of which Ben becomes a Christian whereas
Jerry does not. Up to time 𝑡1, (i.e. 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1) the components of circumstances
(𝐸𝑅2𝑡 ) and subjective preferences (𝐸𝑅3𝑡 ) are the same for both twins, with
𝐸𝑅3𝑡 = (0,0). After this time point 𝑡1 (i.e. 𝑡 > 𝑡1), the subjective preferences
components (and possibly also circumstances) of Ben and Jerry differ. The
figure therefore presupposes existence of free will. If all rewards remain the
same from the time point of moral accountability (𝑡 = 0) and onwards, and if
𝑅𝑁𝐶 = 𝑅𝐶𝑁 = 0, 𝐸𝑅𝑡 is restricted to the dashed line for all 𝑡 ≥ 0.
5 Discussion
In this paperwe applied sequential Bayesian decision theory to an exten-
sion of Pascal’s Wager, for the decision to become a Christian (𝐶) or not
(𝑁). In particular, we discussed when the decision maker should make
his or her decision. We also divided the temporal variation of degrees
of beliefs and rewards into three parts; a foundational part implanted
from birth, a component of external influences, and a third component
that represents free will.
An important aspect of ourwork is the fact that not only are the prior
degrees of beliefs in 𝐶 and 𝑁 subjective, but (evenmore) interpretation
and collection of evidence, the so called likelihood. This is very different
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from ordinary probability calculus, for which degrees of beliefs evolve
neutrally, as in (2). It seems as if our model, with subjective collection
and interpretation of evidence, is able to capture in a better and more
general way how people actually become Christians. We have empha-
sized that degrees of beliefs may evolve in a non-neutral manner due
to free choices of the decision maker, or due to external influence from
God or some other external agent. In philosophy, epistemic rationality
reflects a desire to believe true things [26, 27]. With this in mind one
may ask whether it is non-rational to gather and interpret evidence in
violation of (2), so that either 𝐶 or 𝑁 is favored. The answer to this
question is not necessarily affirmative. Indeed, degrees of beliefs for
the decision to become a Christian are not formed through repeated de-
signed experiments, as in much of natural science, where neither the
decision maker nor some external agent is supposed to interfere with
the outcomes of the experiments. On the contrary, beliefs are either ac-
quired through a process reminiscent of historical science, where much
of the evidence already exists when the investigation starts, or it is pos-
sibly also revealed from an external agent. Since the task of the decision
maker is to find this relevant evidence, it is inherently difficult to even
define a neutral strategy of how to collect evidence and then interpret
it. In particular, if God exists, it is not irrational to let him influence the
decision, if this might help the decision maker to find the truth.
Our results can be extended in different ways. First, it would be
of interest to find the optimal stopping rule 𝑇 for a simple model with
time invariant rewards and some explicit model for how evidence is dis-
tributed under each alternative 𝐶 and 𝑁 in such a way that degrees of
beliefs evolve neutrally, as in equation (2). Then the decision gets more
informed, on average, when more evidence is collected. Second, one
may define a model for which degrees of beliefs do not evolve neutrally,
for instance by quantifying how free will and external influences vary
over time. A first attempt in this direction was made in Appendix E
of [3] in terms of spiritual awareness variables. These variables deter-
mine how our free will is used in order to interpret evidence. Third, it is
possible to impose a more explicit model for how rewards evolve over
time. Fourth, for the decision to become a Christian it would be possi-
ble to divide Non-Christianity 𝑁 into several components, for instance
𝑁1 = atheist, 𝑁2 = agnostic, and 𝑁3 = seeker, in such a way that the
agent will take different actions (in terms of which evidence to seek) be-
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fore the time point 𝑇 of the decision to become a Christian. Markovian
decision processes [28], stochastic control theory [20], and reinforce-
ment leaning [29] could possibly be used in order to formulate such a
model.
Appendix
A.1 OPTIMALITY OF DECISION RULE 1
In this section we will give conditions under which decision rule 𝑇1 in
(4) is optimal:
Proposition 1. Suppose the reward table at time 𝑡 has the form 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡𝑅,
where 𝑡 → 𝑓𝑡 ≥ 0 is a non-negative and non-decreasing function, whereas 𝑅 =
{𝑅𝑥𝑦} is a time-invariant reward table satisfying 𝑅𝐶𝑁 = 𝑅𝑁𝐶 = 0, 𝑅𝐶𝐶 > 0,
and 𝑅𝑁𝑁 > 0. If also the degrees of beliefs evolve neutrally (2), the stopping
rule 𝑇1 in (4) maximizes the value function 𝑉 (𝑇 ) among all stopping rules
𝑇 ≤ 𝑇1.
Proof. Let 𝑇 ≤ 𝑇1 be an arbitrary stopping rule. It then follows that
𝑉 (𝑇 ) = 𝜀𝑇 [𝑅𝑋𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 )𝑇 ]
= 𝜀𝑇 [𝑓𝑇 𝑅𝑋𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 )]
= 𝜀𝑇 [𝑓𝑇 𝐸𝑅𝑇 (𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 ))|𝐸𝑇 ]
= 𝜀𝑇1 [𝑓𝑇 (𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑇1)𝑅𝐶𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 )
+𝑃(𝑁|𝐸𝑇1)𝑅𝑁𝑑(𝐸𝑇 ,𝑅𝑇 ))|𝐸𝑇1 ]
≤ 𝜀𝑇1 [𝑓𝑇 𝐸𝑅𝑇1(𝑑(𝐸𝑇1 ,𝑅𝑇1))]
= 𝜀𝑇1 [𝑓𝑇 𝑅𝑋𝑑(𝐸𝑇1 ,𝑅𝑇1 )]
≤ 𝜀𝑇1 [𝑓𝑇1𝑅𝑋𝑑(𝐸𝑇1 ,𝑅𝑇1 )]
= 𝑉 (𝑇1),
where in the first step we used the definition (1a) of the value function
for 𝑇 , in the second step we invoked the definition 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡𝑅 of the re-
ward function, in the third stepwe used (1b), in the fourth stepwe used
that degrees of beliefs evolve neutrally (2) between time point 𝑇 and 𝑇1,
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in the fifth step we employed the definition (4) and (6) of stopping rule
𝑇1, in the sixth step we invoked (1b), in the seventh step used the fact
that 𝑓𝑡 is non-decreasing, and in the last stepwe employed the definition
(1a) of the value function for 𝑇1. 2
A.2 WHEN TO CONTINUE SEEKING MORE EVIDENCE ACCORD-
ING TO DECISION RULE 3
In this section wewill analyze the stopping rule 𝑇3, defined in (12), and
give sufficient conditions under which it postpones the decision to ac-
cept𝐶 from timepoint 𝑡 to 𝑡+1. Wewill assume that rewards are time in-
variant (3), and introduce the two functions 𝑓(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑅𝐶𝐶 +(1−𝑝)𝑅𝑁𝐶
and 𝑔(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑁 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑅𝑁𝑁 , both of which depend linearly on the
probability 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1. Notice that 𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝐶) = 𝑓(𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡)), 𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁) =
𝑔(𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡)), and𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡 = ℎ(𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)), whereℎ(𝑝) =max[𝑓(𝑝),𝑔(𝑝)]. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the three functions 𝑓(𝑝), 𝑔(𝑝) and ℎ(𝑝).
Figure 3: The two dotted lines illustrate how the expected rewards
𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝐶) = 𝑓(𝑝) and 𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁) = 𝑔(𝑝) vary with the degree of belief 𝑝 = 𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡)
in 𝐶, when the time-invariant rewards satisfy 𝑅𝐶𝐶 = 2, 𝑅𝑁𝑁 = 1.5, and
𝑅𝑁𝐶 = 𝑅𝐶𝑁 = 0. The solid curve 𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡 = ℎ(𝑝) illustrates how the maximal
expected reward varies with 𝑝.
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The rewards of Figure 3 satisfy
𝑅𝐶𝐶 > 𝑅𝑁𝐶, 𝑅𝑁𝑁 > 𝑅𝐶𝑁 . (21)
Wewill show thatwhen (21) holds, the agent postpones the decision
of accepting 𝐶 when ℎ[ ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1)] exceeds a certain threshold, where
̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1) was defined in (13) as the predicted degree of belief in 𝐶 one
time point ahead. Since ℎ is a decreasing function of 𝑝 for small 𝑝 and
an increasing of 𝑝 for large 𝑝, when (21) is satisfied, the agent will either
postpone his decision according to rule 3 when ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1) is sufficiently
close to 0 or 1, or he might never postpone the decision, regardless of
the value of ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1), whenever the threshold of ℎ[ ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1)] is too
large. The latter scenario happens, for instance, if the degrees of beliefs
𝑃(𝐶|𝐸𝑡) in 𝐶 is high at time 𝑡 and the risk 𝜇𝑡 of loosing the offer 𝐶
between time points 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 is high as well. The following result
makes this more precise:
Theorem 1 Consider a fixed time point 𝑡 ≤ min(𝑇3,𝐷) such that the decision
between𝐶 and𝑁 (according to rule 3) has not been made at earlier time points.
Suppose that the reward function is time invariant (3) and satisfies (21). Then
𝑇3 > 𝑡 holds whenever
ℎ[ ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1)] ≥ 𝑓[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)]
+{𝑓[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)]−𝑔[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)]} ⋅𝜇𝑡/(1−𝜇𝑡).
(22)
Proof. We need to prove that (22) is a sufficient condition for 𝑇3 > 𝑡 to
hold. From the definition of 𝑇3 in (12), this is equivalent to showing
that equation (22) implies
𝑓[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)] = 𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝐶) ≤ 𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1. (23)
But this follows, since
𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝜇𝑡𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁)+(1−𝜇𝑡)𝜀𝑡[ℎ(𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1))]
≥ 𝜇𝑡𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁)+(1−𝜇𝑡)ℎ[𝜀𝑡[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1)]]
= 𝜇𝑡𝑔[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)]+(1−𝜇𝑡)ℎ[ ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1)]
≥ 𝑓[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)],
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where in the second step we used the convexity of ℎ and Jensen’s
Inequality, in the third stepwe inserted the definition (13) of ̂𝑃 (𝐶𝑡|𝐸𝑡+1),
and in the last step we invoked (22). 2
A.3 IMPACT OF BELIEF BY HEART ON DECISION RULE 3
In this section we will analyze how decision rule 3 is impacted when
belief by heart is taken into account. This corresponds to the stopping
rule 𝑇 ∗3 of Section 3. Our result belowwill parallel Theorem 1, but when
studying 𝑇 ∗3 we also have to incorporate the agent’s predicted degree
of belief ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1) in 𝐶, due to revealed evidence, as defined in (14).
When comparing 𝑇3 with 𝑇 ∗3 , that is, comparing rule 3without andwith
revealed evidence, it turns out that more is required to postpone the de-
cision of accepting 𝐶, for the model with revealed evidence, whenever
̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1) ≥ 𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡). This is specified in the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Consider a fixed time point 𝑡 ≤ min(𝑇 ∗3 ,𝐷) such that the decision
between 𝐶 and 𝑁 has not been made at earlier time points, according to rule
3. Suppose the reward function is time invariant (3) and satisfies (21). Then
𝑇 ∗3 > 𝑡 holds whenever
ℎ[ ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1)] ≥ 𝑓[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)]
+ {𝑓[ ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1)]−𝑓[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)]}/(1−𝜇𝑡)
+ {𝑓[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)]−𝑔[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)]} ⋅𝜇𝑡/(1−𝜇𝑡).
(24)
Proof. We need to verify that (24) is a sufficient condition for 𝑇 ∗3 > 𝑡,
which is equivalent to showing that (24) implies
𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1 ≥ 𝐸𝑅
∗
𝑡+1(𝐶) = 𝑓[ ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1)], (25)
where 𝑓(𝑝) is the linear function introduced in Section A.2. As in the
proof of Theorem 1 we also make use of the other two functions 𝑔(𝑝)
and ℎ(𝑝) defined in Section A.2, and notice that
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𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝜇𝑡𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁)+(1−𝜇𝑡)𝜀𝑡[ℎ(𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1))]
≥ 𝜇𝑡𝐸𝑅𝑡(𝑁)+(1−𝜇𝑡)ℎ[𝜀𝑡[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1)]
= 𝜇𝑡𝑔[𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡)]+(1−𝜇𝑡)ℎ[ ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸𝑡+1)]
≥ 𝑓[ ̂𝑃 (𝐶|𝐸∗𝑡,𝑡+1)],
where in the second step we used Jensen’s Inequality, since is ℎ(𝑝) is
convex, and in the last step we invoked (24). Hence (25) is proved. 2
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Abstract
Would you have read the first sentence of this paper if some Brazilian
butterfly had had an extra nectar for breakfast? According to orthodox se-
mantics youwould. Yet, compelling arguments suggest that youwouldn’t.
In this paper I argue that you both would and wouldn’t. That is, I argue
that the question is ambiguous. The inherent counterfactual may express
either an irrelevant semifactual or a traditional counterfactual and these
two kinds of factuals ought no to be treated alike semantically.
Keywords: Morgenbesser’s coin, counterfactuals, irrelevant semifactu-
als.
1 Introduction
You’ve just read the first sentence of this paper. Would you have read
it if some butterfly in Brazil had had an extra nectar for breakfast? You
— and most other sensible people — probably think you would. True,
small digressions to the actual course of events may bring about more
widespread and dramatic changes.1 So, lots of thingsmay be affected by
1As witnessed by the so-called butterfly effects.
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that extra nectar intake. But not everything. Lots of other things would
remain unaffected — including the fact that you just read the first sen-
tence of this paper.2 However, this trivial observation apparently has
very dramatic consequences. For instance, it apparently implies that
you would have read the sentence no matter what — even if someone
had offered you $ 1.000.000 not to do so.
In this paper I offer a solution to this unpleasant dilemma (§3). First,
however, I will elaborate on the intuitions underlying each horn. Thus,
in (§1) it is explained why you would have read the sentence even if our
butterfly had an extra breakfast, and then in (§2) why it follows that
you would have read it no matter what.
2 Why you would
Why, then, is it that you would have read the initial sentence of this
paper even if some Brazilian butterfly had had a bit more nectar? As
hinted at above, the intuitive answer is that the behavior of the butterfly
does not influence your reading in any relevant way. Your reading —
and a whole lot of other things, for that matter —would still have taken
place if the butterfly had feasted. As they would if the butterfly had
not feasted. The eating habits of the butterfly is simply irrelevant to your
reading.
In a slightly more technical parlour, let ‘irrelevant semifactuals’ be
counterfactuals with true consequents (hence semifactuals) where the
antecedent is irrelevant to the truth of the consequent (hence irrelevant
semifactuals). Suppose 𝐶 is true and 𝐴 is completely unrelated and
hence irrelevant to the truth of 𝐶. Then, we may reason, that when
we consider the truth of the irrelevant semifactuals 𝐴 > 𝐶 and ¬𝐴 > 𝐶,
we consider the antecedent but hold fixed asmuch as possible about the
rest of theworld (to stay as close as possible to the actual world). (Kvart
1986, p.44). Since, by hypothesis, 𝐶is unrelated to 𝐴, the assumption of
𝐴 or ¬𝐴 will not change anything with respect to 𝐶. Hence, if 𝐶is true
in the actual world, 𝐶 is also true in the closest 𝐴-worlds, and also in the
closest ¬𝐴-worlds. Thus, if 𝐴 is irrelevant to some true 𝐶, this ensures
2If you are sceptic, feel free to tighten up the time index for the consequent until
you feel confident (the butterfly had the extra nectar 14 min/3 min/7 sec prior to your
reading).
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the truth of both (𝐴 > 𝐶) and (¬𝐴 > 𝐶).3
In support of this line of thinking, we may cite the example of Mor-
genbesser’s coin (from Slote 1978). Someone tosses an indeterministic
coin and, while the coin is in mid-air, offers you good odds that it will
land heads. You refuse, and the coin lands heads. It is now intuitively
true that
(1) If you had bet heads, you would have won
And (1) owes its truth to the following irrelevant semifactual:
(2) If you had bet heads, the coin would still have landed heads.
The idea is, again, that the antecedent (your betting) is irrelevant
to the de facto true consequent (the coin landing heads), and so, the
semifactual (2) should be evaluated as true. So should
(3) If you had not bet heads, the coin would still have landed heads,
as your betting behaviour does not influence the trajectory of the coin.
In short, semifactuals with irrelevant antecedents are always true:
(4) (𝐶 ∧(𝐴 is irrelevant to 𝐶)) → (𝐴 > 𝐶)4
In particular, if you did in fact read the first sentence of this paper,
and the eating habits of some Brazilian butterfly is irrelevant to your
reading, then you would have read the first sentence if that Brazilian
butterfly had had an extra breakfast.
3 Why you would not
The key intuitionwhy youwould have read the first sentence despite the
butterfly’s feasting is thus captured in the claim that irrelevant semifac-
tuals are always true, that is (4). But now consider the question: what
3Cf. standard possible world semantics for counterfactuals. The same line of reason-
ing is easily adapted to a semantics modelled on branching time framework as the one
developed by Jacek Wawer and Leszek Wro´nski.
4The first conjunct in the antecedent ensures that 𝐴 > 𝐶 is a semifactual, and the
second conjunct, that it is an irrelevant semifactual. And the consequent then affirms
its truth.
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does it mean, in (4), that ‘ 𝐴 is irrelevant to C’? One very natural way of
characterisingwhat it is for 𝐴 to be irrelevantto the truth of 𝐶 is captured
in the claim that the occurrence ofA is causally independent of the occur-
rence of 𝐶. In Schaffer (2004), Edgington (2004) and Bennett (2003, pp.
234-37) ideas very similar to this are proposed, where ‘irrelevance’ is
understood as causal independence in this sense. Schaffer furthermore
suggests that the relevant notion of causal dependence is spelled out in
the manner proposed by Lewis (1986):
(5) 𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐶 𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝐴 > 𝐶)∧(¬𝐴 > ¬𝐶)
If ‘relevance’ is interpreted as causal dependence in this Lewisian
sense, irrelevance should be expressed as the negation of (5):
(6) ¬((𝐴 > 𝐶)∧(¬𝐴 > ¬𝐶))) → (𝐴 > 𝐶)
And (4) can then be rephrased as:
(4 *) (𝐶 ∧¬((𝐴 > 𝐶)∧(¬𝐴 > ¬𝐶))) → (𝐴 > 𝐶)
However, (4*) entailsStrengthenedConjunctionConditionalization (SCC):
(5) 𝐶 → (𝐴 > 𝐶)
Proof :5
(1) (𝐶 ∧¬((𝐴 > 𝐶))∧(¬𝐴 > ¬𝐶))) → (𝐴 > 𝐶) A 1
(2) 𝐶 ∧¬(𝐴 > 𝐶) A 2
(3) 𝐶 2∧𝐸 2
(4) ¬(𝐴 > 𝐶) 2∧𝐸 2
(5) (𝐴 > 𝐶)∧(¬𝐴 > ¬𝐶) 𝐴 5
(6) 𝐴 > 𝐶 5∧𝐸 5
(7) (𝐴 > 𝐶)∧(¬𝐴 > ¬𝐶) 4,6∧ 𝑙 2,5
(8) ¬((𝐴 > 𝐶)∧(¬𝐴 > ¬𝐶)) 5,7¬𝑙 2
(9) 𝐶 ∧¬((𝐴 > 𝐶)∧(¬𝐴 > ¬𝐶) 3,8∧ 𝑙 2
(10) 𝐴 > 𝐶 1,9 → 𝐸 1,2
5Extracted from Gundersen, L. B. and E. B. Gundersen (2018). ”Conjunction Condi-
tionalization and Irrelevant Semifactuals.” Thought-a Journal of Philosophy 7(4): 284-295.
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(11) (𝐴 > 𝐶)∧¬(𝐴 > 𝐶) 4,10∧ 𝑙 1,2
(12) ¬(𝐶 ∧¬(𝐴 > 𝐶)) 2,11¬𝑙 1
(13) 𝐶 𝐴 13
(14) ¬(𝐴 > 𝐶) 𝐴 14
(15) 𝐶 ∧¬(𝐴 > 𝐶) 13,14∧ 𝑙 13,14
(16) (𝐶 ∧¬(𝐴 > 𝐶))∧¬(𝐶 ∧¬(𝐴 > 𝐶)) 12,15∧ 𝑙 1,13,14
(17) ¬¬(𝐴 > 𝐶) 14,16¬𝑙 1,13
(18) 𝐴 > 𝐶 17¬𝐸 1,13
(19) 𝐶 → (𝐴 > 𝐶) 13,18 → 𝑙 1
Hence, if ‘irrelevance’ is interpreted as causal independence, endorse-
ment of (4) amounts to an oblique endorsement of 𝑆𝐶𝐶.
𝑆𝐶𝐶 is highly implausible6 and adopting it nearly collapses the en-
tire semantics for counterfactuals to the truth-functional semantics char-
acterizing thematerial conditional; counterfactualswith true consequents
and counterfactuals with false consequent and true antecedent will all
receive the same truth value as their material cousins do.
Therefore, given that 𝐶 as matter of fact is the case, according to
𝑆𝐶𝐶, 𝐶 would have been the case no matter what. For instance, given
that you did read the first sentence of this paper, it is now correct to say
that you would have read it no matter what. Apart from a somehow de-
terministic flavor, this claim faces youwith the pragmatic glitch that you
would have read the first sentence even if you were offered 1.000.000$
not to do so.
These considerations put (4*)—and thus (4)—under a fair amount
of pressure.7 But (4) is, recall, the driving thought behind the intuitions
6And besides, SCC threatens — like Conditional Conditionalisation ((𝐴 ∧ 𝐶) → (𝐴 >
𝐶)) does — to render counterfactuals infelicitous for their numerous theoretical tasks
in conditional theories of knowledge, disposition, minds, aesthetics ... and whatnot.
See Gundersen, L. (2002). ”In Defence of the Conditional Account of Dispositions.”
Synthese 130: 389-411.
, Gundersen, L. (2010). ”Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Anal-
ysis.” Erkenntnis 72(3): 353-364.
and Gundersen, L. (2019). Counterfactuals, Causal Independence and Determinism,
In: Blackburn, P., Hasle, P. and Øhrstrøm, P. (2019) Logic and Philosophy of Time:
Further Themes from Prior, Aalborg University Press.
7Actually, they come very close to a knockdown argument against (4). It should
be mentioned, though, that they presuppose i) that causal independence is the right
reading of ‘irrelevant’ and ii) that the Lewesian account of counterfactual dependence
— what remains the most widely accepted account — is also correct.
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that you would have read the sentence, if the butterfly had feasted (§1).
Hence, giving up (4) now seems to imply that you wouldn’t — after all
— have read that sentence, if the butterfly had had an extra nectar.
4 Why you both would and wouldn’t
There is, in fact, a clear sense in which it is false that you would have
read the sentence, if the butterfly had feasted. To see this, consider:
(7) If I had told you a joke, I would have done something illegal.
(7) is clearly false (in most countries). It is false because there is
no relevant connection between antecedent and consequent — telling a
joke does not in any way enhance the risk of criminal behavior. How-
ever, we could argue, as we did in (§1), that since the consequent is as
a matter of fact true (due to a snappy parking) and since the truth of
the antecedent would have done nothing by way of changing that fact,
I would still have done something illegal, if I had told you a joke:
(7 *) If I had told you a joke, I would still have done something illegal.
The same seems to be true of the pair:
(8) If some Brazilian butterfly had had an extra nectar for breakfast,
you would have read the first sentence of this paper, and
(8 *) If some Brazilian butterfly had had an extra nectar for breakfast,
you would still have read the first sentence of this paper.
In §1 we argued from the apparent truth of counterfactuals such as
(7*) and (8*) to the truth of (7) ad (8). And in §2 we then argued from
the apparent falsehood of (7) and (8) to the falsehood of (7*) and (8*).
But maybe the correct lesson to draw from these cases is rather to grant
the truth of (7*) and (8*) but then to point out that these irrelevant semi-
factuals differ in content from (7) and (8). In particular, the truth of
(8) and (9) does not follow from the truth of (7*) and (8*). Counter-
factuals and semifactuals represents two asymmetrical modes of think-
ing; insisting that they are equivalent, apt to be treated in a semanti-
cally identical way, is counterintuitive. Counterfactuals such as (7) and
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(8) affirm a counterfactual dependence between antecedent and conse-
quent whereas the corresponding semifactuals (7*) and (8*) somehow
cast doubt on the counterfactual dependence between the antecedent
and the negated consequent. They suggest that the antecedent would
not have prevented the consequent.
Similar thoughts have been aired by other philosophers of modality
such as Goodman with the explicit proposal that:
(8) 𝐴 > 𝐶 ↔ ¬(𝐴 > ¬𝐶)
where ‘𝐴’> 𝐶’ is the semifactual, (Goodman 1954) pp. 5-6.8 In the
same spirit, Pollock (1976) has proposed that counterfactuals have two
distinct sets of truth conditions; one where there is a counterfactual de-
pendence between antecedent and consequent and one where there is a
lack of such a dependence. Pollock does, though, subsumes both sets
of conditions under one unifying (disjunctive) semantics, but it would
be much more natural, as suggested above, to base two distinct seman-
tics, one on each set, such that counterfactuals and semifactuals each
are assigned their own distinctive semantics.9
In any case, the counterfactual 𝐴 > 𝐶 is not inferable from the semi-
factual 𝐴 > 𝐶. In particular, the truth of (8) and (9) does not follow
from the truth of (8*) and (9*) and so the solution to our conundrum
appears to be that you both would and wouldn’t have read the initial
sentence of this paper. Youwould in the sense of (8*); but youwouldn’t
in the sense of (8).
5 Conclusion
By way of conclusion, you would have read this last sentence in any
case.
8One difficulty with this particular proposal is that 𝐴 > 𝐶 then is given the same
semantical treatment as might counterfactuals; which appears implausible under the
assumption of interdefinability between might- and would counterfactuals.
9Such a division also seems to be obligatory for any probability based semantics
since only the former, counterfactual dependence, can be modelled probabilistically. See
eg. Leitgeb (2012), Gundersen (2004) and Gundersen & Olesen (2018).
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